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<TITLE>Ambassador Robert E. Hunter...NATO Beyond 2000</TITLE>
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<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+4">NATO Beyond 2000</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+3">Ambassador Robert E. Hunter</FONT></FONT></CENTER>
<CENTER><I><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+2">United States Mission
to NATO</FONT></FONT></I></CENTER>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">INTRODUCTION</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">I would like to discuss the
prospects for "NATO Beyond 2000," which is not a presumptuous
title. Only a few years ago, some wrote the obituary for this Alliance,
but the critical value of NATO has been fully proved. In fact, we have
gone beyond that: the structure of enduring European security for
generations to come has now been designed. The intellectual heavy lifting
is mostly over, and we are now fully into the process of constructing.
Thus, discussing "Beyond 2000" will be less dramatic than any
such presentation would have been in the past, because we now believe at
NATO Headquarters that we have a road map that will take us into the new
century effectively.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">NATO'S FOUR KEY
COMMITMENTS</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">After the year 2000, I foresee
several realities that demonstrate the continuing need for this
institution, founded first and foremost on four great undertakings which
are the core of transatlantic and broader European security:</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<UL>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The United States has a
continuing strategic engagement in Europe. This is, in my country, a
settled historic question. The idea of a 1919-style retreat from Europe
is now nonsense. How we express this engagement may change from time to
time, but its core value is now beyond question. And despite what
happened in last year's national elections in the United States, this is
a bipartisan commitment.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">NATO's purpose is to help
preserve the dramatic results of the last 50 years that we have
achieved, achievements without historic precedent among nations as
diverse as we have here--including the abolition of war itself among the
nations of the European Union. It is now inconceivable that
circumstances could come about such as those that produced the First and
Second World Wars; one of NATO's great tasks is to ensure that this
continues to be true in the future. An essential part of that work is
the role that NATO plays in preventing the renationalization of defense.
Being in this together is core and key to what makes the Alliance work.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">We have assumed at NATO
significant responsibilities in our self-interest for stability,
security, and predictability in Central Europe. Let us be clear: NATO
has already expanded. It did so when we created NACC, when we created
Partnership for Peace, and when we committed to take in new members. We
are talking now about how to achieve this particular commitment, not
about whether to do it.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Finally, the fourth critical
role for NATO is to deal with the future of the one country whose course
can have a decisive effect upon European security, and that is Russia.
We know that enabling that country to come fully into life in the West,
playing a productive role with a positive development at home, is
critical to our security.</FONT></FONT></LI>
</UL>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Those are NATO's four big
purposes, and you will notice that they cover a geographic area that
starts approximately on the English Channel (including, of course,
Britain) and moves through the heartland of Europe all the way into
Russia.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">MEETING NATO'S
RESPONSIBILITIES</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">In the time that remains between
now and 2000 as well as after that point, we are prepared to meet these
four responsibilities. They derive from proposals made by President
Clinton at the Summit a year ago, ratified by all the Allies, and now
deeply sunk within the body politic.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">First, I believe, is Partnership
for Peace. It is a permanent institution, not only a transition program
for countries that will join NATO, but a permanent engagement for those
countries that are not (at least not at first) able to be members of NATO.
Frankly, if we do our job right, the difference between being a Partner
and being an Ally is going to be minuscule.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Second, of course, is formal
NATO enlargement. Without going into the questions now of "when"
and "who," we are clearly on track to providing security for all
the nations that are engaged in this process and diminishing it for none.
