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<TITLE>Czech Republic First Vice Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra:The New
NATO: Why and How?</TITLE>
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<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+2"></FONT><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+4">The
New NATO: Why and How?</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+4">A Czech View</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+3">Czech Republic First Vice
Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexandr Vondra</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Few places are as suitable as
Dresden for discussing the significance of the Atlantic Alliance and its
enlargement. Once a commercial and cultural crossroads, later beset by
wartime hardships and subsequent communist-rule decay, Dresden today
symbolizes the positive effects of political, economic, and cultural
freedom.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">When, along with the former
German Democratic Republic, Dresden became part of the Federal Republic of
Germany, the Alliance's eastern border extended to less than 100
kilometers from Prague. No one in my country perceived this change as a
serious threat. On the contrary, the government of the former
Czechoslovakia explicitly supported NATO membership of the newly united
Germany as a significant step toward stability in Europe. There was no
need to fear an enlarged NATO. For a long time, however, enlargement was
not even part of the agenda.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">In December 1994, the United
States--despite hesitations by its Western European allies--put through in
the North Atlantic Council the first declaration to state that "NATO
will expand."At the same time, NATO announced that a study of "how"
and "why" the Alliance should be enlarged was to be prepared in
1995. The legitimacy of asking "how" NATO should expand is
indisputable. But asking "why"it should expand after declaring
it will expand is puzzling. Why does the Alliance declare an objective and
then start seeking its justification? What could better illustrate its
reluctance to seek a new European order?</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">ARGUMENTS OF EXPANSION
OPPONENTS</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Those who cast doubt on NATO's
continuing existence and on the purpose of its enlargement mainly employ
two arguments. One is the loss of a clearly defined enemy; the other is
the alleged failure of the Alliance in Bosnia. Let me briefly analyze both
arguments.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The Loss of a Clearly Defined
Enemy Argument. First, it is true that the Alliance's main political
mission over the last 40 years has been to contain the communist threat
and Soviet expansion; it is also true that this threat disappeared with
the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union. But
containing communism was not the only mission of the Alliance. The 1949
Washington Treaty does not even explicitly refer to it. On the contrary,
the collective self-defense treaty, pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, specifically refers to the need to safeguard freedom, common
heritage, and Western civilization and to promote stability, peace, and
security in the North Atlantic area.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Therefore, common purposes, just
as much as common fears, have provided cohesion and cooperation in the
Atlantic Alliance area. NATO has been and shall remain the guarantor of
transatlantic bonds, which are in the vital interest of both Europe and
America. NATO also has been and shall remain the environment in
which European integration will flourish. NATO has been and shall remain
the efficient force that prevents any single European power from playing a
power game with Russia, the country incapable of full integration into the
European Union. And, last but not least, in our continually growing
complex world, NATO will prevent open antagonism among the major global
power centers. In summary, there are many reasons why the transatlantic
community should stop worrying about defining its main enemy and instead
set about enhancing further cooperation. The project of the North Atlantic
Free Trade Area might serve as the best example.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The Alleged Failure of the
Alliance in Bosnia. Second, it is not true that the Balkan crisis means
that the Alliance has failed. Instead, disintegration of the former
Yugoslavia and the Bosnian tragedy mean that Balkan politicians have
failed--politicians driven by self-preservation, who lack respect for
anything, and who have exchanged their red membership cards for national
flags. The Balkan crisis is also the result of the haphazard and
unprincipled policy of many other states, including NATO members and their
Partners. Those of us who insisted on the integrity of Yugoslavia (which,
after Tito's death, the fall of the Iron Curtain, and the discreditation
of communism has lost its raison d'être) but were not interested
enough to sacrifice more than words for its preservation, made a mistake.
Those of us who, rejoicing over regained freedom or the so-called right to
self-determination, poured oil onto the flames, made a mistake as well.
