|
Server : Apache/2.4.62 System : FreeBSD fbsdweb2.web.rcn.net 14.1-RELEASE FreeBSD 14.1-RELEASE releng/14.1-n267679-10e31f0946d8 GENERIC amd64 User : www ( 80) PHP Version : 8.3.8 Disable Function : NONE Directory : /domains/roger.dnai/2008book/ |
Upload File : |
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"
"http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">
<html><!-- InstanceBegin template="/Templates/2008template.dwt" codeOutsideHTMLIsLocked="false" -->
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">
<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="doctitle" -->
<title>CSDR 2008: Thinking about Strategies</title>
<!-- InstanceEndEditable -->
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/2002Book/emx_nav_right.css" type="text/css">
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/css/rome08.css" type="text/css" />
<style type="text/css">
<!--
.style5 {font-weight: bold;
color: #000000;
font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;
font-size: large;
}
.style7 {font-size: 2px}
.style8 {font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif}
.style17 {
font-size: x-small;
font-weight: bold;
}
.style18 {font-size: x-small}
.style217 {font-family: Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif}
.style219 {font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; font-family: Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; }
.style19 {font-size: 11px}
.style20 {
color: #006699;
font-size: large;
}
.style21 {font-size: small}
.style22 {font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; }
-->
</style>
<style type="text/css">
<!--
.style23 {font-size: medium}
.style24 {font-size: large}
.style25 {
color: #006699;
font-weight: bold;
font-style: italic;
}
.style26 {
color: #006699;
font-size: medium;
font-weight: bold;
}
.style27 {
color: #006699;
font-size: medium;
}
.style293 {
font-size: large;
color: black;
}
-->
</style>
<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="head" --><!-- InstanceEndEditable -->
</head>
<body>
<!-- Start of StatCounter Code -->
<script type="text/javascript">
var sc_project=3086157;
var sc_invisible=0;
var sc_partition=27;
var sc_security="33bf0688";
</script>
<script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.statcounter.com/counter/counter_xhtml.js"></script><noscript><div class="statcounter"><a class="statcounter" href="http://www.statcounter.com/"><img class="statcounter" src="http://c28.statcounter.com/3086157/0/33bf0688/0/" alt="free website hit counter" /></a></div></noscript>
<!-- End of StatCounter Code -->
<div class="skipLinks">skip to: <a href="#content">page content</a> | <a href="../book2007TEST/2002Book/pageNav">links on this page</a> | <a href="#globalNav">site navigation</a> | <a href="#siteInfo">footer (site information)</a> </div>
<div id="masthead">
<div id="globalNav" style="margin-top:15px;"> <div id="globalLink">
<a href="/index.html" id="gl1" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Home</span></span></a><a href="/index.html#about" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Contact Us</span></span></a><a href="/2008book/joulwan.html" id="gl2" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Rome '08</span></span></a><a href="/2007book/joulwan07" id="gl2" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Paris '07</span></span></a><a href="/2006book/jung.htm" id="gl2" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Berlin '06</span></span></a><a href="/2005book/alliotmarie.htm" id="gl2" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Paris '05</span></span></a><a href="/2004book/PeterStruckKeynote.htm" id="gl3" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Berlin '04</span></span></a><a href="/moscow03/weissingerbaylon.htm" id="gl4" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Moscow '03</span></span></a><a href="/berlin02/scharping.htm" id="gl5" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Berlin '02</span></span></a><a href="/2001Book/workshop2001.htm" id="gl6" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Helsinger '01</span></span></a><a href="/2000Book/workshop2000.htm" id="gl6" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Berlin '00</span></span></a><a href="/99Book/workshop1999.htm" id="gl6" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Budapest '99</span></span></a><a href="/98Book/workshop98.htm" id="gl6" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Vienna '98</span></span></a><a href="/97Book/workshop97.htm" id="gl6" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Prague '97</span></span></a><a href="/96Book/Workshop96.htm" id="gl7" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Warsaw '96</span></span></a>
<a href="/95Book/95Workshop.htm" id="gl8" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Dresden '95</span></span></a></div>
</div>
</div>
<div id="pagecell1" style="top:65px;">
<div id="breadCrumb" style="text-align:center;">
<img src="/images/header.gif" alt="Center for Strageic Decision Research: Celebrating over 25 years of international dialogue. International workshop on global security." width="618" height="99" style="padding:20px 10px;" />
</div>
<div id="pageNav">
<div id="sectionLinks">
<p align="center" class="style17">Table of Contents<br>
