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<p align="center" class="style17">Table of Contents<br>
25th International Workshop - Rome '08</p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-preface.html">Preface- Dr. Roger<br>Weissinger-Baylon<br>Workshop Chairman<br></a>
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-overview.html">Workshop Chairman's Overview - Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon</a>
<a href="/2008book/joulwan.html">Opening Dinner Debate - <br>General George Joulwan<br>Former SACEUR</a>
<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part One<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/la-russa.html">Italian Defense Minister<br />
Ignazio La Russa
</a>
<a href="/2008book/browne.html">British Defense Minister<br />
The Rt Hon Des Browne
</a>
<a href="/2008book/gonul.html">Turkish Defense Minister<br />
Vecdi G�n�l
</a>
<a href="/2008book/di-paola.html">NATO Military Committee Chairman<br />
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappata.html">Admiral Luciano Zappata<br />
Dep Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/camporini.html">Italian Chief of Defense<br />
General Vincenzo Camporini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappa.html">Alenia Aeronautica Chairman<br />
Dr. Giorgio Zappa
</a>
<br>Part Two<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/baramidze.html">Georgian Vice Prime Minister<br />
Giorgi Baramidze
</a>
<a href="/2008book/chizhov.html">Russian Amb to EU<br />
Vladimir Chizhov
</a>
<br>Part Three<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/eldon.html">British Amb to NATO<br />
Stewart Eldon
</a>
<a href="/2008book/akram.html">Pakistan's Amb to U.N.<br />
Munir Akram
</a>
<a href="/2008book/de-la-sabliere.html">French Amb to Italy<br />
Jean-Marc de la Sabli�re
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tkeshelashvili.html">Georgian Foreign Minister<br />
Eka Tkeshelashvili
</a>
<a href="/2008book/stefanini.html">Italian Amb to NATO<br />
Stefano Stefanini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buzhinsky.html">Lt Gen Evgeniy Buzhinsky<br />
Russian Min of Defense
</a>
<a href="/2008book/winid.html">Polish Amb to NATO<br />
Boguslaw Winid
</a>
<br>Part Four<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/tegnelia.html">DTRA Director<br />
Dr. James Tegnelia
</a>
<a href="/2008book/rood.html">U.S. Under Sec of State<br />
John Rood
</a>
<a href="/2008book/joseph.html">Former Under Sec of State<br />
Amb Robert Joseph</a>
<a href="/2008book/berdennikov.html">Russian Amb-at-large<br />
Grigory V. Berdennikov
</a>
<a href="/2008book/benkert.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Defense<br />
Joseph Benkert
</a>
<a href="/2008book/flory.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Peter Flory
</a>
<a href="/2008book/sedivy.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Jiri Sedivy
</a>
<a href="/2008book/pfirter.html">OPCW Dir Gen<br />
Amb Rogelio Pfirter
</a>
<br>Part Five<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/lather.html">SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Karl-Heinz Lather
</a>
<a href="/2008book/fitzgerald.html">Admiral Mark. P. Fitzgerald
<br />
Allied Joint Force Command Naples
</a>
<a href="/2008book/ildem.html">Turkish Amb to NATO<br />
Tacan Ildem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schuwirth.html">Fmr SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Rainer Schuwirth
</a>
<a href="/2008book/acosta.html">Global Impact CEO<br />
Ms. Renee Acosta
</a>
<a href="/2008book/soligan.html">Lt Gen James Soligan<br />
Allied Command-Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bagnall.html">Former UK Vice Chief of Defense Staff<br />
ACM Sir Anthony Bagnall
</a>
<br>Part Six
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/volkman.html">U.S. Dir of Internat. Coop.<br />
Alfred Volkman
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tozzi.html">Major General Claudio Tozzi<br />
Italian Defense Ministry
</a>
<a href="/2008book/homberg.html">EADS Senior Vice Pres<br />
Thomas Homberg
</a>
<a href="/2008book/shephard.html">Northrop Grumman VP<br />
Mr. Timothy Shephard
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buckley.html">Thales Senior VP<br />
Dr. Edgar Buckley
</a>
<a href="/2008book/harris.html">Lockheed Martin Global Pres.<br />
Dr. Scott A. Harris
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schneider.html">AFCEA CEO<br />
Kent Schneider
</a>
<a href="/2008book/patterson.html">Mr. David Patterson<br />
Univ of Tennessee
</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part Seven
<p align="center" class="style17" style="margin-bottom: 0;">
<a href="/2008book/grimes.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Def<br />
Hon. John G. Grimes
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lentz.html">U.S. Dep Asst Sec of Def<br />
Robert Lentz
</a>
<a href="/2008book/aaviksoo.html">Estonian Defense Minister<br />
Jaak Aaviksoo
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bloechl.html">Microsoft, Managing Dir.<br />
Tim Bloechl
</a>
<a href="/2008book/wolf.html">Lt Gen Ulrich Wolf<br />
NATO CIS Service Agency Dir
</a>
<a href="/2008book/monteforte.html">Italian Milrep to NATO<br />
Vice Adm Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lintonen.html">Finnish Amb to UN<br />
Kirsti Lintonen
</a>
<a href="/2008book/silvestri.html">Dr. Stefano Silvestri<br />
Istituto Affari Internazionali
</a>
<a href="/2008book/yousfi.html">Algerian Amb to UN<br />
Youcef Yousfi
</a>
<a href="/2008book/karem.html">Egyptian Amb to EU<br />
Mahmoud Karem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tarasyuk.html">Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister<br />
Borys Tarasyuk
</a>
</div>
</div>
<div id="content">
<div class="story">
<h2 class="workshop_year">Rome '08 Workshop</h2>
<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="Main Content" -->
<h1>
Workshop Chairman’s Overview:
In Search of a New Vision<B> </B></h1>
<h2 style="margin-bottom: 0;">
Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon</h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0;">Workshop Chairman and Founder </h2>
<p style="margin-bottom: 0;"></p>
<p align="center" style="margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0;"><img src="images/weissinger-baylon.jpg" alt="Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon" width="154" height="190"></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0;">
At the 25<SUP>th</SUP> International Workshop on Global Security, held in Rome in
June 2008, Admiral Giampaolo di Paola—the incoming chairman of the NATO
Military Committee (and the workshop’s honorary general chairman)—gave
the opening address, followed by key presentations by Italian Defense Minister
Ignazio La Russa (workshop patron), British Defense Minister the Rt Hon
Des Browne, Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül, Georgian Vice Prime Minister
Giorgi Baramidze, Italy’s Chief of Staff General Vincenzo Camporini, and
