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<p align="center" class="style17">Table of Contents<br>
25th International Workshop - Rome '08</p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-preface.html">Preface- Dr. Roger<br>Weissinger-Baylon<br>Workshop Chairman<br></a>
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-overview.html">Workshop Chairman's Overview - Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon</a>
<a href="/2008book/joulwan.html">Opening Dinner Debate - <br>General George Joulwan<br>Former SACEUR</a>
<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part One<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/la-russa.html">Italian Defense Minister<br />
Ignazio La Russa
</a>
<a href="/2008book/browne.html">British Defense Minister<br />
The Rt Hon Des Browne
</a>
<a href="/2008book/gonul.html">Turkish Defense Minister<br />
Vecdi G�n�l
</a>
<a href="/2008book/di-paola.html">NATO Military Committee Chairman<br />
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappata.html">Admiral Luciano Zappata<br />
Dep Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/camporini.html">Italian Chief of Defense<br />
General Vincenzo Camporini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappa.html">Alenia Aeronautica Chairman<br />
Dr. Giorgio Zappa
</a>
<br>Part Two<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/baramidze.html">Georgian Vice Prime Minister<br />
Giorgi Baramidze
</a>
<a href="/2008book/chizhov.html">Russian Amb to EU<br />
Vladimir Chizhov
</a>
<br>Part Three<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/eldon.html">British Amb to NATO<br />
Stewart Eldon
</a>
<a href="/2008book/akram.html">Pakistan's Amb to U.N.<br />
Munir Akram
</a>
<a href="/2008book/de-la-sabliere.html">French Amb to Italy<br />
Jean-Marc de la Sabli�re
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tkeshelashvili.html">Georgian Foreign Minister<br />
Eka Tkeshelashvili
</a>
<a href="/2008book/stefanini.html">Italian Amb to NATO<br />
Stefano Stefanini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buzhinsky.html">Lt Gen Evgeniy Buzhinsky<br />
Russian Min of Defense
</a>
<a href="/2008book/winid.html">Polish Amb to NATO<br />
Boguslaw Winid
</a>
<br>Part Four<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/tegnelia.html">DTRA Director<br />
Dr. James Tegnelia
</a>
<a href="/2008book/rood.html">U.S. Under Sec of State<br />
John Rood
</a>
<a href="/2008book/joseph.html">Former Under Sec of State<br />
Amb Robert Joseph</a>
<a href="/2008book/berdennikov.html">Russian Amb-at-large<br />
Grigory V. Berdennikov
</a>
<a href="/2008book/benkert.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Defense<br />
Joseph Benkert
</a>
<a href="/2008book/flory.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Peter Flory
</a>
<a href="/2008book/sedivy.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Jiri Sedivy
</a>
<a href="/2008book/pfirter.html">OPCW Dir Gen<br />
Amb Rogelio Pfirter
</a>
<br>Part Five<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/lather.html">SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Karl-Heinz Lather
</a>
<a href="/2008book/fitzgerald.html">Admiral Mark. P. Fitzgerald
<br />
Allied Joint Force Command Naples
</a>
<a href="/2008book/ildem.html">Turkish Amb to NATO<br />
Tacan Ildem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schuwirth.html">Fmr SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Rainer Schuwirth
</a>
<a href="/2008book/acosta.html">Global Impact CEO<br />
Ms. Renee Acosta
</a>
<a href="/2008book/soligan.html">Lt Gen James Soligan<br />
Allied Command-Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bagnall.html">Former UK Vice Chief of Defense Staff<br />
ACM Sir Anthony Bagnall
</a>
<br>Part Six
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/volkman.html">U.S. Dir of Internat. Coop.<br />
Alfred Volkman
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tozzi.html">Major General Claudio Tozzi<br />
Italian Defense Ministry
</a>
<a href="/2008book/homberg.html">EADS Senior Vice Pres<br />
Thomas Homberg
</a>
<a href="/2008book/shephard.html">Northrop Grumman VP<br />
Mr. Timothy Shephard
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buckley.html">Thales Senior VP<br />
Dr. Edgar Buckley
</a>
<a href="/2008book/harris.html">Lockheed Martin Global Pres.<br />
Dr. Scott A. Harris
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schneider.html">AFCEA CEO<br />
Kent Schneider
</a>
<a href="/2008book/patterson.html">Mr. David Patterson<br />
Univ of Tennessee
