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<TITLE>BMDO Director Gen. Lester Lyles's Address to 1998 NATO Workshop, Vienna, Austria</TITLE>
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<BODY LINK="0000ff" BGPROPERTIES="FIXED" BGCOLOR="ffffff"><BASEFONT SIZE="3">
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="6" FACE="Palatino">The
Growing Relevance of Missile Defense in the 21st Century</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="4" FACE="Palatino">Lieutenant
General Lester Lyles, Director<BR>
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="4" FACE="Palatino">United
States Ballistic Missile Defense Organization</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">The 15th
NATO Workshop presented us with a wonderful opportunity to discuss the
many challenges we face in creating policy and military capabilities that
will protect our forces and our allies. I am delighted that the
conferencewas held in Vienna, one of the world’s great cities and one
of Europe’s most beautiful since its settlement by Celtic peoples
before the dawn of the Christian era. While taking part in the
Workshop there, I was reminded that this historic city has also been a
city of hope. When the Congress of Vienna met in 1814–1815,
Europe had been at war for a quarter of a century. Indeed, Napoleon’s
final defeat at Waterloo was still nine days away when the great powers of
Europe completed work on the agreements that would restructure the
Continent and codify the rules that still govern diplomacy. And
throughout our own long Cold War, we often found ourselves looking
hopefully toward Vienna, scene of summits and arms control negotiations
that helped keep the peace. </FONT> </P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><B>NEW
THREATS TO OUR SECURITY</B></FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">One can
argue that the situation we face today is more complex and more compelling
than that facing European leaders in 1815. The Atlantic-European
community is much broader and the post-Cold War issues are potentially
more dangerous and deadly. Old World ethnic animosities and regional
confrontations loom large in a world that is home to growing numbers of
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Someone once
suggested that the times we live in should be marked “Subject to
Change Without Notice.” As the Director of the U.S. Department
of Defense’s Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) for almost
two years now, this statement strikes me as particularly fitting. Pakistan’s
April ‘98 launch of the Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile and the
recent nuclear saber-rattling in South Asia remind us that this world is
full of dangerous surprises. Almost without warning, the specter of
conflict and increased tension in South Asia and the possible use of
nuclear weapons, unspeakably horrifying and with global consequences, are
on everyone’s mind. Clearly, our work here today, as Allies and
friends striving to cope in uncertain and unstable times, is a significant
part of the shared security-building enterprise we are engaged in. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">While the
primary goal of the United States remains one of stopping proliferation,
the events in South Asia reinforce my view that the United States and its
European allies must be prepared to deter and defend against the threat or
use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the missiles that
carry them. To be sure, ballistic and cruise missiles will pose a
very real danger to our troops and our homelands in the decades ahead.
However, all of the current international trends give me
considerable confidence that our present political and military thinking,
our counterproliferation strategy, and the mission of my own organization
are the best antidote to that danger and increasingly relevant to our
common security concerns. </FONT> </P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><B>THE
CONTINUING INTERNATIONAL PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES</B> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Despite the
hopes we place on the Missile Technology Control Regime and on our
on-again/off-again negotiations with North Korea, the Pakistani test of
the Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile in April of 1998 demonstrates
unequivocally that ballistic missile proliferation continues. The
Ghauri’s range of 1,500 km indicates a significant increase in
capability over the 300-km Scud B. And while the links between the
Pakistani MRBM program and the North Korean No Dong program have yet to be
clearly established, the shape and specifications released so far for the
Ghauri missile indicate that there are far more than coincidental
similarities. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Likewise the
Iranian medium-range ballistic missile currently in development and
approaching its first test launch also appears to be similar in shape and
specifications to the North Korean No Dong. In fact, a strong case
may be made for the existence of a North Korea/Pakistan/Iran axis of
cooperation that is of even greater concern when we add the further
support of certain Russian entities. Given recent developments and
indications, it is possible that Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea are
