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<TITLE>Secretary General Willy Claes...Expanding Peace and Stability in an
Unsettled World</TITLE>
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<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+4">Expanding Peace and
Stability in an Unsettled World</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+3">Secretary General Willy
Claes</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><I><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+2">North Atlantic Treaty
Organization</FONT></FONT></I></CENTER>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1"><B>TOWARD A COMMON
EUROPEAN FUTURE</B></FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Twice in our century, Sarajevo
has taught us a painful lesson. The last one is fresh in our minds. When
checks and balances fail, age-old rivalries and deep-seated hatred easily
win the day. Civilization is but a thin veneer: once the rule of law
breaks down, ethnic passion, racism, and bigotry take over. I know this
all too well, having spent most of my political career negotiating
civilized compromises between Belgian communities and between European
member states. The victims of Sarajevo 1994 taught us a painful lesson
indeed. But Sarajevo taught us an earlier lesson, too. In 1914, my country
became the first victim of a world war that had erupted far from Belgium.
We should never forget what can happen when major powers become entangled
in local conflicts; we should never forget what can happen when major
powers, instead of absorbing their natural frictions, fight them out at
the first available occasion. Great powers on the rampage are as much a
danger to civilization as ethnic hatred let loose.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">How do we prevent history from
repeating itself? Given the two lessons of Sarajevo, the answers seem
clear. These answers may not always be easy to implement, but that does
not make them less compelling! First of all, how do we prevent peoples,
languages, and religions from battling each other? How can we coax and
cajole both minorities and majorities into compromising and even into
cooperating? As we will see, both NATO and the European Union have a
leading role to play in this respect. A further challenge looms beyond
this task of pushing a myriad of peoples and cultures into cooperation.
How are we to ensure that the big powers in Europe work together? In my
view, this question leads to two others:</FONT></FONT> </P>
<UL>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">How and when will the U.S.,
Russia, and the European Union "get their act together?"</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Once they do, in what kind of
framework will they reconcile their interests and arbitrate their
conflicts?</FONT></FONT></LI>
</UL>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">NATO and the European Union will
supply the framework for answering both of these questions. Before
addressing them, however, a word of caution is necessary. Until now, the
end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Empire were managed
rather well. But the civil war in Yugoslavia and the recent diplomatic
fistfight at the June 1994 NACC meeting in Istanbul proved how deep fault
lines still run. There is no room for complacency. The fight for our
common future is not won yet. As a politician, I know only too well that
resting on one's laurels means in fact going backward. Europe's future
requires that we act.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1"><B>LIVING TOGETHER IN A
KALEIDOSCOPIC EUROPE</B></FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">We have some experience in
living together in Belgium and in the European Union. After the demise of
the multinational empires of the last century, the idea prevailed that
different peoples could not live together. Following in the footsteps of
German romanticism and French Jacobinism, the Wilson Doctrine basically
stated that peoples equal states. This axiom created as many problems as
it solved. Since then, we have learned that--as in coalition
governments--living together can go as well as it can go wrong. Nothing is
preordained. To make it work, the only rule is to work at it. As long as
living together remains the best available alternative for everybody, it
should be fine. In Europe, NATO and the European Union can and should
ensure that such is indeed the case.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">NATO as Keeper of the
Peace</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">NATO is, of course, pivotal in
keeping the peace between many countries, minorities, cultures, and
languages. With that aim in mind, NATO should act in four directions:</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">First, the progressive
integration of Eastern European countries into a NATO network is probably
the best guarantee against quarrels. Without NATO, Greece and Turkey would
probably have been on the brink of war more than once, and even over the
brink. The deeper the countries of the East are integrated into our
networks, the higher the cost of war, the louder our voices of reason.
This argument alone would have made Partnership for Peace and the
associate WEU partnership worthwhile.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Second, NATO should further
strengthen its credibility as the keeper of peace. NATO acted with resolve
in Yugoslavia. We all know that NATO was decisive in resetting the course
of the negotiations. Action has made NATO the single most important
bulwark to keep civil war in Yugoslavia from spreading or being copied.
This new type of "deterrence," however, needs consolidation.
