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<title>CSDR 2008: From the Balkans to Afghanistan: Dealing with the Challenges</title>
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<p align="center" class="style17">Table of Contents<br>
25th International Workshop - Rome '08</p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-preface.html">Preface- Dr. Roger<br>Weissinger-Baylon<br>Workshop Chairman<br></a>
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-overview.html">Workshop Chairman's Overview - Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon</a>
<a href="/2008book/joulwan.html">Opening Dinner Debate - <br>General George Joulwan<br>Former SACEUR</a>
<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part One<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/la-russa.html">Italian Defense Minister<br />
Ignazio La Russa
</a>
<a href="/2008book/browne.html">British Defense Minister<br />
The Rt Hon Des Browne
</a>
<a href="/2008book/gonul.html">Turkish Defense Minister<br />
Vecdi G�n�l
</a>
<a href="/2008book/di-paola.html">NATO Military Committee Chairman<br />
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappata.html">Admiral Luciano Zappata<br />
Dep Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/camporini.html">Italian Chief of Defense<br />
General Vincenzo Camporini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappa.html">Alenia Aeronautica Chairman<br />
Dr. Giorgio Zappa
</a>
<br>Part Two<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/baramidze.html">Georgian Vice Prime Minister<br />
Giorgi Baramidze
</a>
<a href="/2008book/chizhov.html">Russian Amb to EU<br />
Vladimir Chizhov
</a>
<br>Part Three<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/eldon.html">British Amb to NATO<br />
Stewart Eldon
</a>
<a href="/2008book/akram.html">Pakistan's Amb to U.N.<br />
Munir Akram
</a>
<a href="/2008book/de-la-sabliere.html">French Amb to Italy<br />
Jean-Marc de la Sabli�re
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tkeshelashvili.html">Georgian Foreign Minister<br />
Eka Tkeshelashvili
</a>
<a href="/2008book/stefanini.html">Italian Amb to NATO<br />
Stefano Stefanini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buzhinsky.html">Lt Gen Evgeniy Buzhinsky<br />
Russian Min of Defense
</a>
<a href="/2008book/winid.html">Polish Amb to NATO<br />
Boguslaw Winid
</a>
<br>Part Four<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/tegnelia.html">DTRA Director<br />
Dr. James Tegnelia
</a>
<a href="/2008book/rood.html">U.S. Under Sec of State<br />
John Rood
</a>
<a href="/2008book/joseph.html">Former Under Sec of State<br />
Amb Robert Joseph</a>
<a href="/2008book/berdennikov.html">Russian Amb-at-large<br />
Grigory V. Berdennikov
</a>
<a href="/2008book/benkert.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Defense<br />
Joseph Benkert
</a>
<a href="/2008book/flory.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Peter Flory
</a>
<a href="/2008book/sedivy.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Jiri Sedivy
</a>
<a href="/2008book/pfirter.html">OPCW Dir Gen<br />
Amb Rogelio Pfirter
</a>
<br>Part Five<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/lather.html">SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Karl-Heinz Lather
</a>
<a href="/2008book/fitzgerald.html">Admiral Mark. P. Fitzgerald
<br />
Allied Joint Force Command Naples
</a>
<a href="/2008book/ildem.html">Turkish Amb to NATO<br />
Tacan Ildem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schuwirth.html">Fmr SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Rainer Schuwirth
</a>
<a href="/2008book/acosta.html">Global Impact CEO<br />
Ms. Renee Acosta
</a>
<a href="/2008book/soligan.html">Lt Gen James Soligan<br />
Allied Command-Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bagnall.html">Former UK Vice Chief of Defense Staff<br />
ACM Sir Anthony Bagnall
</a>
<br>Part Six
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/volkman.html">U.S. Dir of Internat. Coop.<br />
Alfred Volkman
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tozzi.html">Major General Claudio Tozzi<br />
Italian Defense Ministry
</a>
<a href="/2008book/homberg.html">EADS Senior Vice Pres<br />
Thomas Homberg
</a>
<a href="/2008book/shephard.html">Northrop Grumman VP<br />
Mr. Timothy Shephard
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buckley.html">Thales Senior VP<br />
Dr. Edgar Buckley
</a>
<a href="/2008book/harris.html">Lockheed Martin Global Pres.<br />
Dr. Scott A. Harris
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schneider.html">AFCEA CEO<br />
Kent Schneider
</a>
<a href="/2008book/patterson.html">Mr. David Patterson<br />
Univ of Tennessee
</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part Seven
<p align="center" class="style17" style="margin-bottom: 0;">
<a href="/2008book/grimes.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Def<br />
