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<p align="center" class="style17">Table of Contents<br>
25th International Workshop - Rome '08</p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-preface.html">Preface- Dr. Roger<br>Weissinger-Baylon<br>Workshop Chairman<br></a>
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-overview.html">Workshop Chairman's Overview - Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon</a>
<a href="/2008book/joulwan.html">Opening Dinner Debate - <br>General George Joulwan<br>Former SACEUR</a>
<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part One<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/la-russa.html">Italian Defense Minister<br />
Ignazio La Russa
</a>
<a href="/2008book/browne.html">British Defense Minister<br />
The Rt Hon Des Browne
</a>
<a href="/2008book/gonul.html">Turkish Defense Minister<br />
Vecdi G�n�l
</a>
<a href="/2008book/di-paola.html">NATO Military Committee Chairman<br />
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappata.html">Admiral Luciano Zappata<br />
Dep Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/camporini.html">Italian Chief of Defense<br />
General Vincenzo Camporini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappa.html">Alenia Aeronautica Chairman<br />
Dr. Giorgio Zappa
</a>
<br>Part Two<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/baramidze.html">Georgian Vice Prime Minister<br />
Giorgi Baramidze
</a>
<a href="/2008book/chizhov.html">Russian Amb to EU<br />
Vladimir Chizhov
</a>
<br>Part Three<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/eldon.html">British Amb to NATO<br />
Stewart Eldon
</a>
<a href="/2008book/akram.html">Pakistan's Amb to U.N.<br />
Munir Akram
</a>
<a href="/2008book/de-la-sabliere.html">French Amb to Italy<br />
Jean-Marc de la Sabli�re
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tkeshelashvili.html">Georgian Foreign Minister<br />
Eka Tkeshelashvili
</a>
<a href="/2008book/stefanini.html">Italian Amb to NATO<br />
Stefano Stefanini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buzhinsky.html">Lt Gen Evgeniy Buzhinsky<br />
Russian Min of Defense
</a>
<a href="/2008book/winid.html">Polish Amb to NATO<br />
Boguslaw Winid
</a>
<br>Part Four<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/tegnelia.html">DTRA Director<br />
Dr. James Tegnelia
</a>
<a href="/2008book/rood.html">U.S. Under Sec of State<br />
John Rood
</a>
<a href="/2008book/joseph.html">Former Under Sec of State<br />
Amb Robert Joseph</a>
<a href="/2008book/berdennikov.html">Russian Amb-at-large<br />
Grigory V. Berdennikov
</a>
<a href="/2008book/benkert.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Defense<br />
Joseph Benkert
</a>
<a href="/2008book/flory.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Peter Flory
</a>
<a href="/2008book/sedivy.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Jiri Sedivy
</a>
<a href="/2008book/pfirter.html">OPCW Dir Gen<br />
Amb Rogelio Pfirter
</a>
<br>Part Five<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/lather.html">SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Karl-Heinz Lather
</a>
<a href="/2008book/fitzgerald.html">Admiral Mark. P. Fitzgerald
<br />
Allied Joint Force Command Naples
</a>
<a href="/2008book/ildem.html">Turkish Amb to NATO<br />
Tacan Ildem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schuwirth.html">Fmr SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Rainer Schuwirth
</a>
<a href="/2008book/acosta.html">Global Impact CEO<br />
Ms. Renee Acosta
</a>
<a href="/2008book/soligan.html">Lt Gen James Soligan<br />
Allied Command-Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bagnall.html">Former UK Vice Chief of Defense Staff<br />
ACM Sir Anthony Bagnall
</a>
<br>Part Six
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/volkman.html">U.S. Dir of Internat. Coop.<br />
Alfred Volkman
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tozzi.html">Major General Claudio Tozzi<br />
Italian Defense Ministry
</a>
<a href="/2008book/homberg.html">EADS Senior Vice Pres<br />
Thomas Homberg
</a>
