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<TITLE>Defense Secretary John P. White...Toward a New Europe: Secure,
Peaceful, Free, & Democratic</TITLE>
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<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+4">Toward a New Europe:</FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+4">Secure, Peaceful,Free, and Democratic</FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+3">United States Deputy Secretary of Defense John P.
White</FONT><FONT SIZE="+2"></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">INTRODUCTION</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>The organizers of this NATO Workshop had a wonderful idea when they
decided to host a dinner at the beautiful Lazienki Palace. Historically,
the palace is linked to King Stanislaus Augustus Poniatowski, who in 1791
gave Poland something it can be eternally proud of one of the world's
first written constitutions. By holding part of the important NATO
Workshop at the palace, I hope we will now associate it with something
else Poland can be proud of namely, an important contribution to a new
Europe that is more free, more peaceful, and more secure. </P>
<P>This new Europe was a place envisioned in a speech given on the other
side of the Atlantic 49 years ago. In that speech, an American
soldier-statesman described a Europe united from the Atlantic to the Urals
in peace and democracy, a Europe participating in a strong and enduring
transatlantic partnership sustained by bipartisan political support in the
United States. That soldier-statesman was George C. Marshall. In his
speech, Marshall set forth what came to be known as the Marshall Plan,
which offered Europe a passage toward reconstruction and renewal. Half of
Europe embraced the Marshall Plan and opened the door to prosperity and
freedom. The other half was denied this passage when Joseph Stalin slammed
the door on Marshall's offer of assistance. </P>
<P>Today we have the opportunity to complete the building of a Europe
united in peace, freedom, and democracy. As part of the effort to realize
this new Europe, NATO is in the process of making both external and
internal adaptations. These adaptations will not only aid in the creation
of the new Europe-they will also make NATO better prepared to respond to
future security challenges there. I want to give you an update on how NATO
is progressing on these adaptations and report to you on the steps taken
at the recent meetings of NATO Defense Ministers in Brussels and of the
Foreign Ministers in Berlin. </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">EXTERNAL ADAPTATIONS</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>The first element of NATO's process of external adaptation is the
strengthening of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. The Partnership
for Peace is NATO's vehicle for integrating the new democracies to our
east. PFP is fulfilling President Clinton's vow that we "will not let
the Iron Curtain be replaced with a veil of indifference." </P>
<P>Launched two years ago, PFP has become a strong, permanent, expanding
fixture in European security. In 1996 we will conduct 15 major exercises
and hundreds of other PFP-related activities. One of the most significant
of these exercises-Peace Shield '96-was held recently in Ukraine. This was
the first multinational military exercise "in the spirit of PFP"
ever held on former Soviet soil. </P>
<P>Exercises like Peace Shield '96 are important because they help teach
soldiers of Partner nations how to cooperate and communicate with NATO
forces and with each other while learning how to tackle such post-Cold War
military missions as peacekeeping, humanitarian and disaster relief, and
search and rescue. They also provide an important political benefit by
helping us bridge old Cold War chasms and build personal ties of
cooperation, trust, and understanding. </P>
<P>As we all know, however, PFP is about much more than just military
exercises. It is also about helping Partner nations build modern military
establishments under democratic, civilian control. Thanks, in part, to
PFP, many Partners are now submitting their defense plans to their
parliaments for approval, and working together in the defense Planning and
Review Process at NATO Headquarters, in much the same manner as NATO
countries do. Many Partner nations are also striving to make their
military forces interoperable with NATO. </P>
<P>We are also seeing many PFP members make political and economic reforms
that go well beyond the security sphere. Many Partner nations are working
hard to uphold democracy, tolerate diversity, respect the rights of
minorities, and assure freedom of expression. These countries are also
endeavoring to build market economies, be good neighbors, and respect
sovereign rights outside their borders. </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">Strengthening Partnership for Peace</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>To keep the momentum behind PFP going, a number of ideas were put
forward in Berlin and Brussels for strengthening it. Many of these ideas
centered around making NATO and PFP forces more compatible and
interoperable. For example, we agreed to make the PFP Planning and Review
Process more like NATO force planning. Among other things, this will help
us develop more specific goals to guide Partners as they attempt to make
their forces more compatible with NATO's. However, we continue to believe
that the key to becoming interoperable with NATO is not spending scarce
dollars on expensive equipment, but rather focusing on "low-cost/high-yield"
measures such as adopting common doctrine, technology, and training
procedures, and more English language training. </P>
<P>At our meetings we also looked at ways to build on the success of PFP
exercises by making them even better. For instance, we agreed that an
evaluation process should be created to measure the effectiveness of PFP
activities. We also agreed that there is a need to increase Partner
participation in exercise planning from the ground up by assigning Partner
representatives to NATO's subordinate commands. Building on the
experiences of our Partners in NATO's operations in Bosnia, we agreed to
increase the number and complexity of PFP exercises to include peace <I>enforcement</I>.
