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<TITLE> Joris J. C. Voorhoeve</TITLE>
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<CENTER><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+3">Peace
Operations: Some Lessons for the Future</FONT></FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+2">Minister
of Defense of the Netherlands Dr. Joris J. C. Voorhoeve</FONT></FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">The classic idea that
military deployment must be regarded exclusively as ultimo ratio--that is,
only when all other means have been exhausted and have failed--is not
always wise. Prevention is better than cure. There are situations in which
the early deployment of military means can help contain a conflict and
reduce the number of casualties.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">The objective of all
statesmanship must be to prevent conflicts involving the use of force.
This requires, first of all, non-military, preventive measures:
negotiations to resolve differences by peaceful means, democratization,
economic development, and maintaining the rule of law. Preventing violent
conflict is of course the most humanitarian course of action.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<CENTER>
<H4><B><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT</FONT></FONT></B></H4></CENTER>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">Preventive deployment
spares the lives of civilians and service personnel. Furthermore, it saves
a great deal of money. The total cost of the Gulf War was over $100
thousand million, considerably more than the cost of all peace operations
that have been conducted over the last few years. And this figure does not
take into account the toll in human sacrifice and the destruction of
cities, villages, items of cultural heritage, and the fabric of society.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">Encouraging stable and
harmonious political, economic, and social climates is the main way to
prevent violent conflicts. In volatile countries, attention must be
directed to reinforcing democratic institutions, creating social
organizations, and increasing respect for human rights. Military personnel
can make a contribution to these goals, even before there is any talk of
troops being stationed. For example, they could take part in the
organization and training of politically neutral armed forces, including
the position of the armed forces in a democracy. Such forms of conflict
prevention are actually methods for developing cooperation. I regret,
therefore, that these types of support have not yet been recognized as
official development aid according to internationally applied standards.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">The stationing of troops
can also contribute to conflict prevention in some situations, as it did
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It cannot be proved with
certainty that preventive deployment always prevents conflicts. Still, the
timely stationing of several thousand troops, chiefly from the major
powers, along the borders of Kuwait would have sent a signal to Baghdad
and brought home to Saddam Hussein the fact that he would be confronted
with great force if he went too far.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER>
<H4><B><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">PEACEKEEPING BACKED
BY MILITARY DETERRENTS</FONT></FONT></B></H4></CENTER>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">Clear warnings are a form
of deterrence, and deterrence is a form of prevention. One of the lessons
we learned from U.N. peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia is
the importance of deterrence. During the Cold War, war in Europe was
prevented by the nuclear deterrent. After the democratic revolutions in
Central and Eastern Europe, the nuclear deterrent disappeared into the
background, and rightly so. But conventional deterrent, too, lost much
attention. In the United Nations Security Council, it was thought that
peace in the former Yugoslavia could be maintained by the Blue
Helmets--soft peacekeeping without deterrents. But UNPROFOR had to learn
the wisdom of deterrence all over again. Soft peacekeeping does not
persuade warmongers from using force, or from engaging in terrorist acts
or genocide. A peace operation must be backed up by formidable military
means capable of inflicting heavy damage on aggressors and terrorists who
violate ceasefires and perpetrate gross violations of international law.
