|
Server : Apache/2.4.62 System : FreeBSD fbsdweb2.web.rcn.net 14.1-RELEASE FreeBSD 14.1-RELEASE releng/14.1-n267679-10e31f0946d8 GENERIC amd64 User : www ( 80) PHP Version : 8.3.8 Disable Function : NONE Directory : /domains/roger.dnai/95Book/ |
Upload File : |
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//SoftQuad//DTD HoTMetaL PRO 4.0::19971010::extensions to HTML 4.0//EN"
"hmpro4.dtd">
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">
<META NAME="GENERATOR"
CONTENT="Mozilla/4.03 (Macintosh; I; 68K) [Netscape]">
<TITLE>German Defense Chief General Klaus Naumann...The Transformation of
NATO & the Shaping of European Security</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF" BGPROPERTIES="FIXED">
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+4">The Transformation of NATO
and the</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+4">Shaping of European
Security</FONT><FONT SIZE="+0"></FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+3">German Chief of Defense
General Klaus Naumann</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+1"> </FONT></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Addressing the 12th NATO
Workshop in Dresden is something I would not have dared to dream of less
than a decade ago. That it became possible is the result of our Alliance's
cohesion, solidarity, and risk sharing, a truly winning formula that we
must not forget in today's world of uncertainties and new risks. To that
end, this year's Workshop discussions have focused on the new NATO. I
would like to offer a few observations on the topic from a German point of
view.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">GERMANY'S BENEFITS AND
SACRIFICES</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Germany, whose security policy
has benefited more than any other country's from the end of the bipolar
confrontation, is situated in the heart of Europe. Whether its people like
it or not, Germany must and will play an active role in Europe, including
the acceptance of responsibility and the sharing of risks with Allies. But
Germany is undergoing a period of internal change, since its division was
much deeper than we had thought when we rejoiced in unification.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">When unification came about, two
societies were brought together that were based on truly antagonistic
ideas: democracy in the West and totalitarianism in the East. We had to
merge two peoples whose life conditions had nothing in common but
language; we had to merge two economies that were completely incompatible.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Outside Germany, it is not too
widely known that Germany is de facto spending 5-6% of its GDP for the
unification process and will continue to spend 4-6% of its GDP on this
process until the year 2005. That amount is approximately 150 billion DM
per year. This enormous transfer from West to East makes it possible for
East Germans to enjoy social welfare similar to that of their West German
compatriots. The German experience, however, cannot serve as a model for
other countries in transition. Our most important and difficult task
during the last four years was to get out of the rubble of 45 years of a
centrally planned economy, including total exploitation of capital
investment, unbelievable exploitation of the ecology, and a total lack of
investment in infrastructure. We have learned that the reconstruction of
the eastern part of Germany will require between 15 and 25 years. We have
also learned that the hidden figure of unemployment in the socialist
system is approximately 30%. Therefore Germany and other European
countries, but Germany in particular as the largest and strongest economic
member of the European Union, will have to face up to many problems in the
process of rebuilding Europe. These problems come in addition to our joint
responsibilities in maintaining highly complex societies under rapidly
changing conditions.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">ASSESSMENT OF THE
SITUATION</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">In terms of security, however,
we are much better off. For the first time in 300 years, Germans are no
longer the object of external pressure but have the chance to prevent
conflicts and make peace more secure. Of course, this means making major
changes in our policy, since we must alter the attitude that prevailed in
the days of the Cold War; namely, we must focus on Central Europe
exclusively. Unification and the end of confrontation brought about three
factors which can be considered as constants in terms of German security:</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<UL>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Germany is no longer a
front-line state and is surrounded by neighbors that are its allies or
friends.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Germany is no longer within
range of a military power capable of strategic offensive and occupying
German terrain.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Germany continues to be part
of the Western community of shared values and will continue to be an
important land power in the NATO maritime alliance.</FONT></FONT></LI>
</UL>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Still, we are confronted with
risks and uncertainties in Eastern and Southeastern Europe and realize
that it is no longer sufficient to aim at security in Europe; we must
strive for security for Europe. It seems to me that three very different
approaches to security are being pursued by European countries at this
time:</FONT></FONT> </P>
<UL>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The European Union countries
no longer consider war as an instrument of politics.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Others, e.g., Russia, still
seem to think in categories like zones of hegemony or spheres of
dominating influence.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">A minority, including the
warring parties in the former Yugoslavia, believe that war is an
instrument of politics.</FONT></FONT></LI>
</UL>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">CONSEQUENCES FOR
EUROPEAN SECURITY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATO AND THE SHAPING OF EUROPE'S
ABILITY TO ACT</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">What are the conclusions to be
drawn from this mixed approach to security? On the one hand, the regional
approach that used to be limited to Europe and the NATO Treaty area is no
longer adequate; on the other hand, mere response is not enough to prevent
conflicts in the unleashed world outside nuclear conflict containment.
