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<p align="center" class="style17">Table of Contents<br>
25th International Workshop - Rome '08</p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-preface.html">Preface- Dr. Roger<br>Weissinger-Baylon<br>Workshop Chairman<br></a>
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-overview.html">Workshop Chairman's Overview - Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon</a>
<a href="/2008book/joulwan.html">Opening Dinner Debate - <br>General George Joulwan<br>Former SACEUR</a>
<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part One<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/la-russa.html">Italian Defense Minister<br />
Ignazio La Russa
</a>
<a href="/2008book/browne.html">British Defense Minister<br />
The Rt Hon Des Browne
</a>
<a href="/2008book/gonul.html">Turkish Defense Minister<br />
Vecdi G�n�l
</a>
<a href="/2008book/di-paola.html">NATO Military Committee Chairman<br />
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappata.html">Admiral Luciano Zappata<br />
Dep Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/camporini.html">Italian Chief of Defense<br />
General Vincenzo Camporini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappa.html">Alenia Aeronautica Chairman<br />
Dr. Giorgio Zappa
</a>
<br>Part Two<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/baramidze.html">Georgian Vice Prime Minister<br />
Giorgi Baramidze
</a>
<a href="/2008book/chizhov.html">Russian Amb to EU<br />
Vladimir Chizhov
</a>
<br>Part Three<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/eldon.html">British Amb to NATO<br />
Stewart Eldon
</a>
<a href="/2008book/akram.html">Pakistan's Amb to U.N.<br />
Munir Akram
</a>
<a href="/2008book/de-la-sabliere.html">French Amb to Italy<br />
Jean-Marc de la Sabli�re
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tkeshelashvili.html">Georgian Foreign Minister<br />
Eka Tkeshelashvili
</a>
<a href="/2008book/stefanini.html">Italian Amb to NATO<br />
Stefano Stefanini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buzhinsky.html">Lt Gen Evgeniy Buzhinsky<br />
Russian Min of Defense
</a>
<a href="/2008book/winid.html">Polish Amb to NATO<br />
Boguslaw Winid
</a>
<br>Part Four<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/tegnelia.html">DTRA Director<br />
Dr. James Tegnelia
</a>
<a href="/2008book/rood.html">U.S. Under Sec of State<br />
John Rood
</a>
<a href="/2008book/joseph.html">Former Under Sec of State<br />
Amb Robert Joseph</a>
<a href="/2008book/berdennikov.html">Russian Amb-at-large<br />
Grigory V. Berdennikov
</a>
<a href="/2008book/benkert.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Defense<br />
Joseph Benkert
</a>
<a href="/2008book/flory.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Peter Flory
</a>
<a href="/2008book/sedivy.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Jiri Sedivy
</a>
<a href="/2008book/pfirter.html">OPCW Dir Gen<br />
Amb Rogelio Pfirter
</a>
<br>Part Five<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/lather.html">SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Karl-Heinz Lather
</a>
<a href="/2008book/fitzgerald.html">Admiral Mark. P. Fitzgerald
<br />
Allied Joint Force Command Naples
</a>
<a href="/2008book/ildem.html">Turkish Amb to NATO<br />
Tacan Ildem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schuwirth.html">Fmr SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Rainer Schuwirth
</a>
<a href="/2008book/acosta.html">Global Impact CEO<br />
Ms. Renee Acosta
</a>
<a href="/2008book/soligan.html">Lt Gen James Soligan<br />
Allied Command-Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bagnall.html">Former UK Vice Chief of Defense Staff<br />
ACM Sir Anthony Bagnall
</a>
<br>Part Six
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/volkman.html">U.S. Dir of Internat. Coop.<br />
Alfred Volkman
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tozzi.html">Major General Claudio Tozzi<br />
Italian Defense Ministry
</a>
<a href="/2008book/homberg.html">EADS Senior Vice Pres<br />
Thomas Homberg
</a>
<a href="/2008book/shephard.html">Northrop Grumman VP<br />
Mr. Timothy Shephard
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buckley.html">Thales Senior VP<br />
Dr. Edgar Buckley
</a>
<a href="/2008book/harris.html">Lockheed Martin Global Pres.<br />
Dr. Scott A. Harris
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schneider.html">AFCEA CEO<br />
Kent Schneider
</a>
<a href="/2008book/patterson.html">Mr. David Patterson<br />
Univ of Tennessee
</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part Seven
<p align="center" class="style17" style="margin-bottom: 0;">
<a href="/2008book/grimes.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Def<br />
Hon. John G. Grimes
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lentz.html">U.S. Dep Asst Sec of Def<br />
Robert Lentz
</a>
<a href="/2008book/aaviksoo.html">Estonian Defense Minister<br />
Jaak Aaviksoo
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bloechl.html">Microsoft, Managing Dir.<br />
Tim Bloechl
</a>
<a href="/2008book/wolf.html">Lt Gen Ulrich Wolf<br />
NATO CIS Service Agency Dir
</a>
<a href="/2008book/monteforte.html">Italian Milrep to NATO<br />
Vice Adm Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lintonen.html">Finnish Amb to UN<br />
Kirsti Lintonen
</a>
<a href="/2008book/silvestri.html">Dr. Stefano Silvestri<br />
Istituto Affari Internazionali
</a>
<a href="/2008book/yousfi.html">Algerian Amb to UN<br />
Youcef Yousfi
</a>
<a href="/2008book/karem.html">Egyptian Amb to EU<br />
