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<TITLE>Air Chief Marshal Sir John Cheshire's Address to 1998 NATO Workshop, Vienna, Austria</TITLE>
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CONTENT="NATO, XVth NATO Workshop, NATO Workshop on Political-Military Decision Making,
Air Chief Marshal Sir John Cheshire, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northwest Europe, ACE, Major Subordinate Commander,
Norway, Russia, Northwest Region, Leningrad Military District,
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Wesley Clark, Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon, Atlantic Alliance,
North Atlantic Alliance,
Partnership for Peace, PfP, PFP,
Security, European Security, Tactical Nuclear Weapons">
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<BODY LINK="0000ff" BGPROPERTIES="FIXED" BGCOLOR="ffffff"><BASEFONT SIZE="3">
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="6" FACE="Palatino">Challenges
of Instability for NATO in the Northwest Region </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Air Chief
Marshal Sir John Cheshire KBE CBE</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Commander-in-Chief
Allied Forces Northwest Europe</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">In addition
to the ACE-wide challenges to stability that SACEUR and DSACEUR described
in detail, there are three additional challenges that face us in the
Northwest Region. While these concerns either do not exist on the
doorstep of my MSC (Major Subordinate Commander) colleagues, or are
significantly less prevalent for them, I would still like to focus your
attention on them. </FONT> </P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><B>PROXIMITY
TO RUSSIA</B> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">The first
challenge stems from the fact that geopolitically Russia is the largest
nation in our Area of Interest (AOI). Indeed there is a common
border between Norway and Russia. While it is easy for those of us
who live in the secure environment of Vienna, New York, Ottawa, or even
London to play down the significance of that 196-km common border in
Finmark, the inescapable fact is that it remains a major factor in the
instability assessment made by my colleagues in Norway. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">For the same
reason, all our partner nations in the Baltic area also are very sensitive
to the importance of their individual and collective relationships with
Russia, in the context of regional stability. It is logical that
those nations in the Northwest Region that have a common border with
Russia would be most sensitive to the issue of stability with Russia.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Although
this particular geopolitical issue is of course a <I>national</I>
concern, the fact that it is also a <I>common</I> one for many of our
NATO and partner nations in the Northwest Region leads those of us
responsible for regional stability to take it just as seriously as the
nations themselves. I should also say that anything that Russia
regards as an instability issue, particularly in the Leningrad Military
District (LMD), is of no less concern to us. </FONT> </P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><B>NATO’S
ABILITY TO INFLUENCE REGIONAL STABILITY</B> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">The second
general point in the assessment of instability is how much NATO in
general, and my Region in particular, can actually do to <I>influence</I>
regional stability positively. It is, of course, obvious that we
will do everything we can to enhance stability and reduce risks in our
Region—indeed that is a formal task given to us by the North Atlantic
Council. The dilemma we face, however, is that, in practice, we have
little direct influence over some of the issues that might actually
trigger instability in our Area of Interest. Four examples of such
issues are bilateral border disputes, disturbances over minority rights,
internal political instability, and disputes over offshore resources.
</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Potential
triggers of this sort actually cause us the greatest concern, because they
are the ones over which we have little influence and which could ignite
regional instability rapidly. Such instability might, in turn,
result in a request by a long-standing Partner nation for NATO military
assistance. In short, in these situations we might be unable to
prevent a fuse from being lit, but we might be called on to help contain
the ensuing explosion. </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">We also
recognize that NATO could, wholly unwittingly, aggravate the instability
in the region, and we go to great lengths to avoid the possibility of that
happening. For example, we recognize that we have to strike a very
careful balance in our enhanced PFP program; a balance which, on the one
hand, satisfies the increasing aspirations of the Baltic nations but, on
the other, does not stray into areas that our Russian colleagues would
regard as unacceptably destabilizing. </FONT> </P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><B>Our
Relationship With Russia</B> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">As SACEUR’s
custodian of the defense guarantee in the Northwest Region, I should like
to make three specific points about our relationship with the Russian
military: </FONT></P>
<UL>
<LI><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">First and foremost,
Russia poses no military threat to the Northwest Region. </FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Second, we go to great
lengths to ensure that the Russian military is fully aware of all the
PFP activities in our Region—and why we are carrying them out and
who is involved. Thanks to my good friend General Anatoly
Krivolapov and his like-minded colleagues, I like to think that our
activities are regarded as transparent, militarily sensible, and in the
best interests of regional stability. I have little doubt that
they would tell me if they regarded our activities otherwise. </FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Third, the inescapable
fact still remains that Russia retains sufficient military hardware in
the Leningrad Military District to make life very uncomfortable for any
of the nations in the Northwest Region’s Area of Interest. And
if there is substantial military hardware in the hands of one nation in
our AOI, and if the political situation in that nation is in any way
unpredictable, it would be militarily irresponsible to ignore the
potential for the unexpected. We try to remain militarily
responsible. </FONT></LI>
</UL>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><B>THE
EXISTENCE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS</B> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">A third
potential trigger to instability in my Region is that Russia retains a
substantial number of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) in the Leningrad
Military District. Our concern is not that Russia would contemplate
using them against the nations in our Region. Rather, it is the risk
that one (or more) of those weapons might get stolen. Were that to
happen, and were the weapon to fall into the hands of extremists, then we
would have to be prepared to handle the resulting potential for
instability. </FONT> </P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino"><B>CONCLUDING
REMARKS</B> </FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">I have tried
to highlight just some of the issues that could trigger instability in the
Northwest Region. I want to emphasize that none of them are threats,
in using the traditional definition, but that all of them could occur and
would almost certainly do so with little or no warning. If any of
them were to materialize, we would not underestimate the political and
military consequences of NATO involvement in its aftermath.</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><A HREF="cheshire98.htm">Go to Top of Page</A></P>
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<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="3" FACE="Palatino">Copyright ©
1998 Center for Strategic Decision Research</FONT></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="000000" SIZE="2" FACE="Palatino"> </FONT></P>
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