<a href="/2008book/shephard.html">Northrop Grumman VP<br />
Mr. Timothy Shephard
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buckley.html">Thales Senior VP<br />
Dr. Edgar Buckley
</a>
<a href="/2008book/harris.html">Lockheed Martin Global Pres.<br />
Dr. Scott A. Harris
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schneider.html">AFCEA CEO<br />
Kent Schneider
</a>
<a href="/2008book/patterson.html">Mr. David Patterson<br />
Univ of Tennessee
</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part Seven
<p align="center" class="style17" style="margin-bottom: 0;">
<a href="/2008book/grimes.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Def<br />
Hon. John G. Grimes
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lentz.html">U.S. Dep Asst Sec of Def<br />
Robert Lentz
</a>
<a href="/2008book/aaviksoo.html">Estonian Defense Minister<br />
Jaak Aaviksoo
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bloechl.html">Microsoft, Managing Dir.<br />
Tim Bloechl
</a>
<a href="/2008book/wolf.html">Lt Gen Ulrich Wolf<br />
NATO CIS Service Agency Dir
</a>
<a href="/2008book/monteforte.html">Italian Milrep to NATO<br />
Vice Adm Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lintonen.html">Finnish Amb to UN<br />
Kirsti Lintonen
</a>
<a href="/2008book/silvestri.html">Dr. Stefano Silvestri<br />
Istituto Affari Internazionali
</a>
<a href="/2008book/yousfi.html">Algerian Amb to UN<br />
Youcef Yousfi
</a>
<a href="/2008book/karem.html">Egyptian Amb to EU<br />
Mahmoud Karem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tarasyuk.html">Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister<br />
Borys Tarasyuk
</a>
</div>
</div>
<div id="content">
<div class="story">
<h2 class="workshop_year">Rome '08 Workshop</h2>
<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="Main Content" -->
<h1>
Sharing Responsibility in Afghanistan and Globally </h1>
<h2 style="margin-bottom: 0;">
His Excellency Ignazio La Russa</h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0;"><B>Italian Defense Minister </B></h2>
<p align="center" style="margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0;"><img src="images/la-russa.png" alt="His Excellency Ignazio La Russa" width="100" height="150"></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0;">
I very much appreciate your invitation to this workshop, where very important
and topical issues are being addressed down to the quantum level. This
workshop is a valuable opportunity for those, like us, who are responsible
for governing our countries, managing current crises, and preventing future
ones. </p>
<h2>CHANGES ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE </h2>
<p>
Let me start by noting the limited effectiveness of the available instruments
and strategies to manage and solve the crises that threaten the security
of our countries and of the international community as a whole. This sense
of powerlessness is often the result of a wrong and exaggerated interpretation
of reality. What we should actually say is that our degree of security
has been growing over the last 20 years. In the 1980s, the world was depicted
as a place on the verge of catastrophic conflict, envisioning the use of
weapons of mass destruction. The movie industry seized on this picture
and portrayed the world in the aftermath of nuclear holocaust, as well
as the remnants of human civilization, in quite a convincing and dreadful
manner. </p>
<p>
We all know that that idea of the world was based on a then-specific and
uncertain strategic balance—the so-called balance of terror—that stemmed
from two hostile and heavily armed political entities. But the huge arsenals
ready to be used were not the only frightening factor; perhaps even more
frightening was the fear that war could be triggered by accidental causes
and develop in the blink of an eye. </p>
<p>
We have witnessed many changes since that time. Yesterday’s strong and
deep-rooted reasons for confrontation between the two worlds have faded.
Communism has faded as well, together with its aberrant vision and practices
that subdued a large part of the world population for more than 70 years.
