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<TITLE>NATO Military Committee Chairman General Klaus Naumann...NATO in a
Changing Europe</TITLE>
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<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+4">NATO in a Changing Europe</FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+3">General Klaus Naumann </FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><I>Chairman of NATO Military Committee</I></CENTER>
<P>Throughout the speeches given at the XIIIth Workshop, there has been one
common theme: NATO is the key element for European and transatlantic
security. There has also been consensus that we need to maintain the
strong and reliable link that ties the U.S. and Canada to Europe, because
without the U.S. there is no security for Europe. Fortunately, no one
challenges NATO's continuing and growing importance any longer. But NATO
does need to adapt to the changed environment. </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">NATO ADAPTATION FROM A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>In times of change, clarity is crucial to charting a proper course. But
today, everything is not clear. While we have a European security
architecture, it is not a coherent architecture since it does not yet have
a design even though Hungarian Foreign Minister Dr. Lá Kóá
made stimulating efforts to contribute to one. And while design is not a
military task, I believe it is important to consider several issues: </P>
<UL>
<LI>How to link the regional aspects of European security to the global
ones</LI>
<LI>How to utilize all political tools to achieve peace and stability</LI>
<LI>How to connect relevant institutions in well-coordinated cooperation</LI>
<LI>How to combine regional efforts with NATO's Euro-Atlantic efforts
while avoiding the term "European pillar," since I believe
pillars by their very nature are divisive</LI>
<LI>How to avoid new dividing lines and confrontation through a firm will
on NATO's part and the resolve not to tolerate any veto rights or
conditions</LI>
</UL>
<P>As we work on these challenges, we should take two assumptions into
account: </P>
<OL>
<LI>In the long run, no European state can afford to pursue a national
security policy without some form of alignment. The forms may vary and
definitely will not always involve NATO. Moreover, NATO must remain
efficient, and this point must be remembered in discussions concerning
the opening up of NATO. The word enlargement has a geostrategic
connotation that plays into the arguments of some of those in Russia who
are against it.</LI>
<LI>There is no European security without the U.S., so we must maintain
the transatlantic link. NATO serves interests on both sides of the
Atlantic since there will always be a need for coalitions. And as Czech
President Václav Havel said at the Workshop, NATO is and will
remain the safeguard of European security.</LI>
</OL>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">THE CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN SECURITY</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>The first challenge to European security is the <I>instability</I> that
exists as a consequence of the ongoing transformation process. This
simultaneous transformation of societies and economies in Central and
Eastern Europe will be of long duration and encompass many ups and downs.
Regarding the transformation in Russia, we must remember that the people
are going from feudalism to democracy without the advantage of going
through an age of enlightenment. There will be many temptations to
distract attention from domestic problems by portraying outsiders as the
causes of these domestic failures. Therefore, we need to work toward a
situation using deterrence, containment, arms control, and cooperation in
which resorting to force is impossible. </P>
<P>The second challenge is <I>unresolved ethnic and territorial claims</I>
combined with a renaissance of nationalistic and religious fervor and a
tendency to look inward, which could lead to the renationalization of
defense and security policies. To solve this problem, some will wish to
rely on indirect NATO protection since some nations believe they are safe
in the shade of the NATO umbrella without having to pay the fees. We need
to promote NATO's philosophy that a risk to one of us is a risk to all of
us. We also need to promote the educational value of NATO's integrated
military structure. Thus, our young officers will learn that NATO's
interests need to prevail against narrowly defined national interests, and
that is very important for the future of Europe. </P>
<P>NATO's principles must prevail: this means no territorial claims will be
enforced by military means, conflicts will be settled by peaceful means,
and the right of minorities will be respected and protected. Democratic
principles need to be transformed into foreign policies; we must ensure
that the right of the powerful does not prevail but the power of the
right; and domestically, we must make sure that the individual is
protected against the power of the state. In the new NATO, all members
must subscribe to these principles. </P>
<P>The third challenge I see is the <I>new risks that we face</I>. Today
there is no such thing as regional security. Europeans have to look beyond
Europe. The decisions of the North Atlantic Council meeting in Berlin
announced a turning point in NATO's history in this regard, since now NATO
will respond to challenges originating on the periphery of the NATO treaty
area if they become a threat to NATO's security. But questions remain
whether this step is sufficient to maintain peace in such a complex world
as that described by Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, when he hinted at the
gamut of problems connected with humanitarian interventions. </P>
<P>In addition to deciding to respond to challenges on NATO's periphery,