Otherwise, NATO's contribution to keeping the peace will have been merely
a passing coincidence. For NATO to secure a lasting place in peacekeeping,
there should be no doubt about our willingness to help implement a
Yugoslav peace settlement. In planning for this implementation, we will
have to account for the fact that peace will probably be very fragile and
that the option of a limited interposition force in the U.N. tradition
will not be sufficient. We will need something more forceful, more
convincing--the involvement of the United States. Indeed, one thing is
certain in my mind: without the U.S., there can be no credible
implementation and, without NATO, there will be no U.S. participation.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Third, for peacekeeping, NATO
should always operate within the bounds of international legality.
Peacekeeping should always be in accordance with the U.N. Charter, in
particular with its Chapter VII. NATO would otherwise provoke the same
international suspicion as some Russian operations did. To make my point,
let us recall the strong Russian reactions, even when we acted fully
within the "rules and regulations" of the U.N. resolutions on
Yugoslavia. At a certain stage, the NATO decision on air strikes was
challenged by Russia, and the Russian government seems to have
difficulties convincing Russian public opinion that, in conducting this
kind of operation, the Atlantic Alliance is not taking sides. Two
arguments, however, should be made:</FONT></FONT> </P>
<UL>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">In peacekeeping, NATO has
been careful to position its action within the U.N. framework. One would
be very happy if Russia would do as much for its own peacekeeping
activities.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">We must realize that there is
little enthusiasm on the part of NATO governments for sending
interposition forces to lower tension areas in countries as remote as
Azerbaijan or Tajikistan. The Russians should not feel that NATO is
trying to expand its influence under the cover of peacekeeping.</FONT></FONT></LI>
</UL>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">This last remark leads me to a
fourth point. Should NATO take peacekeeping beyond its own heartland in
Europe? In my mind, the answer to this question is more political than
legal. Whenever we decide to intervene, we should consider our security
interests first. NATO should engage in peacekeeping solely when our vital
interests are at stake. Is this the case, then, for crises erupting on the
other side of the Mediterranean? A positive answer cannot be ruled out,
but we should be aware that there is a difference. Peacekeeping in the
Maghreb is something different from keeping the peace in our "home
counties" of Europe: it is more a case of fighting a fire in your
neighbor's house rather than in your own house. This very distinction will
undoubtedly bring some, but not all, Allies to doubt the wisdom of NATO
acting in these farther reaches. They will most certainly prefer that such
peacekeeping be the U.N.'s responsibility. No matter how reasonable this
position may be, it should not, however, become a pretext for NATO to
avoid reflecting on the "southern threat."</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">European Union
Contributions to Peacekeeping</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">While NATO is central to keeping
the peace, it is not the only factor. Whatever the imperfect state of the
European Union, its dampening effect on a multitude of potential conflicts
is unmistakable. Let me just point out three areas of contribution:</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">First, the European Union is a
living example that former enemies can become friends. Although this may
be self-evident, it is still worth pointing out that Germany and France
have now become the mainstay of stability in Western Europe. Moreover,
minority problems within the Union may have caused extreme tensions but
many of them fell to the forces of compromise and persuasion in the end.
We should not underestimate our capacity for setting a good example and
leading the way. The creation of a Regional Committee in the Maastricht
Treaty has given additional impetus to this "living together
peacefully" approach. Of course, the question remains as to whether
the sheer push and pull of the forces of attraction within the Union are
strong enough for settling all internal conflicts. By the time the Union
grows in size to twenty-two member states, there may be an increase of
internal frictions centered around minorities and borders. Sometimes, I
wonder whether we should not include in our future treaties the principle
of peaceful settlement of disputes and mandatory arbitration. Once Hungary
and its neighbors are members of the Union, these rules may come in handy.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Of course, "prévenir
vaut mieux que guérir." Today, the European Union is actively
engaged in a two-pronged approach:</FONT></FONT> </P>
<UL>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The Copenhagen Summit gave a
new perspective to Eastern Europe. Cooperation and assistance are
forthcoming, agreements have been concluded, special programs have been
worked out. These short-term measures have been linked to future
accession. This enlargement to come does not carry a date yet, but two
things are clear: the promise is there, and no outside vetoes will
influence us. In my opinion, this promise of accession is in itself an
incentive for the candidates to solve their conflicts.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">There is also another prong
to our approach. We do not count on the prize of accession as the sole
means of motivating Eastern European countries to behave well. We
actively try to help them settle their differences. The Commission's
arbitration between Hungary and Slovakia concerning the waters of the
Danube is but one example. The joint action of the Stability Pact is
another. Even though it may not yield immediate results, it brought a
message loud and clear, i.e., settle your problems if you wish to enter.</FONT></FONT></LI>
</UL>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Last but not least, the Union
supplies a third contribution to peacekeeping. Since the January 1994 NATO
Summit, WEU has the necessary leeway to organize its own peacekeeping, "separable
but not separate" from NATO. As I said in Istanbul, NATO today should
intensify its work on the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) to match the
work already done in the WEU following British-Belgian proposals.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1"><B>THE NEW STRATEGIC
TRIANGLE BETWEEN THE KEY PLAYERS</B></FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Keeping small powers and peoples
together is one thing. Keeping big powers working together is another.