With the end of the communist era, so came the end of the need to keep
at a high level of alertness all deterrent means that the West had resorted
to since the end of the Second World War. We gained an opportunity to increasingly
reduce the size and promptness of our defense establishments, and for several
years collected what people called—with creativity and hope—the “dividends
of peace.” </p>
<p>
The diminishment of international friction had a very strong impact on
both the effective organization of the system of international relations
and on the way we perceived it. It marked the beginning of a period of
collaboration among nations; the improvement of a country’s security situation
went hand in hand with the enhanced security of the entire international
community. </p>
<p>
Later, we recognized that this phase was too short. From the early 1990s
on, we realized that the national structure of nations far away from us
was close to collapsing. During the tragic experience in Somalia, all major
Western countries and the United Nations learned how difficult it was to
manage a humanitarian crisis started by internal factions fighting each
other and which remained hostile to peacekeepers who sought to bring relief
to the suffering population. The Balkan conflict has also shown how strong
the effects of war can be, even in a region so close to our world and that
shares our history and our culture. We have become aware that violent,
destructive conflicts can originate outside of typical 20th<SUP>th</SUP>-century conflict
patterns. They can erupt from political confrontation and from ideological
opposition. </p>
<p>
When September 11 came it changed the world. On that date, we had to add
a new dimension to the concept of “traditional war.” The destructive potential
of catastrophic terrorism and macroterrorism can strike great numbers of
victims and cause enormous material damage, and greatly affect the system
of international relations as well. That was a rude and painful awakening.
September 11’s threat to security took a shape we were not expecting, a
shape whose intimate details we had no time to study. </p>
<p>
Recent events—those that have an impact on us and on our political and
decision-making responsibilities—have been the ultimate consequence of
September 11 and of the transformation of the global security scenario.
The terrorist attacks that struck the United States, the United Kingdom,
Spain, Indonesia, and other countries have had a profound impact on the
perception of security and forced us to adjust our way of thinking and
acting. </p>
<h2>THE EFFECTS OF CHANGE ON THE WEST, NATO, AND THE EU </h2>
<p>
The many changes we have seen have not occurred in the same way in every
country. Some nations—those more violently hit by terrorist attacks—have
vigorously supported the adoption of particularly strong security measures
while others have been less timely in doing so. Within the West, we have
witnessed friction between those, like the U.S., who feel themselves “at
war” and those who interpret the new reality as a phantom menace to be
contained at the lowest levels. </p>
<p>
NATO has shown it can react quickly and properly to a terrorist emergency.
Collective defense provisions, as envisioned by Article 5 of the Treaty,
have been adopted quickly and proven their effectiveness. We cannot hide
the fact, however, that the strongest reaction—the beginning of a true
“global war on terror”—was triggered by the country most directly affected
by the September 11 attacks, a country that gathered a huge number of allies
around itself. Indeed, the solution adopted relied on a so-called coalition
of the willing instead of on NATO, even though all the countries deployed
were members of the Atlantic Alliance. But NATO has quickly regained its
position as a protagonist of Atlantic security. The increasing responsibilities
it has taken on in Afghanistan are the plainest evidence of its capacity
to quickly adapt to new environments. </p>
<p>
The European Union—despite its ups and downs—is also taking steps to become
a more powerful and effective actor on the international stage. The first
ESDP missions have been a success. However, further enlargement of the
security and defense dimension of the European Union is being slowed down
by the general scarcity of resources and in particular by the complex political
evolution of the union and its institutions. The EU club has grown considerably
over the last two years but it is still lacking better and more effective
decision-making processes. </p>
<p>
The fact that the European Union will have to embrace newer and larger
responsibilities in the field of security is unavoidable. In particular,
it will have to play a better role in the potential crisis areas around
its borders. The neighborhood policy is an important step forward, especially
in preventive diplomacy and the prevention of crises, but the union needs
to field effective management instruments to address current crises, which
implies enhancing its political and military capabilities. </p>
<p>
Special attention should be devoted to relationships with Russia. For geographic,
historical, economic, and political reasons, Russia and the European Union
must share the burden of responsibility for security on the old continent.
