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<TITLE>Italian Undersecretary of Defense Stefano Silvestri...Special
Challenges to the New NATO</TITLE>
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<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+2"></FONT><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+4">Special
Challenges to the New NATO</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+3">Italian Undersecretary of
Defense Professor Stefano Silvestri</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">INTRODUCTION</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The arguments Lieutenant General
O'Neill presented on ballistic-missile defense at the Workshop are very
convincing. Ballistic-missile defense is very expensive and implies a high
level of cooperation among Allies over a very long period of time.
Determining to use such a defense is therefore a very important political
decision for a government to make and requires a sufficient degree of
consensus. I would like to address this political consensus question and
show how it affects the situation. In so doing, I will play devil's
advocate; forgetting that I am an official of the Italian government, I
will try to be outspoken and provocative to help us assess the problem.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">EXPANDING EUROPE'S
SECURITY INTERESTS TO A GLOBAL DIMENSION</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">My first observation, although
it is not very provocative, is that the disappearance of a political
threat from the East, together with its concomitant drastic decline in
potential military threats and the opening of the Eastern borders, has
considerably changed the European strategic perspective. For years, we in
Europe concentrated on a defense and deterrence posture, looking first and
sometimes only to the continent and to the Soviet Union. The rest of the
world was optional for Europeans with very few exceptions, mainly because
of the heritage of the British and French world roles. This situation
allowed Europe to reap more substantial Cold War dividends than the peace
dividends we are talking about today, because it allowed many European
countries to buy peace and security cheaply and to escape unwanted global
responsibilities.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">All that has ended, and our
strategic theater is enlarging daily. Now we are discussing far-ranging
issues--the defense of Central and Eastern Europe, the security of the
Baltic Republics, the conflicts in the Caucasus, the stability of the
African governments, and peace in the Middle East. These are Europe's new
frontiers, but even these frontiers will continue to change. I can foresee
a time when we will be obliged to rediscover Southeast Asia and the
Pacific, especially if China's foreign policy continues to develop in a
more assertive way.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">European security is thus
reacquiring a kind of global flavor, but European governments, especially
the European electorates and European parliaments, are neither fully aware
of nor prepared for this global dimension. Although the problem exists, we
do not have the vision to deal with it; moreover, we do not have the means
to confront it.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">HISTORICAL OBSTACLES TO
NEW NATO POLICIES</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The Alliance is slowly trying to
adapt, but it is hampered by its historical identity as a defense and
containment instrument. Its major problem, in my opinion, is
political--the absence of a traditional, highly visible threat has
increased differences in priorities among Allies. The fact is that no
scenario centered on Article V missions is fully credible today, or
appears to have high enough priority to reconfirm the Alliance's raison d'être.
A new threat from the East in the short to medium term can be of vital
importance for some countries of the former Soviet Union, for some Central
Eastern European countries, or even for a Baltic country like Finland--but
not for the European countries of the present NATO core, or at least not
yet.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">This is one of the main reasons
why, I believe, the NATO enlargement process is slowing down and becoming
complicated. If NATO enlarges toward the East, then Article V missions
could become central again. This time, however, it would not be possible
to ensure them cheaply. In order to defend Eastern Europe, NATO should
either go back to massive retaliation, which is not very credible, or
invest heavily, massively, in conventional forces, a highly unlikely
prospect for both political and strategic reasons. In addition, it is
still not clear why NATO should choose to confront Russia now, when the
current name of the game is partnership with Moscow. But if we enlarge
NATO without credibly enlarging its defenses, where is the remaining sense
of Article V? And how could we convince our electorate that we should
invest more in order to defend ourselves from a Partner?</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">THE THREAT FROM THE
SOUTH</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Other scenarios are also
interesting, but equally not convincing. Italy is slowly becoming a kind
of "new Germany of NATO." It has many airbases filled with
Allied aircraft, four to five naval groups cruising around its seas, and
is preparing to host important Allied Rapid Intervention Forces. Also, in
operational terms, the Yugoslav crisis has greatly increased the
importance of the Southern Command, something that could become or be made
more permanent if other missions were to be found in addition to the wars
in Bosnia and in Croatia. Unfortunately--or fortunately--the threat from
the South is growing very slowly and is partly non-military or cannot be
dealt with through military means. I am referring to problems like the
Islamic revival, the demographic pressure, or the creeping crisis of
consensus in many African and Arab states. The military threat per se is
relatively limited and could become serious only if and when those states
acquire a credible medium-range missile capability, coupled with the
availability of weapons of mass destruction.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">This concern is very serious but
not terribly urgent, at least in the Mediterranean and for the short term.
