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<TITLE>Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister Dr. Läszlo Köväcs
...Central Europe's Emerging Security Environment: A Hungarian View</TITLE>
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<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+4">Central Europe's Emerging Security Environment:</FONT></CENTER>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><FONT SIZE="+4">A Hungarian View</FONT></P>
<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+3">Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. László
Kovács</FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">A HISTORY OF WESTERN-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>Hungary has long been seeking ways to broaden its economic capabilities
and its foreign relationships, in particular to establish more contacts
and to improve cooperation with the countries of the Euro-Atlantic
community. As early as 1981, we joined the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank. In 1982, we started talks with the European Economic
Communities which, six years later, resulted in full-scale diplomatic
relations. Hungary was the very first country in the Central European
region to establish diplomatic relations with the European Communities.
</P>
<P>Nineteen eighty-four was a crucial year in East-West relations. Although
talks on strategic and medium-range nuclear missiles had been broken off
by the Soviets in Geneva the year before, in 1984 Hungary, a Warsaw Pact
country, was visited by the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, Italy,
Germany, and Belgium. With these visits, Hungary contributed toward
maintaining the dialogue between East and West during a critical time.
</P>
<P>In 1986, we made the first contact with the Council of Europe, where we
were given Special Guest status in 1989. In 1988, Hungary established
contacts with the North Atlantic Assembly and, in 1989, we opened the
border for the refugees coming from the German Democratic Republic. </P>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">THE NEW WORLD ORDER</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>What are the characteristics of the world order today? They are very
different from those of six years ago. The Soviet Union has disintegrated
and the Warsaw Pact and Comecon have ceased to exist. Bipolarity has come
to an end, and the possibility of an all-out East-West confrontation has
faded away. The new international environment has certainly fostered
democratic opposition to the communist system and has helped the reform
forces inside the former Central and Eastern European communist parties to
initiate and carry out an ongoing process of political and economic
transformation. </P>
<P>Thanks to this transition from a one-party system to a multi-party
parliamentary democracy, and from a command economy to market economy,
Central and Eastern European countries have become compatible with the
countries of the Euro-Atlantic community. This process has brought
bipolarity to an end and made conditions available for a new democratic
international order. This order is no longer based on deterrence or
military balance but on cooperation and partnership. </P>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">Economic and Social Problems</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>During the bipolar era, high risk and high stability prevailed in
Central and Eastern Europe. Today, however, the area is characterized by
low risk and low stability. This situation has come about as an
unavoidable side effect of the political and economic transition. The
resulting economic problems, such as internal and international debts,
budget deficits, foreign trade deficits, the high rate of inflation,
growing unemployment, insufficient welfare systems, and a growing
frustration because of the widening gap between the rich and the poor have
brought with them social tension. Due to the lack of experience with
democratic traditions and multi-party parliamentary processes, this social
tension may now become a breeding ground for extremist tendencies. </P>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">The Danger of Nationalism</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>Social problems may also fuel nationalism in the region; nationalism has
deep roots in the area and has surfaced again, sometimes in radical or
aggressive forms. This nationalism can be seen in border-challenging
territorial claims; in ambitions to create ethnically homogeneous
nation-states, which is nonsense in a region that is traditionally
multi-ethnic; in the violation of human and minority rights and in ethnic
cleansing. Radical and aggressive nationalism can lead to ethnic conflicts
and to mass migration, such as we have witnessed in the former Yugoslavia
and elsewhere in less dramatic forms. It can also produce tension in
inter-state relations and foment security problems such as organized
crime, international terrorism, and pollution. </P>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">THE NEED FOR A EUROPE-WIDE SECURITY SYSTEM</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>All of these problems pose the danger of a new division--one between a
secure, stable, prosperous Western Europe and an unpredictable Central and
Eastern Europe lacking security, lacking stability, and facing economic
and social problems. An unstable Eastern Europe will certainly have
negative implications on the stability and security of the western part of
the continent. </P>
<P>To avoid this we need a united Europe based on common history, common
cultural heritage, common democratic values, and common interests--in
security, stability, and prosperity. </P>
<P>The security risks I have outlined are closely interrelated and of great
complexity. They require a complex response. This response must provide
security and stability on a Europe-wide scale and serve as the security
model for the 21st century. The first element of this new architecture is
<I>indivisibility of security and stability</I>. Such indivisibility
means that the security measures in the various parts of the continent
must be closely interrelated, and that security in Western Europe cannot
be guaranteed without security and stability in Central and Eastern
Europe. </P>
<P>The second important element is the <I>nature of security</I>. In
recent years the significance of military components has been decreasing
while that of non-military factors, such as economic, social, human and
minority rights and ecological elements, has gained ground. This element
emphasizes the importance of every country's internal stability because
instability in any country in Europe can destabilize not only its own
