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<TITLE>Lieutenant General Malcolm O'Neill...Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction:How We Can Respond</TITLE>
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<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+4">Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction:</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+4">How We Can Respond</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+3">Lieutenant General Malcolm
O'Neill</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><I><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+2">Director, Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization</FONT></FONT></I></CENTER>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">THE PROLIFERATION
DANGER</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Since former Secretary of
Defense Les Aspin has discussed the changed nuclear threat, I will provide
some additional information regarding the danger of proliferation of
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems, in
particular ballistic missiles. While it is difficult to know exactly how
many countries have or are developing such weapons, we believe that at
least 24 countries have chemical-weapon programs, 10 countries have
biological-weapon programs, and at least 10 countries are interested in
nuclear-weapon development.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The spread of such
mass-destruction weapons must be considered in tandem with the
simultaneous proliferation of their means of delivery. My organization is
especially concerned with the ballistic missile, which from the 1940s
until recently was an invulnerable weapon. If the weapon was delivered, it
hit its target, and there was absolutely nothing that NATO, the CIS, or
any other organization could do about it.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The combination of missiles and
mass-destruction weapons is one of the emerging dangers of the post-Cold
War era. As one U.S. Central Intelligence Agency official recently noted,
the potential mass-destruction capabilities of some countries is
comparable to, and in some cases more lethal than, the 1960 Soviet threat.
The ballistic missile is clearly becoming the weapon of choice for nations
otherwise unable to attack their enemies at long range. The 1988 Iran-Iraq
war, called the War of the Cities; Operation Desert Storm; and the current
fighting in Yemen demonstrate that missiles will increasingly pose a
threat to military forces and civilian population centers.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Of particular concern to us are
the missile programs in Iran, Syria, Libya, and, especially, North Korea.
We know that the North Koreans are developing new missiles: to quote the
U.S. Director of Central Intelligence, R. James Woolsey, "We can
confirm that the North Koreans are developing two additional missiles with
ranges greater than the 1000 km. missile that flew last year. These new
missiles could put at risk all of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and the
Pacific, and, if exported to the Middle East, could threaten Europe as
well." We have similar concerns about a number of other countries
that have missiles and weapons-of-mass-destruction programs. While
individual programs may vary in their pace and level of accomplishment,
the proliferation of such weapons is ominous and requires both our
individual and combined efforts in response.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">RESPONSES TO
PROLIFERATION</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">In March 1993, then-Secretary of
Defense Les Aspin initiated a comprehensive review of the nation's defense
strategy, called the "Bottom-Up Review." This important effort
provided the framework for shifting America's focus toward the new dangers
of the post-Cold War era. One element of the Bottom-Up Review is the
Counter-Proliferation Initiative, which includes missile defense,
political and other mechanisms for controlling the nuclear threat. This
has led to a revamping of the ballistic missile defense program.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">Counter-Proliferation</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Currently, the U.S. looks at
counter-proliferation in two ways. The first is as a prevention approach
to block weapons of mass destruction from getting into the hands of
potential aggressors. Les Aspin has discussed some of the ways that we can
act in this regard; we should redouble our efforts in several of them,
including arms control, international pressure, and denial (i.e., denying
the potential aggressor access to the technology, hardware, and delivery
systems he needs for nuclear weapons). We also should emphasize
dissuasion: negotiating and discussing diplomatically with potential
aggressors the reasons why having mass-destruction capabilities would not
be to their advantage.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">Deterrence</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Deterrence is also important.
Some suggest that Saddam Hussein was deterred to some extent by our
coalition's overwhelming capability--deterred from using chemical weapons
that he actually had. Deterrence can work. But we have to find that magic
formula that will insure that the aggressor knows what the results of his
utilizing these kinds of systems would be and convince him it would not be
to his advantage to utilize them. As Les Aspin has mentioned, however, it
would be very hard to deter a terrorist group.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">Counter-Force</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">We do have one mechanism, called
"counter-force," that we can use before a weapon is launched.
Counter-force involves the use of offensive weapons, special operating
forces, infantry, or whatever is necessary to find a weapon in its
stockpile, while it is being fabricated, or while it is moving across a
bridge in order to knock that weapon out before it is launched. Most of
our Alliance countries have offensive means such as fighter planes,
bombers, and weapons of various kinds that we can use to go after the
launch capability of an enemy.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">Active Defense</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">From my standpoint, the
cornerstone of counter-proliferation, when all other measures fail, is
active defense. We need to have some mechanism to stop an "incoming"
nuclear delivery system when a weapon is coming our way. We do not want
necessarily to go after the nation that launched the system but, in all
cases, we want to go after the system itself and shoot it out of the sky.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Before getting into the
specifics of active defense, I would like to underscore one point, which
goes back to some statements that President Yeltsin made a couple of years
ago. If we really want to have global protection and global defense, no
one nation will be able to provide it. The challenge is so great that all
of us must work together. Indeed, if a country has the technology for
nuclear weapons, it can easily get the technology for missile delivery
since it is a 1950s kind of technology. On the other hand, providing
active defense against that kind of system, especially when there is a
surprise attack, requires a very sophisticated, very expensive response.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">THE U.S. ACTIVE DEFENSE
PROGRAM</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Let me now describe the U.S.
active defense program. The Bottom-Up Review directed me to concentrate on
theater missile defense. This turned the strategic defense element of my
program into a technology program. But because the SCUD-like threat now
exists, my mission is to focus on combating that threat since NATO, the
nations of the former Soviet Union, and others are going to be facing it
in the future.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">Upgraded Patriot,
Maritime Systems, and THAAD</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Within the spectrum of theater
missile defense, the Bottom-Up Review asked me to focus on three areas.