</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part Seven
<p align="center" class="style17" style="margin-bottom: 0;">
<a href="/2008book/grimes.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Def<br />
Hon. John G. Grimes
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lentz.html">U.S. Dep Asst Sec of Def<br />
Robert Lentz
</a>
<a href="/2008book/aaviksoo.html">Estonian Defense Minister<br />
Jaak Aaviksoo
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bloechl.html">Microsoft, Managing Dir.<br />
Tim Bloechl
</a>
<a href="/2008book/wolf.html">Lt Gen Ulrich Wolf<br />
NATO CIS Service Agency Dir
</a>
<a href="/2008book/monteforte.html">Italian Milrep to NATO<br />
Vice Adm Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lintonen.html">Finnish Amb to UN<br />
Kirsti Lintonen
</a>
<a href="/2008book/silvestri.html">Dr. Stefano Silvestri<br />
Istituto Affari Internazionali
</a>
<a href="/2008book/yousfi.html">Algerian Amb to UN<br />
Youcef Yousfi
</a>
<a href="/2008book/karem.html">Egyptian Amb to EU<br />
Mahmoud Karem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tarasyuk.html">Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister<br />
Borys Tarasyuk
</a>
</div>
</div>
<div id="content">
<div class="story">
<h2 class="workshop_year">Rome '08 Workshop</h2>
<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="Main Content" -->
<h1>
Combating Nuclear Terrorism and WMD Proliferation </h1>
<h2 style="margin-bottom: 0;">
Mr. John C. Rood</h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0;">U.S. Under Secretary of State </h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0;"><img src="images/rood.png" alt="Mr. John C. Rood" width="140" height="210"></h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0;">TODAY’S THREATS </h2>
<p>
T errorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including
the danger that terrorists may succeed in their effort to acquire these
incredibly lethal weapons, represent the defining threat of our age. </p>
<p>
Irresponsible states are pursuing the capacity for weapons of mass destruction.
North Korea has conducted a nuclear test, launched long-range ballistic
missiles, and engaged in the proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear
capabilities to other rogue states. Iran continues to support terrorist
groups, to engage in sensitive nuclear activities in defiance of United
Nations Security Council resolutions, and to aggressively develop ever
more capable ballistic missiles. Syria also sponsors terrorism and came
very close to completing a clandestine nuclear reactor, in violation of
its IAEA obligations, that appeared designed specifically to produce plutonium
for nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>
As these repressive governments pursue weapons of mass destruction and
missile delivery systems, responsible states in their regions may be tempted
to pursue their own weapons programs in self-defense, raising the specter
of a cascade of proliferation. Clearly, the Nonproliferation Treaty regime
that has served us well for almost 40 years is under great strain. </p>
<p>
Severe though the threat from state proliferation is, the one from non-state
actors is equally daunting. On the supply end, despite our success in shutting
down the A. Q. Khan network and in strengthening international tools against
non-state proliferators, many continue to ply their deadly trade wherever
and whenever they can, through both illicit activities and manipulation
of the legitimate worldwide economic and financial system. We also continue
to deal with the aftermath of Khan’s activities through support for prosecutions
of key network figures by a range of countries as well as other efforts
to mitigate the threat posed by the spread of equipment and knowledge by
that network. </p>
<p>
Meanwhile, on the consumer end of the supply chain, terrorist groups continue
to seek weapons of mass disruption or mass destruction, including the ultimate
threat of nuclear weapons. That threat will only be compounded if leading
state supporters of terrorism like Iran or Syria succeed in their own proliferation
efforts. </p>
<h2>THE RESPONSE </h2>
<p>
The terrorist attacks on September 11 underscored the new threats we face
and that the institutions of the Cold War were not sufficient to provide
security. Nowhere is that more evident than in meeting the threat posed
by the proliferation of WMD and terrorism. </p>
<p>
I am pleased to say that the international community has made major strides
since September 11 in combating WMD proliferation and nuclear terrorism.