25th International Workshop - Rome '08</p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-preface.html">Preface- Dr. Roger<br>Weissinger-Baylon<br>Workshop Chairman<br></a>
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-overview.html">Workshop Chairman's Overview - Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon</a>
<a href="/2008book/joulwan.html">Opening Dinner Debate - <br>General George Joulwan<br>Former SACEUR</a>
<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part One<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/la-russa.html">Italian Defense Minister<br />
Ignazio La Russa
</a>
<a href="/2008book/browne.html">British Defense Minister<br />
The Rt Hon Des Browne
</a>
<a href="/2008book/gonul.html">Turkish Defense Minister<br />
Vecdi G�n�l
</a>
<a href="/2008book/di-paola.html">NATO Military Committee Chairman<br />
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappata.html">Admiral Luciano Zappata<br />
Dep Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/camporini.html">Italian Chief of Defense<br />
General Vincenzo Camporini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappa.html">Alenia Aeronautica Chairman<br />
Dr. Giorgio Zappa
</a>
<br>Part Two<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/baramidze.html">Georgian Vice Prime Minister<br />
Giorgi Baramidze
</a>
<a href="/2008book/chizhov.html">Russian Amb to EU<br />
Vladimir Chizhov
</a>
<br>Part Three<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/eldon.html">British Amb to NATO<br />
Stewart Eldon
</a>
<a href="/2008book/akram.html">Pakistan's Amb to U.N.<br />
Munir Akram
</a>
<a href="/2008book/de-la-sabliere.html">French Amb to Italy<br />
Jean-Marc de la Sabli�re
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tkeshelashvili.html">Georgian Foreign Minister<br />
Eka Tkeshelashvili
</a>
<a href="/2008book/stefanini.html">Italian Amb to NATO<br />
Stefano Stefanini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buzhinsky.html">Lt Gen Evgeniy Buzhinsky<br />
Russian Min of Defense
</a>
<a href="/2008book/winid.html">Polish Amb to NATO<br />
Boguslaw Winid
</a>
<br>Part Four<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/tegnelia.html">DTRA Director<br />
Dr. James Tegnelia
</a>
<a href="/2008book/rood.html">U.S. Under Sec of State<br />
John Rood
</a>
<a href="/2008book/joseph.html">Former Under Sec of State<br />
Amb Robert Joseph</a>
<a href="/2008book/berdennikov.html">Russian Amb-at-large<br />
Grigory V. Berdennikov
</a>
<a href="/2008book/benkert.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Defense<br />
Joseph Benkert
</a>
<a href="/2008book/flory.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Peter Flory
</a>
<a href="/2008book/sedivy.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Jiri Sedivy
</a>
<a href="/2008book/pfirter.html">OPCW Dir Gen<br />
Amb Rogelio Pfirter
</a>
<br>Part Five<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/lather.html">SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Karl-Heinz Lather
</a>
<a href="/2008book/fitzgerald.html">Admiral Mark. P. Fitzgerald
<br />
Allied Joint Force Command Naples
</a>
<a href="/2008book/ildem.html">Turkish Amb to NATO<br />
Tacan Ildem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schuwirth.html">Fmr SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Rainer Schuwirth
</a>
<a href="/2008book/acosta.html">Global Impact CEO<br />
Ms. Renee Acosta
</a>
<a href="/2008book/soligan.html">Lt Gen James Soligan<br />
Allied Command-Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bagnall.html">Former UK Vice Chief of Defense Staff<br />
ACM Sir Anthony Bagnall
</a>
<br>Part Six
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/volkman.html">U.S. Dir of Internat. Coop.<br />
Alfred Volkman
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tozzi.html">Major General Claudio Tozzi<br />
Italian Defense Ministry
</a>
<a href="/2008book/homberg.html">EADS Senior Vice Pres<br />
Thomas Homberg
</a>
<a href="/2008book/shephard.html">Northrop Grumman VP<br />
Mr. Timothy Shephard
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buckley.html">Thales Senior VP<br />
Dr. Edgar Buckley
</a>
<a href="/2008book/harris.html">Lockheed Martin Global Pres.<br />
Dr. Scott A. Harris
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schneider.html">AFCEA CEO<br />
Kent Schneider
</a>
<a href="/2008book/patterson.html">Mr. David Patterson<br />
Univ of Tennessee
</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part Seven
<p align="center" class="style17" style="margin-bottom: 0;">
<a href="/2008book/grimes.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Def<br />
Hon. John G. Grimes
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lentz.html">U.S. Dep Asst Sec of Def<br />
Robert Lentz
</a>
<a href="/2008book/aaviksoo.html">Estonian Defense Minister<br />
Jaak Aaviksoo
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bloechl.html">Microsoft, Managing Dir.<br />
Tim Bloechl
</a>
<a href="/2008book/wolf.html">Lt Gen Ulrich Wolf<br />
NATO CIS Service Agency Dir
</a>
<a href="/2008book/monteforte.html">Italian Milrep to NATO<br />
Vice Adm Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lintonen.html">Finnish Amb to UN<br />
Kirsti Lintonen
</a>
<a href="/2008book/silvestri.html">Dr. Stefano Silvestri<br />
Istituto Affari Internazionali
</a>
<a href="/2008book/yousfi.html">Algerian Amb to UN<br />