By the year 2000, we will be clear on exactly how these two processes work
together.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Third, of course, is developing
the NATO-Russia relationship, starting immediately with implementing the
Russian Individual Partnership Program, working beyond Partnership for
Peace, and developing by the end of this year a basic understanding of the
framework to govern relations between Russia and NATO for the period
ahead. The relationship is a big conundrum--we cannot be clear that it is
going to work the way we would all like it to work, but at least in the
West and in NATO we are clear on how we need to proceed and why this is
important.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">These three efforts--Partnership
for Peace, enlargement, and NATO-Russia relations--together and in
parallel define the core strategic relationships for the Alliance in the
future.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">CORE QUESTIONS FOR NATO
TO ANSWER</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Now, in order to get there and
to get it done properly, we need by the year 2000 to have answered five
key questions:</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">1. We have to be certain that,
when we take new Allies into the Alliance, we will be able to get the full
support of all 16 parliaments. NATO does not do paper treaties. It is a "three
musketeers" alliance, in the sense that each country commits itself
to the security of all the others, and that has to be made absolutely
clear or it is worthless to enlarge the Alliance.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">2. Countries that come in must
demonstrate that they are prepared to be producers and not just consumers
of security. In fact, a new ally that comes in from the East will have to
be willing to come to the rescue, to the aid, of the rest of us and not
simply expect that NATO will be a guarantor of its own security.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">3. We must answer the very
profound question about what happens to countries that do not join.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">4. We must determine how to
prevent a new division of Europe, which has been brought up repeatedly. It
is completely an apposite question, and one that we have to face most
fundamentally if expansion is to be a truly positive development.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">5. Finally, we need to be able
to reinforce the efforts of reformers in all the countries of the East,
including Russia. There is no point in undertaking security challenges
with new expansion if, in the process, we undercut those who are
attempting to build new futures for their own countries.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">The task involves moving
eastward the European civil space, as I call it. We have to find a way to
go beyond the balance of power, as has been done here in the western part
of the continent. And we need to get well beyond (as we at NATO are
beyond) the concept of buffer states. There is no place for buffer states
in the new conception. We are not talking at NATO about confronting a
common enemy, except one, and that common enemy is insecurity. And every
country participating in this process has that interest in common.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">RELATED ISSUES AND KEY
TASKS</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Now, these are the core issues
and questions that we have to answer. Clearly, however, there are other
things we are going to have to work on mightily between now and the year
2000 and after. One is Combined Joint Task Forces. Another is relations
with the Western European Union--things that I would refer to as the
internal plumbing of the Alliance, and whose reforms we are essential for
meeting even our core responsibilities. The relationship with WEU is
complementary, but that institution cannot and will not supplant the
fundamental requirements we have at NATO. We must also work on OSCE
relations with the U.N., and on the risks from weapons of mass destruction
and the means of delivering them. This last interest is likely to become
more significant in the future, posing radical challenges for us.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">We could also talk about the
Alliance's Mediterranean initiative, but I put that very much in a
secondary category. In fact, we must face quite clearly, as we move
forward, how possible it is to refocus the Alliance geographically away
from where it has been in the past and still preserve its core elements. I
think the answer is that we have to be extremely circumspect before we
shift the geographic focus of the Alliance.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">What I have said is a reminder
of several key tasks that we have to undertake to make this positive
future a reality. A priority is to build public support for all of the key
missions and the ways of meeting them. If we have one thing at NATO that
we feel has to be achieved now, it is to make people understand what our
basic rationale is and what we are doing about it, and to build essential
parliamentary and public support . And I have to say that it is far from
being assured in all of our countries.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">We will also have to keep up
defense spending. We will need to build even better cooperation among the
defense industries--bridges, not walls. We will need to have tangible
support for all of NATO's budgets. Right now, that is in jeopardy. Across
the Atlantic we will need a division of effort, at least in monetary
terms, to demonstrate to the American Congress that our European allies
are, as always, stepping up to the responsibilities they share with us.</FONT></FONT>
</P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Third, we must prepare for a
wide range of developments that could take place in the East, especially
within Russia. We now have developed a methodology that we believe can do
as well as is humanly possible to account for possible futures within
Russia, in terms of the possible risks they present to European security.