Undoubtedly, we will need better defenses, greater capabilities, and
deterrence. But it seems that we have some time ahead of us and that we
may be able to develop these better defenses over the next decade. So,
although we should think of this Southern threat now, it does not have the
kind or urgency that may reverse political perception in a country.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">CHANGING EUROPEAN
POLICIES</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">If we continue to think in
defensive terms according to the traditional NATO way, we may find
ourselves in a very tight spot. We do not live in peaceful times and are
likely to have to confront a very rapid deterioration of the global
stability and security scenario in a way that could threaten our economic
interests, our way of life, and possibly our lives. But in order to manage
and reduce these major threats, we cannot simply defend ourselves, waiting
for the attack to come. On the contrary, we should precede and preempt it,
perhaps according to the strategy of the Byzantine Empire, which assured
its security by interfering in wars between its enemies. It is this
scenario that interests us, with the added value that we are now living in
a much smaller world, and that in fact we will not be obliged to act among
enemies but among possible allies and even partners. In other words, we
should export stability.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Strategically, this means that
Europeans should consider with greater interest the very difficult and
risky region that lies to the east-southeast and includes the Balkans, the
Black Sea, and the Caucasus, with all its interconnections with Russia,
Central Asia, and the Middle East. This is one region, I believe, where a
new global war may start, the others being the China Sea and Southeast
Asia areas. If this is true, then this analysis has some consequences:</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<UL>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">First, it means that
Europeans will have to rediscover global policies and interests and
abandon their current strategic provincialism. Such a process is already
starting but in a confused way and mainly outside the European and
Allied multilateral institutions; it therefore favors a very risky
process of renationalization and fragmentation of our foreign and
defense policies. Instead, I call for developing a common European
defense, security, and foreign policy. If we fail on that ground, I
think we may very well fail on NATO ground, because our Allied
solidarity will have faded away.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Second, in addition to having
to rediscover global policies, Europeans will need different military
means, especially intelligence, communications, and command and control
means, even if that entails some duplication with the American ones. We
will also have to develop missile defense, not simply to defend our own
national territory from still-undeveloped or relatively undefined
threats, but to defend our land and naval contingency forces on distant
battlefields. This, in my opinion, is almost more urgent than defending
our territories.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Third, we will need to
develop a more effective decision-making mechanism based on broad
political consensus over the main strategic priorities to be secured. It
will not be easy, but if we do not develop this kind of understanding
among Allies, other decisions will be difficult to make.</FONT></FONT></LI>
</UL>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">CONCLUSION</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">NATO is an asset which is still
capable of great results despite very unfavorable circumstances such as
declining defense budgets, renationalization of defense and foreign
policies, and incredible difficulties in working with the United Nations.
Therefore, we should do everything possible to reverse the present
negative outlook on Allied capabilities and readiness that have been
presented. In order to do that, we have to adapt rapidly to the changing
circumstances, especially in political and institutional terms. Our first
need is to recover broad political consensus, both domestically and
internationally, on major military missions. If we fail to do so, then our
hope for new Alliance policies can only be very forlorn, and we will have
to turn to other instruments that will be much less effective and will
create other difficulties.</FONT></FONT> </P>
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