</P>
<P>While strengthening PFP is the responsibility of NATO as a whole, in
Brussels we discussed the need for individual NATO nations to build mentor
relationships with individual Partner countries-particularly those whose
resource constraints prevent them from doing as much in PFP as they would
like. The United States, for example, takes pride in the Warsaw Initiative
and the Regional Airspace Initiative. Denmark has played a leading role in
the creation of the BALTBAT, and I welcome Danish Defense Minister Hæ's
offer to host a Baltic Defense Ministerial this fall. Other NATO members
can also strengthen PFP by coming forward with similar initiatives. Let us
do more. </P>
<P>We also need to work harder at building healthy civil-military
relations. Partner states, for example, need to have open, democratic
processes for developing their defense and security strategies. These
should be drafted by the civilian-led Defense Ministry in cooperation with
the military staff, approved by the head of state, submitted to
parliament, and made available to the public. </P>
<P>Achieving this goal may require learning new skills. NATO nations can
help by developing mentor relationships with Partner nations in order to
promote these reforms by instruction and example. Seminars are also
beneficial, such as the one in Garmisch, Germany, last April, and require
greater participation by defense civilians from the Allied nations. I
would urge that we consider special regional conferences on this issue as
well. </P>
<P>A strong PFP will provide new democracies that are not ready or do not
wish to become NATO members with continued opportunities to develop closer
ties to NATO and to participate in European security affairs. It will also
provide these Partner nations with continued opportunities to build
cooperative bonds amongst themselves. In short, far from fading in
importance, we believe that PFP must assume even greater importance for
all participants. </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">Moving Ahead with Alliance Enlargement</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>All of the measures I have mentioned are critical to PFP's success. They
are also critical to NATO's plans to move ahead with enlargement. Last
fall, NATO completed its study on the "how"and "why"
of enlargement. We are now proceeding with the second phase of the process
and will soon establish a timetable and define a process for accession of
new members. We expect to decide on the next steps in December. At the
Brussels meeting in June, building on President Clinton's initiative of
two years before, NATO renewed its commitment to proceeding with the
gradual, deliberate, and steady process of outreach and enlargement to the
east. As Secretary Perry said, "NATO will be larger. Expansion is
moving along as planned." </P>
<P>We are determined to move forward on enlargement. But even as NATO takes
in some new members, the Alliance is not implying the exclusion of others.
The original North Atlantic Alliance grew from 12 to the current 16
members over a period of about 50 years. The next new NATO members will
not be the last. We will not create a new division of the continent or
undercut reform efforts in countries not ready or not interested in
joining NATO. </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">Building Relations Between NATO and Russia</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>As the enlargement process moves ahead, and as we engage all the new
European democracies through a strengthened PFP, we must advance the third
element of NATO external adaptation-building cooperative relations between
NATO and Russia. Russia has been a key player in Europe's security for
over 300 years. It will remain a key player in the coming decades-but will
it play a negative role or a positive one- Obviously, we all want it to be
positive. And there is cause for some optimism. </P>
<P>First of all, Russia is currently in the midst of a democratic election.