looking to develop even longer-range ballistic missiles and to combine
that work with programs for developing weapons of mass destruction.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">This pattern
of international trade in more advanced, longer-range ballistic missiles
appears to extend even further, indeed right up to the southern European
frontier. There is close coordination with and sales to Syria, and
evidence that Iran has offered assistance to Libya for its Al Fatah
ballistic missile program, as well as possible sales of its MRBM missiles.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Each of
these countries I have mentioned also has dedicated significant resources
to research and/or development of an arsenal of chemical and biological
weapons. And now, to our utter astonishment, we are witnessing
blatant, chilling developments in South Asia. India’s five
nuclear test explosions (and Pakistan’s response, with its own
nuclear tests) have given us pause over how quickly optimism about our
security can turn to pessimism. India halted development of its
2,000-km Agni MRBM in 1995. But following Pakistan’s Ghauri
flight tests and its recent nuclear tests, can an Indian decision to
resume flight testing of the Agni be far away? Indeed, it is
conceivable that India could arm with nuclear warheads the Agni and the
shorter-range Prithvi ballistic missile that it has already fielded.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">In other
words, there has been a dramatic turn of events this past year. Most
notably, there has been the clear proliferation of a new class of
longer-range ballistic missiles, a reality that appears to be centered on
closer cooperation between several nations potentially hostile to NATO and
to its European Partners, as well as to their interests. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">So how do we
deal with this problem of proliferation? Current U.S. and NATO
counterproliferation policy is an important guide in our defense planning.
</FONT> </P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><B>THE
U.S. RESPONSE TO CONTINUING PROLIFERATION</B> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">The U.S.
response to the challenges of proliferation comprises three essential
steps. The first is to prevent (or at least slow down)
proliferation. Successful prevention relies heavily on the
participation of and coordination between many U.S. government departments
and agencies, allied nations, and international organizations. However,
the U.S., and indeed most other nations, also recognize that determined
countries will still obtain the capabilities for weapons of mass
destruction and cruise and ballistic missiles despite our best efforts to
prevent it. Therefore, the second step is to try to deter nations
from using or threatening to use these capabilities. Our investments
in this effort and fielding the necessary defenses can provide a major
disincentive for nations to use their missiles and Weapons of Mass
Destruction. In other words, defenses are now joining the continuing
role of nuclear weapons in deterring war and “adventurism.”
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">But since
deterrence may also fail, the third step in U.S. counterproliferation
policy recognizes that U.S. forces must be equipped to fight, survive, and
win in situations in which an adversary might use chemical or biological
weapons delivered by cruise or ballistic missiles. Therefore, DOD’s
acquisition strategy strives to field ballistic missile defense systems to
meet the warfighters’ requirements. My agency is responsible
for managing, directing, and executing the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense
Program, a key part of our military strategy and counterproliferation
policy. </FONT> </P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><FONT SIZE="+1">Theater
Air and Missile Defenses</FONT> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Today, BMDO
is developing missile defenses to serve two fundamental purposes. The
first is to protect through Theater Air and Missile Defenses (or TAMD) the
forces we send abroad as well as the forces of our Allies and friends,
whether they are sent to perform in regional contingencies or peacetime
missions. The second objective is to be prepared to provide the U.S.
with nationwide protection against limited missile threats from rogue
nations should the situation warrant it. More specifically, my
agency must be ready to field a limited National Missile Defense (NMD)
system within three years of a decision to deploy such a system. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Because we
recognize that we will need TAMD and NMD systems well into the next
century, we also have the crucial mission of maintaining a strong missile
defense technology base. Just as today’s programs benefit from
technologies developed in the SDIO (Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization) days, we cannot afford <I>not</I> to maintain the
technological seed corn for tomorrow’s missile defense needs. Our
efforts in this area are intended to provide us with alternative
technologies and components for our ongoing developmental programs and
risk mitigation, as well as to continue building a pathway to the future.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">In order to
provide a near-leak-proof Theater and Air Missile Defense shield for U.S.