environment but also the region and Europe as a whole. </P>
<P>The third important element is <I>security cooperation</I>, not only in
mutual reinforcement and interlocking security structures but also in
active involvement and contributions by each country to the common
security. Until any single country feels isolated, Europe-wide security
will not be achieved. </P>
<P>The new all-European security architecture must also be integrated into
worldwide security. For example, close relationships should be established
between the different European security architectures and their Asian
counterparts, as well as the Organization of Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE). An all-European security architecture should be based on a
network of mutually reinforcing and interlocking international, regional,
or bilateral security institutions, structures, and arrangements. </P>
<P>First, it must be based on an enlarged NATO, the European Union, the
Western European Union, and the Council of Europe. Second, it must be
based on special arrangements between the Euro-Atlantic institutions and
countries such as Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus that are not expected to
join. Third, it must be based on regional structures of cooperation, such
as the Central European Initiative, the Visegrad Group or CEFTA countries,
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and the Baltic Sea or the Barents Sea
Cooperation. Fourth, it must be based on bilateral treaties between
neighboring countries, providing a framework for increasing cooperation
and for finding solutions to controversial issues. A specific all-European
dimension has been given to these bilateral treaties by the European
stability pact, which has incorporated these bilateral treaties. And an
all-European security architecture must be based on the OSCE, which is the
only present pan-European, all-European security structure with crisis
prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation
capabilities. </P>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">NATO ENLARGEMENT</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>The enlargement of NATO is certainly the key to the entire idea. I fully
agree with President Kwasniewski that there is no credible security
architecture in Europe without NATO and without an enlarging NATO. This is
because enlargement is no more and no less than an adaptation to the new
security environment, no more and no less than an adaptation to the new
security environment, no more and no less than the expansion of the zone
of security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe, which is home to
countries that share the same values and want to benefit from, and
contribute to, security. </P>
<P>There are two crucial issues involved in enlargement: first, the
preparation the applicant states must undertake to reach the levels of
conformity, interoperability, and compatibility that are necessary to be
eligible for accession; and second, the way the Alliance will deal with
countries such as the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belarus that do not
wish to join and how it will deal with countries that are eager to join
but might not be admitted with the first group. </P>
<P>In this respect, I want to emphasize the important role of Partnership
for Peace (PFP). PFP and the Individual Partnership programs have
enormously contributed to the preparation of the applicant countries. In
addition, the IFOR operation would not be so effective and successful
without PFP. IFOR has provided extremely important experiences that, once
evaluated and considered, will further improve and upgrade PFP. PFP and
operations such as IFOR have also provided opportunities for countries
that will not join NATO, or at least not in the first wave, to cooperate
with NATO members and non-NATO members and to participate in joint
actions. </P>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">HUNGARY AND EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>We in Hungary wish to fully and organically integrate with the
Euro-Atlantic community, a step that would guarantee security, stability,
economic and social development, and economic and social modernization for
our country. For Hungary, the enlargement of NATO and the European Union
is a window of opportunity. We want our full-scale integration to cover
political, economic, security, security policy dimensions as well as
common defense. We want to join NATO and we want to join the European
Union. We want to achieve full-fledged membership with all rights and
commitments, and to share benefits as well as burdens. We want to become a
member as soon as possible, as soon as we are able to meet the criteria.
We are also interested in having as many countries in our region as
possible, particularly our immediate neighbors, become members-all those
that meet the conditions and qualify for membership. </P>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">Hungarian Preparation for Membership</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>Our preparation for accession includes several points: the reform of the
Hungarian armed forces, improving civilian control, and improving defense
planning and training to conform to NATO requirements. It also includes
increasing the level of interoperability and active participation in PFP
and IFOR, such as providing a battalion of engineers as well as support
and logistics bases on Hungarian soil. We are also working to increase
domestic stability in Hungary, including economic and financial stability.
And last but not least, we are contributing to regional stability. We have
signed basic treaties with Russia, Ukraine, Croatia, Slovenia and
Slovakia, and have been working on a similar treaty with Romania. We also
hope to have a similar bilateral treaty with Yugoslavia one day. We have
extremely good relations with Austria although we do not have a basic
bilateral treaty. </P>
<P>In addition to signing basic treaties with Romania and Slovakia, we have
been doing a great deal to improve cooperation. While relations between
Hungary and Slovakia are sometimes falsely considered a potential threat
to the stability of the region, trade increased by 50% between Hungary and
Slovakia, and by 80% between Hungary and Romania in one year. We have
established thousands of joint ventures. A number of new checkpoints on
the Hungarian-Slovak and Hungarian-Romanian borders have been opened. We
have considerably improved cooperation among the militaries of all three
countries. That is why we hope that the regular, high-level political
contacts, the ongoing dialogue, and the wide-ranging cooperation now in
effect will increase the potential for solving the problems we still have.
</P>
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