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<TITLE>Danish Defense Minister Hans Hækkerup ...Security in Northern
Europe and the Baltic Region</TITLE>
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<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+4">Security in Northern Europe and the Baltic Region</FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+3">Minister of Defense of Denmark Hans Hækkerup</FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">INTRODUCTORY REMARKS</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>I cannot think of a better place to hold the NATO Workshop than the
capital of Poland. Whenever Europe has been divided, Poland has paid a
high price. But it has been the Polish people who, as early as the 1970s
and early 1980s, filled us with hope for overcoming the arbitrary
divisions of our European continent. Their courage and sacrifices have
proved an inspiration to the surrounding countries and a surprise and
relief to most people in the West. Their efforts have set change in
motion. </P>
<P>I would like to focus on two issues that relate to that changeNATO's
opening up to new members and its adaptation to the new Europe; and the
contributions to security and stability in Baltic region made by Denmark.
</P>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">OPENING THE ALLIANCE</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>The objective of opening up the Alliance to our Eastern neighbors should
be self-evident after witnessing the Yugoslavian tragedy unfold and seeing
the tension in other parts of Europe. Europe has simply experienced too
many wars and seen too many arbitrary lines of division cut across people
and their common culture. </P>
<P>Although democracy, respect for human rights, and a market economy are
considered much desired goals, the transformation of societies focused on
achieving these standards is often turbulent and filled with surprises.
Economic setbacks are bound to arise when the planned economy is replaced
by the market mechanism. And political stability may be difficult to
maintain when democracy suddenly replaces the totalitarian rule of the
Communist Party. In other words, stability can be in short supply. </P>
<P>Our best tools for stabilizing new democracies are cooperation and
integration. These strategies worked for the West after the Second World
War, when the United States set the direction by launching the Marshall
Plan. Today the odds of succeeding are even better. </P>
<P>It is important that the process of opening the Alliance to new members
remains gradual, steady, and transparent. It is also important that we
keep in mind the right of sovereign countries to seek their own security
arrangements; this basic principle of international relations must be
respected. When Denmark was a front-line state, it reaped the benefits of
a security guarantee as a member of NATO. I would have a moral problem if
I were to deny new, stable democracies in Central and Eastern Europe the
same guarantee. </P>
<P>In opening NATO, it will remain our foremost responsibility to ensure
that no country is put in jeopardy; it will be unacceptable if some
countries are put in a less secure position. If we cannot avoid putting
countries at risk, opening NATO will be without purpose. All Partners
should be given an equal opportunity to qualify for membership. </P>
<P>It seems a bit ironic that those countries that might need a security
guarantee most may be less likely to join in the first round than
countries that are less in need of membership. Some will claim this point
to be realistic. But I say there is nothing logical about it. We should
not treat any country differently just because the rulers of the former
Soviet Union decided to make it a Soviet republic and not a satellite
state. </P>
<P>Even with equal opportunity, some countries likely will not obtain
membership as fast as others. This must never be interpreted as a lack of
interest by NATO in the security, stability, and well-being of these
countries. The burden of proof lies on our shoulders, and we must convey a
clear message that cannot be misinterpreted; namely, that these countries
are not up for grabs. There can be no return to the notion of spheres of
influence in Europe. I am sure that everyone here will agree to that. </P>
<P>So, then, what should we do to ensure that those countries not accepted
in the first round remain secure? First, we should state that the Alliance
remains open. But this alone is not sufficient. We will have to back our
statement with action--action that rules out any misunderstanding about
the indivisibility of security on the European continent. We must come up
with a substantial and credible solution. </P>
<P>I foresee a special package for those countries that want NATO
membership but are not among the first new members. This package should go
PFP and contain new elements and offers, not be just a repackaging of
existing elements of cooperation. </P>
<P>One of the elements could be decentralization of PFP. This could include
placing Partnership Coordination Cells in the NATO Headquarters in the
area and establishing PFP Coordination Offices in Partner countries.
Another element could be increased cooperation in exercises within the PFP
framework. A third element could be more frequent and regular individual
consultations between NATO and potential new member-states. </P>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">RUSSIA AND THE OPENING OF NATO</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>I am aware that Russia in particular is concerned about the opening of
NATO. I also know Russian history and culture, and the huge price Russia
has paid in ensuring its own security. Based on this history, it is
possible to understand some of Russia's concerns about NATO's opening
toward Central and Eastern Europe. In other words, Russia's uneasiness is
a real problem, and we should address it accordingly. In fact, we are not
only prepared to address it, we are already working on it. </P>
<P>We must completely convince Russia that opening NATO to the East is not
directed against any country. To this end I would like to stress that NATO
has no plans to deploy nuclear weapons or establish military bases in new
member-states. After all, we have just recently removed all land-based
missiles from European soil. But because we plan to engage in meaningful
cooperation with new members--including peace-support operations and PFP
tasks--I believe that new member-states should be integrated within the
Alliance's command structure. Surely this would be useful before engaging
in new IFOR-like operations. </P>
<P>In my opinion, Russia's relationship with NATO in the long run depends
upon whether the Alliance is relevant to the security of Russia as well as
to the security of other countries. To achieve this goal, we must increase
cooperation with Russia in all areas and work together on decisions
concerning European security. The latter we have already done, for
example, in the Implementation Force in Bosnia; a significant Russian
element of that force is contributing to the very success of IFOR. The
IFOR operation is thus displaying the possibilities for European
cooperation and for Russian cooperation with NATO. It is clearly an area
to elaborate upon. Russia-NATO cooperation can also be strengthened
through non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and counter-drug trafficking
efforts. </P>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">NATO ADAPTATION</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>Denmark welcomes and supports the notion that the strengthening of
European Security and Defense Identity must be done within NATO rather
than outside in competition with it. This will make it possible for
Europeans to take on a larger share of the responsibility. It will also
establish a sound basis for preserving transatlantic partnership, which
remains crucial to our security. </P>
<P>The adaptation process must take a broad approach to the complex set of
challenges facing Europe in the future. Without losing sight of its core
functions, NATO must increase its ability to carry out a diverse range of
tasks together with--and in the interest of--all European countries. </P>
<P>To this end, Denmark warmly welcomes the agreement on Combined Joint
Task Force (CJTF) Framework Document. It is a much needed step toward
building CJTF capabilities in the headquarters of the new command
structure. Our decision in Brussels to conduct two CJTF exercises is
putting flesh on the bones. </P>
<P>One of the crucial features of the CJTF concept is its provision for the
participation of Partner countries in the new missions of the Alliance.
