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<TITLE>NATO Mil. Comm. Chairman Gen. Klaus Naumann's Speech to 1998 NATO Workshop, Vienna, Austria</TITLE>
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<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="6" FACE="Palatino">NATO—A
Military Perspective</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="4" FACE="Palatino">General
Klaus Naumann</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="4" FACE="Palatino">Chairman
of the NATO Military Committee</FONT> </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">The setting
for this 15th NATO Workshop is particularly apropos because many of the
topics to be addressed relate to the building of a new European security
architecture. Such discussions, of course, are very reminiscent of
discussions held in Vienna over 180 years ago during the Vienna Congress.
At that time, all of Europe was saying that the Congress dances but
it does not move. Fortunately for us, NATO does not dance, but it
does move a lot. </FONT> </P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><B>FOUR
KEY RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES FACING NATO</B> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Let me start
my address by listing four key risks and uncertainties that I believe will
condition NATO’s transformation as it prepares itself for the
challenges of the next century. The first is the residual risk
emanating from Russia as it struggles with its enormous societal,
ideological, and economic transformation. While we know neither the
duration nor the outcome of this struggle, we intend to cooperate and work
on security issues with, not against, Russia. It is not necessarily
a reassuring sign that former Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Jasov, a man
who was involved in the attempted coup d’état, was appointed
to a top position in the Russian Defense Ministry, but I leave that
decision to the politicians. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">The second
key risk is that posed by the various unresolved disputes within Europe—ethnic,
religious, and territorial—with the Balkans as the most visible
example. There is no need to echo what SACEUR said concerning
Bosnia-Herzegovina, but we should never forget that what we have achieved
there is the absence of hostilities, not peace. There is still quite
a way to go to bring about reconciliation and self-sustaining stability.
Operation Joint Forge, which started in mid-June, is our
contribution to this effort. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">I would be
remiss if I did not mention Kosovo in a discussion of unresolved disputes
in Europe. The points I would like to make are: </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">1. Kosovo
is not Bosnia—the lessons learned in Bosnia-Herzegovina are not
necessarily applicable in Kosovo. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">2. Heavy-handed,
violent suppression of civilians cannot be tolerated. When this type
of suppression occurs, the conflict becomes internationalized. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">3. Kosovans
are not angels either, and they should refrain from increasing the
violence. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">4. Former
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) leadership has maneuvered the issue into a
dead-end street. These leaders should see this and, before it is too
late, reverse course. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">5. NATO
nations seek a peaceful solution, but they have the military capability to
act very quickly if needed. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">The third
risk to NATO is the instability that exists along the periphery of Europe,
from Morocco to the Indian Ocean to Central Asia. Tied to this
instability is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery means, such as missiles. While nuclear weapons concern me,
I am even more concerned about the extent to which our societies are
vulnerable to the “poor man’s nukes,” namely, biological
weapons. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">The fourth
key risk is made up of the so-called new risks or new causes for conflict,
including mass migrations, scarcity of water, and new forms of conflicts.
New forms of conflict include attacks on societies by international
criminals employing military means, and using information technology to
disrupt fragile financial, telecommunication, or energy distribution
infrastructures. </FONT> </P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><B>ADDRESSING
THE RISKS</B> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Given the
range of the four risks I have just described, I am led to three
deductions. First, one cannot expect any one nation, even the only
remaining superpower, to address singlehandedly all the diverse and
transnational dangers of the 21st century. Therefore, we still need
NATO, since NATO links the U.S.’s global power to the regional
capabilities of the European Allies. The range of risks and
uncertainties requires a coordinated, multi-national, and
multi-institutional response. NATO can provide that, since it is the
bedrock of security and stability in Europe. But to promote its
objective of lasting peace and stability for the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO
must continue to develop and enhance cooperative and effective
relationships with non-NATO nations and with other international,
especially European, security- and stability-related institutions. This
is in the strategic interest of all our nations, NATO and non-NATO alike.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">My second
deduction is that crises and conflicts will continue to be complex and
multifaceted and involve multiple agencies. Interventions will
require military forces to work closely with non-governmental
organizations and other non-state actors to make effective use of force
multipliers such as psychological operations and civil-military
cooperation, and to contribute to solutions that have linked political,
socioeconomic, and security dimensions. Moreover, we will have to
intervene in conflicts in post-modern, modern, and pre-modern societies,
each with its own forms of conflict. And we will have to intervene
in a world in which war continues to be alive and well. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">My final
deduction is that crises and conflicts may flare up with little or no
notice and, if they have deeply rooted ethnic origins, they will require
long-term intervention. Also, the longer intervention is delayed,
the worse the situation will become, making any eventual deployment even
more problematic. And once in theater, the very real need for an
