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<TITLE>SACEUR General George A. Joulwan...Building a New NATO</TITLE>
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<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+4"></FONT><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+4">Building
a New NATO</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+2">General George Joulwan,
Workshop Honorary General Chairman and</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><I><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+2">Supreme Allied
Commander Europe</FONT></FONT></I></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Deputy Secretary General Sergio
Balanzino opened this year's NATO Workshop by describing several new
initiatives: the Partnership for Peace, Combined Joint Task Force, and
Counter Proliferation programs. Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes,
Swedish Foreign Minister af Ugglas, former Congressman and Secretary of
Defense Les Aspin, and Finnish Ambassador Jaakko Blomberg discussed the
political and security implications of these initiatives and provided
views from both the Northern and Central parts of NATO. For my part, I
would like to give my assessment of where Allied Command Europe is today,
and where it is going. Although I have few answers, I do have some
questions and some ideas.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">My remarks will focus on the
implementation of a new NATO. Much attention has already been devoted to
the different initiatives resulting from the January 1994 Summit, and we
have already heard many perspectives on the roles of our new Partners as
well as the uncertainty and instability that still exist in Europe. I
would like to make three additional points concerning our changing
Alliance:</FONT></FONT> </P>
<UL>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">First, our new NATO missions
are complex, varied, and resource dependent.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Second, we can achieve
significant synergy in linking the Combined Joint Task Force and
Partnership for Peace initiatives.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Third, we need to develop a
mechanism to work with organizations--such as the U.N. or the WEU--that
request NATO assets before the decision is made to commit Alliance
resources.</FONT></FONT></LI>
</UL>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE'S
NEW MISSIONS ARE COMPLEX</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Let me be more specific about
the first point. Over the past 40 years, we built and maintained a robust
NATO sustained at a high state of readiness, although quite unlikely to be
committed. Today, we have drastically reduced the size of the force. In
some cases, we have cut readiness at the very same time that NATO is
committed and operating out of area. This situation can be somewhat
problematic. From a force structure standpoint, peacekeeping operations
can be more demanding than Cold War operations. Every battalion committed
to peacekeeping requires two or three battalions to support it.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">We are also working in an
environment of constrained resources and budgets. In the next two years,
many nations within the Alliance will reduce their force structures
anywhere from 20 to 60 percent. Equally troublesome is the cutback in both
modernization and R&D funds. After years of sacrifice, the people of
our member nations expect some sort of peace dividend--and rightly so.
Reductions have been and, I believe, will continue to be severe. Yet our
requirements continue to grow. I am not hand-wringing, just pointing out
the facts that we must live with as the mission of the operational arm of
NATO continues.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">From Norway, at the northern
boundary of Allied Command Europe, to Turkey, on the southern boundary, we
are committed in many different ways. In the south, we are in the former
Yugoslavia doing a non-Article 5 mission. To be more specific, we are
conducting Operation Deny Flight, in which NATO is enforcing U.N. Security
Council resolutions with over 200 combat aircraft. In Operation Sharp
Guard, the enforcement of the U.N.'s maritime embargo, NATO provides
support with about 25 combat warships. We are also involved in a "be-prepared"
mission for an operation called Discipline Guard in the event of a
negotiated settlement. Elsewhere in the Balkans, forces from NATO states
are supporting Able Sentry in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia.
We have a multinational operation airlifting and airdropping humanitarian
aid in the former Yugoslavia; it is called Provide Promise. Moreover, we
have Provide Comfort, a multinational operation in support of the U.N. in
Turkey. Those are real commitments that draw assets from one single
pot--Allied Command Europe.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">But there are still more
requirements and commitments. Let me cite just a few. Part of our mission
remains to prepare for an Article 5 situation, and that requires
considerable training. We have now been asked to prepare for a Combined
Joint Task Force headquarters. Although we are still waiting for clear
instructions on this, it is, nonetheless, a requirement. We also have the
Partnership for Peace program, for which 20 Partners had signed up as of
mid-June 1994. Its impact on the Alliance will be very extensive. And the
states of the former Soviet Union still have more than 20,000 nuclear
weapons. Lieutenant General O'Neill and Secretary Aspin have described the
implications of that fact in terms of theater missile defense.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">All these challenges and
commitments demonstrate that Allied Command Europe has a much more diverse
set of missions than ever before. Today, we must determine how to create a
framework for our various missions--a framework that makes sense both to
the operating command and to our member nations. We must also determine
the overall implications of these missions in terms of command, control,
and resources for the entire integrated military structure.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Let me sum up my first point:
This is the new NATO, a vastly different Alliance than the one whose
primary mission was to face an attack from Soviet forces. We must adjust
to that challenge in terms of missions and resources--requirements and
contributions. In doing so, we must make good on a unique opportunity to
create, in our lifetime, a new Europe--one whole and free, from the
Atlantic to the Urals.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><B><FONT SIZE="+1">CREATING SYNERGY
BETWEEN COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE AND PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE</FONT></B><FONT SIZE="+0"></FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">We have to be realistic about
what we are facing. We must make some tough assessments and provide clear
military advice to the political and military leaders of the Alliance.
