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<title>CSDR 2008: A Look at the Crisis Regions: Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Africa</title>
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<p align="center" class="style17">Table of Contents<br>
25th International Workshop - Rome '08</p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-preface.html">Preface- Dr. Roger<br>Weissinger-Baylon<br>Workshop Chairman<br></a>
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-overview.html">Workshop Chairman's Overview - Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon</a>
<a href="/2008book/joulwan.html">Opening Dinner Debate - <br>General George Joulwan<br>Former SACEUR</a>
<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part One<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/la-russa.html">Italian Defense Minister<br />
Ignazio La Russa
</a>
<a href="/2008book/browne.html">British Defense Minister<br />
The Rt Hon Des Browne
</a>
<a href="/2008book/gonul.html">Turkish Defense Minister<br />
Vecdi G�n�l
</a>
<a href="/2008book/di-paola.html">NATO Military Committee Chairman<br />
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappata.html">Admiral Luciano Zappata<br />
Dep Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/camporini.html">Italian Chief of Defense<br />
General Vincenzo Camporini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappa.html">Alenia Aeronautica Chairman<br />
Dr. Giorgio Zappa
</a>
<br>Part Two<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/baramidze.html">Georgian Vice Prime Minister<br />
Giorgi Baramidze
</a>
<a href="/2008book/chizhov.html">Russian Amb to EU<br />
Vladimir Chizhov
</a>
<br>Part Three<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/eldon.html">British Amb to NATO<br />
Stewart Eldon
</a>
<a href="/2008book/akram.html">Pakistan's Amb to U.N.<br />
Munir Akram
</a>
<a href="/2008book/de-la-sabliere.html">French Amb to Italy<br />
Jean-Marc de la Sabli�re
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tkeshelashvili.html">Georgian Foreign Minister<br />
Eka Tkeshelashvili
</a>
<a href="/2008book/stefanini.html">Italian Amb to NATO<br />
Stefano Stefanini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buzhinsky.html">Lt Gen Evgeniy Buzhinsky<br />
Russian Min of Defense
</a>
<a href="/2008book/winid.html">Polish Amb to NATO<br />
Boguslaw Winid
</a>
<br>Part Four<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/tegnelia.html">DTRA Director<br />
Dr. James Tegnelia
</a>
<a href="/2008book/rood.html">U.S. Under Sec of State<br />
John Rood
</a>
<a href="/2008book/joseph.html">Former Under Sec of State<br />
Amb Robert Joseph</a>
<a href="/2008book/berdennikov.html">Russian Amb-at-large<br />
Grigory V. Berdennikov
</a>
<a href="/2008book/benkert.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Defense<br />
Joseph Benkert
</a>
<a href="/2008book/flory.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Peter Flory
</a>
<a href="/2008book/sedivy.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Jiri Sedivy
</a>
<a href="/2008book/pfirter.html">OPCW Dir Gen<br />
Amb Rogelio Pfirter
</a>
<br>Part Five<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/lather.html">SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Karl-Heinz Lather
</a>
<a href="/2008book/fitzgerald.html">Admiral Mark. P. Fitzgerald
<br />
Allied Joint Force Command Naples
</a>
<a href="/2008book/ildem.html">Turkish Amb to NATO<br />
Tacan Ildem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schuwirth.html">Fmr SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Rainer Schuwirth
</a>
<a href="/2008book/acosta.html">Global Impact CEO<br />
Ms. Renee Acosta
</a>
<a href="/2008book/soligan.html">Lt Gen James Soligan<br />
Allied Command-Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bagnall.html">Former UK Vice Chief of Defense Staff<br />
ACM Sir Anthony Bagnall
</a>
<br>Part Six
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/volkman.html">U.S. Dir of Internat. Coop.<br />
Alfred Volkman
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tozzi.html">Major General Claudio Tozzi<br />
Italian Defense Ministry
</a>
<a href="/2008book/homberg.html">EADS Senior Vice Pres<br />
Thomas Homberg
</a>
<a href="/2008book/shephard.html">Northrop Grumman VP<br />
Mr. Timothy Shephard
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buckley.html">Thales Senior VP<br />
Dr. Edgar Buckley
</a>
<a href="/2008book/harris.html">Lockheed Martin Global Pres.<br />
Dr. Scott A. Harris
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schneider.html">AFCEA CEO<br />
Kent Schneider
</a>
<a href="/2008book/patterson.html">Mr. David Patterson<br />
Univ of Tennessee
</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part Seven
<p align="center" class="style17" style="margin-bottom: 0;">
<a href="/2008book/grimes.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Def<br />
Hon. John G. Grimes
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lentz.html">U.S. Dep Asst Sec of Def<br />
Robert Lentz
</a>
<a href="/2008book/aaviksoo.html">Estonian Defense Minister<br />
Jaak Aaviksoo
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bloechl.html">Microsoft, Managing Dir.<br />
Tim Bloechl
