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<TITLE>Dr. Zamfirescu and Prof. Pascu...The New NATO and the Southern
Riddle</TITLE>
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<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+4">The New NATO and the
Southern Riddle</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+3">Romanian State Secretary
Prof. I. M. Pascu and Dr. E. Zamfirescu</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">THE SOUTHERN RIDDLE</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Our mutual challenge is to build
a new European security order based on democratic stability, transparency,
dialogue, and cooperation. The order we are striving for must be both "post-Yalta"
and "non-Yalta." Yet, are the main actors on the European scene
ready to agree that the new order will satisfy their genuine security
interests? The June 1994 NACC meeting in Istanbul suggests that the echoes
of the Cold War have not entirely died out. The continuation of local hot
wars in the former Yugoslavia indicates that the nightmares of the past
may still be waiting in the wings.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">These risks and challenges lead
to the "Southern riddle": how can we avoid, in our part of
Europe, the costly, cynical choice between a new edition of the Yalta
arrangements and a resumption of the great power politics of the pre-Cold
War period? And how can Europe as a whole renew itself without denying the
"Europe-ness" of some of its countries and peoples?</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">In today's Europe, it is true
that the Balkans, or at least parts of the Balkans, are the "weak
link" or the "sick man." But strategic wisdom requires
strengthening of the weaker flanks, in particular by permitting countries
within and around the Balkans to successfully complete their democratic
transitions and become a source of stability and security.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Unfortunately, such wisdom does
not always prevail. Some find it "cheaper" to focus exclusively
on other sub-regions of Central Europe. As long as old obsessions with the
"Central Front" continue to prevent viable Western institutions
from paying due attention to the Balkans, predictability in that area will
remain as low as it is today.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">ROMANIA'S FOREIGN
POLICY</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Those who follow Romanian
foreign policy are probably aware of our plea that Western states and
institutions show even-handedness toward all Central European countries.
We have also repeatedly drawn attention to the risks that might arise from
the perpetuation of the traditional pattern of "zero-sum behavior"
among the states in our region.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Since Romania's current status
with the cardinal European and Euro-Atlantic institutions is similar to
that of the "Visegrad Four," some may legitimately wonder why we
still insist on non-discrimination. Our motivation comes not merely from
an "inferiority complex." We fear that, if only a narrow area
can benefit from closer cooperation and eventual integration with Western
institutions, the common journey of older and newer democracies toward a
united Europe will be longer and more uncertain.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Romania's balanced attitude
partially comes from its geostrategic position. Placed between the "Northern"
and "Southern" tier of Central Europe, our country foresees more
accurately than others the costs of additional fragmentation in an area
already torn by centrifugal tendencies. We also feel a sense of
responsibility, triggered by our territorial and demographic weight within
the region to which we belong.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Therefore, we favor establishing
a solid network of bilateral relations with all states in our part of the
continent, based on the pragmatic consideration that the democratic
development and economic consolidation of all our neighbors is in our own
national interest. Such a network would be an asset for Romania's security
and an important part of the "dowry" it would like to bring to
Western institutions when it joins them as a member.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">As to our inclusion in the
Alliance, we will not duplicate comments made by our Czech and Polish
colleagues on this subject at the NATO Workshop. For our Western friends,
however, we would like to add that democratic changes of governments in
our respective countries do not affect the orientation of our foreign
policies. The direction of our foreign and security policies is
irreversible, because it is rooted in security needs that are very clear,
and because these policies benefit from a consensus of responsible
political forces. It would be inaccurate, therefore, to interpret votes
that mainly express disappointment with the economic performance of a
given government as a desire to jeopardize a clear-cut, irreversible
foreign policy option.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">THE NEED TO PROJECT
SECURITY EASTWARD</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">We will now briefly raise a few
issues that deserve reflection in the hope that we can achieve effective,
joint action. There is only one way to overcome the "security deficit"
that confronts every country in Central Europe while building a new
European security: it is to project Western stability and security
eastward. In non-ideological terms, such an endeavor would equally benefit
countries that, for some reason, have expressed the fear of "isolation."
NATO--the greatest success story in the history of international
security--would be asked to perform the following roles:</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<UL>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">maintain a balance between
Eastern and Central European countries during a period of rapid change,
with particular attention to the distribution of power among countries;</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">prevent anyone from taking
advantage of momentary internal weaknesses; and</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">actively support the efforts
of countries as they gradually increase their security.</FONT></FONT></LI>
</UL>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">In other words, NATO would
remain an alliance defending the security of its members, while assuming
the additional responsibility of a security-projecting factor for the
countries of Central Europe. This extra task could be successfully
accomplished in cooperation with the other security institutions including
the CSCE, the WEU, and the EU.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Since the former Soviet Union
assumed responsibility for the security of Central Europe for almost 45
years, it is not surprising that NATO's intentions toward projecting
security have already triggered strong Russian opposition. Therefore, at
this moment, there is probably no international political issue more
important than establishing a new relationship between NATO and Russia.
Such an endeavor will remain rather hazardous, however, as long as
Russia--in contrast with its former allies/satellites--perceives NATO less
as a security-generating factor for the whole of Europe and more as the
enemy from the Cold War.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">But is NATO ready, willing, and
able to act in such a capacity? Its recent history suggests that it is.
NATO has already declared its willingness to shoulder the implementation
of U.N. and CSCE decisions. By initiating the Partnership for Peace, NATO
has enlarged its role, thus performing simultaneously both its alliance
and security-projection functions for its members and partners. NATO has
also engaged itself in out of area peacemaking operations, namely in the
former Yugoslavia.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Ironically enough, however, that
involvement might eventually be detrimental to the security-projection
function that NATO recently assumed. By strictly limiting itself to the
role of a military instrument in the former Yugoslavia, while leaving the
politics of the situation to other organizations and parties, NATO
prevents itself from assuming the regulatory function that the proper
management of the Balkan situation requires. This is likely to continue,
given the present transition from Globalism to Regionalism, which applies
to Europe, too.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">There are many explanations for
NATO's "self-denial": the desire to avoid military entanglement,
internal politics, tension between multilateralism and unilateralism, or
other factors, including Russia's possible reaction. One factor might even
be a lack of enthusiasm for trying to fully understand the "Southern
riddle"--how the situation in the Balkan area can be related to the
situation in other similar areas.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">To solve this "riddle,"
one must above all stop treating the Yugoslav situation as simply another
conflict of the Third-World type, with ideological and/or religious
overtones. It is more than that: the Yugoslav conflict is the melting pot
that will influence the new shape of the Balkan balance of power. In turn,
the balance of power in the Balkans cannot be dissociated from that in
Europe, particularly Central Europe (Romania holds a prominent position in
both areas), and outside Europe (including North Africa and the Middle
East).</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Therefore, the time has perhaps
come to stop considering the parties involved as merely "good"
or "bad." Such moral appreciations--fully understandable if one
takes into account the monumental crimes committed there--should be
increasingly supplemented with political judgments so that the parties are
viewed as "actors" in a balance-of-power system. The possible
solution to the conflict may not depend upon moral condemnations. Instead,
the solution may depend on ensuring a matching between the parties
directly involved, so that external forces cannot play those parties
against each other.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The former Yugoslavia could
prove to be the test case for the new NATO and for NATO's ability to
actually become a main pillar of stability on the continent. The situation
there is already a reflection of NATO's internal politics and its
relations with Russia, on which the future of our entire continent
depends. Therefore, we will conclude by recalling that a brilliant
Norwegian, Henrik Ibsen, once said: "You should never wear your best
trousers when you go out to fight for freedom and truth."</FONT></FONT>
</P>
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