other leaders, including Finmeccanica’s COO Giorgio Zappa. NATO’s former
Supreme Allied Commander Europe General George Joulwan then led a dinner
debate that addressed fundamental issues, including the vital importance
of NATO’s relationship with Russia. </p>
<p>
During the two and one-half days of workshop discussions, these speakers
were joined by more than forty others, including senior diplomats—with
ambassadors to NATO, the EU and the U.N.—and some of NATO’s most senior
four-star flag and general officers, i.e. SHAPE Chief of Staff General
Karl-Heinz Lather, Allied Joint Force Commander Naples Admiral Mark Fitzgerald,
and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation Admiral Luciano Zappata. </p>
<h2>THE NEED FOR A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND A COMMON VISION FOR THE TRANSATLANTIC
RELATIONSHIP</h2>
<p>
British Defense Minister Des Browne describes the “need to reform our international
institutions in the light of the global challenges we face” and calls for
countries to “focus on the transformation of NATO. While recognizing NATO’s
remarkable successes, he believes that fundamental changes are necessary: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
...reform should take us towards three clear objectives for NATO: well-planned
and well-managed operations; an ability to help identify and deliver the
capabilities needed to support both current and future operations; and
a framework of partnerships that will allow us to work with others who
share our interests and can contribute to them including as part of a more
comprehensive approach. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
Minister Browne further argues, “We need to help the Alliance understand
better its real priorities, and then encourage it to focus and organize
itself to deliver them most effectively.” Speaking along the same lines,
Admiral Di Paola says that we have “a responsibility to think through all
the key issues” that affect our global security so that the Alliance can
develop “a new strategic concept based on a common vision for the transatlantic
relationship.” </p>
<h2>Which Threats Present the Gravest Risks?</h2>
<p>
In the search for a new strategic concept, a common vision, and a reformed
and transformed NATO, Estonia’s Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo argues that
security is “much more a subconscious feeling than the result of some rational
argument.” According to Minister Aaviksoo, “A lot of what we do in defense,
at least on the political level, is very much related to our perceptions
of threats. . .and that some of the problems we face in global as well
as regional security are sometimes diversions of these perceptions.” He
also warns that “we perceive the threats differently—some as real, some
as less real—and that creates a number of problems and misunderstandings.”
Italian Chief of Staff General Camporini, who was the first workshop speaker
to emphasize the need to think through the concept of security, warns that
it is not enough to simply seek security as an end in itself: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
Even a superficial analysis reveals that…the search for security is at
the origin of most of the forms of violence…Even World War II was justified
in this way: Hitler wanted the ‘vital space’ [liebensraum] for the Third
Reich, the space which was needed to make Germany feel secure…Why do I
tell you this? Simply because I want to warn you against the belief that
the use of the term ‘security’ is sufficient to grant legitimacy and legality
to any action and intervention. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
For this reason, it is vital to consider which threats present the greatest
risks to our security, to prioritize them, and to address them in the wisest
and most effective ways. </p>
<p>
In calling for a new NATO strategic concept, Admiral Di Paola expresses
particular concern for several challenges: </p>
<UL>
<LI>
<I>Pressures on the earth’s ecosystem. </I>Such pressures often lead to hunger;
scarcity of oil, water, and other natural resources; and effects on global
warming and climate change. At the time of the workshop, when energy prices
were near their peak, Minister La Russa put “scarcity of energy resources
at the top of the list.” He warned that “today’s energy prices are not
only a danger, but a true and direct threat to the orderly functioning
of our communities.” </LI>
<LI>
<I>Demographic growth. </I>The world’s population is expected to grow by several
billion during the coming decades, and the world’s largest cities are now
found in India, Pakistan, China, Russia, and Korea; Istanbul and Cairo
are already far larger than major western capitals such as New York and
London. </LI>
<LI>
<I>Increasing income inequality.</I> When “increasingly large numbers of people
have absolutely nothing,” Admiral Di Paola suggests that conflicts may
be inevitable. As Egyptian Ambassador Mamoud Karem points out, “The feeling
of insecurity is pervasive, with 40% of the world’s population living below
the poverty line of $2 per day.” </LI>
<LI>
<I>Rapidly evolving information technology.</I> This challenge is truly revolutionizing
the way work is done. In fact, the Internet continues to introduce fundamental
changes in the relationship between people and their governments. According
to Estonian Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo, “The Internet provides open
access to information, which is the best instrument for undermining totalitarian
systems.” IT may even be changing the way governments operate. </LI>
<LI>
<I>Loss of sovereignty. </I>Because of membership in organizations such as the
U.N., the EU, NATO, the IMF, or WTO, Admiral Di Paola points out, countries
are often left with a “dilution of sovereignty” and, consequently, often
have far more limited options than is generally realized to address fundamental
problems. </LI>
</UL>
<p>
These factors, together with such problems as regional or interstate conflicts,
hunger, disease, migration, environmental dangers, and organized crime,
drive traditional security challenges, including “terrorism with weapons
of mass destruction, nuclear proliferation, and the radicalization of ideologies
or religions.” In describing the present challenges, British Prime Minister
Gordon Brown emphasizes: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
- The globalization of the economy </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
- The threat of climate change </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
- The long struggle against international terrorism </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
- The need to protect millions from violence and conflict and to face up
to the international consequences of poverty and inequality </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<h2>The Speed and Span of Change </h2>
<p>
In discussing the new global challenges, Prime Minister Brown calls attention
to “their scale, their diversity, and the speed with which they have emerged.”
