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<p align="center" class="style17">Table of Contents<br>
25th International Workshop - Rome '08</p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-preface.html">Preface- Dr. Roger<br>Weissinger-Baylon<br>Workshop Chairman<br></a>
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-overview.html">Workshop Chairman's Overview - Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon</a>
<a href="/2008book/joulwan.html">Opening Dinner Debate - <br>General George Joulwan<br>Former SACEUR</a>
<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part One<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/la-russa.html">Italian Defense Minister<br />
Ignazio La Russa
</a>
<a href="/2008book/browne.html">British Defense Minister<br />
The Rt Hon Des Browne
</a>
<a href="/2008book/gonul.html">Turkish Defense Minister<br />
Vecdi G�n�l
</a>
<a href="/2008book/di-paola.html">NATO Military Committee Chairman<br />
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappata.html">Admiral Luciano Zappata<br />
Dep Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/camporini.html">Italian Chief of Defense<br />
General Vincenzo Camporini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappa.html">Alenia Aeronautica Chairman<br />
Dr. Giorgio Zappa
</a>
<br>Part Two<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/baramidze.html">Georgian Vice Prime Minister<br />
Giorgi Baramidze
</a>
<a href="/2008book/chizhov.html">Russian Amb to EU<br />
Vladimir Chizhov
</a>
<br>Part Three<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/eldon.html">British Amb to NATO<br />
Stewart Eldon
</a>
<a href="/2008book/akram.html">Pakistan's Amb to U.N.<br />
Munir Akram
</a>
<a href="/2008book/de-la-sabliere.html">French Amb to Italy<br />
Jean-Marc de la Sabli�re
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tkeshelashvili.html">Georgian Foreign Minister<br />
Eka Tkeshelashvili
</a>
<a href="/2008book/stefanini.html">Italian Amb to NATO<br />
Stefano Stefanini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buzhinsky.html">Lt Gen Evgeniy Buzhinsky<br />
Russian Min of Defense
</a>
<a href="/2008book/winid.html">Polish Amb to NATO<br />
Boguslaw Winid
</a>
<br>Part Four<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/tegnelia.html">DTRA Director<br />
Dr. James Tegnelia
</a>
<a href="/2008book/rood.html">U.S. Under Sec of State<br />
John Rood
</a>
<a href="/2008book/joseph.html">Former Under Sec of State<br />
Amb Robert Joseph</a>
<a href="/2008book/berdennikov.html">Russian Amb-at-large<br />
Grigory V. Berdennikov
</a>
<a href="/2008book/benkert.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Defense<br />
Joseph Benkert
</a>
<a href="/2008book/flory.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Peter Flory
</a>
<a href="/2008book/sedivy.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Jiri Sedivy
</a>
<a href="/2008book/pfirter.html">OPCW Dir Gen<br />
Amb Rogelio Pfirter
</a>
<br>Part Five<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/lather.html">SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Karl-Heinz Lather
</a>
<a href="/2008book/fitzgerald.html">Admiral Mark. P. Fitzgerald
<br />
Allied Joint Force Command Naples
</a>
<a href="/2008book/ildem.html">Turkish Amb to NATO<br />
Tacan Ildem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schuwirth.html">Fmr SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Rainer Schuwirth
</a>
<a href="/2008book/acosta.html">Global Impact CEO<br />
Ms. Renee Acosta
</a>
<a href="/2008book/soligan.html">Lt Gen James Soligan<br />
Allied Command-Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bagnall.html">Former UK Vice Chief of Defense Staff<br />
ACM Sir Anthony Bagnall
</a>
<br>Part Six
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/volkman.html">U.S. Dir of Internat. Coop.<br />
Alfred Volkman
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tozzi.html">Major General Claudio Tozzi<br />
Italian Defense Ministry
</a>
<a href="/2008book/homberg.html">EADS Senior Vice Pres<br />
Thomas Homberg
</a>
<a href="/2008book/shephard.html">Northrop Grumman VP<br />
Mr. Timothy Shephard
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buckley.html">Thales Senior VP<br />
Dr. Edgar Buckley
</a>
<a href="/2008book/harris.html">Lockheed Martin Global Pres.<br />
Dr. Scott A. Harris
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schneider.html">AFCEA CEO<br />
Kent Schneider
</a>
<a href="/2008book/patterson.html">Mr. David Patterson<br />
Univ of Tennessee
</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part Seven
<p align="center" class="style17" style="margin-bottom: 0;">
<a href="/2008book/grimes.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Def<br />
Hon. John G. Grimes
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lentz.html">U.S. Dep Asst Sec of Def<br />
Robert Lentz
</a>
<a href="/2008book/aaviksoo.html">Estonian Defense Minister<br />
Jaak Aaviksoo
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bloechl.html">Microsoft, Managing Dir.<br />
Tim Bloechl
</a>
<a href="/2008book/wolf.html">Lt Gen Ulrich Wolf<br />
