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<TITLE>WEU Dep. Secretary General Horst Holthoff...The Role of WEU in the
New European Security</TITLE>
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<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+4">The Role of WEU in theNew</FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+4">EuropeanSecurity Architecture</FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+3">General Horst Holthoff</FONT><FONT SIZE="+2"></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+2"><I>Deputy Secretary General, Western European
Union </I></FONT></CENTER>
<P>My invitation to speak at the NATO Workshop is a tangible illustration
of the close, transparent, and effective relationship between NATO and the
Western European Union (WEU). My remarks will concentrate on the political
military aspects of the role WEU is playing in the emerging European
security architecture, pointing out the pivotal position WEU holds in
strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and as the
defence component of the European Union. </P>
<P>I will speak on the following issues: the development of WEU since its
reactivation in the mid 1980s; the operational development of WEU's crisis
management capabilities; WEU's relations with NATO, including the
implications of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF); and WEU's way forward,
including relations with the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>The end of the Cold War compelled the Member States of the Atlantic
Alliance, the European Union, and WEU to reexamine their roles in
enhancing security and stability on the European continent. Created in
1948 as an intergovernmental organization, WEU was reactivated in the mid
1980s. After attempts to transfer security and defence responsibilities to
the European community failed, Europeans felt the need for a forum to
discuss defence and security issues, and took full advantage of the
membership configuration that WEU offered. </P>
<P>The1987 Hague Platform on European Security Interests was the first
concrete result of WEU's early period of reactivation. The Platform
developed criteria on which European security should be based, and helped
alleviate suspicions in the U.S. and NATO, since it subscribed to the need
for a substantial U.S. presence. Combined with WEU's role in the Gulf,
which helped the U.S. administration face a Congress that believed Europe
was reluctant to participate in ensuring freedom of passage through an
important international waterway, the Platform turned American opinion
around in favour of the emerging European Security and Defence Identity
(ESDI). </P>
<P>The policies of consultation and operational cooperation became the two
pillars of WEU activity. These policies were confirmed by the decisions
made at Maastricht in December 1991, which defined WEU's dual vocation as
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and the defence component of
the European Union. To reflect WEU's pivotal role between the EU and NATO,
a choice of full membership or observer status was offered to members of
the European Union who were not members of NATO; associate membership was
offered to European NATO Allies who were not members of the European
Union. </P>
<P>In June 1992, the Petersberg Declaration defined a way to strengthen
WEU's operational role. The declaration stated that, apart from
contributing to the common defence, military units acting under the
authority of WEU could be employed for humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peacekeeping tasks, and tasks for combat forces in crisis management,
including peacemaking. Member States agreed to make available military
units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces. WEU soon
stated that it was "prepared to support, on a case by case basis and
in accordance with WEU procedures, the effective implementation of crisis
management measures, including peacekeeping activities of the [then] CSCE
or the United Nations Security Council." </P>
<P>The NATO Summit meeting in Brussels in January 1994 was the next
landmark in WEU's political and military development. Politically, the
Summit Declaration stressed the importance all Allies attached to the
transatlantic link and to NATO's essential contribution to European
security and stability. The declaration also established the Allies'
support of a European defence scenario compatible with that of the
Alliance. NATO leaders acknowledged that a stronger European defence role
through further development of WEU would reinforce the transatlantic link
and enable Europeans to take more responsibility for their common security
and defence. Militarily, the Summit was important because it expressed the
Alliance's readiness to make its collective assets available for WEU
operations. </P>
<P>In recent years, WEU has played its part in efforts to project stability
to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Currently, ten Central
European countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia) have
Associate Partner status on the basis of their objective to become members
of the EU. Associate Partners are able to hold political-military dialogue
on European security and defence matters, something which is not available
to them in any other international forum. And through their participation
in WEU activities and planning they learn more of our day to day work and
help build the community of interests that is the indispensable basis of
European integration. Like members of the Partnership for Peace programme,
who learn more about the work of NATO, Associate Partners in WEU are
investing in future EU membership. </P>
<P>To reach our goal of a consistent and stable European security
architecture, WEU will continue to hold an open and ongoing dialogue with
Russia and Ukraine on a variety of European security interests. These
discussions will complement the policies of both NATO and the European
Union. </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRISIS</FONT></B></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>WEU's capability to act collectively has been significantly enhanced in
recent years because of the provision set out in the Petersberg
Declaration to conduct crisis prevention and crisis management operations.
This provision, called Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU), is based on the
following principles: </P>
<UL>
<LI>WEU has no permanent forces or command structure of its own. Forces
and headquarters employed in a particular WEU operation will be drawn
from the lists of military units and headquarters made available by WEU
Member States and organized on a multinational and multiservice basis.</LI>
<LI>Participation in specific operations and decisions to make forces
available remain sovereign decisions of Member States and are determined
after consultation with NATO in the case of forces with NATO missions.</LI>
</UL>
<P>Examples of multinational FAWEUs are the Eurocorps, the Multinational
Division Central, the UK Netherlands Amphibious Force, EUROFOR, and
EUROMARFOR. Such formations provide pre packaged capabilities with
associated headquarters and are an important element of the overall set of
forces from which WEU selects force packages to meet specific
contingencies. The procedures necessary to generate forces as well as the
rules for establishing operational budgets have previously been agreed to.
</P>
<P>As of this date, WEU has acquired a basic crisis management capability.
The decision making structures at Council level and their essential means
of support are presently being tested and will, if needed, be further
refined. In Spain, WEU's Satellite Centre has been receiving images from
the Helios satellite since May. This development reflects our move towards
an independent European intelligence and crisis monitoring capability.
Also in May, a Situation Centre was established at WEU Headquarters,
providing direct crisis monitoring for the Council and its working groups.