the NAC in Berlin also set three objectives. These are, in order of
priority, </P>
<OL>
<LI>To improve NATO's efficiency</LI>
<LI>To strengthen the transatlantic link</LI>
<LI>To identify the European Security Defense Identity (ESDI)</LI>
</OL>
<P>What does this mean for NATO military authorities It means the need to
develop an adapted command and force structure in which all 16 Alliance
members participate and which includes Combined Joint Task Force
implementation and enables ESDI to develop in one single multinational
structure. To do this, ESDI must be properly defined, including the
planning and training that will enable the Western European Union (WEU) to
conduct missions within the scope of the Petersberg Declaration. As a
European, I urge that this be done on a modest scale initially, because
the first WEU mission must be a success. The structure that we develop
must also be flexible enough to absorb enlargement. Does this mean that we
have to square the circle Not quite, but it will be a demanding task for
the Military Committee as NATO's supreme military authority and NAC's
ultimate source of military advice. </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">NATO'S MISSIONS: OLD AND NEW</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>NATO was never a military bloc or just a military alliance. The values
shared by 16 nations led to their determination to share risks and
responsibilities. However, I disagree with those who feel that during the
confrontation period we had high risk and high stability, whereas today we
have low risk and low stability. Rather, I believe that we had low risk
and high stability then, and, now, at least at the regional level, high
risk and low stability. I believe the situation in the former Yugoslavia
illustrates my thesis. Therefore today we need both collective defense as
well as conflict prevention. </P>
<P>Our old mission of collective defense remains valid and serves many
purposes: </P>
<UL>
<LI>It fosters cohesion among Allies and preserves the irreplaceable
transatlantic link</LI>
<LI>It serves as a safety net in case of unforeseen deterioration in
international relations, which gives foreign policy more flexibility</LI>
<LI>It projects stability since it serves as a deterrent</LI>
<LI>It is the glue that keeps nations together and gives them the will
and the resolve to stand together shoulder to shoulder. An attack
against one is an attack against all of us-even though an attack is
unlikely at this time</LI>
</UL>
<P>Anyone who believes that NATO could provide collective defense with
CJTFs alone hurts NATO's cohesion and weakens its protective capabilities.
</P>
<P>NATO's new conflict prevention/crisis management mission aims at keeping
conflicts at a distance and enables us to act collectively in order to
prevent the outbreak of hostilities. Crisis management is also the main
driving factor behind NATO's internal adaptation for ESDI, which will
foster transatlantic cohesion since the Europeans will be taking more of
the burden. The main instrument in this process will be the Combined Joint
Task Force. CJTF, as well as crisis management, will often include
Cooperation Partners, hence the increasing need to promote
interoperability of Partners with NATO. </P>
<P>Crisis management is no longer a reactive, escalatory measure but rather
proactive, preventative diplomacy with military means as the last resort.
But where military action needs to be taken, centralized planning and
decentralized execution are required, along with confidence in the
commander, to avoid micro-management. And let us not forget the 3Rs which
COMIFOR Admiral Smith discussed at the Workshop: Robustness, Rules of
Engagement that are clear, and Resolve. </P>
<P>Along with collective defense and crisis management, we have a third
mission: the projection of stability, which includes the opening of NATO,
enhancing PFP, and strengthening the special relationships with Russia and
Ukraine. Let us be very clear: NATO's opening has been decided upon in
principle, and we will stick to that. We will accept neither veto rights
nor conditions. NATO's primary objective will be to maintain the
Alliance's efficiency and its character as a defensive unit that is based
on shared values. It must be capable and willing to act collectively. </P>
<P>New Partners will enjoy the protection of Article V without any
limitations, but they must be able and willing to contribute to collective
risk and burden sharing. I was very encouraged to hear during the Workshop
that Partners are willing to accept that responsibility. </P>
<P>In all three missions, there will be one common principle for the
conduct of military activities, be it collective defense, crisis
management, or projection of stability, including Partnership for Peace;
we need, as mentioned earlier, to have centralized planning and
decentralized execution, which should be reflected in our command
structure. </P>
<P>Membership will not give new members a free ride on defense, but they
will also not have to embark on an ambitious armaments program. We must
achieve interoperability for both collective defense and crisis
management. We should strive to give our new members security so that they
can concentrate on rebuilding their societies and economies. We call on
industrialists to use all their creativity to make interoperability
happen, although our new Partners will continue to use existing hardware,
perhaps with some mid life upgrades. </P>
<P>NATO's opening will certainly take more than a year's time. Ratification
in some NATO capitals will take months, if not years. During that time we
must enhance and deepen PFP as a stand-alone instrument of European
security. </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>The PFP program was designed by the late Joseph Kruzel, masterminded by
Secretary William Perry and General John Shalikashvili, and informally
introduced in 1993 at the Trevemunde Meeting of Defense Ministers.