extended solution, and thus a continued military presence, will run
counter to the desire of most coalition member-nations to repatriate their
forces as soon as possible. The Alliance must have reaction forces
and the means of rapidly deploying them to deal effectively with such
eventualities, but NATO must also have the capability to sustain the
effort. More important, however, NATO must increase its
understanding of crisis management in a multipolar world full of
multifaceted risks. It must also realize that crisis management will
require coordination with other organizations and, above all, pro-active
approaches that will not be easy to reconcile with bottom-up consensus
building by 16, let alone 19. Admittedly this is a political issue,
but we should keep in mind that the military can act on very short notice
but the political process, again and again, requires time. </FONT> </P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><B>CHANGES
UNDERWAY</B> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">In the
period of almost continual change since the end of the Cold War, the
Alliance has not stood still. NATO has added three new mission
arrows, namely, crisis prevention/crisis management, stability projection,
and counter-proliferation, to its collective-defense quiver. It has
also undergone significant transformations, especially with respect to its
military capabilities: </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">1. NATO
has considerably reduced force and readiness levels, even more than
required by the CFE and other arms control agreements. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">2. It
has retained its defensive nature and its capability to defend the NATO
Treaty area. Its military forces are not, however, directed against
anyone nor do they have an offensive orientation. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">3. Its
military forces are willing and increasingly capable of coping with roles
on the periphery and outside the NATO Treaty area. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">4. Its
forces are increasingly multinational and therefore sustain more
interoperability and logistics difficulties. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">5. Although
its forces are generally in good shape, NATO is struggling to modernize
its equipment to avoid capability gaps and gaps between forces from the
United States and Europe. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">The Alliance
still has a way to go to be able to address all the challenges that are
likely to confront it in the 21st century. But there is no doubt
that we have made enormous progress and that the London Summit of 1990,
the Brussels Summit of 1994, and the Madrid Summit of 1997 were all
extraordinary milestones in NATO’s evolution, as the Washington
Summit will be next April. But the transformation of the Alliance
will not, and cannot, end next April. It will take a considerable
amount of time to implement key decisions that have already been made, and
NATO must also continue to strive to retain its effectiveness, efficiency,
and relevance in a constantly changing world. The world is changing
faster than any organization can follow, and though we may never achieve
every goal, it is critical that NATO follow a long-term vision. The
guiding document that will set the course toward this vision and address
the challenges of the future is the new Strategic Concept. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><B>THE
NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT</B> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Given the
continuing objective of the Alliance to promote long-lasting peace and
stability in the Euro-Atlantic region, I expect that the new Strategic
Concept will rest upon a coherent continuum of missions. This
continuum will range from projecting stability through dialogue,
cooperation, and partnership, through crisis prevention and crisis
management, including peace-support operations, counter-proliferation, and
collective defense. As the ultimate guarantee for member-states,
collective defense would retain its core function within the Alliance and
the transatlantic link would continue to be irreplaceable. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">With such a
continuum of missions, force structures would need to be adapted. These
new missions will require more than one tool, indeed a toolbox filled with
political and military tools. The concept will be to promote,
strengthen, and deepen democracy, human rights, peace, and freedom, and to
do this through dialogue, cooperation, and the ability to defend against
any threat while not threatening anyone who does not act against NATO.
The political tools that will be necessary to do this, which were
addressed by the Secretary General later in the Workshop, include
NATO-Russia discourse, NATO-Ukraine discourse, the EAPC, the Mediterranean
Dialogue, and the NAC. </FONT> </P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><B>WORKING
WITH PARTNERS</B> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"> To
underpin these political efforts, the military will contribute not only
military means, but open, transparent, NATO-Russia military-to-military
dialogue to overcome Cold War misconceptions and to promote trust and
cooperation. General Ivashov, who is well known for his profound
dislike of NATO, may make strong public statements, but there is no chance
and no common will to return to the Cold War. We will cooperate with
Russia as we are doing successfully in Bosnia. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Regarding
NATO-Ukraine relations we must promote and deepen cooperation through the
PFP framework; Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty are the keys to
European security and stability. While the EAPMC is a forum for
exchanging views with Partners on aspects of NATO-Partners cooperation,
PFP is the flagship for cooperation and a stand-alone element of European
security. PFP Staff Elements already exist and PFP exercises are
becoming more and more meaningful through full military cooperation.
PARP, the Planning and Review Process, is enhancing the goal of
achieving full interoperability. But even today, the degree of
interoperability and military cooperation across Europe that NATO has
achieved is one that was unthinkable just a few years ago. </FONT> </P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><B>NATO
ENLARGEMENT</B> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">The process
of opening up NATO to new members will contribute greatly to enhancing
stability in Europe and to spreading the rule of democracy, which no one
should see as a threat. Enlargement is not directed against anyone.