forces, Allies, and friends in different regions, BMDO has adopted a “Family
of Systems’ concept, a flexible configuration of systems capable of
joint and combined force operations. We believe that this approach
is best because one system cannot do it all. Threat systems are so
varied, and mission demands so complex, that a layered defense is required
to allow multiple shot opportunities and to meet the demanding
requirements set before us. Multiple systems working in unison
greatly enhance the probability of destroying incoming missiles. For
these reasons, BMDO is pursuing the acquisition and integration of lower-
and upper-tier land- and sea-based systems. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">The
land-based Patriot PAC-3 is the most mature of our TAMD systems. Currently
in the engineering and manufacturing development (or EMD) phase, the PAC-3
is being fielded in three phased upgrades called “configurations.”
The first two configurations have already been fielded, and the
third will provide the new hit-to-kill interceptor missile plus additional
communications, radar, and ground support system improvements. The
first intercept flight is scheduled for this year. When PAC-3
development is complete, the system will be deployed with our army air
defense brigades as well as with Allies such as Germany and the
Netherlands. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Our
sea-based, lower-tier TAMD system, the so-called Navy Area program, is
also in the development phase following the successful intercept in
December 1996 of a Lance missile target by a modified Standard Missile 2
Block IVA at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. This intercept
was the first successful intercept of a Theater Ballistic Missile target
for the SM2, and achieved all flight objectives, including the
demonstration of infrared acquisition, tracking, handover, and guidance.
As with the Patriot PAC-3, I anticipate that the Navy Area Defense
capability will be deployed on Allied ships including some of the new
trinational frigates in Europe. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">The PAC-3
and the Navy Area system, our two most mature programs, are the highest
priority efforts in the TAMD program today. But these systems are
intended to effectively counter today’s threats, including the SCUD
and its derivatives. We also need next-generation, upper-tier
systems to deal with longer-range threats like the No Dong and the Ghauri.
Our land-based, upper-tier Theater High Altitude Area Defense (or
THAAD) program is currently in what we call its program definition and
risk reduction phase. However, while we believe that the THAAD
program has made some significant progress, especially with the
development of its ground base radar and command/control and launcher, we
are still experiencing difficulties with the hit-to-kill interceptor.
We believe we now understand the problems with the interceptor and
have taken the necessary corrective steps. We also hope the overall
program will soon be back on track and that we will have success with the
next flight test. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Like the
THAAD system, the Navy Theater Wide program, our sea-based, upper-tier
system, will also provide protection against medium- and long-range TBMs
targeted against vital political and military assets. Depending on
geography and the deployment location of the Aegis ship, this system would
be able to effect ascent, midcourse, and descent phase intercepts. Navy
Theater Wide is also in the program definition and risk reduction phase of
development. </FONT> </P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><B>THE
NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION</B> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Meeting TAMD
requirements demands a combination of weapons and sensors as well as
battle management command, control, and communications (BMC3) on land, at
sea, and in the air and space. For these reasons, our acquisition
strategy not only emphasizes “jointness,” it also emphasizes
cooperation with Allies. In other words, we plan to fight together
in a coalition of Allied forces, and this necessitates close working
relationships and integration with our army, navy, air force, and marines;
dialogue with our battlefield commanders and our Allies; and, finally,
active participation in exercises. This comprehensive approach is
putting us on the path to being able to deploy interoperable missile
defenses for the benefit of the coalition warfighter. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">As Under
Secretary of Defense Gansler pointed out, the new security environment has
compelled DOD to adopt a new line of thinking, not only about how best to
exploit the current “revolution in military affairs” and “revolution
in business affairs” to better meet national security objectives, but
also how to maintain its competitive edge and improve commercial and
military integration. This adjustment in our way of doing business
also points to expanded engagement with our friends and Allies. Therefore
I’d like to share with you some thoughts on the growing importance of
international armaments cooperation, especially as it relates to the BMDO
mission. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">International
cooperation structured to get the right equipment into the field and to
support the necessary level of interoperability for modern joint and
