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<p align="center" class="style17">Table of Contents<br>
25th International Workshop - Rome '08</p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-preface.html">Preface- Dr. Roger<br>Weissinger-Baylon<br>Workshop Chairman<br></a>
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-overview.html">Workshop Chairman's Overview - Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon</a>
<a href="/2008book/joulwan.html">Opening Dinner Debate - <br>General George Joulwan<br>Former SACEUR</a>
<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part One<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/la-russa.html">Italian Defense Minister<br />
Ignazio La Russa
</a>
<a href="/2008book/browne.html">British Defense Minister<br />
The Rt Hon Des Browne
</a>
<a href="/2008book/gonul.html">Turkish Defense Minister<br />
Vecdi G�n�l
</a>
<a href="/2008book/di-paola.html">NATO Military Committee Chairman<br />
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappata.html">Admiral Luciano Zappata<br />
Dep Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/camporini.html">Italian Chief of Defense<br />
General Vincenzo Camporini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappa.html">Alenia Aeronautica Chairman<br />
Dr. Giorgio Zappa
</a>
<br>Part Two<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/baramidze.html">Georgian Vice Prime Minister<br />
Giorgi Baramidze
</a>
<a href="/2008book/chizhov.html">Russian Amb to EU<br />
Vladimir Chizhov
</a>
<br>Part Three<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/eldon.html">British Amb to NATO<br />
Stewart Eldon
</a>
<a href="/2008book/akram.html">Pakistan's Amb to U.N.<br />
Munir Akram
</a>
<a href="/2008book/de-la-sabliere.html">French Amb to Italy<br />
Jean-Marc de la Sabli�re
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tkeshelashvili.html">Georgian Foreign Minister<br />
Eka Tkeshelashvili
</a>
<a href="/2008book/stefanini.html">Italian Amb to NATO<br />
Stefano Stefanini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buzhinsky.html">Lt Gen Evgeniy Buzhinsky<br />
Russian Min of Defense
</a>
<a href="/2008book/winid.html">Polish Amb to NATO<br />
Boguslaw Winid
</a>
<br>Part Four<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/tegnelia.html">DTRA Director<br />
Dr. James Tegnelia
</a>
<a href="/2008book/rood.html">U.S. Under Sec of State<br />
John Rood
</a>
<a href="/2008book/joseph.html">Former Under Sec of State<br />
Amb Robert Joseph</a>
<a href="/2008book/berdennikov.html">Russian Amb-at-large<br />
Grigory V. Berdennikov
</a>
<a href="/2008book/benkert.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Defense<br />
Joseph Benkert
</a>
<a href="/2008book/flory.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Peter Flory
</a>
<a href="/2008book/sedivy.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Jiri Sedivy
</a>
<a href="/2008book/pfirter.html">OPCW Dir Gen<br />
Amb Rogelio Pfirter
</a>
<br>Part Five<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/lather.html">SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Karl-Heinz Lather
</a>
<a href="/2008book/fitzgerald.html">Admiral Mark. P. Fitzgerald
<br />
Allied Joint Force Command Naples
</a>
<a href="/2008book/ildem.html">Turkish Amb to NATO<br />
Tacan Ildem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schuwirth.html">Fmr SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Rainer Schuwirth
</a>
<a href="/2008book/acosta.html">Global Impact CEO<br />
Ms. Renee Acosta
</a>
<a href="/2008book/soligan.html">Lt Gen James Soligan<br />
Allied Command-Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bagnall.html">Former UK Vice Chief of Defense Staff<br />
ACM Sir Anthony Bagnall
</a>
<br>Part Six
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/volkman.html">U.S. Dir of Internat. Coop.<br />
Alfred Volkman
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tozzi.html">Major General Claudio Tozzi<br />
Italian Defense Ministry
</a>
<a href="/2008book/homberg.html">EADS Senior Vice Pres<br />
Thomas Homberg
</a>
<a href="/2008book/shephard.html">Northrop Grumman VP<br />
Mr. Timothy Shephard
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buckley.html">Thales Senior VP<br />
Dr. Edgar Buckley
</a>
<a href="/2008book/harris.html">Lockheed Martin Global Pres.<br />
Dr. Scott A. Harris
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schneider.html">AFCEA CEO<br />
Kent Schneider
</a>
<a href="/2008book/patterson.html">Mr. David Patterson<br />
Univ of Tennessee
</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part Seven
<p align="center" class="style17" style="margin-bottom: 0;">
<a href="/2008book/grimes.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Def<br />
Hon. John G. Grimes
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lentz.html">U.S. Dep Asst Sec of Def<br />
Robert Lentz
</a>
<a href="/2008book/aaviksoo.html">Estonian Defense Minister<br />
Jaak Aaviksoo