We need to remember that this simple statement would have been cause for
astonishment fewer than five years ago. We do not yet know the outcome of
the election, but the fact that the election is taking place is ultimately
more important than who wins. Building a free and fair electoral process
is an end in and of itself-it is one of the first steps that a country
should take to become part of the new Europe that we all envision. </P>
<P>The second cause for optimism is Russia's record of cooperation with the
United States over the past several years. We are making significant
progress in our efforts to dismantle our Cold War nuclear arsenals and to
prevent the spread of nuclear technology to rogue nations. </P>
<P>The third reason to be optimistic is that Russia is participating in the
Partnership for Peace program. For instance, Russia played a prominent
role in the Peace Shield '96 military exercises just three weeks ago. NATO
welcomes Russia's participation in PFP, and we would like to see more.
Indeed, we hope that over time Russia will take on a leading role in PFP
commensurate with its status as a great country. </P>
<P>A fourth cause for optimism is the well-established NATO-Russia practice
of dialogue and cooperation. NATO and Russia have agreed to cooperate on a
wide range of topics, and have held a number of useful consultations. Our
ongoing cooperation in Bosnia has been remarkable. </P>
<P>It is important for NATO and Russia to continue building on their common
ground, even when there are disagreements. It is fair to say that many in
Russia consider NATO a threat. While we cannot gloss over these concerns,
they will not be a roadblock to enlargement. In fact, we hope that Russia
will soon acknowledge the growing evidence that NATO is not a threat. The
more that Russia deepens its involvement with NATO, the more I believe
that Russia will recognize this. Ultimately, I believe that Russia will
come to understand that NATO enlargement means enlargement of a zone of
security and stability that is very much in Russia's interest. </P>
<P>Meanwhile, we cannot let our disagreements over NATO enlargement get in
the way of "here and now" opportunities to work together.
Currently the United States is reaching out to Russia with a program of
bilateral training exercises. Our goal is to expand NATO-Russia
cooperation across the board-both within PFP and within the broader
NATO-Russia "16 plus 1" relationship. Secretary Perry noted
after the Brussels conference that cooperation between the U.S. and Russia
on disarmament and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction is likely to continue regardless of the outcome of the Russian
elections because that cooperation is in the security interests of both
parties. The same holds true, he stated, concerning expanded cooperation
between Russia and NATO. </P>
<P>At the Brussels conference, the Russian Defense Minister met with the
NATO Defense Ministers in a "16 plus 1" format to discuss ways
of further expanding and institutionalizing the NATO-Russia cooperative
relationship. The discussion was positive and productive, and we look
forward to continuing this work in the coming months. </P>
<P>A recent springboard for expanded cooperation between NATO and Russia
has been our work together in Bosnia. Today a Russian brigade is serving
in a multinational division of IFOR. At NATO Headquarters, Russian General
Shevtsov is serving as the operation's liaison to NATO. General Shevtsov
and General Lentsov in Bosnia are in close contact with their NATO
counterparts, General Joulwan and General Nash, every day. </P>
<P>It took an enormous amount of work by all parties to make this
cooperative venture work. But it has been worth it-not just because of the
additional troops Russia brings to Bosnia, but because Russia's
participation in Bosnia will have a positive impact on the security of
Europe for years to come. </P>
<P>Not long ago, while at SHAPE Headquarters, I saw General Shevtsov with a
NATO secure phone on his desk. I was struck by how far we have come. We
used to have secure phones at SHAPE Headquarters so that we could talk
about NATO operations without the Russians listening to us. Now we use
secure phones to talk to the Russians about our combined operations. </P>
<P>Making this arrangement permanent--as was discussed in Brussels--will
allow Russia to gain a greater understanding of how NATO works, how NATO
countries interact, and how further military cooperation among NATO
countries, other Partner countries, and Russia can foster trust and
understanding. </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">INTERNAL ADAPTATIONS</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>In addition to helping show us the way on NATO-Russia relations--a key
element of NATO <I>external</I> adaptations--our work in Bosnia has also
given NATO a boost in moving forward on <I>internal</I> adaptations. Our
mission in Bosnia may well be representative of the new types of roles
that NATO must be prepared to take on. In order to tackle such roles, NATO
must adapt internally to become both more flexible and more efficient.