Then, we can take clear, timely, comprehensive political guidance from
Brussels and use the Partnership for Peace and Combined Joint Task Force
efforts to prepare to work with our Partners in peacekeeping and
humanitarian relief activities. If our Partners are going to stand up
forces to work with NATO in out of area or peacekeeping commitments, it
also makes sense for those Partners to train to common standards, use
common procedures, and follow a common doctrine in order to create the
best conditions for success. Perhaps the Partnership Coordination Cell can
help provide such doctrine, training, and exercises for interested
Partners who could later work under a Combined Joint Task Force controlled
by either NATO or non-NATO. Linking and leveraging the Combined Joint Task
Force and Partnership for Peace in this way makes excellent sense
operationally. If we can succeed in attaining such synergy, we will have a
new NATO, one in which we work with our Partners in a truly proactive and
productive manner.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">WORKING WITH
ORGANIZATIONS THAT REQUEST NATO ASSETS</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Now, I would like to turn to my
third point: how we can work with other organizations, including the U.N.
or the WEU. Operating with another organization may involve making
Combined Joint headquarters and other assets available. But, before we
hand over such resources, we must make sure that we understand that there
is only one pot--one set of assets from which to draw. The required assets
for both non-Article 5 and Article 5 missions include combat forces,
combat support forces, and combat service support forces. When we make
those resources available in a non-Article 5 area, they may involve only
10 to 20 percent of our available combat forces but employ 75 to 80
percent of our available logistics, communications, and intelligence
forces. This makes things very difficult because there are only a limited
number of resources from which to draw, and I am responsible to our
political and military masters for the apportionment of those assets. As
we look more closely at peace-support operations, we must take into
consideration the impact they will have on the rest of our missions and
our strategy.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">I want to underscore the fact
that many of our most critical assets are in very short supply. It will be
quite important in the future for us and for all NATO member nations to be
very much aware of how those shortages affect operational capability. For
example, every satellite communication (SATCOM) system in Allied Command
Europe is currently supporting operations in the former Yugoslavia. So, as
we look at new NATO initiatives and proposals and as we contemplate
committing more of our forces, we must keep in mind such shortages and the
continuing needs of commanders across the Alliance. In doing so, we will
be able to provide both the Military Committee and the North Atlantic
Council with clear military advice, especially on the apportionment of
forces, before forces are committed.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">LEADER DEVELOPMENT,
INTEROPERABILITY, PEACE-SUPPORT OPERATIONS, AND LIAISON</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Let me add a few more thoughts
before concluding. First, we need to find ways to do better leader
development training. The changing world environment makes it imperative
to prepare our nations' senior leaders for the full spectrum of possible
challenges. This is a tough assignment; and we need seminars, study
sessions, and computer-assisted exercises to help in this effort. In May,
we conducted the first high-level exercise within Allied Command Europe.
It was well-attended by flag officers from throughout the Alliance; we
will continue to emphasize this sort of training. We welcome assistance
and suggestions on how to proceed in the leader development of Allied
Command Europe.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">My second thought concerns
interoperability, which has been a NATO issue for decades. Today, as we
begin to operate with new Partners, we need to consider what that concept
means to PFP in terms of communications, command and control, logistics,
and other common areas. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, 35 nations
are involved--many of them trained to different standards, with different
doctrines, different forms of communications, and different logistics. If
we have the opportunity, and if our Partners are willing, I believe we
should try to determine how to create the best conditions for success in
working together with air, land, and sea forces. So, interoperability will
become a major PFP issue. I will try to use the SHAPE Technical Center to
assist me with it, but I would also welcome any suggestions as we move
ahead in this very important field.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Regarding peace-support
operations, one might ask a number of questions. Should we integrate them
into the total spectrum of our training? Should we include both Article 5
and non-Article 5 missions in our training plan? Should we consider
different methods depending on the presence of conscripts and volunteers
in the force? Peace-support operations are very difficult and complex
missions, and we need to understand how to train both NATO and Partner
forces to conduct them.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">My final point concerns liaison,
particularly with the U.N. Clearly, as we continue to support U.N. forces,
we must establish some sort of liaison mechanism between our
organizations, both at the political and military levels. On the military
level, it is certainly important to discuss procedures and rules of
engagement, as well as command and control, with the United Nations before
commitment.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">CONCLUSION</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Today, we are witnessing the
emergence of a new NATO. Even as we build this new organization, we must
continue to nurture the solidarity, mutual trust, and confidence that have
made the Alliance great. At the same time, we must conduct the whole new
spectrum of missions ranging from Article 5 to peace-support operations.