UNPROFOR became truly effective as a peace force only after the Rapid
Reaction Force was formed. The foundation for the Dayton Peace Agreement
was laid only after Operation Deliberate Force used firepower against the
Bosnian Serbs in August and September of 1995. Similarly, the military
strength of IFOR and SFOR is now preventing the former warring parties
from returning to war. This is why I think we should form a NATO-led
successor force to SFOR after July 1, 1998. I hope that all countries
taking part is SFOR will continue their commitment.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER>
<H4><B><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">PROGRESS IN CONFLICT
PREVENTION</FONT></FONT></B></H4></CENTER>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">Three years after the
genocide in Rwanda, not much progress has been made in conflict
prevention. Certainly there have been some useful proposals, but these
ideas have not always been put into practice. However, some steps have
been taken. The improvement of the United Nations' rapid reaction capacity
has been placed high on the political agenda. In New York, a rapidly
deployable headquarters is being formed. The United Nations' Standby
Arrangements System is gradually being expanded. And, at the suggestion of
Denmark, several countries are in the process of setting up a High
Readiness Brigade. Many countries are also involved in reinforcing the
African peacekeeping capacity. Thus, some lessons <I>have</I> been
learned.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">However, the U.N. does not
yet have a rapidly deployable force. In 1996, the refugees in Zaïre
were left to their own fate far too long; it took months before the
international community decided to send in troops. Canada tried to play a
leading role in improving this situation, but did not receive adequate
support. The return of hundreds of thousands of refugees to Rwanda
appeared to end the need to deploy troops--or, at least, such was the
prevailing opinion. In light of the tens of thousands of casualties that
resulted, I question whether the problem was not underestimated by many.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">The situation in Zaïre
at the end of 1996 and the current situation in Burundi both illustrate
the gap between good intentions and actual willingness to take timely
action. Surely everyone is <I>for</I> prevention. But in actual crises,
troop deployment is often deferred to the point where prevention is no
longer possible. Policy differences among the major U.N. member-states
often lead to postponement of decisions. The U.N. cannot act
independently.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER>
<H4><B><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">THE ROLE OF THE U.N.</FONT></FONT></B></H4></CENTER>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">The political will of the
Security Council to take timely action has not been strengthened during
the last few years. The more the problems involved in peace operations
have increased, the more the confidence in the U.N. has declined. The U.N.
and its member-states now face a dilemma. If too many of the U.N.'s peace
operations fail, the organization will lose credibility. But if the
member-states are too cautious in intervening to stop large-scale
bloodshed, the organization will lose equal credibility. In either case,
defeatism and cynicism with respect to the U.N.'s role are not the proper
ways to react. The only reaction must be a constant endeavor to reinforce
the organization.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">Certainly, the U.N. must
not put too much on its plate. It has become clear that the organization
is not well suited to lead medium-and large-scale military operations: For
example, it was not equipped to carry out operations such as Desert Storm
or IFOR or SFOR. Although the ideal picture of the U.N. may be that, as an
independent and worldwide organization, it is responsible for solving
conflicts throughout the entire force spectrum, the reality is that it is
not yet capable of fulfilling this role. Large-scale military operations
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter must, in principle, be carried out
by a coalition of the willing led by a major nation, or by a regional
military organization capable of mounting such operations. And to be
effective, the troops of such a coalition must have trained together.
NATO, which guarantees well-coordinated military action, is proving in
Bosnia that it is capable of heavy operations. Of course, the U.N.
provides the authority for Chapter VII operations; the Security Council
mandates such actions.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER>
<H4><B><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">THE ROLE OF NATO</FONT></FONT></B></H4></CENTER>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">The fact that we must not
ask the U.N. to launch major military operations puts heavy responsibility
on the shoulders of those institutions that <I>are</I> capable of such
actions, such as NATO. But if NATO is capable of such operations, where
was it at the time of the crisis in Zaïre? A large number of NATO
countries took part in the U.N.-led planning for the Multinational Force
for Zaïre, but the force never reached the deployment stage. Should
our efforts, then, be directed to rendering NATO truly capable of playing
a leading role in an urgent crisis far removed from its own treaty area?</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">According to Article 53 of
the U.N. Charter, the Security Council can make use of regional
organizations for the purposes of enforcement action. However, most
regional organizations, such as OSCE or the Organization of African Unity,
lack a military capability. Moreover, NATO is not really a regional
organization in the sense of Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter. And Article
53 refers to operations in the organization's own region, not those far
removed. Still, under Article 42 of the Charter, the U.N. can call upon
member-states or a group of member-states for an operation. And for
practical purposes the U.N. can call upon organizations such as NATO whose
primary objective is collective self-defense. NATO has declared its
willingness to carry out peacekeeping operations on behalf of the U.N. or
the OSCE. Also, since a group of NATO members can form a Combined Joint
Task Force, in which non-NATO members such as countries in Partnership for
Peace can participate, NATO assets can be deployed in a variety of ways,
if approved by the members.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">At the NATO Summit in
Madrid, the decision will probably be taken to adapt NATO's Strategic
Concept, which dates from 1991 and, to some extent, still reflects the old
way of thinking within NATO. However, a great deal of attention must be
paid to peacekeeping; NATO must concentrate on peace and security in
Europe and its vicinity. Of course, NATO should not take too much upon
itself and should apply self-restraint. The countries and organizations in
other regions should have prime responsibility in those regions. While
taking the lead in maintaining the peace, NATO must use regional
frameworks for peacekeeping. Individual NATO members and Partners for
Peace may, of course, lend their support to such regional initiatives.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<CENTER>
<H4><B><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">RUSSIA AND NATO</FONT></FONT></B></H4></CENTER>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">For peace and security in
Europe and its vicinity, good relations with Russia are essential. NATO
will now be cooperating more closely with Russia in peace operations.