Preventive action must be taken.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Such action certainly
necessitates the use of conflict management mechanisms in the very early
stages of crises. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), because it includes the United States, Russia, and Europe, must
play a role, and its efforts ought to be appreciated.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">However, conflict management
means action, and this is the OSCE's weakness; the former CSCE's
consensus-minus-one policy has not been remedied. Nevertheless, I feel we
must continue to work on developing the OSCE, if only to let Russia find a
place in Europe without the chance to assume a dominating role.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">To this end, it will be
necessary to identify common political goals at the beginning of a crisis
rather than take military action on the basis of whitewashed contrasts as
occurred in Yugoslavia. Europe will also need organizations capable of
acting, and the only one is NATO.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">As of now NATO can act only in
its own right when exercising its Article V responsibilities. It needs a
political mandate from an organization such as the United Nations (U.N.)
to legitimize other actions. The U.N., however, is an organization
stretched beyond its resources. It has become clear that regional
organizations must pick up some of the burden. This is a political task,
but it seems possible that the Alliance could undertake crisis-management
operations according to Article IV of the NATO Treaty and based on either
a U.N. mandate or Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. In the latter case, a "coalition
of the willing" probably would act based on their determination and
with the consent of their allies. NATO, however, should not act as a
servant of the U.N. as it does right now in the former Yugoslavia. The
bitter lesson that NATO has learned there is that it is impossible to
reconcile peace-enforcement operations with the conditions of a
peacekeeping operation. NATO increasingly is being seen as ineffective and
is losing both credibility and support.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">In my view, future NATO missions
should encompass: collective defense of the NATO Treaty area; crisis
management and conflict prevention within NATO's not-yet-defined sphere of
interest; and the projection of stability through cooperation. There is no
question that NATO must undergo further change to that end. NATO should no
longer be seen as a one-way alliance that provides security only for
Europe; it should help our American partners if they need it. Therefore it
must be enabled to manage crises beyond collective defense. This issue
involves the still-unresolved Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) problem,
which in my view is an issue of instruments. It is by no means as
complicated an issue as identifying the sphere of interest within which
NATO nations might be willing to act to prevent conflicts, or the more
institutional issues of establishing proper political decision-making
machinery, military command structures, and appropriate force structures
for both crisis management and collective defense (these should be
identical).</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">To use the capabilities and
resources of the Alliance to shape Europe's security and defense identity,
we need to implement the mandate of the January 1994 NATO Summit. Answers
are urgently needed, since they may affect the JGC 96, which will deal
with the question of a European security policy. Nothing, however,
justifies abandoning NATO's integrated military structure. Modification is
possible, but abandonment would open the bottle and let out the genie of
defense renationalization.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">PROJECTING STABILITY
EASTWARD</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">NATO has taken two initial steps
to project stability to the East by creating the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PFP). In just one
year, PFP has become an integral part of the European security scene. It
is a useful tool that encourages NATO and individual Partners to work
together. It also helps new democratic states to restructure, establish
democratic control of their military forces, and learn new forms of
military doctrine, environmental control, and disaster relief.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The 20 PFP military exercises
planned for this year, of which Germany will participate in 14, will do
much to foster this transitional process. Twenty-six nations, including
Russia, have deemed PFP membership to be in their interests. This progress
is encouraging, but improvement in coordination between national,
bilateral, or trilateral activities and NATO programs is also necessary.