To do so efficiently and effectively will require the understanding and
support of our member nations. We must stabilize our existing forces, have
clarity in both our missions and purpose, and continue to promote
modernization and technological development. To do all this will require
unprecedented innovation and imagination by the leadership of Allied
Command Europe and the member nations. It will require the insights of
clear-thinking leaders.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">PANEL DISCUSSION</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">Major General Kenneth
Hagemann</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)
appreciated the opportunity to participate in the Eleventh NATO Workshop,
which is also the eighth that our agency has supported. This year,
Norway's beautiful land was an ideal setting for what proved to be one of
the truly valuable conferences of this type. Such workshops are an
extremely important part of DNA's vision of how we should modify our
research and development program from year to year to ensure that we meet
the war fighters' requirements. One of DNA's primary operational missions
is to provide technical support assessments and advice to the operational
commanders. By participating in such workshops, we are better able to
understand those requirements. Furthermore, the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, which is a primary concern of the United States, is
increasingly becoming a concern of the Alliance and the world at large.
This concern includes deterrence, arms control, treaty support, deep
underground targets, collateral effects and damage, preemptive strikes,
mission planning, Nunn-Lugar support, lethality, and defensive forces. All
these issues are part of DNA's research and development program.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Because of the importance of
DNA's relationship with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE),
it was a great pleasure for me to introduce General George Joulwan, who
has been the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) since October 1993
and is the eleventh SACEUR in succession since General Eisenhower. General
Joulwan has spent over half of his career in Europe, serving in a variety
of positions throughout the Berlin Wall era, from its construction to its
fall. Born in Pottsville, Pennsylvania, he graduated from the U.S.
Military Academy at West Point, and went on to serve two combat tours in
Vietnam. During his fourteen years in Germany, he went from platoon leader
to division commander. General Joulwan came to SHAPE last year after
serving as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Southern Command. In his short
time on the job, he has been faced with numerous challenges, one of which
is NATO's involvement in military actions for the first time since its
inception. General Joulwan's responsibilities are awesome, and NATO's
military command is very fortunate to have him at the helm.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The distinguished group of
commanders whose remarks appear below are General Joulwan's brain trust.
Admiral Leighton Smith, the Commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe, is
principally involved with the situation in the former Yugoslavia; General
Helge Hansen is Commander of Allied Forces Central Europe, and the officer
in charge of the two Partnership exercises that have been scheduled in the
Netherlands and Poland; General Sir Garry Johnson is the Commander of
Allied Forces Northern Europe; finally, General Danielsen is the head of
the ACE Reaction Force Planning staff at SHAPE. Their contributions will
help us understand how to look at events and issues from the perspective
of their applications to the military and to the allied operating command.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">Admiral Leighton W.
Smith, III</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Commander-in-Chief Allied
Forces Southern Europe</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">In the former Yugoslavia, we
have four distinct ongoing operations: Deny Flight, Sharp Guard, Provide
Promise, and the development of plans in the event that the U.N. should
ask NATO to execute a peacekeeping operation. Each of these programs have
different chains of command. Some go through national channels; others go
through NATO channels or in parallel with the U.N. and NATO. Generally, in
"Lessons Learned," we try to discover what is wrong and spend
little time on what is right. But a good mission statement derived from
clear political guidance is the common element that led to success on all
operations in which I have been personally involved. Such guidance is
vital and must come up front. With it, you can develop a military concept
of operations and a plan to follow that concept. Unfortunately, political
guidance is at times received infrequently and may not be clearly or
completely understood.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">A second element of success
comes from clear rules of engagement, together with an understanding of
how each nation will follow them. For example, Germans can or cannot do
certain things because of interpretations of their constitution; a Greek
ship can or cannot do other things for political reasons. But we can
accommodate these differences as long as we know them in advance.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Trained individuals--people who
have a level of expertise that allows them to be certified for a given
operation--are a third element. When pilots and crews come to Deny Flight,
for instance, they go through a certification process that includes
familiarization flights. They are also tested on Rules of Engagement
before being certified individually by Commander AFSOUTH. In the same way,
ships' commanding officers and crews go through a training and
certification process before being put in their positions. As a result,
when Sharp Guard or Deny Flight crews are asked to act within their
mission statement, there is no doubt that they can do it.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Our Intelligence is very good.