In fact, as Admiral Di Paola observes, these challenges are magnified by
the “speed and span of change.” While we are accustomed to dealing with
change, we “tend to adapt to change rather slowly” and, unfortunately,
the speed of change is now extraordinary. Italian Defense Minister La Russa,
describing the difficulties in dealing with the speed and span of change,
emphasized that politicians need much more time to make and implement decisions
effectively: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
We need time! The time we have for crisis management and resolution no
longer matches the time required to actually solve such crises. The time
we are given by politicians, the media, and western society is incompatible
with the time a crisis takes to spread out, be tackled, and solved. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonül, at a workshop planning meeting in
Ankara, Turkey, suggested that it is impossible to predict the kind of
crises that will arrive in the near future. As an illustration of the speed
and span of change, less than six months after the Rome workshop additional
challenges to global security have already emerged: </p>
<UL>
<LI>
<I>The Russia-Georgia conflict. </I>Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia on August
7, 2008, sparked a brief but intense military conflict between Russia and
Georgia, during which Russia was widely accused of overreaction. As a result
of this conflict, as well as growing Russian resentment over the planned
ballistic missile defense installations in Hungary and the Czech Republic,
there is risk that Cold-War tensions between Russia and the West could
return. As to the Georgia-Russia conflict, there were already signs of
deep tension between the parties during the Rome workshop. Georgia’s Vice
Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze warned: </LI>
</UL>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
...Russia would redraw the map of Eastern Europe and risk an armed conflict.
Rather than fulfill its role as a peacekeeper and a mediator in Abkhazia
Georgia, Russia has become a party to the conflict. Withdrawing from the
1996 CIS embargo that banned weapons transfer to the separatist rebels
in March, extending legal recognition to Georgia’s separatist territories
with the April 16 presidential decree, shooting down in Georgian air space
an unmanned and unarmed surveillance drone of the ministry of internal
affairs of Georgia on April 20…, and introducing the Russian Ministry of
Defense’s so-called railroad troops in May all offer clear evidence of
Russia’s intentions. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
As to the hotly contested ballistic missile defense installations, Russia
may have at least some reason for optimism, since U.S. President-elect
Obama has not expressed support for the proposal. In the meantime, Ambassador
Chizhov, Russia’s representative to the EU, sums up Russia’s opposition
and concern: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
...another element which also proves the existing continuing fragmentation
of security space is the famous—or infamous, depending on your point of
view—third ballistic missile positioning area in Poland and the Czech Republic,
which I would describe as an attempt to deploy an untested system of questionable
reliability against a nonexistent threat. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<UL>
<LI>
<I>The sub-prime crisis and global recession. </I>The sub-prime crisis is developing
into a full-blown global recession—perhaps the deepest in 75 years. Its
resolution may be especially challenging because the underlying financial
causes are not yet fully understood. Princeton University’s Paul Krugman,
winner of this year’s Nobel Prize in economics, lays most of the problems
on the doorstep of the huge “shadow banking system” that lies completely
outside regulatory structures. The current crisis is extraordinary not
only in its scale, but in the rapidity with which a global recession of
great magnitude has emerged, the scale and complexity of the policies that
will be needed to turn the crisis around, and the extreme uncertainty of
the effectiveness of proposed policies. </LI>
<LI>
<I>Cyber-war. </I>In what may be an emerging pattern during international conflicts,
the military conflict between Russia and Georgia was accompanied by cyber-attacks
against Georgia’s Internet infrastructure, and several important Georgian
government Web sites were blocked or compromised. In the U.S., defense-related
sites seem to be under almost constant attack. Dealing with these challenges
often requires international cooperation and raises complex political issues.
Defense Minister Aaviksoo describes some of this complexity: </LI>
</UL>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
...Whenever there is [cyber-space] policing, individual rights are infringed
upon, and this is always a high-profile political issue. So how can we
enforce traffic rules? Can we impose hardware and software on the Internet?...And
who is responsible for enforcing the rules? What are the legitimate means
of counter-attacking even when we are able to identify the possible intruder?
Since most attacks are globally distributed, there is a legitimacy problem.