Hon. John G. Grimes
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lentz.html">U.S. Dep Asst Sec of Def<br />
Robert Lentz
</a>
<a href="/2008book/aaviksoo.html">Estonian Defense Minister<br />
Jaak Aaviksoo
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bloechl.html">Microsoft, Managing Dir.<br />
Tim Bloechl
</a>
<a href="/2008book/wolf.html">Lt Gen Ulrich Wolf<br />
NATO CIS Service Agency Dir
</a>
<a href="/2008book/monteforte.html">Italian Milrep to NATO<br />
Vice Adm Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lintonen.html">Finnish Amb to UN<br />
Kirsti Lintonen
</a>
<a href="/2008book/silvestri.html">Dr. Stefano Silvestri<br />
Istituto Affari Internazionali
</a>
<a href="/2008book/yousfi.html">Algerian Amb to UN<br />
Youcef Yousfi
</a>
<a href="/2008book/karem.html">Egyptian Amb to EU<br />
Mahmoud Karem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tarasyuk.html">Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister<br />
Borys Tarasyuk
</a>
</div>
</div>
<div id="content">
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<h2 class="workshop_year">Rome '08 Workshop</h2>
<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="Main Content" -->
<h1>
From the Balkans to Afghanistan: Dealing with the Challenges </h1>
<h2 style="margin-bottom: 0;">
General Karl-Heinz Lather</h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0;"><B>SHAPE Chief of Staff </B></h2>
<p align="center" style="margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0;"><img src="images/lather.png" alt="General Karl-Heinz Lather" width="145" height="205"></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0;">
We have been in the Balkans since 1992, supporting UNPROFOR and enforcing
the no-flying zone. During an operation that was called Deny Flight, NATO
aircraft helped UNPROFOR protect its forces and served as a deterrent to
the then-warring parties. In 1994, cooperation between the United Nations
and NATO intensified, and NATO aircraft conducted close air support and
air strikes on selected targets. </p>
<p>
The security situation in Bosnia Herzegovina worsened in July 1995 with
the fall of the U.N. Safe Havens, Srebrenica being just one of them. NATO
was then asked to conduct air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions with
heavy weapons and then, during Operation Deliberate Force, which was conducted
between the end of August and mid-September 1995, we flew a total of 3,515
missions. This operation was crucial in bringing the warring parties to
the negotiating table at Dayton and, at the end of 1995, bringing all NATO
nations together with 18 non-NATO nations, including Russia. A force of
54,000 troops was provided in IFOR to provide a safe and secure environment
for the implementation of what we call the General Framework of Agreement
for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. </p>
<p>
Several years later, NATO air power was used again in Kosovo. The Kosovo
crisis reached a peak in the middle of 1998, when large-scale violence
led to hundreds of civilian casualties and the displacement of nearly 300,000
people from their homes. International efforts over the following months
failed to reach a diplomatic resolution to the conflict. Despite efforts
to maintain a cease-fire, with international observation and verification
supported by NATO, the humanitarian and security situation continued to
worsen. </p>
<p>
In the spring of 1999, NATO made a unilateral decision to intervene to
bring about the end of the humanitarian crisis and to stop violence and
repression. We made air attacks against selected targets in the former
Republic of Yugoslavia in order to compel compliance with U.N. Security
Council Resolutions and force withdrawal of their force from the province
of Kosovo. Mandated later by the still-in-place U.N. Resolution 1244, NATO-led
forces dedicated by Operation Joint Guardian were deployed in Kosovo. where
they still are. And you heard the number where we currently stand. Now,
what can we learn from all that? </p>
<h2>COMMAND AND CONTROL OF FORCES</h2>
<p>
In the area of command and control of forces, it is necessary to have a
robustly resourced force from the very beginning of each peace enforcement
operation. This is essential, not only to deal with the challenges in theater
and to demonstrate the resolve of the international community to implement
the relevant peace agreement but also to ensure that critical military
capabilities are met from the outside. If unfilled, such critical shortfalls
are likely to remain for some time and will place those serving in operation
theaters at additional risk, including risk of life. Unity of command is
desired and is demanded from the military from the outset. However, in
the case of an alliance of nations, it must be recognized that nations
will rarely give full command of their forces to the operational commander.
