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<TITLE>Lieutenant General Malcolm R. O'Neill...Challenges of
Counter-Proliferation for the New NATO</TITLE>
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<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+4">Challenges of
Counter-Proliferation for the New NATO</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+3">Lieutenant General Malcolm
R. O'Neill</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
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<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+1"> </FONT></CENTER>
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<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">INTRODUCTION</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">At last year's NATO Workshop, my
session partner was former U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. His recent
death was a great loss to all of us who work in the defense establishment
of the United States and to others as well. He was a special advocate of
actions by NATO and the United States in the area of
counter-proliferation. Partly for this reason, I will emphasize the
particular challenge of counter-proliferation to the new NATO, while also
examining other challenges to NATO's future including responding to new
and different kinds of threats, accommodating the economic realities of
today's world, and ensuring that the Alliance participates as the
Euro-Atlantic security architecture evolves.</FONT></FONT> </P>
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<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">THE NEED TO RESPOND TO
NEW AND DIFFERENT THREATS</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">One of NATO's greatest
challenges will be responding to the new proliferation threat. Field
Marshal Sir Richard Vincent has mentioned the activities that NATO is
undertaking to respond to this threat. Subsequent to the 1994 Summit, NATO
established two committees to implement an approach for dealing with
proliferation. First, the work of a senior politico-military group on
proliferation, the SGP, led to the adoption in Istanbul last spring of an
Alliance policy on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Also, a
senior defense group on proliferation, the DGP, which was charged with a
three-phase program, completed the first phase of assessing the risks
posed by proliferation. The DGP has moved on to the development of defense
policy guidance for NATO, grappling with the operational implication of
living in a world where weapons of mass destruction can be employed
against us, and what this means to the Alliance. The group will later work
on the third phase of their program: assessing the capabilities NATO needs
to respond to proliferation. This work is an important part of NATO's
continuing adaptation to the new security environment.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">In the first phase of its
program, the DGP concluded that preventing the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, in particular missile-delivery systems for both
ballistic and cruise missiles, remained NATO's top counter-proliferation
priority. The group also concluded that such efforts are not likely to
stop missile proliferation. Accordingly, it was determined that NATO
should examine a range of military capabilities to discourage
proliferation, including missile defense, to further protect forces,
territories, and populations.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">NATO's policy on
counter-proliferation has two dimensions: political and military.
Basically, the political dimension consists of dissuasion, through
security assurances, guarantees, and support of our Allies; denial,
through measures such as export controls; disarmament, through treaties
and agreements; and, finally, diplomatic pressure, through sanctions and
isolation of the aggressor.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The military dimension is the
area in which I concentrate military counter-proliferation measures,
including counter-terrorism, deterrence, defusion, elimination of
production facilities that might be used by an adversary, as well as
active defense and passive defense; we also ignore offensive counter-force
as a counter-proliferation strategy.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Let me show how this translates
directly in the world of missile defense. In the political schema,
Ballistic-Missile Defense (BMD) can support efforts to discourage the
spread of ballistic missiles: if we have missile defenses, missiles will
certainly be a less likely weapon choice for a potential adversary.
Similarly, active defense of a friendly country could lower the risks of
not proliferating in response to an opponent's proliferation. In the
arms-control context, by devaluing offensive systems, BMD can actually
encourage and facilitate regional or global efforts to negotiate
limitations on ballistic missiles.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">On the military side, the
protection of military forces, key facilities, and population centers by
missile defenses would permit military operations to be conducted and
would strengthen the solidarity of the Alliance or coalitions in the face
of weapons of mass destruction and their potential use. Furthermore, by
reducing the potential damage an adversary could inflict on NATO forces
and interests, ballistic-missile defense would bolster the credibility of
deterrence and reduce the possibility that NATO would decide not to take
offensive action. This is an important point, because NATO's central
strategic concept is deterrence. Ballistic-missile defense is necessary to
avoid any situation in which NATO determines not to employ its forces
because it is vulnerable to missile attack.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Active defense could also be
used to defuse a crisis or potential conflict; demonstrating resolve has
less impact on crisis stability than threatening the use of an offensive
system. Active defense would also provide a less provocative alternative
to preemptive strikes against enemy ballistic missiles, and perhaps
provide more decision space in which to de-escalate a crisis.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
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<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">ACCOMMODATING THE
ECONOMIC REALITIES OF TODAY'S WORLD</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Lower defense budgets are a fact
of life on both sides of the Atlantic. We therefore need to take advantage
of past investments in systems such as Patriot, some of our ships, some of
the systems that have been built in Europe, and the SA-12 in Russia, for
example.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Research and technology, now
maturing in many Alliance nations, are ready to be tapped and could
rapidly and economically improve our counter-proliferation posture.