Indeed, even the prospect of membership has proven to be an
excellent tool, exemplified by the impressive number of stability-inducing
bilateral agreements that have been signed by Central and Eastern European
nations, a true fireworks of reconciliation. Certainly you all know
the political and economic implications of enlargement. But from a
military perspective, we hope that future Alliance members will be net
contributors to and not merely recipients of security and that, above all
else, NATO will remain an efficient organization. We must keep this
in mind as well as our sincere commitment to keeping the doors open in the
years to come, so that NATO will be able to retain the capabilities that
make it unique. As far as interoperability is concerned, despite the
best intentions of all concerned, it will take several years to fully
integrate invited countries into Alliance military structures. Equipment
compatibility will also prove a challenge although, in the short term,
language, common procedures, and communications interconnectivity will be
the greatest hurdles. We and the Invited Countries are working hard
to address these issues, and we will succeed. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">And lastly,
in the area of external adaptation, the Alliance is expanding its contacts
and pursuing closer cooperation with other international, especially
European, security- and stability-related institutions. The
mechanisms being established can only enhance NATO’s ability, in
collaboration with similarly minded nations and institutions, to address
the multifaceted and transnational risks of the future. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><B>STREAMLINING
INTERNAL MILITARY STRUCTURES </B> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">The Alliance’s
military structures also need to be reformed to ensure that they will be
able to undertake any mission from the continuum of missions that may come
their way. One of these structures, the new NATO command structure,
which was agreed to in December of 1997, is no longer focused on defending
against attack from the East. It was redesigned against the
background of NATO enlargement and the new strategic environment, and is
now designed to cope with the continuum of missions I mentioned earlier.
I do not expect the need for additional major changes as a result of
the updating of the Strategic Concept. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Work on the
Combined Joint Task Force concept is also proceeding well. Implementation
of the CJTF concept, expected in the year 2000, will add flexibility and
responsiveness to NATO’s military posture and allow the Alliance to
react more quickly to collective defense, ESDI, and “out of area”
contingencies, including peace operations such as the one in Bosnia.
Indeed, CJTF-provided flexibility to respond to collective defense
tasks is a major factor in making it unnecessary for NATO to establish
command structure headquarters on the territories of the three Invited
Countries. CJTF activities will in all likelihood include Partner
participation, even within the CJTF headquarters, where the details of
non-Article 5 missions will be analyzed, decided upon, executed, and
supervised. As you can see, the CJTF concept offers an extremely
versatile tool with which the Alliance can accomplish its missions.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">The NATO
command structure and the CJTF concept are key components of ESDI, an
instrument that will enable Europeans to act if the U.S. is not willing
to. ESDI will foster U.S. commitment to Europe. Its policies
and procedures are more or less in place now, i.e., Europeans can act
using NATO’s assets and capabilities. However, ESDI can only be
fully exploited if all European NATO nations eventually participate in
NATO’s integrated military structure. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">To be able
to meet the demands of increased flexibility, mobility, deployability, and
sustainability that come with the continuum of missions that NATO faces
requires that NATO address another one of its tools, namely, the structure
of its military forces. A force structure review is now underway and
we are seeking ways to enhance our capabilities through deeper integration
and more multinational force-multiplier areas such as C41 and missile
defense. Individual nations will have to review their force planning
as well since it is becoming increasingly obvious that focusing on only
territorial defense will not suffice in the future. And despite
today’s fiscal restraints, deliberations on the “Euro,” and
incredibly fast technological progress, nations will also have to allocate
the necessary resources to implement the Force Goals they have accepted.
This does not necessarily mean that we must spend much more money
for defense, but rather that we should cooperate more closely in Europe
and encourage cooperation between Europe and the United States as well.
</FONT> </P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><B>THE
PILLARS OF NATO</B> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">I cannot
close without reiterating that the incredible success of this Alliance has
essentially rested on two fundamental pillars: collective defense and the
transatlantic link. It was these two pillars that allowed NATO to
apply diplomacy successfully during the Cold War, ever mindful of what
Frederic II of Prussia once said: “Diplomacy without weapons is like
an orchestra without instruments.” Not only did collective
defense serve us well during the Cold War, it continues, particularly
through the integrated military structure, to provide us the wherewithal
to carry out complex operations with both NATO and non-NATO nations.
It also enables us to orchestrate, even on extremely short notice,
significant and successful exercises such as Determined Falcon, a complex
exercise comprising 83 aircraft from 13 nations. Twenty-eight hours
after the Defense Ministers determined its need, a concept was planned and
approved, and executed in unknown air space two days later. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">The
transatlantic link, including the coupling of Canada and especially the
United States to Europe, has been instrumental in securing peace and in
countering renationalization in Western Europe over the years. This
link, combined with collective defense, has been a successful formula for
NATO, one that we should never take for granted and must work hard to
preserve and enhance. To do otherwise is to invite failure. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">In the world
of soccer, many coaches follow the rule of never changing a winning team.
If the Secretary General were the coach and I the assistant coach
for fitness, prowess, and stamina, I would say look at NATO’s
military. It is the instrument that makes NATO unique because it is
the military that enables NATO to act. To politicians and diplomats,
I say you can rely on your military. The NATO team is in good shape
and prepared to enter the next millennium. The NATO team is a
winner.</FONT> </P>
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