|
Server : Apache/2.4.62 System : FreeBSD fbsdweb2.web.rcn.net 14.1-RELEASE FreeBSD 14.1-RELEASE releng/14.1-n267679-10e31f0946d8 GENERIC amd64 User : www ( 80) PHP Version : 8.3.8 Disable Function : NONE Directory : /domains/roger.dnai/2008book/ |
Upload File : |
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"
"http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">
<html><!-- InstanceBegin template="/Templates/2008template.dwt" codeOutsideHTMLIsLocked="false" -->
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">
<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="doctitle" -->
<title>CSDR 2008: Dealing with Regions in Crisis: The Case of Afghanistan</title>
<!-- InstanceEndEditable -->
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/2002Book/emx_nav_right.css" type="text/css">
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/css/rome08.css" type="text/css" />
<style type="text/css">
<!--
.style5 {font-weight: bold;
color: #000000;
font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;
font-size: large;
}
.style7 {font-size: 2px}
.style8 {font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif}
.style17 {
font-size: x-small;
font-weight: bold;
}
.style18 {font-size: x-small}
.style217 {font-family: Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif}
.style219 {font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; font-family: Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; }
.style19 {font-size: 11px}
.style20 {
color: #006699;
font-size: large;
}
.style21 {font-size: small}
.style22 {font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; }
-->
</style>
<style type="text/css">
<!--
.style23 {font-size: medium}
.style24 {font-size: large}
.style25 {
color: #006699;
font-weight: bold;
font-style: italic;
}
.style26 {
color: #006699;
font-size: medium;
font-weight: bold;
}
.style27 {
color: #006699;
font-size: medium;
}
.style293 {
font-size: large;
color: black;
}
-->
</style>
<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="head" --><!-- InstanceEndEditable -->
</head>
<body>
<!-- Start of StatCounter Code -->
<script type="text/javascript">
var sc_project=3086157;
var sc_invisible=0;
var sc_partition=27;
var sc_security="33bf0688";
</script>
<script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.statcounter.com/counter/counter_xhtml.js"></script><noscript><div class="statcounter"><a class="statcounter" href="http://www.statcounter.com/"><img class="statcounter" src="http://c28.statcounter.com/3086157/0/33bf0688/0/" alt="free website hit counter" /></a></div></noscript>
<!-- End of StatCounter Code -->
<div class="skipLinks">skip to: <a href="#content">page content</a> | <a href="../book2007TEST/2002Book/pageNav">links on this page</a> | <a href="#globalNav">site navigation</a> | <a href="#siteInfo">footer (site information)</a> </div>
<div id="masthead">
<div id="globalNav" style="margin-top:15px;"> <div id="globalLink">
<a href="/index.html" id="gl1" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Home</span></span></a><a href="/index.html#about" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Contact Us</span></span></a><a href="/2008book/joulwan.html" id="gl2" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Rome '08</span></span></a><a href="/2007book/joulwan07" id="gl2" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Paris '07</span></span></a><a href="/2006book/jung.htm" id="gl2" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Berlin '06</span></span></a><a href="/2005book/alliotmarie.htm" id="gl2" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Paris '05</span></span></a><a href="/2004book/PeterStruckKeynote.htm" id="gl3" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Berlin '04</span></span></a><a href="/moscow03/weissingerbaylon.htm" id="gl4" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Moscow '03</span></span></a><a href="/berlin02/scharping.htm" id="gl5" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Berlin '02</span></span></a><a href="/2001Book/workshop2001.htm" id="gl6" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Helsinger '01</span></span></a><a href="/2000Book/workshop2000.htm" id="gl6" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Berlin '00</span></span></a><a href="/99Book/workshop1999.htm" id="gl6" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Budapest '99</span></span></a><a href="/98Book/workshop98.htm" id="gl6" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Vienna '98</span></span></a><a href="/97Book/workshop97.htm" id="gl6" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Prague '97</span></span></a><a href="/96Book/Workshop96.htm" id="gl7" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Warsaw '96</span></span></a>