Youcef Yousfi
</a>
<a href="/2008book/karem.html">Egyptian Amb to EU<br />
Mahmoud Karem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tarasyuk.html">Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister<br />
Borys Tarasyuk
</a>
</div>
</div>
<div id="content">
<div class="story">
<h2 class="workshop_year">Rome '08 Workshop</h2>
<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="Main Content" -->
<h1>
Thinking about Strategies </h1>
<h2 style="margin-bottom: 0;">
Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte</h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0;">Italian Military Representative to NATO<B> </B></h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0;"><img src="images/monteforte.jpg" alt="Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte" width="114" height="139"></h2>
<p style="margin-bottom: 0;"> </p>
<p style="margin-top: 0;">
Today’s proceedings had a lot to do with “strategy shaping.” Strategy,
though, is a difficult animal to handle. Unlike politics, it looks beyond
two- to three-year time spans, and, also unlike politics, as Gen. Camporini
pointed out, it is not reactive—it helps focus on the ultimate aim. Therefore,
a lot of reflection is needed, as Peter Flory rightly said when he mentioned
that Gen. Ulysses Grant regretted that he had not reflected more on the
likely course of action his Confederate opponent, Gen. Johnson, might undertake. </p>
<p>
Sun Tzu said something similar when he stated that “The winning general
spends many hours in his tent before the battle.” Actually, I am not certain
whether he meant that a general, before battle, should have a sound sleep,
like the Prince of Condé, or if he was encouraging his compatriots to do
what Gen. Grant should have done, namely, to think out a well-conceived
plan. </p>
<h2>THE USE OF OMLTs </h2>
<p>
A well-conceived plan implies having clear knowledge of the tools you are
about to use. One tool that we have is Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams
(OMLTs). </p>
<p>
OMLTs are not involved with training. They provide Afghan National Army
(ANA) units with the human capabilities they do not have, such as the ability
to coordinate fire, synergy in action, provisioning of medevac helicopters,
and so on. OMLTs are precious, but they do not increase the skills of their
Afghan fellow soldiers, unless these are taught to them through an ad-hoc
curriculum. </p>
<p>
A young diplomat from my country, in fact, was puzzled at the difficulty
nations have in providing OMLTs, whose numbers range between 19 and 35
elements each, only to be told that the provisioning of one OMLT implies
the stand-down of an operational battalion, which has to give up all its
key figures at the junior officer and NCO level in order to generate the
OMLT. </p>
<p>
ANA training, in short, is a lot more than OMLT provisions. It is no surprise,
therefore, that SHAPE insists that medium- and long-term measures be taken
in accordance with its well-conceived and comprehensive plan. </p>
<h2>USING THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH </h2>
<p>
It is worth mentioning that the Comprehensive Approach, another tool that
was mentioned earlier, is based on EBAO—the effect-based approach to operations—and
that the latter relies heavily on bottom-up feedback, so that the top brass
can draw lessons in real time not only from failures but from successes.
A risk looms over the whole system, however. How can a young lieutenant
tell a highly opinionated general that he has to change approach—without
incurring his wrath? </p>
<p>
As was noted today, there are strong, diverging opinions on the approaches
that should be taken in Afghanistan, so strong that they recall Mahan’s
statement about “those strong, even uninterested emotions (which are) the
only factor diplomacy cannot master.” An example of that is the Surobi
District case, in which the local population, reassured by ISAF’s presence
and ability to cooperate, is handing over large amounts of weapons and
narcotics. Because of this, the nation providing forces to the district
had to partially give up its plan to concentrate in another region, very
much like Amb. Winid said, because a turnover between units in that area
would have hampered cooperation. On the other hand, some influential media
were quick to pretend that any province in Afghanistan is a self-standing
reality, and therefore the Surobi case cannot be reproduced elsewhere,
i.e.the validity of a policy of cooperation with local elders, carried
out as done in Surobi is not generally valid. When politics try to shape
also tactical aspects of a campaign, as those newspapers did in this case,
EBAO is dead! </p>
<h2>STRATEGY AND KNOWLEDGE </h2>
<p>
I would like to mention, while we are on this subject, what Corbett said
about strategy, namely, that it should enable those involved to extract
from the particulars of any single situation the general, recurring aspects,
so that “the normal case” can be found, very much like finding the musical
theme from which all variations are derived. </p>
<p>
So, strategy fears emotion, and implies finding, by trial and error, the
right way to reach the desired aim, the <I>zweck</I>. This requires sound knowledge
of the human environment. An international organization—not NATO—issued
several documents stating that knowledge is connected to intelligence.
