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<TITLE>Swedish Foreign Minister Margaretha af Ugglas...Old and New Pillars
of Swedish Security In a Changing Europe</TITLE>
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<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+4">Old and New Pillars of
Swedish Security</FONT><FONT SIZE="+0"> </FONT><FONT SIZE="+4">In a
Changing Europe</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+3">Swedish Foreign Minister
Margaretha af Ugglas</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">INTRODUCTION </FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Bergen is an excellent place for
reflecting on the relations between Northern Europe and the continent as a
whole. This is due in part to its beauty, but also to its history. Eight
hundred years ago, Bergen was the site of a famous Cistercian monastery
with close links to monasteries in England, France, and several others in
Sweden. This network of monasteries was an important part of the medieval
European architecture, one might say, although the monks themselves
employed that word more literally. At about the same time, Bergen became,
in the commercial sphere, an important member of the Hanseatic League,
which linked together German and other cities as far apart as Bruges in
Belgium, Novgorod in Russia, and, of course, Visby in between. I am using
these two examples to illustrate the basic fact that the North has always
been an integral part of Europe. We were Europeans long before there was a
European Union. And now, the North is as deeply affected by the dramatic
transformations of our continent as any other part of it--perhaps more
than many others, as I shall try to explain.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">If I claim that there are five
pillars of Swedish security policy, it may sound as if I am overburdening
the architectural imagery. But, for brevity's sake, I would like to base
my points on five themes, which may be described as pillars of security.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">FACTORS OF CONTINUITY</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The first pillar represents
continuity in the form of continued non-participation in military
alliances, supported by a strong national defense. Since Napoleonic times,
Sweden has stayed out of military alliances and also out of war. Abroad,
this policy of neutrality was not always viewed as glorious, but it was
acknowledged by most as realistic and constructive. And we have paid for
it in terms of a substantial national defense effort. During the Cold War,
there was no military vacuum in the North; despite the strategic
importance of the region, the peacetime military presence of the two blocs
could be kept to a minimum, and tensions maintained at a low level. A
strong Swedish defense contributed to regional stability, and still does.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">From the 1950s to the 1980s, the
policy of neutrality was strongly emphasized as the unchangeable bedrock
of Swedish foreign policy. This was done to such an extent that people
sometimes lost sight of the fact that neutrality was never an end in
itself, but always an instrument. Departures from this policy and attempts
to find other solutions were certainly made. Joining the League of Nations
in the 1920s was one example--with its sanctions policy and without
Germany and the Soviet Union; trying to establish a Scandinavian defense
alliance in the late 1940s was another. In the Cold War atmosphere,
however, the instrumental nature of the policy of neutrality was sometimes
lost. As a result of self-imposed restrictions, we also refrained from
political cooperation that might have been regarded as potentially
compromising the credibility of the policy we had chosen. Twenty-three
years ago, the Swedish government of the day concluded that membership in
the European Community would not be compatible with our security policy.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">This reflection on the past is
intended to clarify what has changed for Sweden and what has not. Sweden
continues to stay outside military alliances. We shall continue to have a
strong national defense. As in other countries, our defense will
undoubtedly remain under the same pressures to be "leaner but meaner."
But defense spending is being maintained and has actually increased in
real terms recently. It will continue to be a stabilizing factor in the
North. While these are factors of continuity, a fundamental change is
taking place: the self-imposed restrictions of the past concerning foreign
and security policy cooperation have been replaced by our interest in
becoming active participants in European affairs again. This brings me to
the other pillars of Swedish security.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">THE EUROPEAN UNION</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">I would point to the European
Union (EU) as the second pillar. Sweden's application for membership in
the EU is probably the single most important Swedish foreign policy
decision since World War II and, possibly, of this century. It is getting
to be viewed in this light in Sweden. There is an awareness of the
historical dimension: after 180 years, we are joining continental affairs
in a programmatic way.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">In security terms, EU membership
is seen in Sweden as a bonus or a plus. Even if most of the Common Foreign
Security Policy (CFSP) still remains to be developed, we believe the
continuing integration process per se and the community created by daily
cooperation adds to our security. But the importance of the EU in security
terms goes beyond this, of course. First, the European Union is the
natural center of gravity and source of attraction for Central and Eastern
Europe. It is the key factor for extending West European stability
eastward. The membership prospect is indeed a stabilizing force in the
political affairs of Central and Eastern European countries that still
need to come in from the cold.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Second, the European Union can
only handle the many new security challenges facing it today by developing
coherent common policies. Although this paper was presented at a workshop
on political-military decision making, it is worth underlining that the
immediate threats to European stability, the former Yugoslavia
notwithstanding, are not primarily military in nature. I am thinking of
the many new so-called low-level threats emanating from the "debris
of disintegration" in the East, or from the economic pressures and
social unrest in regions to the South of our continent. The consequences
of organized crime, illegal migration, and trafficking in drugs and
weapons; refugees; and environmental hazards are being felt more widely.