After two world wars, a country like mine does not need to be reminded of
what happens when two powerful neighbors are at loggerheads. For all of
us, the construction of a triangle of cooperation between the three main
players in Europe--the United States, Russia, and the European Union--is
in our most vital interest. Of course, each key player needs to sort out
its own affairs before it can become a reliable and predictable partner in
cooperation.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1"><B>American Foreign Policy
Objectives</B></FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Today, the United States seems
ahead of others in the reordering of its foreign policy priorities in
Europe. At the January 1994 NATO Summit, the U.S. signaled two positions:</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<UL>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">First, it wants to remain a
fundamental partner in European security. President Clinton's promise to
keep a hundred thousand U.S. troops in Europe was an eloquent expression
of this principle.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Second, it asked us Europeans
to shoulder a bigger share of the common burden. U.S. insistence on "separable
but not separate" peacekeeping and on the "European Security
Dimension" stemmed from this principle.</FONT></FONT></LI>
</UL>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Moreover, after the Summit, the
U.S. played an increasing role in trying to settle the Yugoslav crisis,
giving living proof of its involvement in Europe. Let us note in passing
that all of this took form and substance through NATO. I will come back to
that.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1"><B>Russia's Generally
Volatile Foreign Policy</B></FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Russia, on the contrary, seems
farther from a stable foreign policy and even from internal stability in
general. Recent years have shown how unpredictable Russia's political
future can be. Given the importance of rightist and conservative circles,
political surprises should never be excluded, the more so because the
economic situation remains abysmal. Although Russia may have a supply of
brains, energy, and raw materials, Moscow has not succeeded in harnessing
these factors into a workable economy. On the contrary, poverty, misery,
and crime seem to be the only growth sectors. This political and economic
instability basically means that, more than ever, Russia exists as a
superpower solely in a military sense. Understandably, countries in
Eastern Europe and the Baltic States are frightened by this volatile mix
of military might and economic-political uncertainty. Their only
consolation so far, and it is slim at best, is that Russia today renders
more lip service to the CSCE principles and speaks less about the grand
theory of the "near abroad." This consolation is very slim
indeed because, in practice, we see a return to big power politics. In the
Caucasus, Russia plays its own games. On another level, Russia's bad
temper in Istanbul is clear evidence of Moscow's return to big power
politics. This return to "true nature" was to be expected. As we
will see, the real question is how to insert Russia and its legitimate
interests into a positive network. This will be a daunting task, in which
NATO will have a vital role to perform.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">The European Union's
Pole of Stability</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">And then, there is the European
Union, as always somewhere halfway and in between. Under the cover of
NATO, the European Union has grown into a major pole of stability. Let us
recall that:</FONT></FONT> </P>
<UL>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Negotiations for the
enlargement of the Union to include Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Norway
have been completed; in the meantime, so-called Europe Agreements have
been concluded with six Central and Eastern European countries with a
perspective of accession to the Union.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The Western European Union
has offered Associated Partner status to the same group of countries,
including the three Baltic States, that are also in the process of
concluding Europe Agreements.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Last month, in Paris, these
nine countries agreed to work with the Union on a stability pact that
will help them develop "good neighbor" relations with each
other.</FONT></FONT></LI>
</UL>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Nevertheless, it is clear that
Europe did not go far enough in establishing a common foreign and security
policy. The instruments at its disposal were not sufficient to cope with a
situation as explosive and violent as the one that developed in
Yugoslavia. As a matter of fact, the sequence of events demonstrates that
only the active involvement of the United States and Russia, together with
the European Union and the United Nations, could possibly have an
influence on the war--and even that must still be demonstrated. The policy
of our Action Plan remains the right approach but, at the time, the Union
alone did not have enough weight to see it through.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">A question now arises: are the
instruments of the Maastricht Treaty efficient enough to deal with a new
crisis of this type? And, if not, what can be done in the review process