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bloechl.html">Microsoft, Managing Dir.<br />
Tim Bloechl
</a>
<a href="/2008book/wolf.html">Lt Gen Ulrich Wolf<br />
NATO CIS Service Agency Dir
</a>
<a href="/2008book/monteforte.html">Italian Milrep to NATO<br />
Vice Adm Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lintonen.html">Finnish Amb to UN<br />
Kirsti Lintonen
</a>
<a href="/2008book/silvestri.html">Dr. Stefano Silvestri<br />
Istituto Affari Internazionali
</a>
<a href="/2008book/yousfi.html">Algerian Amb to UN<br />
Youcef Yousfi
</a>
<a href="/2008book/karem.html">Egyptian Amb to EU<br />
Mahmoud Karem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tarasyuk.html">Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister<br />
Borys Tarasyuk
</a>
</div>
</div>
<div id="content">
<div class="story">
<h2 class="workshop_year">Rome '08 Workshop</h2>
<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="Main Content" -->
<h1>
WMD Proliferation–Threats and Response </h1>
<h2 style="margin-bottom: 0;">
Mr. Peter C.W. Flory</h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0;">NATO Assistant Secretary General </h2>
<p align="center"><img src="images/flory.png" alt="Mr. Peter C.W. Flory" width="100" height="150"></p>
<p>
It is an honour to be here today to talk about NATO’s response to WMD proliferation,
and in particular, NATO’s policy on missile defence as an element of the
Alliance’s overall strategy to counter WMD. </p>
<p>
When Metternich was informed that his longtime rival, the wily French diplomat
Talleyrand, had died, he is said to have remarked, “I wonder what he meant
by that?” At April’s Bucharest Summit, NATO leaders agreed on what I consider
a balanced, realistic, and forward-looking statement on missile defense.
I would like to organize my remarks around that statement—and tell you
a little bit about what NATO meant by that. In particular, I will try to
give you some insight into the debates, discussions and considerations
that led up to the Bucharest Declaration. </p>
<p>
I think this context on how NATO arrived at that statement is important.
When negotiations between the U.S., Poland and the Czech Republic on extending
the protection of the U.S. missile defence system to European allies were
first announced in January 2007, missile defence had not been on the agenda
of most European governments or security experts since the end of the Cold
War. Technical work on missile defence had continued at NATO and among
experts in national capitals and industry. But at least at the beginning,
the political debate in Europe that began last January had a pronounced
Cold War era-tone and flavor—helped, if that is the right word, by some
very Cold Warlike statements from Russia. By the time we got to Bucharest,
however, the debate had moved on in a very constructive manner and laid
the groundwork for our statement in Bucharest and for our subsequent work. </p>
<p>
The first element of the Bucharest statement was:
</p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
“Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies’
forces, territory and populations.”
</P>
<p>
As the details of that assessment are classified, I cannot go into them
here. What is important is that the 26 members of the Alliance looked at
the intelligence on WMD and missile programs in Iran, North Korea and elsewhere,
including Iran’s nuclear program and its ambitious missile testing over
the past few years, and concluded that these programs pose an increasing
threat to the Alliance. This echoed NATO’s findings at the Riga and Prague
Summits. </p>
<p>
While no one can predict with confidence the exact pace of Iran’s missile
and nuclear developments, there is an awareness among Allies that current
trends are bringing more and more of NATO territory into missile range
of Iran. There is also an appreciation of the fact that developing a NATO
system to defend NATO territory against ballistic missiles, if the Alliance
decides to do so, will take time, so delaying decisions until we have perfect
clarity on the threat would involve risks. </p>
<p>
I think the Bucharest Declaration also reflects an awareness that in addition
to specific programs in specific countries of concern, there is also, at
a more general level, a growing nexus or potential nexus between (1) the
spread of dangerous capabilities, specifically ballistic missiles and nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons and technologies, (2) political instability,
and (3) extremist ideologies, in areas of importance to NATO and NATO members,
that could pose a threat to the security of the Alliance. This approach
is sometimes described as a “capability-based approach,” focusing not only
on identified threats, but on the broader question of how an adversary—any
adversary—might fight, and what capabilities might be needed to counter
such threats. </p>
<p>
After noting the increasing threat, the Bucharest Declaration goes on to
say:
</p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
“Missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat.”
