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<HR SIZE="2"><P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="7" FACE="Palatino">
Chapter 12
</FONT></P><HR SIZE="2">
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="6" FACE="Palatino">
The Results of the Cologne Summit
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">
Minister of Defense of Luxembourg Alex Bodry
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">
<B>FRAMING THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY</B>
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
<FONT COLOR="#000000" FACE="Palatino" SIZE="7">F</FONT>ollowing closely on the heels of the NATO Washington Summit, the European
 Union&#146;s Cologne Summit, and the enforcement of the Amsterdam Treaty, the
 XVI<FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" FACE="Palatino" SIZE="2"></FONT><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" FACE="Palatino" SIZE="1"><SUP>th</SUP></FONT><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" FACE="Palatino" SIZE="2"> NATO Workshop on Political-Military Decision Making fits perfectly
 into the process envisaged by the Euro-Atlantic community for framing the
 European Security and Defense Identity. In addition to the Workshop, this
 process has also been enriched by the Saint-Malo Declaration, the WEU&#146;s
 Bremen Ministerial Meeting, and by two meetings in which EU Defense Ministers
 met with colleagues from European countries that are not members of the
 Union.</FONT>
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
Through these events, the first pieces of the &#147;grand design&#148; for framing
 the European identity have been put on the board&#151;in an orderly, transparent,
 and consensual way that has resulted from constructive cooperation among
 the nations concerned.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
The full design will not be completed for some time&#151;the Cologne Summit
 estimated the end of the year 2000. But though much institutional and operational
 work is yet to be done, the political momentum reached in the first six
 months of 1999 should be fully explored and exploited.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">
<B>THE WEU PERSPECTIVE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION POSITION</B>
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
I have been asked to speak on the subject of ESDI, or, more precisely,
 on the planned European Common Security and Defense Policy as seen through
 the eyes of the incoming Luxembourg President of the Western European Union.
 I shall of course indicate some of the main topics of our program, but
 they will not be my main focus here. Rather, I shall address the results
 of the recent Cologne Summit since the bulk of the Western European Union&#146;s
 future up to the year 2000 has been determined by previous decisions made
 by the European Union and, indirectly by the Alliance, particularly at
 its Washington Summit. I would like to make two points in that regard.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">
<B>The WEU Perspective</B>
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
First, the Berlin and Brussels decisions on eventually allowing the use
 of NATO assets for European-led operations were made with the assumption
 that the Western European Union would implement the process. This understanding
 was enhanced on the European side by the Amsterdam Treaty provisions stipulating
 that the WEU was to provide the EU with access to operational capabilities.
 The Western European Union has always understood that one of its core functions
 is to act as a bridge between the European Union and NATO. The Alliance
 and the WEU have devoted much energy over the last years to this very function,
 and have made considerable progress.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
As you all know, the Washington Summit made this bridging function superfluous.
 The Alliance has decided to directly cooperate with the European Union.
 The mechanisms that now exist for consultation, cooperation, and transparency
 between NATO and the WEU are to be built upon consultation, cooperation,
 and transparency between the Alliance and the EU. One of the major tasks
 of our incoming Presidency is to make further progress in that area.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
In regard to this new, direct relationship, the Washington Declaration
 explicitly includes the possibility of EU access (but no further WEU access)
 to Allied means for EU-led operations. It states that we are &#147;ready to
 define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European
 Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations
 in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance.&#148;
 These new developments between NATO and the European Union preclude us
 from speaking on ESDI matters from a WEU perspective alone.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">
<B></B><B>The European Union Position</B>
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
My second point also encourages our adoption of a larger and more integrated
 perspective than the perspective of the WEU alone. It is based on the Amsterdam
 Treaty itself and on the new decisionmaking power that the heads of states
 and governments have acquired to define the principles, general guidelines,
 and common strategies for the Union&#146;s Common Foreign and Security Policy.
 The treaty states that the European Council is competent to define the
 policy to be carried out by the WEU.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
Any attempt to distinguish between a WEU and an EU approach to a Common
 European Security and Defense Policy would be most artificial and, above
 all, not in keeping with the political facts of life. This is underlined
 in paragraphs of Article 17 of the Amsterdam Treaty that provide for the
 possibility of framing in a progressive way a common defense policy that
 might lead to a common defense &#147;should the European Council so decide,&#148;
 and that also provide for the possibility of the integration of the WEU
 into the Union &#147;should the European Council so decide.&#148; The Vienna and
 Cologne Summits also confirmed that major decisions are to be made first
 by the EU and endorsed later by the WEU. The task of the Luxembourg Presidency
 of the WEU regarding ESDI will therefore be operational rather than conceptual
 and political.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
With that in mind, you will understand why I want to speak on ESDI from
 a Cologne point of view rather than from a Bremen one; in NATO language,
 they are neither separable nor separate any longer. However I would first
 like to make a general remark regarding the concept of defense.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
Under the Maastricht Treaty, the concept of defense within the context
 of European institutions was somewhat confused. This state of affairs certainly
 contributed during the second half of this decade to suspicion between
 Europeans and some Allies as to what the concept really involved and the
 outcome that was intended. It also halted European progress in the defense
 realm.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
With the Amsterdam Treaty, the situation became clearer, encouraging breakthroughs
 in Saint-Malo, Washington, and Cologne. Article 17 of the Amsterdam Treaty
 clearly restricts issues of common defense policy to &#147;humanitarian and
 rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis
 management, including peacemaking.&#148; It is under this conceptual framework
 that the Cologne Summit developed its new reflections and decisions pertaining
 to the strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defense.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">
<B>THE COLOGNE SUMMIT AND THE STRENGTHENING OF THE COMMON EUROPEAN POLICY
 ON SECURITY AND DEFENSE</B>
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
One of the EU&#146;s decisions was to position itself not only as a commercial
 and an economic power, but also as a major political player. To that end,
 it demonstrated in Cologne an enhanced political resolve to play its full
 role on the international stage. The Summit gave the European Union the
 means and capabilities it needs to assume its responsibilities to strengthen
 the Common Foreign and Security Policy and to render it more credible.