</P>
<P>In my career as a businessman, an academic, and a defense official, I
have spent a good deal of my time studying how institutions change. And I
know that the hardest institutions to persuade that change is necessary
are often those that, like NATO, have been successful but still need to
change. It is much easier to persuade institutions in crisis that change
is necessary. But change we must. </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">Increasing NATO Flexibility</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>NATO needs to become more flexible because we no longer face a
monolithic threat to which a unified response by all 16 NATO members is
the only conceivable option. Instead, we face a variety of security
threats that do not all call for the same type of response. To meet these
different challenges, we have worked hard to develop a planning and
deployment mechanism that allows for more flexibility in the use of NATO
forces and involves different mixes of assets from contributing nations.
We call this mechanism a Combined Joint Task Force, or CJTF. </P>
<P>Creating an enduring CJTF structure that is satisfactory to all 16
current member countries has been difficult, but we have made significant
progress. In the field, we have put aside our theoretical differences
about how a hypothetical CJTF would work, and found a way to put together
a real live CJTF, namely, NATO's IFOR. We now have the opportunity to
combine the practical lessons we learned in putting together IFOR with the
theoretical framework developed at NATO Headquarters. </P>
<P>We intend to keep this momentum going. In Berlin, in early June, NATO's
Foreign Ministers announced an agreement on a political-military framework
for CJTF. And in Brussels last week, the Defense Ministers directed the
North Atlantic Council to further refine and implement those arrangements.
Ultimately, the CJTF will allow the European members of NATO to strengthen
their new security and defense identity. This new flexibility will permit
such tasks as operations led by the Western European Union using NATO
assets. </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">Increasing NATO Efficiency</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>In addition to becoming more flexible, NATO also needs to become more
efficient. In some ways, NATO was not well structured for the Bosnia
mission. Our command and decision-making structures were geared almost
exclusively towards executing a known plan with designated forces against
a known adversary. Using IFOR involves much greater uncertainty. Putting
it together showed us that we have a real need to streamline and modernize
NATO's internal procedures. </P>
<P>NATO's military authorities are now taking a long, hard look at how to
make our command structure more responsive and more flexible, how to
streamline planning and force-preparation procedures, and how to simplify
and speed up the entire decision-making process. We look forward to
receiving the report that will contain their recommended changes this
fall. </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">CONCLUSION</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>The goal of NATO's internal adaptations is to allow all the Allies to
work together more effectively to meet new and changing security needs.
But some things will not change: NATO will continue to be a transatlantic
alliance; the United States will continue to play a leading role in NATO.
Bosnia has taught us that NATO still operates best when we are all
together. We hope that everyone on both sides of the Atlantic has learned
that lesson, and that NATO will continue to operate as a group on all of
its major missions. The United States has been a full partner for the last
50 years. It will remain so as the Alliance changes and grows. </P>
<P>The internal adaptations NATO is making now will make the Alliance
better prepared to respond to future challenges to European security and
stability. The changes will encourage a greater European role and will
facilitate full French participation in NATO's military bodies. They will
also help prepare NATO for enlargement. And they will help NATO build the
Europe that George Marshall spoke about 49 years ago when he proposed the
Marshall Plan. At that time, Marshall told America that it must "face
up to the responsibility which history has placed upon our country."
Today, this responsibility has been placed not only upon America, but also
upon all the nations of Europe. All of us must face up to the
responsibility to help realize a Europe that is more secure, more
peaceful, more free, and more democratic. </P>
<P>The Warsaw Workshop--like the recent meetings in Berlin and in
Brussels-- is proof that we are, in fact, meeting this responsibility. As
Secretary Perry said in Brussels, echoing President Clinton's words, "The
future of NATO is bright. NATO will be stronger and more united. NATO will
continue to expand its zone of stability and flexibility through the
Partnership for Peace. NATO will be larger. NATO will build a special
relationship with Russia. NATO will be more flexible. And the United
States cannot be secure if Europe is not secure. So the United States will
continue to play a leading role in NATO." </P>
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