</P>
<p>
One of the questions many governments asked themselves, after the U.S.
proposal put missile defence back on the agenda in NATO, was, where does
missile defence fit into the spectrum of traditional measures for combating
the spread of missiles and WMD? For example, should it be addressed by
diplomacy, arms control, non-proliferation regimes, and traditional military
deterrence? For some, the question was, will missile defence undermine
or weaken these traditional tools? </p>
<p>
The answer NATO came up with was to recognize that missile defence is part
of a broad, layered defence along with all the mechanisms I just mentioned.
Most nations, of course, simply do not have the desire to possess dangerous,
destabilizing weapons. In other cases, existing treaty and political norms,
together with vigourous non-proliferation policies and diplomacy, have
helped shape the balance of incentives so nations have abandoned the pursuit
or possession of these weapons—for example Kazakhstan and Ukraine, South
Africa, and Libya. </p>
<p>
But these mechanisms have been unable to prevent some nations from defying
the rules and norms. Not every nation agrees to be bound by treaties and
agreements, and some of those that do, cheat. And it doesn’t take a large
number of nations like this to create a threat to others. </p>
<p>
In this context, Alliance leaders concluded that missile defence could
support traditional arms control and non-proliferation measures. In particular,
by devaluing ballistic missile capabilities, missile defence can over time
reduce the incentive to develop missiles in the first place. </p>
<p>
Another consideration was the impact of missile defence on traditional
deterrence. Here there is no doubt that traditional military deterrence
will continue to play a vital role. But there is a growing concern that,
in an era of dictatorial and/or extremist regimes that may not share our
values or assumptions—and especially after September 11 redefined the limits
of what might be considered “unthinkable”—traditional deterrence, while
necessary, may no longer be sufficient. NATO nations also understand that
some countries pursue ballistic missiles and WMD precisely because these
can furnish an asymmetric means to counter traditional military strengths
and deterrence. </p>
<p>
Another element in this discussion was the potential value of defensive
options in deterring or countering threats, for example, in the case of
a rogue regime willing to launch an attack against an Alliance member,
then use its own population as a shield to prevent a military response.
</p>
<p>
The impact of the proposed U.S. European Site was of course a critical
element in our discussions. Thus the Bucharest communiqué continues, </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
“We therefore recognize the substantial contribution to the protection
of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned
deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets.”
</P>
<p>
When NATO Defence Ministers met in June 2007, they asked us—the NATO staff—to
assess the implications for NATO of the planned U.S. missile defence system
elements in Europe. This analysis covered issues such as, how much coverage
and protection would the proposed U.S. site provide for NATO territory,
and what would be the implications of the U.S. system for NATO’s ongoing
work on territorial missile defence? </p>
<p>
We did an extensive analysis and, on the first question, reached the conclusion
I just cited: the European Site would provide a “substantial contribution
to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles.” </p>
<p>
As to the second issue, I probably need to review for you what NATO was
already doing on territorial missile defence. (I will talk about NATO’s
work on theatre missile defence shortly.) </p>
<p>
As many of you are aware, at the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO leaders asked
the NATO organization to examine options to address the “growing Ballistic
Missile threat to Alliance territory, forces and population centres.” This
led to the Missile Defence Feasibility Study, which was completed and approved
in 2006. It concluded that missile defence for NATO territory was technically
feasible within the assumptions and limitations of the study. </p>
<p>
But this study did not include the U.S. missile defence system in Alaska,
and it did not, of course, include the proposed Third Site. So we had to
consider, how does the proposed U.S. European site change the results of
the MDFS? Not surprisingly, the U.S. system has a substantial impact on
the MDFS analysis, since the amount of NATO territory that a NATO system
would have to protect would be substantially smaller than without the U.S.
system. </p>
<p>
On the relationship between the U.S. European site and NATO’s ongoing work,
the Bucharest declaration went on to say: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
“We are exploring ways to link this US capability with current NATO missile
defence efforts as a way to ensure that it would be an integral part of
any future NATO-wide missile defence architecture.”