They require common responses, including common European Union policies.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">As a member of the European
Union, Sweden will work toward strengthening the CFSP. Whatever lessons
are drawn from the tragedies in the former Yugoslavia, an obvious one is
that we need more, not fewer, instruments for responding jointly to
crises, and we also need more, not fewer, common foreign policies. The
only restriction, of course, is that joint action can be developed only
when members of the Union have important interests in common, to quote the
Maastricht Treaty. We hope that this commonality will be strengthened. The
C in CFSP stands for "common" and not for "convenience."
As you may know, the Swedish Parliament has determined that our
relationship to the Western European Union (WEU) will be defined only once
we become members of the EU. Yet, it is already easy to see that we would
have an obvious interest in becoming observers in the Western European
Union.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">As a European Union member, we
expect to cooperate loyally in meeting the challenges facing the Union
from various directions, including the South. Correspondingly, we hope
that, together with the other Nordic countries, we shall bring to the
Union a distinct Northern dimension.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">THE NORTHERN DIMENSION</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Here I come to the third pillar
of Swedish security. Russia directly meets the West only in the North of
Europe, and I would submit that changes since the Cold War have been
almost as dramatic in Northern as in Eastern Europe. The three Baltic
States have recovered their independence. The Baltic Sea has ceased to be
a maritime equivalent of the Berlin Wall. Northwestern Russia is starting
to regain its natural place as an integrated participant in a regional
cooperation that dates back to Viking trade, Novgorod as part of the
Hanseatic League, and, later, St. Petersburg as a dynamic growth factor
for the whole region in the 19th century.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Following the logic of the Cold
War, maps of Northern Europe were, until recently, vertical, tall and
narrow. The new ones are less tall and much broader. The new North has
become horizontal, not vertical. Of course, it is still far from being a
region in any political or economic sense of the word. The bitter heritage
of the Soviet era can still be felt, not only in the Baltic States but all
over Russia as well. In that sense, Northern Europe has become a sort of
frontier or pilot area for dealing with the remains of Soviet
disintegration. The Nordic countries have more of a direct stake in what
happens in this process than most West European countries: perhaps we
stand to gain more from positive developments in Russia, just as we have
more to lose from bad developments.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The logical response to this
situation is a policy of consistently involving and engaging Russia in
European cooperation, and of promoting its integration in as many ways as
Russia's size and its own development will permit. Successful democratic
and economic reforms in Russia are probably the single most important
factor for long-term European stability and security. Only Russia itself
can carry out these reforms. But regional cooperation could help build a
new Russia from below, as a result of practical daily contacts. The Nordic
countries can make a contribution here, the importance of which extends
beyond merely regional implications.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Regarding Russia as a normal
partner also means expecting it to follow standard European rules and
norms in its external dealings. Geopolitical weight does not confer any
special rights or prerogatives. We expect the last Russian soldiers to
leave the Baltic States by August 1994, when the final withdrawal from
Germany will be celebrated, thus removing the last vestiges of the Second
World War. Like other countries, Russia has legitimate interests to look
after, and we are convinced that common European institutions will help
provide a satisfactory framework for doing so. In this framework, there is
also room for building a Russian-Baltic relationship that is not only free
from acrimony and rhetoric, but genuinely constructive and mutually
beneficial. We are trying to do everything we can to promote such a
development.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">THE TRANSATLANTIC
COMMITMENT</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">In military terms, and for
reasons well-known to this audience, Northern Europe is not just an area
of regional importance--it is also strategically important. This brings me
to the fourth pillar of Swedish security, the transatlantic one.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Even if Sweden is a country that
neither is nor aspires to become a NATO member, I think we have good
reason to testify to the value of NATO, both for its role in providing a
strategic balance and as a stabilizing force in Europe. NATO's continued
commitment to the North and, through NATO, the commitment of the United
States, are obviously of particular interest to Sweden. NATO continues to
be one of the cornerstones of European security. We therefore have reason
to welcome the new functions that NATO successfully took on after the end
of the Cold War. NATO's resources and structures have proved to be
indispensable in carrying out the U.N. mandate in the former Yugoslavia.