<a href="/95Book/95Workshop.htm" id="gl8" class="glink"><span class="style18"><span class="style19">Dresden '95</span></span></a></div>
</div>
</div>
<div id="pagecell1" style="top:65px;">
<div id="breadCrumb" style="text-align:center;">
<img src="/images/header.gif" alt="Center for Strageic Decision Research: Celebrating over 25 years of international dialogue. International workshop on global security." width="618" height="99" style="padding:20px 10px;" />
</div>
<div id="pageNav">
<div id="sectionLinks">
<p align="center" class="style17">Table of Contents<br>
25th International Workshop - Rome '08</p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-preface.html">Preface- Dr. Roger<br>Weissinger-Baylon<br>Workshop Chairman<br></a>
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-overview.html">Workshop Chairman's Overview - Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon</a>
<a href="/2008book/joulwan.html">Opening Dinner Debate - <br>General George Joulwan<br>Former SACEUR</a>
<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part One<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/la-russa.html">Italian Defense Minister<br />
Ignazio La Russa
</a>
<a href="/2008book/browne.html">British Defense Minister<br />
The Rt Hon Des Browne
</a>
<a href="/2008book/gonul.html">Turkish Defense Minister<br />
Vecdi G�n�l
</a>
<a href="/2008book/di-paola.html">NATO Military Committee Chairman<br />
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappata.html">Admiral Luciano Zappata<br />
Dep Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/camporini.html">Italian Chief of Defense<br />
General Vincenzo Camporini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappa.html">Alenia Aeronautica Chairman<br />
Dr. Giorgio Zappa
</a>
<br>Part Two<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/baramidze.html">Georgian Vice Prime Minister<br />
Giorgi Baramidze
</a>
<a href="/2008book/chizhov.html">Russian Amb to EU<br />
Vladimir Chizhov
</a>
<br>Part Three<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/eldon.html">British Amb to NATO<br />
Stewart Eldon
</a>
<a href="/2008book/akram.html">Pakistan's Amb to U.N.<br />
Munir Akram
</a>
<a href="/2008book/de-la-sabliere.html">French Amb to Italy<br />
Jean-Marc de la Sabli�re
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tkeshelashvili.html">Georgian Foreign Minister<br />
Eka Tkeshelashvili
</a>
<a href="/2008book/stefanini.html">Italian Amb to NATO<br />
Stefano Stefanini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buzhinsky.html">Lt Gen Evgeniy Buzhinsky<br />
Russian Min of Defense
</a>
<a href="/2008book/winid.html">Polish Amb to NATO<br />
Boguslaw Winid
</a>
<br>Part Four<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/tegnelia.html">DTRA Director<br />
Dr. James Tegnelia
</a>
<a href="/2008book/rood.html">U.S. Under Sec of State<br />
John Rood
</a>
<a href="/2008book/joseph.html">Former Under Sec of State<br />
Amb Robert Joseph</a>
<a href="/2008book/berdennikov.html">Russian Amb-at-large<br />
Grigory V. Berdennikov
</a>
<a href="/2008book/benkert.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Defense<br />
Joseph Benkert
</a>
<a href="/2008book/flory.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Peter Flory
</a>
<a href="/2008book/sedivy.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Jiri Sedivy
</a>
<a href="/2008book/pfirter.html">OPCW Dir Gen<br />
Amb Rogelio Pfirter
</a>
<br>Part Five<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/lather.html">SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Karl-Heinz Lather
</a>
<a href="/2008book/fitzgerald.html">Admiral Mark. P. Fitzgerald
<br />
Allied Joint Force Command Naples
</a>
<a href="/2008book/ildem.html">Turkish Amb to NATO<br />
Tacan Ildem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schuwirth.html">Fmr SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Rainer Schuwirth
</a>
<a href="/2008book/acosta.html">Global Impact CEO<br />
Ms. Renee Acosta
</a>
<a href="/2008book/soligan.html">Lt Gen James Soligan<br />
Allied Command-Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bagnall.html">Former UK Vice Chief of Defense Staff<br />
ACM Sir Anthony Bagnall
</a>
<br>Part Six
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/volkman.html">U.S. Dir of Internat. Coop.<br />
Alfred Volkman
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tozzi.html">Major General Claudio Tozzi<br />
Italian Defense Ministry
</a>
<a href="/2008book/homberg.html">EADS Senior Vice Pres<br />
Thomas Homberg
</a>
<a href="/2008book/shephard.html">Northrop Grumman VP<br />
Mr. Timothy Shephard
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buckley.html">Thales Senior VP<br />