</P>
<p>
Here I need to give you a little more history on what we mean by “current
NATO missile defence efforts.” NATO has been thinking and working since
the 1990s on theatre missile defence for deployed forces (as distinct from
the analysis of defense of NATO territory I just described). This work
has its roots in the 1991 Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein used Scud missiles
to attack military targets in Saudi Arabia—as well as using extended-range
Scuds against Israel in a strategic gambit to bring Israel into the war. </p>
<p>
This work culminated in an Alliance decision, following the Istanbul Summit
in 2004, to develop the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence
program, better known as ALTBMD, to protect deployed NATO forces against
missiles with ranges of up to 3,000 kilometres. Through the ALTBMD program,
NATO is developing a command and control backbone that will link sensors
and interceptors to be provided by nations. We are expecting this system
to achieve an initial capability in 2010-2011. </p>
<p>
Based on the above findings, Allied leaders in Bucharest decided: </p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
“…[b]earing in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security
as well as NATO solidarity, [to] task the Council in Permanent Session
to develop options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to
extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered
by the United States system for review at our 2009 Summit, to inform any
future political decision.”
</P>
<p>
Here the language is pretty clear. In fact, the Conference of National
Armaments Directors (or CNAD) had already prepared, in preparation for
Bucharest, an initial technical report on architecture options for a NATO
missile defence system, building on the proposed U.S. system, to provide
coverage for those areas not protected by the U.S. system. The CNAD, which
I chair, is working now to refine those options and to complete additional
analysis that the nations have asked us to undertake in preparation for
the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit. Specifically, we will look at or continue our
work on debris issues, defence against shorter range missiles, including
the potential threat of missiles in the hands of non-state actors, technical
questions relating to C2 information exchange, and the performance of national
missile defence systems in providing comprehensive coverage of NATO territory
and population centres. This work will provide the capability options for
the political-military deliberations leading up to discussions and possible
decisions at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit next April. </p>
<p>
At Bucharest, we also addressed the question of Russia, and Russia’s response
to the proposed U.S. European site and the possible linkage of NATO and
U.S. missile defence systems.
</p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
“We also commend the work already underway to strengthen NATO-Russia missile
defence cooperation. We are committed to maximum transparency and reciprocal
confidence building measures to allay any concerns.”
</P>
<p>
Our approach to Russia is an important part of our overall approach to
missile defence, and I want to be clear, NATO wants to work with Russia
to address Russia’s reasonable concerns. To that end, we have held a number
of meetings of the NATO–Russia Council to discuss the issue of the U.S.
site and territorial missile defence for NATO, including detailed briefings
by the U.S. on its missile defence system and the proposed European site. </p>
<p>
At the same time, Russia does not have a veto on Alliance decisions. And
Russia has not, frankly, helped its cause by threatening Alliance members,
or offering implausible arguments as to why Europe should not have the
option of being defended against ballistic missiles—something Russian leaders
have themselves enjoyed for more than three decades. For example, it doesn’t
take an Einstein, as the Secretary General has said, to recognize that
what the U.S. is proposing does not threaten Russia’s strategic deterrent
forces. </p>
<p>
Meanwhile, on the practical level, NATO is working with Russia to develop
interoperability between NATO and Russian theatre ballistic missile defence
systems and operators who might be deployed in adjacent areas of responsibility
in a future crisis response operation. This work is generally going well.
Most recently, this January we had a successful computer assisted exercise
in Munich. On the other hand, Russian officials have been clear that Russia
will break off this cooperation if NATO joins the U.S. in a missile defence
system. </p>
<p>
Finally, Alliance leaders joined in encouraging
</p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
“the Russian Federation to take advantage of United States missile defence
cooperation proposals” [and expressing readiness] “to explore the potential
for linking United States, NATO and Russian missile defence systems at
an appropriate time.”
</P>
<p>
I think these statements show how serious we are, in NATO, in seeking to
work with Russia to address Russia’s reasonable concerns, and potentially,
to consider the linkage of U.S., NATO and Russian missile defence systems.
It also shows that Allies recognize and support the efforts the U.S. has
made in offering Russia options for missile defence cooperation. </p>
<p>
In closing, as you have seen, the work we are doing on missile defense
is a new chapter in NATO’s almost 60-year mission of collective defense.
As Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer said in Prague in May,
</p>
<P ALIGN="LEFT">
“the image of NATO as a mere fire brigade is too narrow. Yes, we must remain
capable of responding to imminent threats. But we must also look ahead—we
must scan the strategic horizon for potential new challenges, and we must
develop common approaches to deal with them—making sure we take into account
the time needed to develop those solutions.” </P>
<p></p>
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