Forces will arrive with restrictions, both upon the deployment and their
people’s employment. These restrictions or caveats place limitations on
the operational and tactical commanders. It is imperative that these limitations
be fully understood by all in the chain of command and that action is taken
often at the political level to insure that over time these restrictions
are minimized or ideally fade away or are removed. With rules of engagement
being developed as part of each operation’s plan, some participating nations
might be more restricted because of constitutional or political reasons
or constraints. Once again, such differences need to be harmonized to ensure
that forces can coordinate and act unanimously throughout the theater of
operations. </p>
<h2>SITUATIONAL AWARENESS </h2>
<p>
The second point is the need for situational awareness. That is a key element
of the successful implementation of the military aspects of any peace enforcement
operation, and insures that commanders at all levels maintain situation
awareness. This point is vital not only for commanders to know where they
are in relation to other units but also to understand their environment
to the fullest extent. </p>
<p>
At the beginning of an operation, maintaining situational awareness will
largely be in the hands of regular military units supported by intelligence
elements that are organic to them. However, over time, when general compliance
has been achieved, there is the opportunity to reduce what one could call
the hard edge of the military profile and move to operations that are intelligence
driven. Lessons learned in Bosnia-Herzegovina and I think in Kosovo clearly
demonstrate the utility of small teams like liaison and observation teams
that discreetly carry their side-arms and are deployed to local municipalities
to meet, talk to, and understand the people and, of course, to report to
the chain of command. Understanding how individuals feel about particular
issues and when preemptive action might be needed by the military to ensure
that the military element of the operation maintains the initiative is
key. </p>
<h2>NON-MILITARY TASKS </h2>
<p>
My third point is that international peace forces deployed to a crisis
reaction operation must be aware that they may have to fulfill non-military
tasks. We do not like that. Each operation is conducted under an internationally
approved mandate and, for Alliance operations, the tasks that a force can
conduct are detailed in the relevant operation’s plan. Should new tasks
arise, as currently is the case for KFOR, then NATO as an organization
may decide that they can be undertaken. </p>
<p>
While NATO forces generally do not undertake nation-building tasks, it
is important that the local governments and security institutions of the
country in which NATO forces operate are brought to maturity as quickly
as possible and that indigenous capabilities and capacities are developed.
During the initial stages of operations, forces must be capable of maintaining
a safe and secure environment if necessary, up to the use of lethal force.
However, as operations develop, the maintenance of the environment gradually
must be guaranteed through the use of non-lethal means. In KFOR, and earlier
in SFOR-IFOR, the biggest challenge was to build up crowd- and riot-control
units’ capabilities to deal with demonstrations, disturbances, and civil
unrest. In some cases in which KFOR troops contributed, nations had to
change national legislation to allow their forces to be equipped and trained
for that task. Once achieved, this capability became what I think is a
very powerful and effective deterrent. Also in Kosovo, KFOR had to secure
and has to secure many patrimonial sites of religious and cultural significance.
Given the sensitivity of the parties in Kosovo to these sites, we think
the use of military force for this purpose is appropriate, although manpower
intensive, because it helps to calm emotions and the situation. </p>
<h2>MISSION HANDOVER </h2>
<p>
At some point in time, we become ready for the mission handover. Normally,
peace support operations follow a similar routine: preparation is first,
deployment is second, then execution, and then redeployment. The center
of gravity for us lies in the execution phase, which could be further split
into a number of stages pending the specific situation. Based on the assessment
of the overall situation in theater, leaders might decide to conduct a
mission handover to other organizations. The best timing is foreseen at
the end of the deterrent-present stage—which Mark Fitzgerald alluded to
as well—just before moving into what we call minimum presence posture.
The latest example of such a handover was in Bosnia-Herzegovina, when,
at the completion of SFOR, NATO handed over to EU ALTHEA and left behind
only a minimal footprint in the country. Our experience tells us that such
a handover has to be planned very carefully, including the important tasks
of the various organizations, the delineation of such tasks, intelligence
sharing, and providing access to historical data. </p>
<h2>COOPERATION WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS </h2>
<p>
The last point is the need for cooperation with other organizations. International
peace forces are not usually deployed alone; a number of international
governments and non-governmental organizations are deployed as well. Each
of these organizations addresses specific target areas and develops its
own mostly independent lines of operation. Experience tells us that there
is really a need to coordinate all these activities in theater, to deliver
a comprehensive and even-handed approach to the conflicting parties. NATO
commanders are instructed to routinely maintain good relations with the
heads of other organizations in the area. Recently, we developed the concept
of liaison and observation teams in Bosnia-Herzegovina and liaison monitoring
in Kosovo. The purpose is not only to deal with representatives of the
local populations but also to coordinate with other organizations working
in the same area. That is of mutual benefit to all parties concerned. </p>
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