coalition warfare will not only allow us to leverage Allied government
investments but also enable us to gain the interoperability and Alliance
cohesion we need for fighting together efficiently as a team. BMDO
continues to develop strategies for cooperating with our Allies and
friends in the area of ballistic missile defense. Our current focus
is on three international objectives. The first and, arguably, the
most important, objective is interoperability. We intend to enhance
security and coalition warfighting capabilities by ensuring that TAMD
systems deployed by our Allies are interoperable with those fielded by
U.S. forces. Because we will fight as a coalition, interoperability
must be the watchword. If we do not continue toward
interoperability, eventually we will have not only incompatible equipment,
but incompatible doctrine as well. Indeed, it is essential that we
have BMC3 and interoperability among U.S. forces and those of our
coalition partners. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">The second
reason for international cooperation is burden-sharing where there are
common requirements. It is our goal to reduce the costs and share
the risks and benefits of the cooperative design, development,
co-production, and procurement of TMD systems. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Our third
and final goal is technology cooperation. We see great value in
leveraging the experience base, industry, and unique capabilities and
systems afforded by our Allies and friends to further enhance the
effectiveness of U.S. TBMD systems. </FONT> </P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><FONT SIZE="+1">BMDO-Allied
Cooperation</FONT> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Currently,
there are two budding opportunities for BMDO to involve our European
Allies directly in the development of missile defenses. The first is
the lower-tier system called the Medium Extended Air Defense System (or
MEADS), which is being pursued by the United States, Germany, and Italy.
This system meets an urgent requirement for a system that will
protect deployed maneuver forces from all current and emerging air and
missile threats. Intended as a replacement for the older Improved
HAWK air defense system (widely deployed with Allied forces), MEADS has
been a natural program for cooperative development. During this
work, the countries involved have increased interoperability, shared
costs, reinforced transatlantic relationships, and enabled the more
efficient sharing of the missile defense mission with other nations in
future regional contingencies. MEADS will add Italy to the list of
TMD-capable nations and will offer a procurement opportunity to other NATO
nations. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">MEADS is a
particularly appropriate example of the new, March 1997 International
Armaments cooperation policy that directs the services and others within
DOD to cooperate internationally to the maximum extent possible within
current U.S. policy guidelines. It is fair to say that this will be
a major test of transatlantic armaments cooperation. The Department’s
leadership is working hard with our Allied partners first to build a
reliable cost estimate for development, production, and fielding of the
system, and second to find the necessary funds to proceed with the next
stage of design and development. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">The second
opportunity for long-term cooperation among NATO Allies in the area of
ballistic missile defense stems from the recent decision by the NATO
Conference of National Armaments Directors, or CNAD, to proceed with a
program plan to identify the steps and resources necessary to establish,
manage, and coordinate within NATO programs for a layered Theater
Ballistic Missile defense. NATO will be able to take these steps
building on an existing Military Operational Requirement within a policy
framework developed by the so-called Defense Group on Proliferation and
given approval by the North Atlantic Council about two years ago. The
program plan will move NATO to consider the addition of upper-layer
interceptors to an architecture already likely to include: (1) Battle
Management and Control through modifications to NATO ACCS; (2) Shared
Early Warning from U.S. overhead assets and added ground and sea-based
sensors; and (3) lower-layer interceptors, such as Patriot and MEADS,
which will probably be acquired by individual nations and assigned to NATO
command. </FONT> </P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><B>RESOLVING
TO MEET CONTINUING SECURITY NEEDS</B> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">The United
States and NATO are making steady progress in a very complex array of BMD
programs. These programs will be an integral part of our future
defense posture—recognition of the fact that we will continue to live
in times in which circumstances facing defense planners on both sides of
the Atlantic are “Subject to Change Without Notice.” </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Our work
with our Allies remains a vital element of DOD’s overarching
defense-planning initiatives and an integral part of BMDO’s
acquisition mission. We know that the threats posed by NBC weapons
and the proliferation of missile technologies and systems will not go
away. So neither must our resolve to meet this ominous challenge to
our security and our cherished way of life.</FONT></P>
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