To what extent will we be willing to tolerate infringement of national
rules when there is a possible target in a third country?...Do we develop
only reactive measures or do we devise and develop active cyber-crime prevention
measures, including intelligence and other means? </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
In a North African context, Algeria’s U.N. ambassador and former foreign
minister, Youcef Yousfi, is concerned that “groups linked to Al Qaeda”
are presenting real problems by “using web sites for recruitment, propaganda,
and conducting attacks.” Like Minister Aaviksoo, he says that “international
cooperation is also needed to face this issue, and we need to think how
we can develop such cooperation.” </p>
<p>
Among the gravest concerns, in the view of Microsoft’s Tim Bloechl, “…would
be efforts to quietly infiltrate infrastructure-related computer networks
and, when the time is right, to execute attacks to disrupt or render inoperative
elements of the infrastructure.” He also warns: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
If such attacks are carried out by terrorist organizations that do not
identify themselves as the source of the attack…how would we respond?...Would
the circumstances of the attack present a casus belli? And who would we
counterattack if it did? And what ROE would we employ as part of such operations? </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
According to Robert Lentz, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Networks (NII), the threat is increasing rapidly. He warns: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
our dependency on this network, all the information that flows on it, all
the platforms that are now tied to it, and all the business systems and
economic systems that are linked to it, make it imperative that the cyber-defenders
and -protectors do their job effectively. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
His overall judgment is not encouraging: “At this point in time,” he says,
“I think the assessment is that we are really losing that battle.” </p>
<h2>Unexpected, Unrecognized, or Underestimated Threats </h2>
<UL>
<LI>
<I>Fading or intermittent threats. </I>Rapid change is characterized not only
by the arrival of new and often unexpected threats, but also by the speed
with which many issues simply fade from view—or appear only intermittently:
Concerns over anthrax, the avian flu, the Asian tsunami, and hurricane
Katrina have been eclipsed by the more recent crises, although those issues
may well return at some point. </LI>
<LI>
<I>Unrecognized or underestimated threats. </I>In addition, there are serious
issues that policy makers have been reluctant to recognize as crises or
that have not yet been assigned the importance they merit: </LI>
<LI>
<I>Consequences of cyber-crime. </I>While Admiral Di Paola lists information technology
as one driver of security challenges, the international community seems
to underestimate or ignore the economic and social effects of cyber-attacks,
malware, and computer-related crimes. In fact, these crimes are often of
the same order of magnitude as illegal drugs and, as indicated above, are
potentially even more dangerous. </LI>
<LI>
<I>Piracy at sea. </I>The recent capture of a Saudi supertanker off the coast
of Somalia highlights the reality that piracy at sea is increasingly brazen
and could become a significant security threat. Already, the African Union
has asked the U.N. to send peacekeepers to Somalia and calls have been
made for NATO intervention. According to the Kenyan government, ransoms
over the last year exceeded $150 million, which potentially gives pirates
resources with which to increase their capabilities. These funds also might
be used to support the activities of Islamic fundamentalists. On the other
hand, some Islamic groups in Somalia are seeking to interfere with the
pirates’ activities, which they consider to be non-Islamic. </LI>
<LI>
<I>Religious fundamentalism.</I> While September 11 and a vast number of Al Qaeda-related
attacks throughout the world—from Madrid to Indonesia—clearly demonstrate
that radical Muslim beliefs can represent a grave danger to our societies,
it would be an unpardonable mistake to consider all Muslims as threats.
At the same time, the religious conservatives in many western countries—including
evangelical Christians, Catholics, and Jews—are seeking to acquire political
power in the name of such beliefs as opposition to the teaching of evolution,
stem cell research, abortion, and gay marriage as well as support for Israel’s
recovery of its so-called Biblical lands. Many of these groups are among
the strongest advocates of aggressive military policies. </LI>
<LI>
<I>Unintended policy effects of western governments and international organizations.</I>
Many of the most harmful economic and social problems that contribute to
extreme income inequalities and poverty originate in the policies of western
allies in the Middle East, in European and North America countries, and
in powerful international institutions such as the EU, the World Bank,
the IMF, and WTO. </LI>
<LI>
<I>“Disinformation” by the media. </I>At least in the U.S., news media have often
distorted news, causing the public to be badly informed on important policy
issues. As an admittedly extreme example, a large percentage of Fox News
viewers in the U.S. were convinced that the September 11 attacks were orchestrated
by Al Qaeda in Iraq, when in reality Al Qaeda had virtually no presence
whatsoever in that country. </LI>
<LI>
<I>Africa as a forgotten continent.</I> According to Ambassador Youcef Yousfi,
“Africa is the forgotten continent. The international community looks at
disasters, the wars, the diseases, and the lack of development there without
any reaction.…in Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
the international community is unable to make decisions…” According to
reports from a delegation that includes former U.N. Secretary General Kofi
Annan and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, the current Zimbabwe crisis
is more serious than imagined, with up to five million in need of food. </LI>
<UL>
<LI>
<I>Health care issues. </I>As Minister La Russa points out, health care in Afghanistan
is one of the many endemic problems (education is another) for which improvements
are vitally needed, since “the more able Afghanistan is to stand on its
feet, the more likely our intervention there is likely to be considered
a success.” Health care issues are of critical importance in developed
countries as well. In the U.S., for example, obesity is reaching such proportions
that it already constitutes a grave health problem, and it seems to be
spreading to other countries. Although some may hesitate to consider obesity
or other health care problems as security issues, more Americans are likely
to die from obesity’s direct and indirect effects than would be expected
to die from the avian flu, terrorism, or even terrorism with WMDs. </LI>
<LI>
<I>Simultaneous crises. </I>Ambassador Karem asks, “What might happen if a strong
nexus develops between soaring food prices, energy sources, and a global
water crisis? Could this be a recipe for a new war on a global scale?”