We have strengthened long-standing nonproliferation tools like the International
Atomic Energy Agency and assistance programs to reduce and secure weapons
of mass destruction, related materials, and technologies. We have also
made new use of traditional international instruments, enlisting them for
the first time in the fight against weapons of mass destruction proliferation
and terrorism. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, the strong
council resolutions against Iran’s and North Korea’s programs, and the
General Assembly’s International Convention for the Suppression of Acts
of Nuclear Terrorism are good examples. </p>
<p>
Finally, and most notably, we have developed new instruments, including
the Proliferation Security Initiative, the G-8 Global Partnership Against
the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Under their auspices, the vast
majority of the international community has united to counter proliferation
and nuclear terrorism through innovative action that takes advantage of
existing legal authorities and growing cooperative relationships. </p>
<p>
Despite that progress, much more remains to be done by the international
community to prevent irresponsible states and terrorists from acquiring
and using weapons of mass destruction. We must continue to strengthen existing
tools and develop new ones. We must also recognize that proliferation is
truly a global threat; no region is immune. </p>
<p>
In countering the threats posed by WMD proliferation and potential terrorist
use of these weapons, we need to employ a systematic approach of “defense
in depth,” which involves: </p>
<UL>
<LI>
Securing the potential sources of weapons of mass destruction </LI>
<LI>
Dismantling the facilitating networks that could supply WMD weapons to
rogue states and terrorists </LI>
<LI>
Interdicting illicit transfers of dangerous weapons, materials, technology,
and knowledge as they move through the avenues of global commerce: land,
sea, air, and cyber-space </LI>
<LI>
Disrupting terrorist efforts to acquire WMD materials and to turn them
into weapons of terror </LI>
<LI>
Strengthening our defenses against a potential WMD attack </LI>
<LI>
Deterring the use of these weapons against any of our nations </LI>
</UL>
<p>
Let me now discuss briefly each of these elements. </p>
<h2>REDUCING AND SECURING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION </h2>
<p>
At the end of the Cold War, former Soviet weapons of mass destruction,
materials, and expertise appeared to present the greatest proliferation
threat. Through U.S. programs initially sponsored by Senators Nunn and
Lugar and subsequently through partners’ efforts under the G-8 Global Partnership
Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the United
States, Russia, and other partners have marked major achievements in reducing
former Soviet weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and related
materials and securing those that remain. The United States and Russia
are on track to meet the goals set in 2005 by Presidents Bush and Putin
at Bratislava to complete security upgrades at all identified Russian nuclear
warhead and fissile material facilities by the end of 2008. </p>
<p>
Since its inception in 2002 at Kananaskis, the G-8 Global Partnership
has been central to expanding and accelerating our work to reduce and prevent
the proliferation of former Soviet weapons of mass destruction, related
materials, equipment, and expertise. While that work is not yet finished,
the Global Partnership must now address global WMD threats. Expanding the
scope of the Global Partnership to address WMD threats worldwide is among
our highest nonproliferation priorities for the upcoming G-8 Summit. By
expanding the scope, the G-8 will provide concrete resources for our shared
objective of fighting terrorism and proliferation around the world, including
our commitments under the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. We hope that the G-8
leaders will explicitly expand the partnership at the July 2008 summit
so that we can work together in 2009, under Italy’s G-8 leadership, to
attract new Global Partnership partners and resources and better coordinate
our global activities. </p>
<p>
As its name implies, the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)
is already very active in reducing and securing nuclear and radiological
materials worldwide. GTRI has returned to Russia over 500 kilograms of
Soviet-originated highly enriched uranium from vulnerable sites around
the world. It has also shut down four civilian research reactors using
highly enriched uranium and converted another 13 to operate on low-enriched
uranium. Further, GTRI has upgraded physical security at 600 facilities
in over 40 countries that contain high-risk radioactive material, containing
over 9 million curies. </p>
<p>
In addition to securing nuclear and radiological materials at their source,
we are also working with other nations to improve our capability to detect
and therefore better prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear materials through
programs like the Second Line of Defense, which has put in place detectors
along the southern tier of the former Soviet Union. We are also working
with the Megaports and Container Security Initiatives, which put detectors
at major ports. We have also deployed nuclear material detectors at ports,
airfields, and land crossings in the U.S. </p>
<p>
As an increasing number of states turn to nuclear energy in light of the
growing cost of other energy sources and growing concerns about avoiding
greenhouse gas emissions, we must play an active role in ensuring that
states pursuing the economic and environmental benefits of peaceful nuclear
energy are moving forward in a manner that does not increase proliferation
risks. In 2007, Presidents Bush and Putin issued a Joint Declaration on
Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation that aims at assisting states to acquire
safe, secure nuclear power, encouraging proliferation-resistant nuclear
technologies, and presenting viable alternatives to the spread of enrichment
and reprocessing. Ambassador Berdennikov has been working closely with
the U.S. Special Envoy for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Ambassador Jackie
Wolcott, to implement the ideas set forth in the Joint Declaration. </p>
<p>
A key element in this effort is persuading states not to pursue enrichment
and reprocessing. In this regard, the United States, Russia, other partners,
and the IAEA are all working on means to ensure reliable access to nuclear
fuel should there be a disruption in supply, to encourage states to choose
the international fuel market in lieu of acquiring indigenous enrichment
and reprocessing technologies. The United States recently signed Memoranda
of Understanding with Jordan, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi
Arabia in which each of those governments set themselves as counter-examples
to Iran by expressing their intent to choose the international market rather
than pursue enrichment and reprocessing. We are also seeking to set tough
criteria on enrichment and reprocessing transfers at the Nuclear Suppliers
Group. </p>
<h2>CUTTING OFF PROLIFERATION </h2>
<p>
A key requirement for the international community is to interdict proliferation
shipments before they reach their intended destination. A landmark in that
effort was the creation in 2003 of the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI). As you know, PSI is designed to be a flexible complement to formal
treaties and nonproliferation regimes. </p>
<p>
Since 2003, PSI has grown substantially, both in terms of the number of
nations that participate and in the depth and sophistication of its activities.