Partnership for Peace has now grown into a permanent element of European
security arrangements and has succeeded beyond the expectations of those
who decided on it at the 1994 Brussels Summit. Today Partnership for
Peace, on a practical military level, is also a major contributor to the
effectiveness of the IFOR mission. </P>
<P>In the future, we see PFP playing two important roles: The first, in
preparing new members for the responsibilities and requirements of NATO
membership; and the second, as a means of strengthening relations with
Partners who do not join the Alliance early or do not join it at all. Our
Ministers have given us direction on enhancing PFP and on expanding
cooperation into areas such as civil military relations, defense
procurement, air defense, and the development of defense policy and civil
emergency planning. The Planning and Review Process will be broadened to
include adapting interoperability objectives to cover the entire range of
the Alliance's new missions. </P>
<P>To make better use of the experience and talent our Cooperations
Partners (CPs) bring to the PFP process, we will be seeking increased
opportunities for Partners to assume greater responsibility in the shaping
of PFP programs and in the planning and conducting of PFP exercises. But
as in crisis management, there is some merit to sticking to centralized
planning and decentralized execution. One of the ways in which we plan to
increase Partner opportunities is through a joint Allied Partner
evaluation and application of lessons learned from the political and
military cooperation in IFOR. </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">STRENGTHENING TIES WITH RUSSIA AND UKRAINE</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>In addition to developing stronger ties with all Cooperation Partners,
we also wish to further enhance our strong ties with Ukraine and to
develop a strong, stable, and enduring relationship with Russia. We are in
a critical period now as we await the outcome of the Russian Presidential
election runoff, but no matter who wins, our objective will remain the
same: to seek a true partnership with Russia in order to arrange for
common security and to cope with perceived risks. </P>
<P>To develop this partnership, we can build on the success we have had
with Russian forces working within IFOR; but that is just a beginning and
definitely at too low a level. NATO is open to a political dialogue to
help Russia overcome its tendency to mirror image the former Warsaw Pact
onto NATO, which we all know is not appropriate. We also need to look at
some of the suggestions put forward by Foreign Minister Primakov at the
Berlin Ministerial meeting suggestions that relate to issues on which NATO
and Russia can cooperate, such as counter proliferation, Theater Missile
Defense, and countering drug trafficking and international crime. </P>
<P>Ukraine's contribution to IFOR is also a worthwhile vehicle for
practical military cooperation. We look forward to working with Ukrainian
military authorities to find additional ways to enhance our relationship
with them. And to address a concern raised by the Ukrainian Foreign
Minister regarding the deployment of NATO nuclear weapons onto the
territory of new NATO members, I would like to reassure him by quoting
from the NATO Enlargement Study, which was given to Partners last fall: "In
light of both the current international environment and the current
potential threats facing the Alliance, NATO's current nuclear posture
will, for the foreseeable future, continue to meet the requirements of an
enlarged Alliance. There is, therefore, no need now to change or modify
any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or policy..." </P>
<P>I believe that we can also expect more NAC meetings in the 16+1 format
with Russia and Ukraine. </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">THE EFFECTS OF CHANGE ON THE MILITARY
AUTHORITIES</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>What does all this mean for NATO military authorities </P>
<P>First, it means we need to ensure the efficiency of NATO's command and
force structures through greater flexibility and by enhancing our
capabilities to reinforce its most threatened region. If necessary, we
must also be prepared to project power on a limited scale, which is
clearly short of any global capacity </P>
<P>Second, it means we must increase our ability to react to short notice
decisions, such as the need to be ready to commit enabling forces and to
ensure force deployability. </P>
<P>Third, we need to adapt our force and command structures before the
opening of NATO takes place, and do so in great transparency to prove that
opening is not directed against anyone </P>
<P>Fourth, it means we must make ESDI happen without any duplication or
bifurcation. </P>
<P>And, finally, it means we need to make better use of scarce resources
and to concentrate on force multipliers such as C3I, lift, logistics,
combat support, and combat service support. We need more multinational
efforts and to arrange for them while maintaining steadfast cohesion
within NATO. </P>
<P>NATO will continue to serve as the bedrock of stability and security for
the Euro Atlantic region but in order to do so, we need to maintain
efficiency, which is key to NATO's credibility. As I also just mentioned,
we need to maintain cohesion, which we so splendidly did in Bosnia through
IFOR. Cohesion and solidarity are crucial as we approach the more thorny
issues of adaptation and later in enlargement. NATO threatens no one. NATO
is and will remain an Alliance of democratic nations that share values and
a common vision that was formulated in 1949 immediately after the darkest
years this continent has seen in its thousands of years of history. This
vision is of a Europe whole and free, living in peace and stability. It is
a vision our generation has the chance to turn into reality. </P>
<P>This should be the message we take home from Warsaw, and it should
inspire us to turn the dream into reality for the nations of Central and
Eastern Europe that were artificially separated from Western Europe for
more than 40 years. I think everyone feels how crucial it is to
reintegrate these countries with the West. We will succeed in this
important venture if we continue to work hard and remain one team with one
mission: peace and stability for all of our nations. </P>
<P><A HREF="Naumann.htm">Go to top of page</A> <BR><A HREF="Workshop96.htm">Return to Warsaw '96</A> <BR><A HREF="../index.html">Return to Home Page</A> </P>
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