As Minister La Russa points out, such simultaneous crises have already
occurred: “…energy depletion is overlapping with food shortages…The causes
of food shortages are substantially the same as those causing the energy
crisis.” Given the gravity of the current global financial crisis, the
conditions for a “perfect storm” may already be in place. </LI>
</UL>
</ul>
<h2>Multiple Futures </h2>
<p>
In order to deal with the extraordinary speed and span of change, as well
as the difficulty predicting issues and crises that can arise with relatively
little notice, Admiral Luciano Zappata, NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Transformation, described a new project called “Multiple Futures,” which
involves: </p>
<p></p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
….trying to illustrate the challenges that decision-makers may face, as
well as their implications, and to better understand and analyze how we
may best organize and equip our forces and define our future capability
requirements. We will analyze the global trends and key drivers in the
future security environment. This work will help us understand the resultant
implications in terms of potential threats and risks to our populations
and values, and then help frame the discussion on future challenges and
military implications in terms of roles and missions. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
</P>
<p>
The Multiple Futures project will help answer key questions, including
“Which capabilities must we develop?” and “Within which timeframe?” </p>
<h2>DEALING WITH THE CHALLENGES </h2>
<h2>Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation </h2>
<p>
The executive summary of the report Commission on the Prevention of Weapons
of Mass Destruction begins with the following warning: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
“Unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it
is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used
in terrorist attack somewhere in the world by 2013.” </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
Of all the challenges to global security, none is greater than the need
to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In fact, the
concern for WMD proliferation is most likely at the heart of the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the concern over Iran’s potential acquisition of
nuclear technologies, and many other serious issues. In order to discuss
the threat, Dr. James Tegnelia, director of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, chaired a major panel with presentations by senior U.S., NATO,
and Russian officials. The speakers were Mr. John Rood, U.S. Under Secretary
of State for Arms Control and International Security; Amb. Robert Joseph,
former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security; Amb.-at-Large Grigory V. Berdennikov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Russian Federation; Amb. Jiri Sedivy, NATO Assistant Secretary General
for Defense Policy and Planning; Mr. Peter Flory, NATO Assistant Secretary
General for Defense Investment; Amb. Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General,
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; and Mr. Joseph Benkert,
U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security
Affairs. </p>
<p>
As Dr. Tegnelia notes in his chapter below, the panel addressed issues
including: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
(a) How do different countries view the risks of WMD proliferation? (b)
Which threats seem to be the gravest? ©) Is a nuclear device (or radiation
bomb) the principal concern—or are countries more worried by chemical threats,
biological threats, or even high explosives? (d) Within governments, is
it possible to rank or prioritize the risks, or are there simply too many
differences of perception among ministries and agencies—or do priorities
simply change too rapidly in response to a steady stream of unexpected
news and shifting public reactions? (e) What approaches, including strengthened
intelligence, seem to work best? (f) Should risks be addressed at remote
distances, the view of some countries including the U.S., or should the
highest priorities be domestic? (g) Are current approaches effective or
have they merely been fortunate? </P>
<p>
U.S. Under Secretary of State John Rood lists some key elements of the
threat: </p>
<p></p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction…represent
the defining threat of our age. Irresponsible states are pursuing the capacity
for weapons of mass destruction. North Korea has conducted a nuclear test,
launched long-range ballistic missiles, and engaged in the proliferation
of ballistic missiles and nuclear capabilities to other rogue states. Iran
continues to support terrorist groups, to engage in sensitive nuclear activities
in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions, and to aggressively
develop ever more capable ballistic missiles. Syria also sponsors terrorism
and came very close to completing a clandestine nuclear reactor, in violation
of its IAEA obligations, that appeared designed specifically to produce
plutonium for nuclear weapons. </P>
<p></p>
<p>
Ambassador Bob Joseph, who was asked by Dr. Tegnelia to sum up the discussion,
emphasizes the importance of political resolve, especially in dealing with
Iran: </p>
<p></p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
…we will not succeed without…the demonstration of political resolve over
time…Iran is an incredibly complex problem but I think we know…what we
need to do….There is no easy choice. Every choice that is out there for
dealing with Iran in an effective way entails costs, but we must be willing
to pay those costs. </P>
<p></p>
<p>
Concerning Russia, Ambassador Joseph suggests: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
…we need to ensure that there is mutual respect in our relationship with
Russia. We need to build on opportunities with Russia, and the Global Initiative
and the Nuclear Energy Initiative are two cases in which our interests
coincide. But we also need to deal with Russia with a sense of resolve,
resolve in the context of a commitment to our principles. . . of democracy,
human rights, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
Responding to these threats will require international cooperation. According
to U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Benkert, the key to success
is partnerships with concerned nations: </p>
<p></p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
What is to be done about these threats? The strategy for dealing with enemies
who may not respond to traditional tools of deterrence requires that we
build partnerships with nations who share our concerns about WMD terrorism.
. . We, the United States, don’t have the resources to do it alone, and
we won’t succeed if we try.<B> </B></P>
<h2>Regional Security</h2>
<p>
<I>Security in the Balkans.</I> Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, NATO’s Allied Joint Force
Commander in Naples and Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, has a generally
positive view of progress in the Balkans: </p>
<p></p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
When I look at what has happened in the Balkans over the last few years,
I think of how we have brought Croatia and Albania into NATO… and how we
are pretty close to getting Skopje in there. And when I see that Bosnia
is signing up with PfP and trying to gain MAP status, that Montenegro is
coming along, and that Serbia is participating in PfP, I see the trend
towards collective security on the EU side. I also see how the signing
of Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs) is supporting economic
stability. . .my headquarters is trying to figure out how we can provide
the leadership to get that security sector reform piece. . .in place.… </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
Nonetheless, Admiral Fitzgerald remains extremely concerned about the situation
in Kosovo. His concerns are based in part on the stagnant economic situation
there, the dependence on funds arriving from the diaspora or by international
military forces stationed in the country, and, especially, the prominent
role of corruption and smuggling: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
. . .We have been [in Kosovo] for 10 years; the situation is what I would
call stagnant on the economic side of the house, with the highest unemployment
in Europe—58%—and GDP growth is just starting to come up, now at 7%. .
. Inflation is up to about 13%. Electricity is the lifeblood of the country,
but there has been no new infrastructure put in there, and the people are
still living with 1950s and 1960s technology… </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
[However, the] real issue in Kosovo in my view is not whether this is going
to be a Serbian province or an independent country, but where are the people’s
next euros coming from?. . .The corruption, the smuggling, everything is
eating into that country’s quest to become an independent state. That is
where I think we have failed over the last 10 years. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
In assessing the causes of the situation in Kosovo, Finland’s Ambassador
Kirsti Lintonen, raises three questions: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
- Is the mandate not clear enough? It is true that Security Council Resolutions
are often a result of compromises. The now-famous resolution 1244 on Kosovo
is not an exception. Clarity is therefore essential - especially on the
operational level. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
- Do the actors not have a common vision of the strategy and a shared starting
position? If not, a comprehensive approach is badly needed, as well as
a common understanding of the facts relating to the situation. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
Are the actors duplicating each other’s work or leaving things unaccomplished?
If that is the case, coordination, leadership and a clear division of labour
are needed. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
- If the actors do not share a strategy in the beginning, how can they
agree on timing and exit strategy? In today’s world, the issues we face
are complex, and cooperation of various organizations is desperately needed.