In May 2008, I was pleased to host, in Washington, D.C., a meeting of the
group, which included over 90 partner-nations. A declaration was adopted
that notes the developments of the last five years and reaffirms the commitment
of PSI participating states to respond to new proliferation challenges.
This meeting also served to share information about PSI and to revitalize
states’ active participation in it. </p>
<p>
Since PSI’s inception, partner-nations have successfully conducted dozens
of interdictions of sensitive materials bound for nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons and ballistic missiles while they were en route to countries
like Iran and Syria. The interdictions were handled in a manner that is
consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law
and frameworks. PSI nations continue to build the capacity of partners
to act in a coordinated fashion. For example, PSI partners have conducted
35 exercises involving over 70 nations to improve interdiction capabilities
around the world. </p>
<p>
Much PSI activity is very quiet; successful interdictions are usually not
publicized. A major exception was the October 2003 interdiction of the
BBC China, which carried A. Q. Khan–supplied centrifuge components destined
for Libya. That cooperation, involving the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and Italy, was an important factor leading to Libya’s abandonment
of its weapons of mass destruction and longer-range missile programs and
to the dismantling of the A. Q. Khan proliferation network. Today, Libya
has come full circle, abandoning WMD and long-range ballistic missiles
as well as support for terror. In fact, Libya is now a participant in PSI. </p>
<p>
The activities of the A. Q. Khan network also highlighted the importance
of global economic, financial, and law enforcement action to counter the
global sources of support for proliferation. One response was United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1540, requiring all member-states to criminalize
proliferation by non-state actors and to adopt and enforce effective export
controls. The recent renewal of Resolution 1540 for another three years,
with a focus on international financial transactions, demonstrates its
continued importance. With Resolutions 1718, 1737, 1747, and 1803, the
Security Council also acted to deny international financing to North Korea’s
and Iran’s WMD and missile programs. </p>
<p>
The United States and several friends and allies have also taken firm national
action to disrupt the financial flows that feed proliferation. With the
adoption of Executive Order 13382 in 2005, President Bush authorized targeted
financial sanctions against proliferation networks, modeled on those against
terrorist networks. To date, the United States has designated 52 entities
and 12 individuals under this Executive Order. </p>
<h2>COUNTERING NUCLEAR TERRORISM </h2>
<p>
Recognizing the need for a multilateral approach to countering the threat
of nuclear terrorism, Presidents Bush and Putin launched the Global Initiative
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in July 2006. Less than two years later, the
initiative grew to include 73 partner-nations, including all 27 member-nations
of the EU as well as both the IAEA and EU as observers. Member-states are
committed—on a voluntary basis—to countering nuclear terrorism by building
partner-nation capacity across the elements of physical protection, detection,
search and confiscation, denial of safe haven, law enforcement, response,
and investigation. </p>
<p>
Just before this workshop, on June 16–18, I was in Madrid, Spain, where
I led the United States delegation to the fourth meeting of Global Initiative
partner-nations Over 50 partner-nations participated. At that meeting,
we discussed the program of work activities that have been conducted to
date on subjects like regulation and detection of smuggling of nuclear
and radiological materials, law enforcement cooperation, and conversion
of reactors of highly enriched uranium that can be used in a nuclear weapon
to low-enriched uranium. We also reviewed the first two exercises conducted
to date under this initiative: a table-top exercise conducted by Spain
simulating an RDD attack on a city and a large-scale field exercise in
Kazakhstan involving over 900 troops, intelligence, law enforcement, and
other officials. </p>
<p>
Another key point that we discussed at the meeting was enhancing public
and private-sector cooperation to mitigate the risk of nuclear terrorism.