Exploitation of these resources, however, will be difficult without a
better understanding of each nation's abilities to contribute and how the
resources will be provided.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Of course, new systems will also
have to be developed, so in this world of declining economic resources we
will have to have armaments cooperation. Our former U.S. Deputy Secretary
of Defense, John Deutch, has called this an "economic necessity,"
at least from the U.S. standpoint.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">NATO is doing its part and has
just established a group for the development of a Medium Extended Air
Defense System, which will have air defense, cruise-missile defense, and
ballistic-missile defense capabilities. Right now the program includes
France, Germany, Italy, and the United States. It underscores the common
desire of those four nations to pursue cooperative programs that will
develop and produce affordable tactical weapons systems. In my opinion, it
is a model program for the post-Cold War scenario.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Since I announced the formation
of the Extended Air Defense and Theater Missile Defense Ad Hoc Working
Group last year, this group has completed its preliminary work and
suggested cooperation in a large number of areas, including 15 different
technical areas. Such cooperation makes economic sense and helps
strengthen our transatlantic balance.</FONT></FONT> </P>
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<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">ENSURING NATO
PARTICIPATION IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The final challenge that we see
for the new NATO is ensuring that NATO continues to participate in the
evolving security architecture for Europe. In areas like peacekeeping and
out of area operations, global use of ballistic missiles could have
serious implications for NATO's support of any U.N. or other peacekeeping
operation. As ballistic missiles spread, it becomes increasingly likely
that NATO forces may be forced to operate in areas where ballistic-missile
threats are present. If we do not have protection against these threats,
it is less likely that we will become involved.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The Combined Joint Task Force
will require Theater Missile Defense (TMD) protection. What that means to
me as a developer is that we have to talk about integrated and
interoperable theater missile-defense forces and concepts of operations.
Fortunately, NATO military and political authorities are addressing these
questions right now, while material developers under the auspices of the
Conference of NATO Armament Directors are exploring system alternatives.
In fact, a NATO military operational requirement for theater-missile
defense has been drafted and submitted to NATO through the Military
Committee for consideration by the nations. When the review is complete,
the proposal will go forward to the North Atlantic Council.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Through the Partnership for
Peace program, NATO has an opportunity to build closer relationships with
the East in areas such as material acquisition. Secretary General Claes
has noted that there is more to Partnership for Peace than military
exercises and activities. What we see in the program is an opportunity to
bind Allies and Partners in a close pattern of activity covering a wide
range of security-related matters.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Cooperative research and
development, leading potentially to joint acquisition of systems, is
another way to build and strengthen Partners, both militarily and
industrially. In areas such as counter-proliferation, technical challenges
require the highest level of sophistication, and promise a payoff across a
broad spectrum of military and commercial applications. To this end, the
U.S. missile defense office, which is my office, has conducted discussions
that will lead to bilateral cooperative efforts with several Central
European countries. One that comes to mind is the Czech Republic, with
which we will be working very actively to develop sensor technologies for
use by both of our Ministries of Defense. Such efforts can contribute
toward developing a closer Eastern European relationship with Partners and
provide an important opportunity to enhance Alliance relations with the
former Warsaw Pact.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Ballistic-missile defense could
conceivably build better relations with an important PFP member, namely,
Russia. The traditional mutual nuclear deterrence relationship with the
Soviet Union has been based upon maintaining mutual strategic
vulnerability to the threat of nuclear retaliation. Perpetuating this
vulnerability can only exacerbate security concerns in a world with
expanded threats. By moving away from mutually assured destruction toward
mutually assured safety, as recently mentioned by the U.S. Secretary of
Defense, we hold the potential for developing a more cooperative and
stable partnership with Russia.</FONT></FONT> </P>
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