At the outset, the organizations need a common strategy, a mutually agreed
division of labour and a clear exit strategy. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
Looking back on NATO’s experience in Kosovo, SHAPE Chief of Staff General
Lather’s overall assessment seems less harsh than Admiral Fitzgerald’s
or Ambassador Lintonen’s. General Lather emphasizes KFOR’s successes in
crowd and riot control and in guarding sites of religious and cultural
importance: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
In KFOR, and earlier in SFOR-IFOR, the biggest challenge was to build up
crowd- and riot-control units’ capabilities to deal with demonstrations,
disturbances, and civil unrest. In some cases in which KFOR troops contributed,
nations had to change national legislation to allow their forces to be
equipped and trained for that task. Once achieved, this capability became
what I think is a very powerful and effective deterrent. Also in Kosovo,
KFOR had to secure and has to secure many patrimonial sites of religious
and cultural significance. </P>
<p></p>
<p>
Despite the above concerns (especially Admiral Fitzgerald’s), Ambassador
Tacan Ildem, the Turkish Ambassador to NATO, is clearly more optimistic
about the future of Kosovo: </p>
<p></p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
…Bringing about the independence of Kosovo was the culmination of a long,
unique, and complicated process, and, to further consolidate stability
in the region, we have to support Kosovo by all means as well as ensure
the well-being of all the communities within its borders. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
After the parliamentary elections in Serbia, we remain cautiously optimistic
about the security situation in Kosovo. The determined presence and increased
activities of KFOR have contributed to stability and security, but it is
very important for all actors in theatre to assume their responsibilities
and respective roles. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
In the coming years, let us hope that the more optimistic assessment prevails! </p>
<p>
<I>Afghanistan and Pakistan. </I>Afghanistan is NATO’s most important operation.
Consequently, a number of arguments and observations were made about its
success and challenges, including a warning by British Ambassador to NATO
Stuart Eldon, which we should heed: </p>
<p></p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
…we must be honest about what we are doing. In essence, the international
community is engaged in support of the government of Afghanistan…The Afghans
must lead—it is, after all, their country—but the more we can tailor our
support behind the government’s efforts to exercise its authority fully
throughout its territory, the more successful we will be. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
</P>
<p>
There is no doubt that Afghanistan presents NATO with its greatest challenge.
Italy’s Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee, Vice Admiral
Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, points out that the Afghanistan conflict
is subject to the same difficulties experienced in counter-insurgency operations
elsewhere, including in Vietnam: </p>
<p></p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
Unfortunately—and Vietnam showed this at length—the more troops you pour
into a theatre, the more the resistance stiffens, and you and your allies
end up exhausted, unmotivated, and incapable of acting alone. Countering
narcotics traffic in Afghanistan, therefore, will require a careful balance
between the will to succeed quickly and the need to avoid transforming
the Afghan operation into a fight in which the locals move increasingly
to the insurgent side. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
In an environment in which the opposition is land-heavy, there is no point
in trying to match numbers by relying on superior firepower. Asymmetry
is at the heart of this science, and the enemy’s weak spots must be targeted.
. .Sending more troops is a way to avoid deep thinking. </P>
<p></p>
<p>
In the view of Ambassador Munir Akram, Pakistan’s Permanent Representative
to the United Nations, the U.S. relationship with Pakistan is currently
“strained.” Consequently, success in Afghanistan (and the tribal regions
in Pakistan) will depend on rethinking the Pakistan-U.S. relationship as
well as the security objectives for the region: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
The political and operational challenges being confronted in the campaign
to eliminate terrorism and to stabilize Afghanistan need to be addressed
urgently through strategic dialogue between Pakistan and the United States.
The U.S. and NATO also need to review their strategic objectives vis-B-vis
Afghanistan and to redefine ‘success.’ They will: </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
1. Not be able to transform Afghanistan overnight into a modern democracy </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
2. Not be able to change the conservative Islamic ideology and beliefs
of the people of Afghanistan </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
3. Not be able to eliminate or ignore the major power components in Afghanistan,
especially the Pashtun tribes </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
The new strategy will need to be truly comprehensive, including political,
economic, and military components. </P>
<p></p>
<p>
In Ambassador Akram’s view, there need to be fundamental changes in the
approach to the conflicts in the region: there must be a new political
strategy, a new economic strategy, and a new military strategy: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
The political strategy should aim at reconciliation. It should be designed
to: </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
1. Isolate the violent extremists from the moderate, non-violent, and non-involved
majority </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
2. Win hearts and minds through practical assistance (health, food, housing,
agricultural support) </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
3. Build peace through grassroots measures, district by district, village
by village </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
4. Utilize traditional modalities, for example, the Jirga system, for dispute
settlement and accommodation </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
The economic strategy should utilize the ‘power of finance’ to win the
cooperation of tribal and local leaders, have urgently needed and locally
required reconstruction and job-creation projects as the priority, improve
transport and communications, encourage local entrepreneurship, and find
a viable solution to the poppy problem, for example, buy up the crops of
small farmers. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
The military option should remain the option of last, not first, resort.
While the larger presence of coalition forces may be required in the short
term, given Afghan antipathy to foreigners, these forces should be progressively
replaced with strengthened elements from the Afghan National Army, especially
local militias. The major military targets should be Al Qaeda terrorists,
hard-core militants, and criminal elements, not part-time (Taliban) fighters. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
He further cautions that none of these strategies can succeed “unless governance
and the system of justice are improved throughout Afghanistan.” </p>
<p></p>
<p>
Like Ambassador Akram, Egypt’s Ambassador Karem sees “no military solution
to the conflict in Afghanistan.” Accordingly, he points out the need to
deal with a large number of complex problems ranging from the nature of
“law, education, and training” to the conflicts between “western-style
democracy, rural tribal ethics, and “Islamic values”: </p>
<p></p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
…we must still agree on what constitutes the rule of law, education, training,
and so on. Which is more applicable, western-style democracy or rural tribal
ethics as well as Islamic values that have been in existence for centuries?.