Dr. Edgar Buckley
</a>
<a href="/2008book/harris.html">Lockheed Martin Global Pres.<br />
Dr. Scott A. Harris
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schneider.html">AFCEA CEO<br />
Kent Schneider
</a>
<a href="/2008book/patterson.html">Mr. David Patterson<br />
Univ of Tennessee
</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part Seven
<p align="center" class="style17" style="margin-bottom: 0;">
<a href="/2008book/grimes.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Def<br />
Hon. John G. Grimes
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lentz.html">U.S. Dep Asst Sec of Def<br />
Robert Lentz
</a>
<a href="/2008book/aaviksoo.html">Estonian Defense Minister<br />
Jaak Aaviksoo
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bloechl.html">Microsoft, Managing Dir.<br />
Tim Bloechl
</a>
<a href="/2008book/wolf.html">Lt Gen Ulrich Wolf<br />
NATO CIS Service Agency Dir
</a>
<a href="/2008book/monteforte.html">Italian Milrep to NATO<br />
Vice Adm Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lintonen.html">Finnish Amb to UN<br />
Kirsti Lintonen
</a>
<a href="/2008book/silvestri.html">Dr. Stefano Silvestri<br />
Istituto Affari Internazionali
</a>
<a href="/2008book/yousfi.html">Algerian Amb to UN<br />
Youcef Yousfi
</a>
<a href="/2008book/karem.html">Egyptian Amb to EU<br />
Mahmoud Karem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tarasyuk.html">Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister<br />
Borys Tarasyuk
</a>
</div>
</div>
<div id="content">
<div class="story">
<h2 class="workshop_year">Rome '08 Workshop</h2>
<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="Main Content" -->
<h1>
Dealing with Regions in Crisis: The Case of Afghanistan<B> </B></h1>
<h2 style="margin-bottom: 0;">
Ambassador Stewart Eldon CMG OBE</h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0;">British Ambassador to NATO<B> </B></h2>
<p align="center" style="margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0;"><img src="images/eldon.jpg" alt="Ambassador Stewart Eldon" width="114" height="139"></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0;">
Recently Des Browne gave you a British view of NATO transformation and
the way we can ensure that the Alliance becomes an efficient and effective
provider of security in the 21<SUP>st</SUP> century. In these brief remarks I will
move from the strategic to the operational, concentrating primarily on
Afghanistan. </p>
<h2>OPERATIONAL NEEDS IN AFGHANISTAN </h2>
<p>
The first point I’d like to make is that, as with so many of our current
crises, there is no purely military solution to the situation in Afghanistan.
To achieve success, the whole international community must mobilize together.
The spectrum ranges from NATO, the hard end of security, through the EU
and national contributions in areas such as governance, the fight against
corruption, and the rule of law, to the U.N., NGOs and other development
agencies. In short, we need a comprehensive approach, which must encompass
the region as well as just Afghanistan. </p>
<p>
The second thing I want to say in this forum is that we must be honest
about what we are doing. In essence, the international community is engaged
in support of the government of Afghanistan in a major counterinsurgency
strategy. The Afghans must lead—it is, after all, their country—but the
more we can tailor our support behind the government’s efforts to exercise
its authority fully throughout its territory, the more successful we will
be. </p>
<h2>THE SECURITY SITUATION </h2>
<p>
Against this scenario, it is sometimes tempting to focus exclusively on
the security aspects of the situation—certainly the media tends to encourage
this and not to report on the real successes in other areas. However, despite
the casualties we and others suffered recently, the security situation
in Afghanistan has improved. The Taleban’s leadership has been targeted
successfully, and recent operations in Southern Helmand severely disrupted
their training and lines of communication. </p>
<p>
This has had two principal effects. First, the insurgents’ sphere of influence
has been reduced. Nine-tenths of the security incidents are now confined
to one-tenth of the country, and the rest is relatively peaceful. Second,
and crucial in this context, the Taliban’s ambition has been reduced from
insurgency to terrorism. Increasingly their focus is now on intimidating
Afghan communities, coercing the vulnerable into becoming suicide bombers,
and carrying out brutal and indiscriminate attacks on the international
community and, above all, ordinary Afghans. These tactics pose a different
but serious challenge, and we must adjust our efforts to deal with them.