of 1996? Like other countries, Belgium is currently reflecting on possible
proposals for the 1996 review. They will be presented in due course. In
the meantime, I would like to point out that the development of a common
security and defense policy at the European Union level is not a challenge
to the Atlantic Alliance. On the contrary, it will help the Alliance in
its own adaptation process.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1"><B>A Three-Party Strategic
Equation</B></FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">While the three main players are
reordering or refining their foreign policy objectives in Europe, every
possible effort should be made to insert all three into a strategic
equation. This equation should become the mainstay of stability in Europe.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Between Russia and the United
States, a stable relationship seems to be emerging:</FONT></FONT> </P>
<UL>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">On the purely bilateral
level, intense cooperation exists, in particular in the economic and
nuclear fields.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">On the multilateral level,
Russia's status as an important power is slowly but surely being
reconfirmed. Difficulties concerning Russia's signing of the Partnership
for Peace will be ironed out. A substantial dialogue with NATO will
presumably evolve. This dialogue should remain informal. There is no
question as to giving Russia veto privileges on what NATO decides, in
particular when Eastern European countries and the Baltic States are
concerned.</FONT></FONT></LI>
</UL>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Between the U.S. and the
European Union, matters seem to be rather clear:</FONT></FONT> </P>
<UL>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">During Belgium's presidency,
we worked hard to make the transatlantic dialogue succeed, and we always
found interest on the other side of the Atlantic. We hope that future
presidencies--be they small or big--will invest in this dialogue as
heavily as we did.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The WEU is not an alternative
to NATO but the expression of a cohesive European defense within the
Atlantic Alliance. The model on which work is being done at the moment
is the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces. It must be elaborated
based on the assumption that there should be a sharing of
responsibilities and functions between NATO and the Western European
Union.</FONT></FONT></LI>
</UL>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Far less clear are the relations
between Russia and the European Union:</FONT></FONT> </P>
<UL>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">At Corfu, we will sign a
Partnership Agreement with President Yeltsin. It should help economic
reforms and stability in Russia.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Our future political relation
with Russia remains up in the air. I sometimes fear that Russia will
resist when the full extent and importance of a future enlargement of
the Union becomes clear. Russia's new reticence towards the inclusion of
nine Eastern European countries in the WEU as Associate Partners may be
a foretaste. But one thing should be clear: whatever Russia's feelings,
we will never allow Moscow to have a veto or a "droit de regard"
on future enlargement.</FONT></FONT></LI>
</UL>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1"><B>CONCLUDING REMARKS</B></FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Throughout history, periods of
stability have been regularly followed by eras of strife and struggle.
After the Pax Romana came the great invasions. After the balance of power
in the first half of the last century came bigger and bigger wars. Our
continent has known half a century of lasting peace and prosperity.
Contrary to what many younger people believe, this situation is not the
fruit of the laws of nature. For this fortunate environment to persist, we
need to act. Only if we develop the rule of law among ourselves, only if
we stick to our institutional checks and balances, will peace and
prosperity in Europe prevail. I do not think that stability is something
automatic. On the contrary, instability is the rule and only our political
efforts will bring about the exception of stability.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">In my mind, it is crystal clear
that for these political efforts to have long-lasting effects, they should
be embedded in a durable framework. NATO and the European Union have
provided such a framework, over and over again, with good anchorage. Of
course, both institutions need updating. And, of course, nothing is
perfect. But every day we see that only NATO and the European Union have
enough power of attraction and repulsion to keep Europe a civilized place
in which to live. The fiftieth anniversary of the landing of Allied troops
in Normandy reminded us of the determining role the United States played
in restoring peace and democracy in Europe. The Atlantic Alliance created
a framework in which this presence could continue to play a stabilizing
role on our continent. The Atlantic Alliance is the shield behind which
the European Union could develop into a second anchor of stability. It
would be folly to weaken this link between the two sides of the Atlantic
and to deprive Europe of this fundamental pillar of its security.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
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