The NATO exercise named Cooperative Guard, which will deal with both CJTF
elements and Partner participation, could be viewed as a forerunner for
CJTF exercises. Cooperative Guard is built around Baltic Approaches
(BALTAP), and will take place to a great extent in November of this year
and May of next year. I believe valuable lessons will be learned from it.
</P>
<P>Adapting NATO's command structure is one of the most important tasks we
have in front of us in the coming months. Let me point to one aspect of
this adaptation that the Danish government finds of particular
interest--the role of Partner countries. </P>
<P>A large number of our Partners are participating in IFOR and will
undoubtedly wish to take part in future NATO operations as well. In my
view, the future command structure should particularly focus--in addition
to the traditional Article V tasks--on CJTF and PFP tasks. With the
expected increase in decentralized Partnership activities, the new command
structure should also establish Partnership Coordination Cells in
connection with relevant NATO Headquarters in the area. This would give
European Partner countries the opportunity to participate actively in the
day-to-day work that goes on in NATO Headquarters concerning the planning,
training, and exercises needed for future operations within the new
missions of the Alliance. </P>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">DENMARK'S CONTRIBUTION TO SECURITY AND
STABILITY IN THE BALTIC REGION</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>An all-important synergy has developed between cooperation in exercises,
training, and dialogue within bilateral and multilateral frameworks and
cooperation that occurs in actual peace-support missions like IFOR. For
example, cooperation within PFP activities helped to provide the
foundation for the Nordic-Polish brigade. This brigade consists of forces
from two non-aligned countries (Sweden and Finland), two NATO countries
(Norway and Denmark), and four Partner countries (Poland, Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania). The composition of the brigade shows that PFP and
bilateral cooperation are investments in our common future. </P>
<P>Denmark has embarked on a comprehensive military cooperation program
with countries from Central and Eastern Europe; this program is a good
start on the road I believe we will travel over the next several years.
Our first bilateral cooperation agreement within this program, which I
signed as Defense Minister, was an agreement with Poland. Since that
agreement was signed we have moved in only one direction--forward, toward
even more comprehensive cooperation between our two countries. This
cooperation has been complemented and strengthened by our trilateral
cooperation with Germany. Thus we have embarked on a substantial
relationship of cooperation among the Danish Division, the 14th German
Division, and the 12th Polish Division. </P>
<P>The BALTBAT project is another important example of our cooperation with
Central and Eastern European countries. Together with our bilateral
cooperation agreements with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, this project
has produced some very visible results in a very short time. In June, I
visited Bosnia with the Danish Parliamentary Defense Committee, and we
were escorted by Lithuanian soldiers around the Zone of Separation.
Platoons from Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia are part of the Danish
battalion in the Nordic-Polish brigade. </P>
<P>Our cooperation with the Baltic countries has also promoted Baltic
defense cooperation, involving Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in close
cooperation with other European states. In addition, BALTBAT has proven to
be a vehicle for maintaining keen interest in Baltic security and defense
among a large group of Western nations. </P>
<P>Denmark has also concluded a bilateral cooperation agreement with
Russia, but so far cooperation has been fairly limited compared to that
with other Baltic Sea states. I believe, however, that this situation
exists for many other NATO countries cooperating with Russia; we hope that
IFOR will help to improve these cooperation ties. </P>
<P>I was very encouraged by my last visit to IFOR in the former Yugoslavia.
IFOR is making a real difference in Bosnia. People in Sarajevo are now
replacing the plastic in their windows with real glass. Many fields that
used to be mined are in the process of being cultivated. And
reconstruction is gradually getting started. </P>
<P>IFOR's success in bringing an end to the war in Bosnia is a testament to
the importance of the new tasks the Alliance has taken on. However, IFOR
in its current configuration could not have been possible without PFP. And
it surely would not have been so successful. The peacekeeping exercises
and the development of common standards in the Planning and Review Process
have been excellent preparation for Partner countries. </P>
<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE="+1">THE NEED TO SUPPORT THE NEW DEMOCRACIES</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>NATO has never been simply a traditional military alliance. Members
share the will to defend and promote what we consider to be basic values:
freedom, democracy, individual rights, and the rule of law. </P>
<P>The peoples of Central and Eastern Europe have clearly demonstrated to
us that we are not alone in cherishing these values. Realizing this, we
must keep in mind the very reason for our Alliance, and that this reason
is as valid as ever. However, the tasks needed to defend and support our
values are different now. That is why NATO has changed, and that is why it
must continue to adapt to the new Europe. </P>
<P>Central and Eastern European countries have now enjoyed for nearly seven
years the freedom they gained by their desire for this most fundamental
right. The time has now come for the rest of Europe to further support
their efforts, and to make sure that these new democracies are not let
down, and that their courage has not been in vain. </P>
<P><A HREF="Haekkerup.htm">Go to top of page</A> <BR><A HREF="Workshop96.htm">Return to Warsaw '96</A> <BR><A HREF="../index.html">Return to Home Page</A> </P>
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