As with all counterinsurgencies, the progression of clear, hold, and build
should be followed. </p>
<p>
This implies establishing a long-term and comprehensive framework for security,
political, social, and economic development in support of Afghanistan.
It implies increasing Afghan leadership. And it implies increasing support
where the Afghans need it most. </p>
<h2>ELEMENTS OF A LONG-TERM, COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK </h2>
<p>
The first key element relates to the Afghan Security Forces. Training of
the Afghan Army is going well, and the army is now involved in a leading
role in over 80% of NATO’s operations. Over the next few months we will
need to discuss with the Afghans whether long-term targets for the size
of the Afghan National Army are correct and, if not, whether a larger force
(for example, of 100,000) is supportable over the longer term. </p>
<p>
The Afghan Police is a second critical element and ultimately more important
in terms of lasting stability. Here the picture is less good. With current
resources the first round of police training under the U.S.-sponsored district
development program will not be completed until 2013. This is too late,
and more resources are needed. We very much welcome the fact that Italy
and other governments are looking at what more they can do to help. The
efforts of the EU Police Mission are also critical, focused on national
policing standards, higher-level training, and the rule of law. </p>
<p>
To hold and build, governance and development are essential. These areas
stray far outside NATO’s mandate, but support, for example, from the PRTs,
will be essential to ensure sustainable local government structures and
development. We need to get the right people in place—Gordon Brown has
proposed establishing a corps of deployable civilians to help in conflict
and post-conflict environments. An important balance must be struck between
direct aid delivery (for example, for reconstruction) and more strategic
development activities implemented through Afghan structures. NGOs and
bilateral donors also have important roles to play and need to feel out
their relationship with the military. In due course, we need to think through
whether PRTs are the most appropriate mechanisms for aid delivery in areas
where security permits a more traditional approach. </p>
<h2>CN AND COIN </h2>
<p>
Although I cannot do justice to the complexities of this subject in the
time available, I do want to cover two specific issues: Counternarcotics
(CN) and the delivery of civil effect in a counterinsurgency (COIN) context. </p>
<p>
CN is vitally important in an Afghan context. The links between drug traffickers
and the insurgency are painfully clear: the Taleban rely on drug money
to finance a high proportion of their operations. The relevance to NATO’s
role is also obvious. CN strategy is a long-term business with many strands
and must remain under Afghan lead. But NATO is now considering what more
it might do to support the Afghan National Drugs Strategy in terms of,
for example, targeting laboratories that produce material to feed Taleban
coffers. </p>
<p>
Each country has its own approach to delivering civil effect. In eastern
Afghanistan the U.S. has over many years built up a sophisticated approach
to reconstruction and development based on a military backbone of PRTs
and other enablers. This is working well, not least because a relatively
limited geographical spread and (by Afghan standards) a relatively sophisticated
infrastructure make it easier to achieve results. It also helps that traditionally
U.S. military commanders have had ready access to development and reconstruction
funds. </p>
<p>
The U.K. approach shares all the basic principles of COIN but differs in
some practical respects. In Regional Command-South (RC-S) the territory
is larger, less populated, and less developed; central government has had
little, if any, influence. In the British context, reconstruction money
is delivered through international development mechanisms rather than through
the military, although in many cases the military deliver, and we have
just announced the deployment of an extra troop of Royal Engineers to support
our PRT in Lashkar Gah by undertaking quick-impact projects in support
of the local community. In addition, we will attach civil-military cooperation
officers to each of our battle groups and will form military stabilization
teams on the model of the ad hoc team that we deployed with great success
in the wake of the reoccupation of Musa Qala. </p>
<p>
We have also appointed a two-star civilian to head the PRT in Lashkar Gah
and to take command of British assets in Helmand (except insofar as they
are dedicated to ISAF and remain under the NATO military command chain).
The objective is to achieve more coherent delivery of civil effect against
the background of a difficult security situation. I hope Roger Weissinger-Baylon
will invite me back next year to tell you whether we got it right. </p>
<p>
</p>
<!-- InstanceEndEditable --></div>
</div>
<div class="style8" id="siteInfo"> <a href="#">Top of page </a> | <a href="../index.html">Home</a> | ©2009
Center for Strategic Decision Research</div>
</div>
<br>
</body>
<!-- InstanceEnd --></html>