</a>
<a href="/2008book/wolf.html">Lt Gen Ulrich Wolf<br />
NATO CIS Service Agency Dir
</a>
<a href="/2008book/monteforte.html">Italian Milrep to NATO<br />
Vice Adm Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lintonen.html">Finnish Amb to UN<br />
Kirsti Lintonen
</a>
<a href="/2008book/silvestri.html">Dr. Stefano Silvestri<br />
Istituto Affari Internazionali
</a>
<a href="/2008book/yousfi.html">Algerian Amb to UN<br />
Youcef Yousfi
</a>
<a href="/2008book/karem.html">Egyptian Amb to EU<br />
Mahmoud Karem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tarasyuk.html">Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister<br />
Borys Tarasyuk
</a>
</div>
</div>
<div id="content">
<div class="story">
<h2 class="workshop_year">Rome '08 Workshop</h2>
<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="Main Content" -->
<h1>
A Look at the Crisis Regions: Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon,
Africa<B> </B></h1>
<h2 style="margin-bottom: 0;">
Ambassador Jean-Marc de la Sablière</h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0;">French Ambassador to Italy<B> </B></h2>
<p style="margin-bottom: 0;"></p>
<p align="center" style="margin-top: 0;"><img src="images/sabliere.jpg" alt="Ambassador Jean-Marc de la Sablière" width="126" height="144"></p>
<p style="margin-bottom: 0;"> </p>
<p style="margin-top: 0;">
Everyone here is able to gauge the importance gained by the U.N. through
peacekeeping operations carried out since the end of the Cold War. Today
there are over 100,000 peacekeepers deployed in 18 different missions,
at an overall cost of $7.5 billion. But although this massive engagement
by the United Nations has had structural and operational consequences for
the organization, in my remarks I am going to focus on the importance of
cooperation between the U.N. and regional and subregional organizations,
which are ever present on the ground alongside the United Nations, to meet
the expectations of the international community. </p>
<h2>U.N. COOPERATION WITH REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS</h2>
<p>
Over the past 15 years or so, the U.N. has increasingly cooperated with
several regional organizations on more than one continent. These include: </p>
<UL>
<LI>
The African Union and subregional organizations ECOWAS and IGAD, to carry
out operations solely in Africa: in Sudan, in the Great Lakes region in
Burundi, in Western Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire), and,
shortly, in Somalia<U> </U></LI>
<LI>
The Organization of American States, in connection with the events in Haiti </LI>
<LI>
The European Union, to lead operations in Europe (Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia)
but also in Africa (twice in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in
Chad/CAR) </LI>
<LI>
NATO, in Europe (the Balkans), in Afghanistan, in Iraq (training), and
also in Sudan (to provide the logistics needed to support the deployment
of UNAMID troops) </LI>
</ul>
<p>
This cooperation has been undertaken in many different ways. A quick look
at the operations carried out over the past few years shows that these
ways have included: </p>
<UL>
<LI>
What I call “staggered” operations, in which the U.N. takes over from a
regional organization (Burundi, Liberia) </LI>
<LI>
Joint or hybrid operations<U>,</U> such as UNAMID, which is currently being led
in Darfur by the African Union and the U.N. in an original joint way<U> </U></LI>
<LI>
Operations led by several organizations or states—though there may be a
single global mandate, these operations are highly complex because different
missions are deployed in the same area but report to different decision-making
centers; in this connection, the EU has intervened twice to provide temporary
support to a U.N. operation in which it was unable to tackle specific events
on its own (ARTEMIS and EUFOR DR Congo) and is presently leading a security-building
operation in Chad (EUFOR, Chad/CAR) in support of a U.N. mission (MINURCAT) </LI>
<LI>
Logistics and training support, which the EU provides primarily to the
AU </LI>
</UL>
<p>
The importance and usefulness of this kind of cooperation, especially between
the AU and the EU, was acknowledged in a statement by the president of
the Security Council that was issued on November, 6, 2007, welcoming, above
all, the precious role played by regional organizations, not only in crisis
prevention, but also in seeking a political settlement for the crises once
they have broken out. In March 2007, the Security Council had already underscored
the fact that the African organizations were “well-placed to understand
the root causes of the many conflicts in the area and to be valuable in
their prevention and settlement, thanks to their profound knowledge of
the region.” The fact that these organizations regularly appear before
the U.N. Security Council for a joint assessment of the regional situations
is a clear sign of their willingness to work together. </p>
<p>
The United Nations also realizes that these regional organizations have
an important role to play in carrying out operations to prevent the spread
of destabilizing factors, specifically in combating light weapons trafficking
and terrorism. Furthermore, they are essential partners in peace enforcement
