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<TITLE>NATO Secretary General Javier Solana...NATO: Towards the 21st
Century</TITLE>
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<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+4">NATO: Towards the 21st Century</FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+3">NATO Secretary General Javier Solana</FONT>
</CENTER>
<P>The theme of this year's Workshop is "The Future of NATO."
Nothing could be more appropriate, since NATO is currently engaged in
generating new ideas and fresh approaches to make it effective and
relevant in the 21st century. Looking back at our Ministerial meetings in
June, I would say that the future of NATO is being made here and now. The
decisions we have made will have a profound effect on NATO's evolution.
And they show a NATO with more to do than ever, and a NATO determined to
be fit to meet the challenge. I would like to take a few moments now to
review what we are doing. </P>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">IMPLEMENTING IFOR</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>Let me first mention NATO's most pressing current priority, which is the
IFOR operation in Bosnia. Because of IFOR, this past spring has been the
first in four years that has not brought with it a major military
offensive in Bosnia. The Peace Agreement is now in its sixth month, and
NATO's vital role in leading the Implementation Force has helped both keep
and build the peace there. </P>
<P>In our Ministerial meetings, NATO has sent a clear signal that we remain
determined to do the job in Bosnia--and do it well. We will maintain IFOR
at roughly its present strength right up to and during the elections in
September. These elections are the Bosnian people's chance, at last, to
have their say. It is their chance to affirm that they wish to see Bosnia
develop positively and peacefully and to build a permanent peace together.
This is essential for the future of Bosnia. The elections will enable the
establishment of the common political institutions the country urgently
needs to overcome its divisions, both visible and invisible. </P>
<P>In addition to maintaining IFOR's strength through the elections, we
have also decided to maintain IFOR's overall capability until the end of
its mandate in December. However, it is up to the parties themselves to
pursue the long-term process of reconciliation and to recognize that peace
is the only viable option, and that compliance with the Peace Agreement is
the means of achieving it. The challenges are immense, and it will take
the full effort and commitment of all concerned to make our vision for
Bosnia succeed. In the crucial months ahead, the international community
can and must do its part to assist, but the parties themselves must take
on the responsibility of making peace work. </P>
<P>To me, the significance of IFOR transcends Bosnia. The extraordinary
cooperation embodied in the force reflects a new and unprecedented spirit
of cooperation across Europe. In my visits to Bosnia, I have been
immensely impressed and inspired by what I have seen of the IFOR
operation. Take, for example, the Nordic-Polish brigade. It brings
together the Scandinavian countries, the Baltic countries, and Poland in a
unique demonstration of practical cooperation. Americans and Russians,
too, are working side by side, frequently going out on joint patrols
together. </P>
<P>These cooperative ventures are just a few examples of a new dynamic, a
new mentality at work in Europe. Never before has there been such
extensive military cooperation on this continent. And never before, when
conflicts have arisen in the Balkans, have so many countries been on the
same side--the side of peace. IFOR is the model of an undivided Europe at
work; it is a model for the future, from which we must all learn and on
which we must build. </P>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">STRENGTHENING PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>The creation of IFOR owes a great deal to the Partnership for Peace
initiative. Without PFP it would not have been possible to assemble such a
large coalition so rapidly and so effectively. Within two years, PFP has
turned into the most ambitious military-cooperation program in Europe. It
has created momentum that we need to keep up. </P>
<P>Thus, in our meetings, we agreed to further strengthen the Partnership.