. .Uprooting or uplifting national values should not be the mission of
NATO. In the meantime we cannot be selective or apply double standards.
Take the case of drugs and opium in Afghanistan. If the nexus between crime,
terrorism, small arms and light weapons, and drugs has existed for a long
time, why is it today, after the coalition forces have been present for
a long time, that we still argue that this is a social problem that relates
to common trade and social values and leave it to grow and worsen? </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
As Ambassador Karem notes, there are high expectations and hopes that “coalition
forces would bring in order to end the vicious circle.” </p>
<p></p>
<p>
<I>A Russian perspective. </I>Since Russia has made important contributions to
the fight against the Taliban, its views need to be taken into consideration.
Despite the many successes achieved by the U.S., its coalition partners,
and NATO in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General Evgeniy Buzhinsky of the Russian
Defense Ministry expresses some concern as to the slow pace of progress
and other issues: </p>
<p></p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
…despite the considerable time that has passed since the failure of the
Taliban regime, . . . we cannot yet speak about real improvements in the
environment there. Frankly speaking, the influence of the central government
is limited to the Kabul area—the new Afghan authorities still do not control
other parts of the country. As for the country’s economy, it exists only
because of foreign donations and the opium trade. But the growth of Taliban
activity is even worse than that. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
In our opinion, there can not be only a military solution to the Afghanistan
problem. A balanced and flexible approach that takes into account both
the realities of the country and the mentality of the Afghani people is
necessary. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
Since Russia has demonstrated a desire to assist the Afghan government
(including approximately $200 million in military aid), General Buzhinsky
regrets that his country’s efforts are not more appreciated. Examples of
Russian disappointment include “…a pilot project of providing Russian aid
and counsel concerning professional training of drug-fighting structures
in Afghanistan and central Asia.” Russia also regrets “…Kabul’s refusal
to send Afghan cadets to a drug counter-action course.” </p>
<h2>Civil-Military Integration</h2>
<p>
Since local governments and NGOs play a key role in most operations, successful
civil-military integration is vital. Nonetheless, as former SHAPE Chief
of Staff General Rainer Schuwirth points out, there is still much to learn
despite many years of experience in working with NGOs: </p>
<p></p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
…when you look into lessons learned, you find deficiencies in areas such
as the quality of situational awareness; the seamless dissemination and
sharing of information by actors; the scope, speed, and quality of interdisciplinary
planning and decision-making processes; effective linking of political
and operational (civil-military) action in a crisis area; coordinated information
management up the chain of command; and coordination among international
organizations, local actors, and NGOs. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
Another military point of view is offered by General Karl-Heinz Lather,
General Schuwirth’s successor as SHAPE Chief of Staff. General Lather emphasizes
that “international peace forces are not usually deployed alone.” Consequently,
they need to cooperate with local governments and NGOs: </p>
<p></p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
Each of these organizations addresses specific target areas and develops
its own mostly independent lines of operation. Experience tells us that
there is really a need to coordinate all these activities in theatre, to
deliver a comprehensive and even-handed approach to the conflicting parties.
…Recently, we developed the concept of liaison and observation teams in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and liaison monitoring in Kosovo…not only to deal with
representatives of the local populations but also to coordinate with other
organizations working in the same area. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
Viewing civil-military interaction from an opposite perspective—that of
an NGO that has been involved in crises worldwide—Global Impact’s CEO,
Renée Acosta, offers several observations as to how crisis situations might
be handled more effectively: </p>
<p></p>
<UL>
<LI>
<I>Rebuilding as it was, not as it could have been.</I> “There is a flaw in the
rush to provide aid. For example, in the aftermath of the tsunami there
was enough money in contributions that the region could have leapfrogged
to having schools wired for computers. Instead, the area was rebuilt as
it was, not as it could have been.” </LI>
<LI>
<I>Relief may be perceived as aiding the enemy. </I>“For NGOs the only question
is how to offer aid, and that aid is offered with a blind eye to the belief
systems or actions of those in need. To others that aid could be considered
‘aiding and abetting the enemy.’ This is a real point of contention when
it comes to working collegially with the government.” </LI>
<LI>
<I>Safety concerns when NGOs work with the military.</I> “Some NGOs feel that
being identified with any government or the military of any country endangers
their programs and their safety. On the other hand, in the toughest spots
on earth, safety and security need to be provided.” As an example, Renée
Acosta gives her organization’s experience in Afghanistan: “Of the organizations
[that] Global Impact funds, 18 NGOs are supporting 58 programs, 2 of which
have closed because of safety concerns. In Iraq, 6 organizations are supporting
17 programs and another 6 have closed because of safety concerns.” </LI>
<LI>
<I>NGOs’ concern for impact on their funding streams.</I> “Part of the friction
we’ve encountered as we launch Global Reach inter alia is the perception
on the part of some NGOs that having the military move into development
and sustainability will somehow upset their funding streams and control
over their world.” </LI>
</ul>
<h2>The Role of Industry</h2>
<p>
<I>The challenge of transatlantic defense industry cooperation. </I>As leader
of the defense industry panel, Alfred Volkman summarized the challenge
that both government and industry face in supporting the actual warfighters,
the military: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
Most nations are now actively engaged in a war against terrorists, but
many nations believe that they also must be prepared to fight conventional
wars against nation-states. How do we balance the resources that we have
to wage the battle against terrorism, the long war that we will be fighting
against terrorist threats, with the legitimate need to think about how
we must defend ourselves in a more conventional war against traditional
nation-states? </P>
<p></p>
<p>
As Mr. Volkman points out, this can lead to serious difficulties, with
vital programs encountering long multi-year delays: </p>
<p></p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
In NATO, for instance, we have been trying for over 10 years to get a ground
surveillance capability. I would contend that this is because we cannot
strike the right balance among industrial participation by nations, military
capability, and the cost that is required to provide this kind of capability—a
problem we need to address. </P>
<p></p>
<p>
Speaking from a European perspective, Thales’s Senior Vice President Edgar
Buckley adds: </p>
<p></p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
...we need to push ahead with building a strong European defense…At the
same time, we need to strengthen transatlantic defense industrial cooperation,
including taking steps to streamline, simplify, and make more logical and
efficient the regulatory prices on both sides of the Atlantic where security
allows. </P>
<p></p>
<p>
In line with Dr. Buckley’s call for a stronger European industrial base,
EADS Vice President Thomas Homberg proposes the following seven points
necessary to achieve progress: </p>
<p></p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
1. Consolidation of demand…contributing to a real transatlantic and global
effort </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
2. Harmonization and privatization of requirements to strongly support
industrial rationalization </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
3. Common programs and real work sharing, most probably based on centers
of excellence </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
4. More focus on, more coordination of, and most probably more money for
research </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
5. Common programs based on common standards to optimize the warfighter’s
efficiency </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
6. Good and open access to government defense and security planners and
their concepts </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
7. Access to lessons learned from exercises and operations to…push forward
and optimize industrial solutions </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
According to Northrop-Grumman’s Tim Shephard, globalization adds additional
complexity to the issue of international defense industry cooperation.