 The Summit did not make decisions regarding collective defense.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
As it works on developing the CFSP, the EU will also strive to develop
 its diplomatic and economic policies and intervention possibilities through
 robust operational capabilities. To do so, the Council must be able to
 make and implement decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and
 crisis management tasks, the so-called Petersberg tasks, defined in the
 Amsterdam Treaty. It should also be able to ensure political control and
 the strategic direction of EU-led Petersberg operations.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
To that end, the EU will need situational-analysis capability, intelligence
 sources, and the ability to perform relevant strategic planning. In order
 to carry out the decisionmaking process, the Union may also need to:
</FONT></P>
<UL>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
Hold regular (or ad hoc) meetings of the General Affairs Council that include
 Defense Ministers as appropriate
</FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
Establish a permanent body in Brussels that consists of representatives
 who have political-military experience, i.e., a Political/Security Committee
</FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
Form an EU Military Committee that consists of military representatives
 who make recommendations to the permanent body
</FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
Create an EU military staff with a Situation Center
</FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
Develop other resources as needed, for instance, a Satellite Center.
</FONT></LI>
</UL>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
Despite their need, the Cologne Summit did not establish an institutional
 framework to develop these committees and resources. The Summit limited
 itself to requiring the General Affairs Council to prepare the modalities
 for incorporating into the EU the WEU functions the EU will need to fulfill
 its new responsibilities regarding the Petersberg tasks, which should be
 done by the end of the year 2000. At that point, the European Council stated,
 &#147; &#133; the WEU as an organization would have completed its purpose.&#148;
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
The Cologne Summit also discussed the fact that member-states need to develop
 additional forces (including headquarters) that are suited to crisis management
 operations, and to do so without unnecessary duplication. The main characteristics
 of these forces would be deployability, sustainability, interoperability,
 flexibility, and mobility.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
The Cologne Summit also came to one main conclusion, which I would like
 to strongly underline: &#147;For the effective implementation of EU-led operations,
 the European Union will have to determine, according to the requirements
 of the case, whether it will conduct EU-led operations using NATO assets
 and capabilities, or EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets
 and capabilities.&quot;
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
It also issued guidelines as to the use of national or multinational means
 in cases of &#147;autonomous&#148; operations, but I will not comment on these. More
 important to discuss, in the context of our panel, are the precise policy
 principles for EU-led operations that will have recourse to NATO assets
 and capabilities, including European command arrangements. These cover:
 the implementation of the Berlin and Washington decisions; assured EU access
 to NATO planning capabilities that are able to contribute to military planning
 for EU-led operations; the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified
 NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
In this context, the Cologne Summit also addressed some of the problems
 that have resulted from the differences in memberships and status among
 the members of the Alliance, the European Union, and the Western European
 Union as they relate to the successful creation of a European Policy on
 Security and Defense. Some of these issues are:
</FONT></P>
<UL>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
The possibility of all EU member-states, including non-Allied members,
 to participate fully and on an equal footing in EU operations
</FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
Satisfactory arrangements for European NATO members that are not EU member-states
 to be fully involved in EU-led operations, building on existing consultation
 arrangements within WEU
</FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
Arrangements to ensure that all participants in an EU-led operation will
 have equal rights during the operation, while adhering to EU&#146;s decision-making
 autonomy, notably the right to discuss and decide matters of principle
 and policy.
</FONT></LI>
</UL>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">
<B></B><B>CONCLUDING REMARKS</B>
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
Let me add a last word concerning our upcoming WEU Presidency. Security
 cannot allow a vacuum. Therefore, the Western European Union must remain
 fully operational until its crisis prevention and management mechanisms
 are transferred to the Union. As I have already indicated, WEU-NATO relations
 must be continued as long as there is still the need to do so. After the
 current President&#146;s task of &#147;auditing&#148; the WEU&#146;s capacities in that area,
 we will focus the &#147;audit&#148; on national and multinational forces, and, we
 hope, lead the Permanent Council to determine necessary future changes.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino">
All future Presidents will have to keep the WEU&#146;s house in order as long
 as it stands. They will have to continue the duty of handing over to the
 European Union a valid and valuable defense legacy. While the European
 Union has no &#147;defense culture&#146; and no experience nor expertise in that
 area, the following WEU Presidents will have to see to it that, at the
 moment of hand-over, the European Union does not have to start from scratch
 in the defense field. Relations between the WEU and NATO might well prove
 the most valuable treasure of the inheritance.
</FONT></P>
<P>

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