Russia must also work with the EU and NATO to maintain peace and security
in Europe and in other areas of strategic importance. </p>
<h2> SHARING THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADDRESSING
GLOBAL THREATS </h2>
<p>
Terrorism, organized crime, and destabilization caused by failing states
or by the irrational behavior of those that acquire military technologies
and weapons capable of causing immense damage, even at long distances,
represent global threats. Conscientious countries on the other side must
share the concerns and responsibilities of security and are therefore morally
and politically obliged to make the mechanisms of multilateral cooperation
work. Since the end of the Cold War also marked the end of the political
and ideological confrontation that split the world in two, the instrumental
use of the mechanisms of multilateral crisis management must also cease
as well. </p>
<p>
Many serious and unresolved issues have come to the forefront again, with
the scarcity of energy resources at the top of the list. For some years,
the cost of energy has been relatively low and perhaps we tried to forget
about that issue. But today’s energy prices are not only a danger, but
a true and direct threat to the orderly functioning of our communities. </p>
<p>
The rise in costs has occurred for a number of reasons. First and foremost,
it is due to the quick growth of two Asian giants, namely, India and China,
which caused an obvious, exponential increase in energy consumption. The
supply of energy, however, has not changed very much, both for technical
reasons and because of political motivations, including the will to maintain
national control over national resources. This has resulted in the reverse
of the liberalization trend. </p>
<p>
Now energy depletion is overlapping with food shortages, which affect some
populations while casting their shadows on everyone. This is reflected
in the increase in the price of agricultural products. The causes of food
shortages are substantially the same as those causing the energy crisis. </p>
<p>
The combined effect of these two critical situations is potentially dangerous.
On one hand, we have the strategic priorities of those who see their energy
security threatened. On the other, we have those who feel the pressure
of the threats to food security. I think it would be fair to say that the
only way to address these issues properly is to have all major stakeholders
in the international political landscape work together. </p>
<h2>CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN </h2>
<p>
Let me recall an actual example of crisis management that entails all the
points I have just described—it shows how very interconnected they are.
In Afghanistan, the international community is deployed in a region where
a transnational terrorist structure thrived and in part still survives.
National institutions failed there tragically and paved the way for the
advent of warlords, who are devoted to smuggling and to controlling the
territory with their weapons. </p>
<p>
In Afghanistan there is a tremendous scarcity of natural resources and
infrastructures. Endemic problems affect the health care sector and all
of society. There are also profound difficulties within the newly born
democracy and with law and order. In short, the international community
in Afghanistan is facing the majority of today’s crisis-generating factors
in the same place and at the same time. International military intervention
has been and still is indispensable for restoring an acceptable security
situation, and will be for some years. But if we adopt a long-term vision—if
we consider a point in time after the redeployment of our forces—we can
easily understand that the more able Afghanistan is to stand on its feet,
the more likely our intervention will be remembered as a success. </p>
<p>
To provide one example, let’s consider the huge program of reconstruction
of the Afghan school system, to which Italy is generously contributing.
Little sons and daughters now going back to school are clear evidence of
what we have achieved. But it will take some years before today’s children
can play their role in Afghan society. It will require several generations
before the “new Afghans,” that is, those who lived not only in wartime
but had an opportunity to study and to receive proper health care, may
prevail on the country. </p>
<h2>THE NEED FOR TIME </h2>
<p>
All that I have discussed is indeed food for thought. We need time! The
time we have for crisis management and resolution no longer matches the
time required to actually solve such crises. The time we are given by politicians,
the media, and Western society is incompatible with the time a crisis takes
to spread out, be tackled, and solved. </p>
<p>
This is why I have said that we must be aware of how limited our capability
may be to influence these phenomena, unless we build a wide and sound consensus
for truly long-term political projects. And this should be independent
of any change in political establishments, which is a common trait of our
advanced democracies. I hope that we can achieve such a wide and sound
consensus at the national level and within the international organizations
we are part of. </p>
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