The first area is the immediate upgrading of systems like Patriot, which
are in the field today, making them all they can be. The second area is
the development of new mid-term capabilities, and in this area we are
probably spending at least half, if not two-thirds, of our budget. For the
midterm (i.e., maturing in the 1990s and in the field in the year 2000),
we are planning three core systems: an upgrade to the Patriot; the first
maritime ballistic missile defense system, which would be based on the
U.S. Aegis cruiser; and THAAD, or Theater High Altitude Area Defense.
THAAD is the first system that is designed from the ground up as a
ballistic missile defense system and will be the first system that will be
able to match the existing theater threat. (We consider the theater threat
to be a range from 100 km to over 3000 km; it is well short of a strategic
threat and much slower than a strategic threat.) While the reentry vehicle
of a theater missile is much easier to see than that of a strategic
missile, theater defense is still a tremendous challenge. On the U.S.
side, therefore, we will not have a significant theater missile defense
capability until around the turn of the century. For some of us, that is
unsettling, because things can certainly occur before the turn of the
century to threaten our missions.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">Long-term and Other
Programs</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The final area of focus in
theater missile defense is the long term. There, we are seeking more
technologically challenging solutions such as a wide-area maritime system
that would have a significant range and would be able to defend an ally
from over the horizon, as it were, at sea. We are also looking into a
boost-phase interceptor--an air-to-air missile that would be delivered by
a fighter aircraft and would engage the boost phase. Such an engagement
would preclude an enemy entry into friendly air space and would actually
cause the enemy booster to crash in the adversary's area rather than in
ours. Developing such an interceptor is very challenging technologically,
but it is something that we must examine.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The rest of the U.S. missile
defense budget will be spent on technologies to support long-range sensing
and surveillance, better and cheaper components for our theater missile
defense systems, and long-term investments in strategic defense if we feel
such defenses need to be employed. Also, Congress has asked me to project
both the performance aspects of a strategic defense and the timeline for
deployment, because we are worried that a potential adversary with
mass-destruction capability might be able to develop a larger missile
system that could fly over oceans and strike the United States. For the
time being, though, we are focusing on the battlefield area, the NATO
area, and the two regional contingencies that are part of our national
strategy.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">COOPERATION WITH OTHER
COUNTRIES INCLUDING RUSSIA</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">I want to reemphasize the
significance of international cooperative research and development. The
United States has spent a great deal on ballistic missile defense:
approximately $33 billion. And we do not yet have a system. I have asked
for an additional $18 billion over the next five years to obtain the
modicum of capability mentioned above. As you can see, we need the
technologies that are available in Europe, Russia, and elsewhere. Over the
past few years, we have had cooperative programs with the United Kingdom
(our biggest collaborator), Israel, France, the Netherlands, Germany,
Japan, and, most recently, Russia.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Cooperation with Russia and
other states of the former Soviet Union is definitely interesting, and we
are gaining technical information from it. It plays an important role in
providing a missile defense capability, but also in synergizing the
tremendous military defense capabilities of the two nations in an area
that could be beneficial to us all.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">With Russia, we are looking at
two areas. The first is our ballistic missile defense program, which we
feel could be very helpful in supporting arms-control regimes,
particularly in the area of advanced sensors--satellite systems, radars,
and other such equipment.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Second, the cooperative program
with Russia is an important step in maintaining Russian enterprises by
funding research and ongoing developmental activity in areas in which both
we and Russia are particularly strong. By working cooperatively, we are
developing mutually supportive programs that help steer research away from
nuclear systems and toward defensive non-nuclear technologies. Through
such cooperation, we feel we can improve simultaneously the security of
Western powers, Russia, and various other regional powers. We can also
improve general political relations and increase the prospects for
counter-proliferation and non-proliferation, which are still important
elements of our national strategy. The motivation for this cooperation was
a 1992 proposal by President Yeltsin that he called Global Protection.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">Dr. J. David Martin</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">General O'Neill alluded to a
variety of discussions about NATO activities and others that we are
currently having around the world. These discussions began with the
development of the Revised Strategic Concept, which recognized a need to
look at missile defenses, among other approaches, in order to respond to
the problems of nuclear proliferation.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">More recently, we have seen
renewed energy for examining a variety of ways to include missile defenses
in our overall strategy. At the January 1994 NATO Summit, two groups on
proliferation were established to develop the political framework. In
addition, the military is actively developing a military requirement,
recognizing the threat that may emerge from the Middle East and perhaps
North Africa. A mandate has also been given to the Alliance's material
research and development people to look at current capabilities, evaluate
how they can be improved to provide a first capability in missile defense
(with the Patriot system, for example), and, more importantly, begin to
determine how we can provide an overall area defense of NATO in the
future. The Conference of National Armament Directors has assembled a
group to examine how to proceed with all these issues on a cooperative
basis. Given the limited resources of the United States and its European
partners, we must work together to put a capability into the field.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
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