NATO CIS Service Agency Dir
</a>
<a href="/2008book/monteforte.html">Italian Milrep to NATO<br />
Vice Adm Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lintonen.html">Finnish Amb to UN<br />
Kirsti Lintonen
</a>
<a href="/2008book/silvestri.html">Dr. Stefano Silvestri<br />
Istituto Affari Internazionali
</a>
<a href="/2008book/yousfi.html">Algerian Amb to UN<br />
Youcef Yousfi
</a>
<a href="/2008book/karem.html">Egyptian Amb to EU<br />
Mahmoud Karem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tarasyuk.html">Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister<br />
Borys Tarasyuk
</a>
</div>
</div>
<div id="content">
<div class="story">
<h2 class="workshop_year">Rome '08 Workshop</h2>
<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="Main Content" -->
<h1>
An Overview of Regions in Crisis: Afghanistan and Iraq </h1>
<h2 style="margin-bottom: 0;">
Ambassador Boguslaw W. Winid</h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0;">Polish Ambassador to NATO</h2>
<p align="center"><img src="images/winid.jpg" alt="Ambassador Boguslaw W. Winid" width="74" height="102"></p>
<p style="margin-bottom: 0;"> </p>
<p style="margin-top: 0;">
I must admit that it is difficult to address the very comprehensive theme
of this panel. It concerns several crisis regions, which are different
in terms of background, political and geographical situations, actors involved,
and the level of engagement of the international community. In order to
make addressing this theme a bit easier, I have decided to focus on Afghanistan,
which is a key priority for NATO and for my country. Then I shall say a
couple of words on Iraq and, finally, make two general points about Poland’s
contribution to crisis response operations. </p>
<p>
I am not going to talk about progress on the ground in Afghanistan. I think
it is visible, and the Bucharest Summit as well as the International Conference
to Support Afghanistan that was held in Paris recently proved it so. I
am going to outline a few factors that, in my personal view, are critical
if NATO and the international community are to succeed there. Although
these elements are related specifically to the situation in Afghanistan,
I believe they can be applied to other conflict regions as well. </p>
<h2>SUCCEEDING IN AFGHANISTAN</h2>
<h2>Enabling Afghan Leadership and Ownership</h2>
<p>
An Afghan official used to say, “Afghanistan is a strong nation, but a weak
state.” That is why our central objective must be to assist the government
of Afghanistan in establishing a sustainable and functioning state. We
must help Afghans in different areas: in developing and strengthening their
institutions, improving security situations, and fostering reconstruction
and development efforts. Also, as we support the armed nation-building
in this country, the Afghan people must remain at the center of our strategy. </p>
<p>
In assisting Afghans, we must not forget that our presence in Afghanistan
is at the request of the government, which sets the tone for key activities
and priorities there. Therefore “Afghanization” must be a key word in our
mission. We have to do our utmost to understand the Afghan people’s own
perspective and see the challenges from the point of view of Kabul, not
Warsaw, London, Rome, or Madrid. That is why documents developed by Afghans,
such as the Afghan National Development Strategy, must become key guiders
as we conduct this mission, and that is why our aid should be channeled
through Afghan government structures. This is the best way to achieve sustainable
progress and the best value for the money. </p>
<p>
Obviously, a key task for NATO is to assist Afghan authorities in building
the hallmarks of an effective and sovereign security sector, namely, the
Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Only Afghan-led
forces can ensure the rule of law in the longer term. </p>
<p>
I believe that ISAF has been advancing on these fronts, especially in training
the army. The ANA continues to grow in both size (in 2009 we are aiming
for 70,000 trained Afghan soldiers) and capability and is being given greater
responsibility in planning and executing operations. We hope it will progressively
take over lead security responsibility in the country, starting with the
Kabul area during the summer of 2008, as announced by President Karzai. </p>
<p>
Promising signals are also visible in our national area of operation. When
my country takes over security responsibility for the eastern Afghan province
of Ghazni later in 2008, we will closely cooperate with soldiers from a brigade
headquarters and two infantry battalions in the Afghan National Army. </p>
<p>
Nevertheless, let us be under no illusion that progress can be artificially
accelerated. We are in for a long haul. However, sooner or later the country
will be on its own. Training Afghanistan’s security forces is our best
exit strategy. </p>
<h2>Ensuring Necessary Capabilities and Resources for the Mission </h2>
<p>
General David Barno, commander of the American forces in Afghanistan from
2003 to 2005, once said that successful counterinsurgency in this country
was 20% military effort and 80% nonmilitary. I do believe that’s true.