operations through their participation in post-conflict rebuilding programs. </p>
<p>
Although at times the above modes of cooperation are plainly a negotiated
political solution (for example, in Darfur), more often than not they are
an inescapable need when strong pressures are brought to bear on the international
community to take action and one organization alone is not enough to get
the job done or to handle it effectively. The United Nations is still a
political-military organization that is ill equipped to lead certain complex
and demanding military operations throughout the entire world; it is up
against the increasing problem of force generation. An organization such
as the African Union, with its clear political mandate, has no military
capabilities of its own, despite some progress. NATO has substantial military
assets but clearly does not have universal legitimacy and is uncomfortable
with the political-military management of a crisis. As for the European
Union, it is often reluctant to be engaged. </p>
<h2>STUMBLING BLOCKS TO FULL COOPERATION </h2>
<p>
Because we do not have a universal cooperation model we must adapt our
instruments on a case-by-case basis. Hence, it is important to identify
any issues that might arise to overcome them in the future and to avoid
certain stumbling blocks: </p>
<UL>
<LI>
The increasing recourse to regional organizations must not call into question
the universal nature of the United Nations and its ensuing legitimacy.
The Darfur crisis has shown how ineffective an overly regional solution
can be. There are lines that cannot be crossed, of which the African Union
is well aware, for it is not in the interest of Africans to encourage these
tendencies. In addition, the primacy of the United Nations, which gives
it legitimacy or, at the very least, increased legitimacy, must likewise
be safeguarded vis-à-vis contributing regional organizations such as NATO.
</LI>
<LI>
Cultural differences must be well understood. Thus, DPKO operates in a
very decentralized manner. To the contrary, NATO and the EU are pyramidal
organizations, with a very strong top-down political-military control structure.
Reconciling these kinds of organizations on the ground is not an easy task.
KFOR has had to take emergency action to deal with the consequences of
a decision essentially made locally by the UNMIK commanders, in accordance
with the guidelines coming from New York. The main problem was not so much
the decision itself; rather, it was with the communication between the
two organizations. Each of the parties concerned must make an effort to
adapt. </LI>
</UL>
<p>
In this respect, recent operations have shed light on the need to pursue
and enhance the military upgrading of DPKO. The extremely complex U.N.
operations need to be able to report to a staff structure in New York,
however light. This is what has led to the idea of setting up a New York–based
military cell to interface with DPKO, to meet the expectations of the European
armies engaged in the UNIFIL II operation. Decisions are now being made
in New York to upgrade the military expertise of the United Nations, thereby
facilitating cooperation with organizations such as the EU and NATO. </p>
<UL>
<LI>
Generally speaking, the political coherence of an operation must be guaranteed
when political, military, police, and rebuilding efforts are divided among
several partners. In this respect, once it is engaged on the ground, the
U.N. should clearly be in complete charge of leading the mission within
the framework of a global political-military strategy. This has not always
been the case, and we have had to acknowledge that in the operations carried
out in Afghanistan. </LI>
<LI>
The EU’s potential as a U.N. partner may still be enhanced. In fact, the
European Union has solid civilian-military capabilities, making it unique
and enabling it to intervene in every phase of a crisis, from prevention
to settlement and peace enforcement. It is also able to deploy a rapid
and viable reaction force, which we saw in the DR Congo and Chad. But the
EU must want to do this. </LI>
</UL>
<h2>CONCLUDING REMARKS</h2>
<p>
My fundamental conclusion is that to enable cooperation, we must understand
one another and know what our capabilities and limits are. Hence, we must
foster an ongoing discussion and coordination effort aimed at improving
cooperation between the U.N. and regional organizations. Objectives and
mandates must also be clearly defined. Although a great deal has been achieved,
much remains to be accomplished. </p>
<p>
On the basis of its experience serving peace, France advocates pragmatism
in choosing the organizations that are best suited to supporting the United
Nations. It wishes to adapt the rules of operation within the United Nations
as well as between the United Nations and the regional organizations. Finally,
it wants the EU to take on an active role in facing up to these challenges,
thereby meeting the expectations of the entire world. </p>
<p>
It is in this spirit that we will hold a forum in November 2008 on U.N.-EU
cooperation. This forum will contribute to our discussion on strengthening
the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). </p>
<p>
<B></p>
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