</P>
<P>Practising, testing, and streamlining our procedures are key
requirements for establishing WEU as an efficient and credible operational
tool. To this end, a coherent exercise policy has been developed. A
planning conference will take place each year to coordinate the aims of
the exercise programme. We will also coordinate with the NATO exercise
calendar. Presently, we are in the second phase of the first major WEU
exercise. </P>
<P>In addition to our exercise programme, other initiatives the Strategic
Mobility Concept, Operational Sea Training, generic planning and African
Peacekeeping, are all contributing to reinforcing WEU's operational
capability. Although much remains to be done, many of the basic elements
of operational capability are now or will shortly be in place. </P>
<P>Currently, WEU is conducting three operations in connection with the
former Yugoslavia: </P>
<UL>
<LI>The combined NATO/WEU <I>Operation Sharp Guard</I> enforces the arms
embargoes and economic sanctions against the former Yugoslavia. With 12
ships now in use, the operation to date has carried out close to 6,000
checks. Operation Sharp Guard has paved the way for future cooperation
between NATO and WEU and has provided valuable experience for WEU.</LI>
<LI>The <I>Danube Operation</I> assists the Riparian states (Hungary,
Romania, Bulgaria) in implementing the Danube embargo. Seven WEU members
have contributed to this non military operation: Italy, Germany, France,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. About 65,200
inspection checks have been made since the mission began in June 1993.
The operation represents a concrete example of cooperation between WEU
and some of our Associate Partners.</LI>
<LI>In September 1994, responding to a request made by the EU, WEU
participated in the planning and establishing of the EU civil
administration of the city of MOSTAR. WEU contributed to the
organization and recruitment of a <I>WEU Police Force</I>for the city,
which now consists of over 175 police personnel. The force is directed
by a WEU Police Commissioner subordinated to the EU Administrator, and
is charged with setting up a reliable unified local police force. This
operation is the first and only time the EU has called on WEU to carry
out a specific task.</LI>
</UL>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">RELATIONS WITH NATO</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>Cooperation between WEU and NATO will help considerably to reinforce
European peacekeeping efforts and other contingency missions. Closer links
will allow WEU to make use of key capabilities in the fulfilment of its
role. The recent decision in Berlin on furthering the development of ESDI
within the Alliance, the adoption of the CJTF concept, and the support for
WEU-led operations will also make a vital contribution towards providing
WEU with a wide range of operational multinational command capabilities.
</P>
<P>While the definition and development of the European Security and
Defence Identity is taking place in NATO as well as in the EU and WEU, its
realization requires not only internal NATO adaptation but also a close,
transparent, and effective relationship between WEU and NATO. Considerable
progress has been made towards that goal in recent years. Our Joint
Councils now meet regularly every three months, and our level of
cooperation and interaction, including the joint operation in the
Adriatic, continues to grow. </P>
<P>Finally, the 1995 Security Agreement between WEU and NATO as well as the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) linking WEU to NATO's communications
systems enable us to intensify efforts already under way, such as the
exchange of documents and intelligence sharing. </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">The Implications of CJTF</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>The Combined Joint Task Force concept, with its flexible and deployable
multinational triservice headquarters capabilities, will facilitate the
dual use of collective assets and capabilities. It will also enable WEU to
conduct larger scale Petersberg type operations. For WEU-led operations,
the concept is based on non duplication of personnel and assets that are
separable but not separate; such personnel and assets should be used in
the same way that they would be employed by NATO. Access to NATO's
collective assets is of particular importance for WEU, especially
intelligence gathering and analysis, observation capabilities, AWACS,
communications systems and transport. </P>
<P>The implementation of the CJTF concept will be the touchstone of NATO
WEU cooperation. The Berlin decision details the point of departure for an
intense process of consultations, a process characterized by compatibility
and reciprocity. </P>
<P>Areas on which work is likely to focus in WEU and NATO are:
identification of illustrative scenarios for a WEU operation; practical
modalities for the transfer of assets, which might lead to a joint concept
of how NATO and WEU can interact in crisis management; financial
implications; proposals to study how NATO defence planning could support
all Allies with respect to WEU-led operations; and a CJTF exercise based
on a WEU-led operation. </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">THE FUTURE OF WEU</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>The relations between WEU and EU are an important item on the agenda of
the IGC. Last year WEU presented to the IGC three options for future EU
WEU institutional relations. </P>
<P><I>Option A</I> proposed maintaining WEU as an autonomous institution.
Links between WEU and EU would be strengthened with back to back summit
meetings. </P>
<P><I>Option B</I> proposed progressive integration of WEU into EU. This
could be handled in a number of ways, for example, establishing a
political commitment enabling the EU Council to instruct WEU, or defining
a legal framework that would commit WEU to implementing all EU decisions
and actions with defence implications. </P>
<P><I>Option C</I> proposed merging WEU with EU. In this case, close
working links between EU and NATO would be essential. A merger of the two
organizations would imply a certain number of exceptions for European
countries that are members of NATO but not of EU. </P>
<P>While the three options vary widely, all three recognize that the links
between WEU and EU must be strengthened to ensure a coherent, timely, and
efficient response to the risks and dangers facing Europe. </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">CONCLUDING REMARKS</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy needs efficient
and credible military underpinning. While this can be achieved only
gradually, I am optimistic that it will happen. WEU should be capable of
conducting Petersberg type missions at the lower end of the spectrum by
the end of the year. And once the CJTF concept is implemented, WEU will be
able to carry out all types of Petersberg missions. </P>
<P>Through close links with the Atlantic Alliance, WEU will achieve its
goal of providing a genuine military tool that is part of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. Political conditions are now ripe
for WEU to make further, decisive progress within the framework of
transatlantic security and solidarity, and the development of the European
Security and Defence Identity. </P>
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