Well, it is much more than that! </p>
<p>
In explaining the essence of knowledge, a recent book recalls that, when
he was in Madagascar, the French General Gallieni—the very man who stopped
the German offensive of 1914 by summoning all the taxis in Paris, thus
deploying quickly the troops required to stop the enemy—“compelled those
who worked in his staff to know as deeply as possible the history, the
culture, the mindset and behavior of all the tribes they were facing.”
The need for deep knowledge is not new, and, because Gen. Gallieni was
operating in a counter-insurgency context, this form of operation is not
new either. </p>
<h2>BALANCING ACTION WITH LOCAL OWNERSHIP </h2>
<p>
Very recently, Spain celebrated the 200<SUP>th</SUP> anniversary of its invasion by
Napoleon; the books published on this occasion may shed new light on the
difficulties of his counter-insurgency campaign, whose magnitude was only
slightly less than the German effort during World War II. Many of the features
of this campaign in fact bear a close resemblance to what happened in more
recent years and show the need to carefully balance direct action with
local ownership. </p>
<p>
Before looking at the most recent instances of this issue, I would like
to recall what happened in northern Italy between 1943 and 1945. Of the
25 German divisions deployed there after the armistice to stop the advance
of the Allies through the peninsula, more than half were diverted to carry
out counter-insurgency action—little attention was devoted to developing
local forces, whose training took an extraordinarily long time because
of the scarce resources allotted by Germany. Therefore the Italian insurgents,
or partisans, as they were called, were well supplied by the Allies and
able to distract increasing numbers of troops from the battlefront. </p>
<p>
Now, however, the Allies are reluctant to act directly and are not overly
enthusiastic about filling a steadily growing CJSOR. This may be disappointing,
but it is how alliances are. Many years ago, in fact, the French strategist
Daveluy said that “alliances were made to wage war at a cheap price,” and
he claimed that the opposite should be true, that all alliances should
throw into the fight whatever they can in order to succeed. </p>
<p>
Unfortunately—and Vietnam showed this at length—the more troops you pour
into a theatre, the more the resistance stiffens, and you and your allies
end up exhausted, unmotivated, and incapable of acting alone. Countering
narcotics traffic in Afghanistan, therefore, will require a careful balance
between the will to succeed quickly and the need to avoid transforming
the Afghan operation into a fight in which the locals move increasingly
to the insurgent side. </p>
<p>
In an environment in which the opposition is land-heavy, there is no point
in trying to match numbers by relying on superior firepower. Asymmetry
is at the heart of this science, and the enemy’s weak spots must be targeted.
The history of counter-insurgency, though, shows that such an approach
is seldom taken. Sending more troops is a way to avoid deep thinking. </p>
<h2>STRATEGY AND WMD </h2>
<p>
Today we also discussed the issue of weapons of mass destruction. Here,
fortunately, strategy shaping is in full swing. PSI and Operation Active
Endeavor are demonstrating the soundness of Mahan, who said, “One ounce
of prevention is worth one pound of treatment.” </p>
<p>
However, there is a distinction between fending off WMD attacks and dealing
with the aspirations of those states that wish to dissuade others from
using them, very much in line with Gen. De Gaulle’s remark “<I>On va lui arracher
un bras</I>.” Gen. Camporini said that security concerns lead to a lot of violence
if they are not properly taken care of, and for this reason the struggle
against proliferation will not be complete without complementing muscle
with some guarantees. </p>
<p>
International organizations exist to do that, but the problem that emerged
from today’s debate is what kind of relations should exist among them.
</p>
<h2>THE NEED FOR PATIENCE AND STEADINESS </h2>
<p>
Being associated with both NATO and the EU, I have observed two interesting
points. </p>
<p>
First, international organizations are, from time to time, inherently incapable
of having normal relations with other international organizations, very
much like people suffering from enormous stress. Unless the root causes
of their malaise are cured, they will be unable to behave as others wish. </p>
<p>
Also, international organizations are continually tempted to argue with
their member-states, often about relatively minor issues. Those nations,
though, not only provide the international organizations with money and
force, but they are their natural customers, and they expect results, often
disproportionate to the resources provided. </p>
<p>
In order to overcome these and the other challenges of our times, living
in an environment marked by harsh competition and growing tension, we need
patience coupled with steadiness. Only strategy will help us to go beyond
the action-reaction loop, which is so common but so self-defeating. </p>
<!-- InstanceEndEditable --></div>
</div>
<div class="style8" id="siteInfo"> <a href="#">Top of page </a> | <a href="../index.html">Home</a> | ©2009
Center for Strategic Decision Research</div>
</div>
<br>
</body>
<!-- InstanceEnd --></html>