Although no Intelligence is perfect, ours is as good as it can be for a
given situation. The great deal of effort that has gone into this area is
providing good situational awareness and a good tactical picture.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Most people do not think much
about trust, but it comes as a result of meeting people and working
together. In Deny Flight, for example, the situation is not ideal from a
unity of command viewpoint. Yet there is clear unity of effort and purpose
because of the personal relationships Bertrand de Lapresle, Michael Rose,
and myself have established, and because we communicate frequently. Of
course, we do not agree on everything, but we can work together
effectively.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Finally, when trying to develop
an operational order for peacekeeping, it is important that these orders
be dynamic, because operations that were envisioned six months ago may
have changed a great deal in the meantime.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">General Helge Hansen</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Commander-in-Chief Allied
Forces Central Europe</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">I would like to comment on the
SHAPE Technical Center (STC) using my personal experience at SHAPE as
Deputy Chief of Staff Operations. If any organization has really earned
the name Rapid Reaction, it is the STC. The deployment of forces from the
center to the southern flanks could not have been handled as it was--under
tight political control and reacting to daily demands--without the SHAPE
Technical Center's help in creating an inter-regional command and control
system and its rapid development of the software and hardware interfaces.
The SHAPE Technical Center is also developing a software and hardware
technology that will be valuable over the mid and long term. When rapid
reaction is needed in times of crisis, this center is most responsive and,
in my view, one of our most precious assets at the disposal of the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">General Sir Garry
Johnson, KCB, OBE, MC</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Commander-in-Chief Allied
Forces Northern Europe</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">During the Workshop discussion,
General Hjalmar Sunde asked whether resource constraints, as well as the
concentration on peacekeeping, were beginning to draw down the funds
available for Article 5-type training. As a subordinate commander to
SACEUR, I believe that there is such a danger. Peacekeeping, which is the
thing of the moment, uses SACEUR's resources; peacekeeping takes people
from my headquarters and General Hansen's (CINC Central Europe) in order
to give them to Admiral Smith (CINC Southern Europe). Moreover, some
governments and politicians find this process so absorbing that they
happily divert resources from Article 5 situations, because they think
that the risks of an Article 5 situation are improbably low. Surely,
Admiral Smith would say that the AWACS used in his peacekeeping operation
are effective because they are trained for Article 5 at the higher end of
the war-fighting spectrum.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Therefore, I occasionally get
worried when people angle in on peacekeeping, saying, for example, "Let's
teach peacekeeping. That is the thing of the future." I then remember
the head of the armed forces of an English-speaking nation on the other
side of the world who was concerned about isolation; he wanted to send
forces over to join in a peacekeeping operation but feared that, in doing
so, his forces would forget war-fighting--which is what they were really
trained for. I sometimes look at the exercise program and wonder whether
we are in danger of losing sight of the real purpose of the Alliance's
armed forces--and not just Article 5. After all, as SACEUR said, you may
begin a peacekeeping intervention at one end of the war-fighting spectrum
and who knows to what level it will grow before you are finished.
Therefore, we need to maintain our war-fighting capability.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">Lieutenant General
Dagfinn Danielsen</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Chief of Staff, ACE
Reaction Force Planning Staff</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">General Joulwan asked me to
collect the lessons learned from the former Yugoslavia as a way to help
NATO's planning and execution of operations. One aim was to establish a "Center
for Lessons Learned" that would permit us to systematically benefit
from our experience. In order to improve future interoperability, we must
keep track of the lessons we learned. I am not ready yet to give details
about the lessons from the former Yugoslavia, but our work should be
completed soon.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Perhaps, a group of experts
could define the problem areas for interoperability, but I do not believe
it is that easy. Only exercises will show us where difficulties lie and
how to take corrective action. Since exercises will cost money, I hope
that the politicians will follow through on their decisions to allocate
sufficient resources for that purpose.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">We will be able to develop a
common doctrine, common standards, and common procedures for peacekeeping
or peace-support operations, but it will take time. Although this kind of
work initially began during the Second World War, some areas still call
for improvement. The interoperability problem may be easier to define,
however, when it is restricted to peace-support operations. Of course, as
General Joulwan pointed out, interoperability is a two-way street. We
cannot merely place huge stacks of NATO documents on the table and ask our
Partners to read them. We also need to draw on their own expertise, since
many of the Partner countries have substantial experience with
peacekeeping operations that could benefit NATO.</FONT></FONT> </P>
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