According to the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and
Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, "[the two entities]
will consult and strive to cooperate to the broadest possible degree"
in areas such as "joint operations, including peacekeeping
operations, on a case-by-case basis, under the authority of the United
Nations Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE." In
addition, according to the Founding Act, "To enhance their
partnership and ensure this partnership is grounded to the greatest extent
possible in practical activities and direct cooperation, NATO and Russia's
respective military authorities will explore the further development of a
concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations." This is an
important agreement that should be put into practice, not only in Bosnia,
but also in other situations.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER>
<H4><B><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">THE ROLE OF WEU</FONT></FONT></B></H4></CENTER>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">It is often suggested that
the Western European Union could become an important peacekeeping
organization. WEU has adopted the Petersberg tasks of humanitarian action,
peacekeeping, and even peace making. However, though the organization has
certainly made valuable contributions over the past few years, it still
lacks political decisiveness, military integration, and the force
projection needed to give it a leading role in major peace operations. WEU
still lives in the shadow of its stronger brother, NATO. The main
organization for European security is the new NATO that is being built,
with its close partnership with Russia, Ukraine, and other PFP countries.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<CENTER>
<H4><B><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">UNSAS AND CIMIC</FONT></FONT></B></H4></CENTER>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">During their last biannual
meeting in Brussels, the NATO Ministers of Defense stated that experiences
in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere demonstrate that the successful
completion of certain civil and humanitarian tasks is essential to the
overall success of any peace-support operation. Humanitarian assistance is
often included in a peace operations mandate. Military operations and
reconstruction activities are becoming simultaneous rather than successive
tasks. Supervising the enforcement of a cease-fire, the separation of
troops, and the demobilization of personnel is now taking place in tandem
with the return of refugees, the reconstruction of the economy, mine
clearance, the provision of humanitarian assistance, preparations for
elections, and the restoration of the national administration.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">In order to provide rapid
integrated action by military and civilian personnel, UNSAS (the United
Nations Standby Arrangement, under which member states hold troops
available for possible U.N. peacekeeping), which is now mainly a military
system, should be expanded to include public administrators, civil police,
administrative staff, legal staff, and the like. For every peace
operation, there ought to be a consultative body in which the main actors
contributing to a country's reconstruction are represented. International
efforts in Bosnia and Albania and previous peace operations in Haiti and
Cambodia demonstrate the desirability of a sound consultative structure.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">Today's military personnel
must be jacks-of-all-trades. They must be able to negotiate and deal with
people of other nations and cultures. They have to know their way through
the maze of international organizations and be familiar with the actions
and methods of non-governmental groups. This is why, when training
military personnel, more emphasis should be placed on civil-military
cooperation. To this end, NATO has proposed forming a Civil-Military
Cooperation Battalion.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">Military involvement in an
area of conflict should also not come to an end once the peace force has
been withdrawn. Even though peace building is in principle a task for
civilian agencies, the military can sometimes make a contribution to this
goal. One contribution was the mine clearing done in Cambodia, Angola, and
Bosnia. Such work should continue after the peacekeeping troops have left.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<CENTER>
<H4><B><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">CONCLUDING REMARKS</FONT></FONT></B></H4></CENTER>
<P><FONT FACE="Palatino"><FONT COLOR="#000000">Once the weapons in a
conflict have been silenced, the real peace must be gained. This requires
an integrated approach and close cooperation between military and civilian
actors. Such cooperation should be NATO's guiding principle in the years
ahead. As it moves ahead, we expect that the new members of NATO,
candidates for membership, and all Partnership for Peace countries will
work together in the new European Atlantic Partnership Council to produce
new and better forms of peacekeeping.</FONT></FONT> </P>
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