Once more, they did it without being able or willing to sacrifice more
than words. And those who, at the time when peace enforcement was still
feasible, kept arguing about the future of the European security
architecture, made a mistake too.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Nevertheless, all of these
failures have nothing to do with the Alliance, which is by definition only
an organization for the collective defense of its members. The one-time
discussion about "out of area" deployments was an intellectual
construction created in the euphoria over the success in the Gulf War, as
opposed to the growing helplessness in the Balkans. Of course, NATO can
provide technical equipment for use by the U.N. if the U.N. agrees. It can
provide protection for the servicemen from member-countries serving under
the UNPROFOR flag. But that is all. Therefore the December 1994 session of
the North Atlantic Council, for fear of internal discord, could do nothing
but wisely refrain from discussing the Bosnian crisis and, instead, focus
on the enlargement of the Alliance.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">THE CZECH VIEW ON NATO
EXPANSION</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Why should NATO be enlarged? The
Czech Republic believes it should be enlarged because, in the past, NATO
has justified itself as an organization that can guarantee transatlantic
bonds; because NATO does not and never shall lose its purpose (despite the
current absence of a clearly defined enemy); because NATO protects only
its members from external threat; because the Czech people want to share
in the responsibility for safeguarding stability and security in the
transatlantic area; because we advocate the same values and are willing to
defend them; because we are convinced that it is more effective and
cheaper to guarantee security in cooperation with others; and because,
having learned a lesson from history, we regard the stabilization of
Central Europe as the task of our time, and as the precondition for
stability in all of Europe.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The power vacuum between Germany
and Russia has been and continues to be a key risk factor "par
excellence." It has remained so despite the fact that the principal
risk is no longer represented by a concrete enemy, but by the general
unpredictability of future developments. And this unpredictability is the
challenge that the Euro-American community is facing when trying to
formulate a future coherent strategy.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Let us therefore keep in mind,
as we discuss how NATO should be enlarged, the crucial position of Central
Europe. In principle, there are three possible paths toward enlargement:
evolutionary, reactive, and stability-promoting.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The Evolutionary Path. The
evolutionary scenario is based on a "European Union first"
strategy, also called the "royal way." While this path would be
relatively problem-free and inexpensive, it would not solve the dilemmas
of the Central European space. It would link stability in Central Europe
with the dubious future of negotiations on the Common Agricultural Policy
and reform of European institutions. It would also gradually marginalize
the role of the Alliance in European policy, resulting in the potential
abandonment of the principles of collective defense for the vague
principles of cooperative security.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The Reactive Path. The reactive
scenario is based on the "Russia first" or, at best, "Wait
and see" strategy. This scenario would be primarily conflict-free and
hold regard for Russia's position in global politics, but it too would
fail to solve Central Europe's dilemmas and might increase them by
indirectly inviting Russia to be the first to move. While the West waited
and looked on, Russia would assert its influence. This approach would open
the door to the disintegration of the West, and indirectly strengthen and
integrate Russia.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The Stability-Promoting Path.
The stability-promoting scenario gives preference to the "NATO first"
option. It supports the conviction that Central Europe must be anchored
and stabilized with U.S. assistance. While this approach would be both
financially and politically more demanding, it would not needlessly
provoke Russia and would preserve Alliance cohesion and flexibility. This
approach would also take into account the vital interest of the Alliance
itself, that is, to confirm its viability and significant position in the
future formation of transatlantic and European security. Last but not
least, it would offer a clear and active answer to the dilemmas of the
Central European region. I am confident that two countries at
least--Poland and the Czech Republic--welcome this approach and are also
able to support it.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">RUSSIA'S ROLE IN
ENLARGEMENT</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Much attention has been paid to
the impact the enlargement of NATO would have on countries that will not
be among the first to join the Alliance, on those that will wait a long
time for admission, and on those that will never be admitted. Russia plays
a pivotal role in all such considerations. It is in the best interest of
the West and Russia therefore to avoid Russia's isolation and to keep the
door open to strategic cooperation between them. The U.S. Administration
has been following this dual strategy in Central Europe and Russia.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">In this regard, it is worthwhile
to mention the last ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council and
NACC that took place in Noordwijk in late May. The meeting's most
important result was that Russia would join the Partnership for Peace
program and accept NATO's offer of enhanced dialogue. In doing so, Foreign
Minister Andrei Kozyrev reversed what he did in December 1994 when he
rejected both offers on the grounds that his country disapproved of NATO's
enlargement.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Why did Russia eventually accept
NATO's offer? Did the Moscow Summit convince it that more may be gained by
cooperation than confrontation with the West? The answer is unclear.