About 1,300 Swedish soldiers are serving under UNPROFOR, gaining
experience in cooperating with NATO in peacekeeping activities. When
placed at the disposal of U.N. peacekeeping missions, the efficiency of
integrated NATO structures represents a valuable asset for all European
countries.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The Partnership for Peace (PFP)
initiative is, in our view, a very constructive response to a number of
demands made on the organization at the present juncture. Sweden submitted
its Presentation Document in spring 1994 and looks forward to concluding
the Individual Partnership Program very shortly. Quite naturally, this
program will focus on peacekeeping activities and contributions to
transparency and democratic control. We look forward to participating in
the first peacekeeping exercise in the Netherlands in October 1994. We
also look forward to helping set up a Baltic peacekeeping battalion,
together with other countries. We expect to be an active Partner in the
Partnership for Peace program. And like other countries participating in
the PFP, we look forward to Russia's participation in this cooperation in
the near future.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Sweden also has good reason to
welcome other important decisions made at the NATO summit in January
regarding the Combined Joint Task Forces, which will strengthen a European
security and defense identity. In this case, as with the PFP, the
flexibility of the new approach will allow countries that are not members
of the Alliance to cooperate with NATO. It will also allow them to
contribute more effectively to meeting new challenges to European security
in possible operations under a U.N. or a CSCE mandate.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">CSCE AND U.N.
INVOLVEMENT</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">This mandating function remains
essential. The CSCE and the U.N. can be seen as the fifth pillar.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The United Nations remains the
ultimate source of legitimacy for the use of force and for decisions
binding the whole international community. It is striking how, since the
end of the Cold War, the U.N. has become involved in solving conflicts on
our own continent. Therefore, strengthening the U.N. is not only a global
interest, as we seem to be moving toward a more fragmented international
system facing increasingly varied challenges; it is also a directly
European interest. U.N. peacekeeping must become more efficient, based on
the strengths and weaknesses that have been amply demonstrated since U.N.
commitments have grown dramatically.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The role of the CSCE has been
developing rapidly over the last few years. During the year when I was
chairman of the CSCE, we emphasized conflict prevention and crisis
management, reinforcing the community of values, developing cooperation
with other organizations, and strengthening the internal structures of the
CSCE. Important work is continuing in these directions. At the Budapest
Summit, it will be particularly essential to arrive at a common view on
the role of third-party forces in local conflicts.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Since many of these local
conflicts concern countries that were part of the former Soviet Union, I
think one key to further development of CSCE capabilities lies in
achieving a close coordination between Russian diplomatic efforts and the
joint efforts undertaken by the CSCE. That is certainly one conclusion
that can be drawn from our current experience as chairman of the Minsk
group on the Nagorno-Karabach conflict. The political importance that
Russia attaches to the CSCE, as recently underlined by Defense Minister
Grachev, should be reflected in the role that Russia is prepared to give
to the CSCE in conflicts close to Russia's borders. The future of the CSCE
is, to a large extent, a function of the role that Russia itself is
prepared to let it play. Likewise, without a consistent substantive
commitment from NATO countries, the CSCE can achieve little in any of the
conflicts on its agenda.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The CSCE is indispensable as a
forum for political consultation and cooperation, including both the
transatlantic and the Russian presence. Its source of strength is its
great flexibility and its ability to adapt to new circumstances.
Sometimes, however, the CSCE lacks internal cohesion--a reminder that it
needs to be supplemented by deeper forms of integration.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">CONCLUSION</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Our new attitude toward Europe
reflects our new attitude toward security. To build and secure democracy,
to facilitate the rule of law, to promote human and minority rights, and
to create market economies to the east and southeast of Sweden are now
some of our major foreign policy objectives. The pillars of Swedish
security, old and new, will reinforce each other. We are facing changes in
Europe with an open mind. While we remain outside military alliances, we
still share the vision that conflict is best prevented through increased
integration. Our security goal for the rest of this century can be most
accurately described as European integration with a North European
dimension.</FONT></FONT> </P>
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