As we often say, “There can be no lasting security without development,”
and the Taliban can only be defeated in the long term by better governance
and more development in Afghanistan, rather than through purely military
means. Therefore, we need greater progress on the economic front, in reconstruction,
improvements in governance, fighting narcotics, and so on. </p>
<p>
However, the Alliance’s mandate concerns security. As we put a great deal
of emphasis on development, reconstruction, and governance, we should not
neglect the need to contribute sufficient resources to ensure NATO’s successful
operation. We need to fill the remaining troop shortfalls (including OMLTs),
provide necessary enablers (helicopters), and, last but not least, for
effectiveness of the overall mission, we have to attempt to reduce or eliminate
restrictions on the use of national forces. As the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and my boss Radoslaw Sikorski once said, “To give without caveats
is to give twice.” </p>
<p>
If we are to succeed in Afghanistan, we must continue the military effort.
Let me stress that failure to mobilize resources in support of our joint
endeavor in this country would show that only unilateral actions matter.
It would strike a blow not only at NATO, but at the concept of multilateralism
in general. </p>
<h2>Making Operational the Comprehensive Approach Concept</h2>
<p>
The comprehensive approach has become a buzzword. In its essence, it means
that NATO, as an organization, cannot in many cases (and Afghanistan is
one of them) achieve its aims all on its own. As a result, we need partners,
including other international organizations and NGOs. And we need better
coordination among them all to impart greater effectiveness and coherence
to stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Of course, those who advocate
coordination must also be willing to be coordinated themselves, and I think
NATO is ready to do that. </p>
<p>
A leading role in this area needs to be played by the U.N., and I believe
that Kai Eide, Special Representative of the UNSG, is the right person
to make the difference there. At the Bucharest Summit and at the Paris conference
we noticed the willingness of other partners to increase their engagement
in Afghanistan. The EU, for instance, is committed to substantially increasing
its efforts, and recently decided to double the number of experts working
in its police mission in the country. Right now, the most pressing challenge
for the entire international community, including NATO, is to assist the
Afghans in preparing for presidential and parliamentary elections. </p>
<h2>Improving Our Strategic Communications</h2>
<p>
If we cannot convince the public and the media that our strategy is working,
NATO’s mission is doomed to fail. First, we have to, at a minimum, maintain
the support of the Afghan people for our efforts. Second, we must improve
the image of the mission among our own publics. Of course, support for
ISAF’s mission varies from country to country, but, make no mistake, no
country is fully immune from having its public become disillusioned with
the involvement of troops in a conflict so far away from national borders. </p>
<p>
Poland is a good example of this. I must acknowledge that my compatriots’
support for our mission in Afghanistan remains modest, to put it mildly.
However, Poles well understand the obligations that stem from being a member
of the Alliance, and therefore there are no serious calls for withdrawal
of the troops. However, the small and conditional level of support by our
public could have a negative impact in the longer term. </p>
<p>
That is why we, as NATO and as nations, need to communicate more effectively
our goals, accomplishments, and remaining challenges in Afghanistan to
the Europeans and North Americans who foot the bills. We have to enhance
our capacity to counter extremist propaganda and, last but not least, we
need to train more military public affairs professionals. An important
step was taken with the endorsement of the ISAF Strategic Vision and the
Comprehensive Strategic Political-Military Plan at the Bucharest Summit.