The private sector controls and operates the bulk of the facilities and
technology for the movement of people and material around the globe. This
supply chain includes airports, ports, railroads, telecommunications, banking
and finance networks, and other key infrastructure that terrorists might
exploit. In Madrid, we hosted a panel with private-sector and local government
representatives on ways to integrate the private sector with ongoing efforts
to combat nuclear terrorism through a variety of activities. Partner-nations
agreed to develop additional plan-of-work activities and exercises that
promote private-sector cooperation with national, state, and local governments
to combat nuclear terrorism. </p>
<p>
Looking ahead, partner-nations will expand the counterterrorism work of
the Global Initiative. Morocco has done excellent work in the Global Initiative
on denial of terrorist safe haven and in countering the root causes of
terrorism. Partner-nations in Madrid committed to deepening participation
by further integrating the counterproliferation and counterterrorism communities.
Partner-nations will also strive to develop additional robust capabilities
for attribution, nuclear forensics, and detection of nuclear materials. </p>
<h2>DEFENDING AGAINST WMD PROLIFERATION AND
NUCLEAR TERRORISM </h2>
<p>
Even as we expend maximum effort to deny irresponsible states and terrorists
access to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, we must be prepared
to defend ourselves should they succeed. Improved chemical and biological
defenses are essential for this. Another central requirement for defending
against potential WMD attack is effective missile defenses. Such defenses
discourage proliferation, give us an important tool for deterring a WMD
attack delivered by missile, and give us a means to defeat an attack if
necessary. </p>
<p>
The number of states possessing ballistic missiles has nearly tripled in
the last three decades, from nine in 1972 to over two dozen in 2008. The
presence of missile defenses undermines the ability of irresponsible states
to use the threat of ballistic missile attack to coerce states and actually
makes it far less likely that an adversary would ever use missiles during
a conflict. We are working closely with NATO, and particularly with Poland
and the Czech Republic, to augment cooperation on missile defense. We are
pleased that the NATO Alliance has reached a consensus on this important
issue as embodied in the communiqué from the recent NATO Summit in Bucharest,
which recognized: </p>
<UL>
<LI>
The threat facing the Alliance from WMD and ballistic missiles </LI>
<LI>
That missile defenses are an important element of a broader strategy to
counter this threat </LI>
<LI>
That the U.S.-led system offers substantial protection of Allies </LI>
<LI>
That the Alliance should explore options for expanding coverage for NATO
member-states </LI>
</UL>
<h2>NORTH KOREA AND IRAN </h2>
<p>
Lastly, let me touch on the challenges posed by North Korea and Iran. In
the case of North Korea, we are pursuing implementation of agreements we
reached at the Six-Party Talks, which call for North Korea to abandon all
existing nuclear programs and its nuclear weapons. We have made progress
through the disabling of facilities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, but
the tough work of verifying North Korea’s declaration and its proceeding
to dismantle its nuclear programs remains ahead. </p>
<p>
In Iran, we are also pursuing diplomatic action within a group of six nations,
the P5+1. This group recently made a renewed offer of incentives to Iran.
We continue to urge Iran’s leaders to accept this generous offer, meet
the requirements of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions, and sit down
to negotiate with these six countries. If Iran does not accept the proposal,
we will pursue the other track of our dual-track approach and increase
pressure on the regime, including through sanctions. </p>
<p>
The possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran represents a profound threat to
the security of the United States and other nations around the globe. We
therefore continue to encourage nations to reevaluate their dealings with
Iran. Now is not a time for business as usual. Given the stakes and the
commercial risks posed by Iran’s deceptive financial and trade practices,
countries should carefully scrutinize their financial and other commercial
dealings with Iran. </p>
<h2>CONCLUDING REMARKS </h2>
<p>
We can take considerable pride in all we have done collectively over the
past few years to combat the threats of WMD proliferation and nuclear terrorism.
But pride must never mean complacency or satisfaction with the status quo.
Even as we have strengthened international norms and actions against proliferation
and terrorism, state and non-state proliferators have reacted with defiance
and efforts to devise new proliferation pathways to replace those that
we have cut off. They must not succeed. </p>
<p>
I would like to end with words spoken by President Bush in 2002. They remain
as true today as they were then, and will surely continue to remain true
for the foreseeable future: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass
destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination.
. . .History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed
to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security
is the path of action. </P>
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