We wish that country well, but we are also prepared to do what we have to
toward the common security of all.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Fourth, we have to recognize and
we have to ensure that, in modernizing the structures of NATO, we do not
lose our capacity to undertake our core requirements. This includes
continuing centrality for the NATO integrated military structure, both for
Article V and for non-Article V activities. We cannot have two NATOs; we
can have only one, because neither would be effective.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">Finally, of course, we need
complementary efforts by other institutions; I have already mentioned WEU
and the European Union. It will make little sense in the grand historic
perspective if we do everything at NATO effectively, moving eastward in
Europe, if that effort is not accompanied by steps by the European Union.
Security in today's world is organic. NATO can take the lead, but it
cannot do it alone.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">NATO'S INVOLVEMENT IN
PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">What are we, as 16 nations (and
at some point more nations than that), prepared to do in areas and
situations that do not fall along history's great fault line in Central
Europe? This is the most difficult question for us conceptually at NATO
and inevitably brings us back to Bosnia. Clearly, we have learned a lot
from this experience. What we have learned has helped us create Combined
Joint Task Forces. We have also learned a lot about political-military
control for non-Article V situations. And yes, we have learned a lot about
dealing with the U.N. in a more effective relationship. But let me be
clear: It is not certain that the NATO institution can adapt--or should
adapt--to play a critical role in what is now known as peacekeeping or
peace making. I think we have to have some very clear standards for
judgment. It is not how we deal with non-Article V situations with future
Bosnias. It is not, in fact, about how we change our structures; it is
about how we at NATO make our decisions:</FONT></FONT> </P>
<UL>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">We have to determine in each
case what it is genuinely in our collective interest to do. That implies
a significant geographic constraint on where we become involved.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">We have to be sure that we
preserve the core elements of the Alliance. Becoming engaged elsewhere
cannot be worth undercutting what we have to do within the central
purposes.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">We have to make sure that
whatever we do, we never, never default on a commitment. We have not
defaulted on a single commitment with regard to Bosnia. But let us face
it, many people in the outside world believe that we have done so. We
have to define what we are doing--the mission and the mandate--with
clarity. One of the problems with Bosnia is that, through mid-1995, we
did not have a clear, agreed mission and this had some corrosive effect
on the Alliance.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">We must ensure that we on the
political level keep faith with the military in our Alliance in terms of
the tasks we set and what we expect. We cannot ask the military people
in NATO to go into circumstances where they do not have a clear task, a
clear mandate, and our full backing.</FONT></FONT></LI>
<LI><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">And finally, we have to
ensure, if we get involved, that we have the firm backing of all the
peoples of our various countries.</FONT></FONT></LI>
</UL>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">This is a difficult set of
criteria. And it leads us to be quite prudent and quite conservative in
taking on new tasks. Yes, at NATO we no longer talk about out of area
circumstances. We are out of area. We are, as I have said, already deeply
engaged in Central Europe. But there are going to be limits imposed, not
in advance but with experience. It is important for us to recognize and to
account for those limits. It is important for us to work out new
relationships with OSCE,and to understand what the WEU can indeed do on
behalf of all the Allies. And we also have to understand that we are
entering into an era in which, in some circumstances, we are going to
operate with coalitions of the willing.</FONT></FONT> </P>
<CENTER></CENTER>
<CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+1">CONCLUSION</FONT></FONT></B></CENTER>
<P><FONT COLOR="#000000"><FONT SIZE="+0">We cannot find final answers to
all of these questions now, but, while what I have just outlined is
conceptually the most important task we still face and conceptually the
most difficult, it is not politically the most important challenge facing
NATO. This is not an Alliance searching for a new mission; it is therefore
not necessarily ready to take on new missions like peacekeeping for want
of other reasons for being. The four key commitments that I have outlined,
along with the threat of weapons of mass destruction, provide a clear and
compelling rationale for NATO far beyond the year 2000. This is, clearly,
truly a Cartesian argument. Indeed, if there were not a NATO, we would now
be in the process of inventing it. In fact, I think for the year 2000 and
beyond, we should be quite thankful that the previous generations that
designed and tested the NATO Alliance created an institution that has
proved, in an amazing fashion, to be readily adaptable to the reality of
the demands of the future.</FONT></FONT> </P>
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