In the short term, this will be achieved by deepening the Planning and
Review Process and through our work on civil-military relations. In the
longer term, we envisage a stronger role for Partners in shaping PFP
programs. So PFP is here to stay--as a means to prepare with our Partners
for peacekeeping operations, to prepare those countries who wish to join
NATO, and to further deepen our cooperation with those countries not
planning to join NATO soon or at all. </P>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">STRENGTHENING NATO</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>We have also made major decisions designed to strengthen NATO through
the fundamental adaptation of our internal structures. This work will be
guided by three objectives: first, to ensure a more flexible, more
effective NATO with the capabilities it needs for its traditional
mission--collective defense--and its new missions of crisis management and
peacekeeping; second, to preserve the transatlantic link; and third, to
build a European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance. All
Allies are agreed on the importance of these objectives, and on the fact
that they are fully compatible with each other. </P>
<P>One important means to help us achieve these objectives is Combined
Joint Task Forces concept, which we have completed in Berlin. This concept
will: </P>
<UL>
<LI>Permit a more flexible and mobile deployment of forces, including
forces for new missions</LI>
<LI>Enable the use of separable but not separate military capabilities in
operations led by the Western European Union (WEU)</LI>
<LI>Facilitate the participation of nations outside the Alliance in
operations such as IFOR</LI>
</UL>
<P>A key aspect of the adaptation we are engaged in is the reflection of a
European Security and Defense Identity the Alliance. We will develop
command arrangements to permit all European Allies to play a larger role
in NATO's military and command structures, allowing Europe to assume more
responsibility and share Alliance burdens more equitably. With the
approval of all 16 Allies, NATO assets and capabilities will be made
available to the WEU. We will now get on with the work of making these
arrangements a reality. </P>
<P>We will also remain firmly on course for the enlargement of NATO.
Opening NATO is part of a wider process of the natural growing together of
Europe. It will not create dividing lines or isolate any country. On the
contrary, our goal remains establishing ever closer and deeper cooperative
ties with our Partner countries. In fact, opening the Alliance would mean
continuing an artificial demarcation that no longer corresponds to
European realities. As I said in Warsaw during a visit in April: after
1945, when Western Europe was given another chance, it was given an
Atlantic chance. The same chance, not a lesser imitation of it, should now
be given to the new democracies to NATO's east. </P>
<P>But opening NATO to the east will be neither easy nor cost free. The
current NATO Allies must thoroughly assess the impact new members will
have on the political and military structures of the Alliance. And those
aspiring to become members must thoroughly reflect on membership's
implications for their own political and military environment, and how
they see themselves contributing to the overall security of the Allies.
</P>
<P>That is why we are currently involved in an intensive dialogue with
those countries that have expressed an interest in joining NATO. In
December, our Foreign Ministers will assess the results and decide the
next step. In short, the process of NATO's opening is on track. </P>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">BUILDING A STRONG NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>A wider NATO will be part of a Europe in which a democratic Russia has a
rightful place. Thus, while we are responding to the legitimate
expectations of Central Europe to be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic
security structure, we also want to address the concerns of Russia and to
build a strong, lasting NATO-Russia relationship. We want to embed this
relationship deeply into the new security structure in Europe. </P>
<P>The success of NATO-Russia cooperation in Bosnia provides an excellent
foundation for our work. Also, in recent months, we have held important
consultations with Russia on issues such as the former Yugoslavia, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the CFE Treaty. But NATO
wants to do much more. At the 16+1 meeting in Berlin with Russian Foreign
Minister Primakov in June, we reiterated our proposal to form a political
framework for NATO-Russia relations. </P>
<P>The fact that our proposals for intensifying the NATO-Russia
relationship are being examined carefully and with interest gives us cause
for optimism. I firmly believe that NATO and Russia make headway in
establishing a strong, stable, and enduring partnership that properly
recognizes our common interest in security and stability on our continent.
Our successful cooperation in IFOR shows the way. </P>
<P>We also intend to deepen our cooperation Ukraine. Over the past six
months, this cooperation has intensified through the implementation of the
document on enhanced NATO/Ukraine relations that we agreed to last
September, and also through Ukraine's participation in IFOR. </P>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">CONCLUSION</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>As you can see, our Ministerial meetings have opened a bold new chapter
in the life of the Atlantic Alliance. Through our strong transatlantic
partnership, we are working hard to: </P>
<UL>
<LI>Make our Alliance stronger and more effective in order to carry out
its full range of missions</LI>
<LI>Develop a European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance</LI>
<LI>Continue the process of opening the Alliance to new members</LI>
<LI>Strengthen our cooperation with all Partner countries, including
Russia and Ukraine</LI>
</UL>
<P>With our Alliance thus renewed, we will be able to face the challenges
of the 21st century with confidence. </P>
<P><A HREF="Solana.htm">Go to top of page</A> <BR><A HREF="Workshop96.htm">Return to Warsaw '96</A> <BR><A HREF="../index.html">Return to Home Page</A> </P>
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