Now, it is time to implement their provisions. </p>
<p>
Because of time constraints I am going to stop talking about Afghanistan
now, but I want to acknowledge that there are other important factors that
define our level of success in that country. Among them certainly are how
to foster good-neighborly relations, especially with Pakistan; how to improve
counter-narcotics efforts; and how to promote the political reconciliation
process in Afghanistan. </p>
<h2>SUCCEEDING IN IRAQ</h2>
<p>
As U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon recently put it, “Iraq stepped back
from the abyss.” Despite the fragility of the situation, there is growing
optimism in this country that progress is at last being made in security,
thanks to both the U.S.-led coalition and Iraqi efforts. Cease-fires in
Sadr City and Basra are still holding, and the Iraqi government claims
some success in clearing al-Qaeda from the city of Mosul. There is hope
that Prime Minister Maliki’s government will push ahead with political
reconciliation among Sunni Arabs, Shia, and Kurds while continuing to clamp
down on both Sunni and Shia extremists. We can also see more constructive
engagement of Iraq’s neighbors and partners in the region. Continuing this
approach remains essential to achieving peace and stability in Iraq and
in the region as a whole. In addition, provincial elections scheduled for
autumn 2008 should be seen as an important milestone in the political process
in Iraq. </p>
<p>
We have also witnessed positive changes in the Iraqi province of Diwaniyah,
which is still controlled by the Multinational Division Center-South under
Polish leadership. We believe that after a long stabilization process that
involved close cooperation with the local authorities and the Iraqi Security
Forces, the desired level of safety has been achieved. Now, it is time
to hand over complete responsibility for the province to its authorities
and the Iraqi forces. This process has already been initiated and should
be completed in July 2008. This moment will become the beginning of a new
reconstruction stage in the province and will influence the situation in
all of Iraq. We are very proud that the 8<SUP>th</SUP> Iraqi Army Division, which
was trained by our forces, is among the best units in the country. </p>
<h2>POLISH CONTRIBUTIONS</h2>
<p>
Previously we decided that having our troops participate in stabilization
and peacekeeping operations would become “la specialité de la maison” and
an important tool of Polish foreign policy. Thus, my country is playing
an increasingly larger role as an important European peacekeeping power
in the world. In fact, Polish troops are engaged in each and every region
in crisis that we discussed today. We have a growing presence in Afghanistan—recently
we deployed an additional 400 people, thus increasing the size of our contingent
to 1,600 troops. In August 2008 we are sending eight additional helicopters
as well.<SUB> </SUB></p>
<p>
However, our engagement in the coalition force in Iraq is coming to an
end. As of October 2008, Poland will pull its remaining 900 troops out
of that country. However, we will slightly increase our participation in
the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (this is the mission in which the Italian
carabinieri team provides training to the Iraqi National Police). </p>
<p>
We are also participating in a major EU-led military operation in eastern
Chad and the northeastern area of the Central African Republic. This mission
is tasked with providing security in the region, allowing the delivery
of humanitarian aid as well as the protection of civilians and U.N. personnel
there. The deployment of our soldiers is underway. Once completed, the
Polish contingent, with 400 troops and 2 helicopters, will become the second
biggest in size only to France’s contingent. A Polish officer has been
appointed the deputy commander of the EU mission. </p>
<p>
Finally, Poland continues a long tradition of participation in U.N. peacekeeping
missions. Currently, we have 500 soldiers deployed in the U.N. Interim
Force in Lebanon as well as more than 350 troops in the U.N. Disengagement
and Observation Force in the Golan Heights, between Syria and Israel. </p>
<h2>The Reasons Poland Is Committed </h2>
<p>
Polish commitment to international peacekeeping is not guided solely by
national interest. There are many other factors that influence our decisions:
Allied obligations and the readiness to contribute to transatlantic burden-sharing
in security and defense, willingness to support our partners in need, contributing
to the fight against terrorism, and our strong belief that it is imperative
to assist a country in making the transition from failed state to a democracy.
In Poland, we also have a historical tradition of men going abroad to fight
in other countries’ wars of liberation—“For your freedom and ours.” Our
efforts to help Afghans and Iraqis remain true to this tradition. </p>
<h2>Dispersal of Polish Troops in International Peacekeeping Operations </h2>
<p>
Poland obviously gives priority to NATO operations; more than half of our
troops deployed abroad are participating in Alliance activities. However,
as I mentioned, there are Polish soldiers in U.N.-led as well as EU-led
missions. In particular, the latter are of increasing importance to us.
We perceive the European Union as a second pillar of our security, alongside
NATO, and therefore Polish engagement in EU missions is growing. Recently,
my country’s authorities decided to join Eurocorps and to make a brigade-size
unit available to it. Our soldiers and policemen are also deployed not
only in Chad but in EU missions in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
Afghanistan. We also took part in the operation in Congo in 2006. I think
this trend will continue in the future, in Africa, the Middle East, or
elsewhere. </p>
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