In addition, exercises that would result in an ever-increasing degree of
common standards and procedures should be considered. Germany has offered
some proposals to that end and introduced legislation that will enable our
country to host PFP exercises as of next year.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">NATO ENLARGEMENT</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">As NATO undertakes its
transformation, risk will be involved. Partners' unfulfilled hopes could
lead to withdrawal and frustration; also, if the Alliance proceeds too
quickly, it will accept new members before it has adequately adjusted to
new tasks. That is why NATO enlargement must be approached with judgment
and patience and, most of all, as a process that needs time.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Today, Eastern and Central
European nations consumed with the task of constructing democratic
governments and market economies instinctively look westward for their
models. They seek the same umbrella of protection and the same prosperity
now enjoyed by NATO members. Our task is to help these countries achieve
these goals through a new, yet realistic, security structure. That NATO
should and will expand is no longer a question. What is in question is
where, when, and how expansion will take place.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Before NATO is extended, the 16
member-nations that currently make up NATO must decide whether or not they
are prepared to guarantee collective defense and common protection of
interests. New members must be willing to share risks, responsibilities,
and burdens with us, and should be prepared to accept the membership
rules.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">THE SHAPING OF THE
EUROPEAN SECURITY</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">AND DEFENSE IDENTITY</FONT><FONT SIZE="+0"></FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">As the Alliance moves in new
directions, a new European security and defense identity is about to be
shaped. At the center of this evolution is the Western European Union
(WEU), which must become the defense component of the European Union and
the European pillar of NATO. Europe must attain the capability of limited
independent action. How we will distinguish between the tasks of NATO and
those of the WEU-EU and find ways to achieve a common European ability to
act require, however, a great deal of thought and imagination.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Some limited European
capabilities are needed without duplicating NATO's efforts. Having them
and using them will tie the United States firmly and lastingly to Europe.
This is a must, for without the United States there will be no security
with an unstable Russia, no chance to achieve supra-regional security.
Without a U.S. commitment to Europe there would be a risk of strategic
decoupling, the negative implications of which would go far beyond the
areas of security and defense. Fortunately, the United States has signaled
that it welcomes the strengthening of NATO's European defense pillar via
the Western European Union.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">There will be instances in the
future when WEU members will want to engage in operations in which other
NATO members choose not to be involved. This is why the so-called
dual-hatting of NATO and WEU forces, the support of the Combined Joint
Task Force, and a security architecture with both the strength and
flexibility to meet the varied security tests of this new period of global
change are so important. But all of these changes will result in new
demands on the armed forces. The task of covering the military spectrum,
from armed humanitarian operations to coercive measures in
crisis-management missions, will be added to the tasks of those employed
within NATO's collective defense.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Armed forces are undergoing
dramatic changes at the present time:</FONT></FONT> </P>
<UL>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The original function of
national and Alliance defense forces is being expanded by a variety of
new tasks; the forces are becoming multifunctional.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The unidimensionality of
risks encountered in a period of confrontation is being replaced by a
variety of multidirectional risks.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The situation of nuclear
confrontation, in which the employment of forces was almost precluded
and only reaction on the defending side was allowed, no longer exists.
What is needed now is action, including preventive action.</FONT></FONT></LI>
</UL>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Accordingly we had to change the
mission of the Bundeswehr. We are transforming our armed forces into an
instrument that will enable Germany to contribute to conflict prevention
by using the entire spectrum of political, economic, and military means in
a flexible manner. The resulting new force structure will enable my
country to contribute to NATO's highly trained and readily available
reaction forces as well as its main defense forces.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Germany will remain a very
active player and a most reliable partner in Europe and in NATO. We are
willing to shoulder risks and to accept wider responsibilities within the
U.N., NATO, and the EU, and we are equipped with armed forces that are fit
to fight and willing to help.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0"><A HREF="Naumann.htm">Go to Top
of Page</A></FONT></FONT> <BR><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0"><A HREF="95Workshop.htm">Return
to Dresden '95 Page</A></FONT></FONT> <BR><A HREF="../index.html">Return to Home Page</A> </P>
</BODY>
</HTML>