He offers the recent U.S. Department of Defense tanker contract as an example: </p>
<p></p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
…a Northrop-EADS bid to bring 48,000 jobs to the American south was questioned
by elements in America who championed a competitor’s bid. That competitor
would build or source much of its own tankers outside America, principally
in Europe, ironically, through its commercial partnerships there, but the
bid may paradoxically include component subsystems from as far away as
China. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<p>
<I>R&D investments.</I> Recognizing the importance of R&D investments, Finmeccanica’s
Dr. Zappa points out that his company “…invests about $1 billion a year
in research and development activities—14% of revenues.” This extremely
large proportion of revenue gives his company a strong competitive advantage
in the marketplace. </p>
<p></p>
<p>
In addition, Lockheed Martin’s Dr. Scott Harris calls attention to the
need for European countries to increase their investments in defense R&D
even further: </p>
<p></p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
…Without sufficient resources, we will be unable to continue to advance
transatlantic defense cooperation. Meaningful collaboration becomes more
difficult, emerging technologies are concentrated on one side of the ocean,
the workforces do not have comparable skills. . . There is no substitute
for real expenditures on tangible programs if the health of European industry
is to be preserved and if further transatlantic cooperation is to be possible. </P>
<h2>LOOKING AHEAD</h2>
<h2>The Need for Countries to Work Together</h2>
<p>
In order to address the “new risks and threats,” Turkey’s Defense Minister,
Vecdi Gönül, warns that “no nation has enough power and capacity to cope
with them alone.” In fact, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Zappata sees
our future as “dense in risks,” but, at the same time, “every risk is a
hidden opportunity.” He says, “The scarcity of resources and threats to
our peoples must become a factor of unity. The world is so little that
everybody can now rock the boat!” </p>
<p></p>
<p>
Consequently, coordination and cooperation have become more important than
ever for international security. Former SACEUR General George Joulwan,
in concluding the workshop’s opening dinner debate, which he led again
this year, emphasized the need for countries to work together—including
with Russia: </p>
<p></p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
The great nations and the great institutions—and that includes Russia and
all of the nations of NATO—need to work together, whether they like it
or not, to find the way. If they don’t, then all we have sacrificed is
at risk. </P>
<P ALIGN="LEFT"></P>
<h2>The Importance of Effective Leadership from the New U.S. Administration </h2>
<p>
It is clear that much will depend on the effective international leadership
of the new U.S. administration, which will face simultaneously the enormous
domestic challenge of an economy that is entering a recession of such unprecedented
proportions that the U.S. budget deficit for the coming year could approach
$2 trillion. </p>
<p>
Fortunately, the improved security situation in Iraq—together with the
fact that U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates will stay on for the first
part of President-elect Obama’s term—will undoubtedly make it easier for
Mr. Obama to follow through on his promise to withdraw troops from Iraq
(and presumably move some of them to Afghanistan to fight the Taliban).
In addition, the immense costs of the sub-prime crisis as well as the severe
effects of the spreading and deepening global recession are putting the
world’s political leaders under increased pressure to limit the economic
and social damage to their countries, achieve positive results in whatever
areas they can, and explore all possible means of doing so. </p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
In such a context, many international leaders can be expected to support
Mr. Obama’s stated intention of employing when possible diplomatic means,
instead of mainly military ones, to address international conflicts, and
there are already encouraging signs that this is happening: Turkey, which
has significant economic ties to Iran, has floated the idea of trying to
help achieve better relations between its neighbor and the United States.
Similarly, EU President Nicolas Sarkozy, in order to reduce tensions with
Moscow, has encouraged the Czech Republic and Hungary to reconsider or
delay their ballistic missile defense installations. Likewise, Italian
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has offered to help use his strong personal
ties with Presidents Bush and Medvedev to smooth U.S.-Russia tensions,
while Afghan President Hamid Karzai has offered to negotiate with the Taliban.
Israeli President Shimon Peres has expressed confidence in his country’s
ability to achieve peace with the Palestinians. </p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
Some of these intentions may be overly optimistic, and none seems to be
bearing fruit as of yet. Nonetheless, a large reservoir of goodwill appears
to be awaiting the newly elected U.S. president when he takes office on
January 20: Let us hope he will take full advantage of it! </p>
<h2>Inspiration from Ataturk—Humanity as a Single Body</h2>
<p>
Because Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül invited the coming 26<SUP>th</SUP> International
Workshop on Global Security to Istanbul, it is appropriate to conclude
this overview with a quotation from Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey,
whom Minister Gonül cited in his Rome workshop address: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
We should consider humanity as a single body and a nation as one of its
organs. Pain on the tip of a finger is felt by all other organs. Therefore,
we should see all nations as part of a single body and then take the necessary
precautions. </P>
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