Although Andrei Kozyrev accepted NATO's offer, he once again voiced his
stance against enlargement. Many people were astonished by this attitude,
but it is difficult to find a single rational reason why Russia would
rejoice over NATO's enlargement. Such an enlargement would be inconsistent
with all of Russia's state interests. It is far better for Russia to have
small states for neighbors than the most powerful alliance in the world.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The strategic objectives of the
West are to integrate the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into
NATO and the European Union, and to engage in strategic cooperation with
Russia. On the other hand, Russia's objectives are to prevent the
enlargement of NATO, to reassert its influence in "the near abroad,"
and to become a fully qualified Partner in the "concert of nations."
The protocol and seating arrangements at the Victory Day celebrations in
Moscow in May symbolized these objectives very well: the G-7 members and
the permanent members of the Security Council were placed in the center,
while the other heads of states sat with Russian officers and their wives.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Russia has no reason to change
its negative attitude toward enlargement. It wishes to gain enough time to
restore its political and economic strength and strategic importance.
Within a few years' time, Russia will probably be more stable and stronger
than it is today. So, why should it surrender the positions it has already
achieved? Moscow applies this approach to former Soviet Union and Eastern
Bloc countries and also to Finland and Austria, which were both forced
into a special status by the USSR after World War II. Their current
attempts to change this status are encountering opposition from one single
country--Russia. As Minister Kozyrev stated at the last NACC session,
serious consideration should be given to the idea of common security
guarantees being granted by the West and Russia to the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, but so far not a single country in this region
has requested that Russia provide them.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">RUSSIAN AGREEMENTS</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Today's reality should warn us.
While NATO members are engaged in complicated discussions about their own
future and slowly prepare their study on enlargement, another form of real
and dynamic enlargement is well underway in the East. How else can one
perceive the Tashkent Pact; the agreements on the activities of Russian
Secret Service agents in some CIS countries; the agreements on Russian
military bases in Belarus, Ukraine, and Georgia; and the agreement on
common border defense of the CIS? The states of Central and Eastern Europe
continue to declare their intention to join the European Union and
possibly NATO, yet there is an increasing number of examples that "pro-Western
policy" has started to recede in some countries and is being replaced
by a sort of new "Eastern policy." For example, the Bulgarian
Prime Minister, during a recent visit by his Russian counterpart, did not
hesitate to deny his country's intention to join NATO. There is also talk
about the need to transform NATO into a loose collective security system,
something like another ineffective OSCE.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">NEW NATO MEMBERS</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Who then wishes to join or, more
accurately, will be admitted to NATO? Any candidate must have a consistent
and continuous policy and demonstrate a lasting and continuous willingness
(for at least two election periods) to join the Alliance, supported by
decisive political forces. The group of such countries is smaller than
many people might imagine. All candidates must also be states that present
NATO members wish to admit and that will not jeopardize the functionality
of NATO as a whole.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The Czech Republic has made NATO
membership a priority goal. This fall, we will hold the first major
exercise on Czech territory--COOPERATIVE CHALLENGE--within the framework
of Partnership for Peace. We are also expecting to be part of the
presentation and discussion of the internal study on the conditions of
NATO enlargement. We are firmly convinced that this study will be approved
at the December session of the North Atlantic Council. Then we will be
able to move on to answer the final two parts of the enlargement
question--which countries will join, and when?</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0"><A HREF="Vondra.htm">Go to Top
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