Mahmoud Karem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tarasyuk.html">Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister<br />
Borys Tarasyuk
</a>
</div>
</div>
<div id="content">
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<h2 class="workshop_year">Rome '08 Workshop</h2>
<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="Main Content" -->
<h1>
Key Address: The Search for Global Security </h1>
<h2 style="margin-bottom: 0;">
General Vincenzo Camporini</h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0;">Italian Chief of Defense </h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0;"><img src="images/camporini.jpg" alt="General Vincenzo Camporini" width="74" height="91"></h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0;">THE SEARCH FOR GLOBAL SECURITY </h2>
<p>
It is sometimes beneficial to consider the origin and the meaning of the
terms that have become magic passwords in the public debate. One of these
terms is security and I propose to you to consider the power of this concept
in the history of mankind. </p>
<p>
The term comes from Latin and it means “without worry.” Even a superficial
analysis reveals that security, or better, the search for security is at
the origin of most of the forms of violence. Since the early days of history,
even the most brutal aggression has its roots in the search for security:
I feel unsecure because I do not have access to commodities which I consider
essential, therefore I challenge those who have it. Even World War II was
justified in this way: Hitler wanted the “vital space” for the Third Reich,
the space which was needed to make Germany feel secure. </p>
<p>
Why do I tell you this? Simply because I want to warn you against the belief
that the use of the term security is sufficient to grant legitimacy and
legality to any action and intervention. It is therefore necessary to qualify
the term and we may feel better and more comfortable if we add the word
“global,” which may also be used ambiguously, if I pretend to feel secure
in every field, regardless of the feelings of the rest of mankind, but
which may also indicate a wider and possibly universal share of a state
of security, where no one fears to be deprived of the resources believed
to be vital for his own subjective welfare. </p>
<p>
I need not tell you that today this is utopia since we all fear to lose
vital resources: energy, water, food, house, life or even only a pleasant
weekend. And this is true for the individual as well as for the communities,
small or large as they may be. Therefore a real global security may be
searched only by trying to grant everybody what is felt as a need, a mission
which may seem impossible but which is the only one worth the effort in
times when the consequences of a drawing in a paper in Copenhagen inevitably
is the direct cause of several killings in the Philippines. </p>
<p>
No geographical limits, no time limits, because IT makes any time to become
real time; no borders between disciplines since even flower cultivation
may, and indeed has become a factor. Biology, cybernetics, climate—whether
it changes or not—everything may become a threat. Hence global threats
become the challenge for global security. </p>
<h2>THE DISPLACEMENT OF VIOLENCE </h2>
<p>
Most striking has been the inversion—some might say perversion—of the traditional
definition of modern war provided by Carl von Clausewitz (<I>On War</I>, 1873)
as “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will,”
and as “not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation
of political activity by other means.” Looking at what happened on 9/11
it was very hard to identify a diplomatic counterpart to discuss with! </p>
<p>
The shock produced by the initial attack eroded the foundations of a democratic
civil society. I do not have the ambition to change what von Clausewitz
wrote; however, previous definitions are not in line with contemporary
changes achieved by globalization, terrorism, and advances in communication
technology that lead to a displacement of violence, and an increased targeting
of civilians. </p>
<p>
The threat shuffle reflects shifts in the level of analysis as well as
the perspective of the observer. It demonstrates implicitly as well as
explicitly the increasing importance of <I>chrono</I> and <I>bio</I> over geo-politics
and immediacy elevates the potentiality of the threat too. </p>
<p>
Many of the threats do not cause global conflicts in and of themselves.
Rather, it is the complexity and combinations—the phase shifts—of the threats
that often lead to violent conflict and global insecurity. </p>
<h2>THE POLITICAL POTENTIAL OF NETWORKED TECHNOLOGIES </h2>
<p>
Just as a system is more than the sum of its parts, a network is more than
nodes, hubs, and connected agents of power. Defined by Kevin Kelly as “organic
behavior in a technological matrix,” a network produces effects as well
as conveys information. A network can be a force multiplier as in net-centric
warfare or networked terrorism. </p>
<p>
Networks are critical to media, cultural and economic flows. Post Cold
War, post 9/11, we have witnessed the emergence of competing sources of
power, heteropolar networks, in which different actors are able to produce
profound global effects through interconnectivity. </p>
<p>
Varying in identity, interests, and strength, networked actors gain advantage
through the broad bandwidth of information technology, using networked
IT to traverse political, economic, religious, and cultural boundaries,
changing, for instance, not only how war is fought and peace is made, but
making it ever more difficult to maintain the very distinction of war and
peace. </p>
<p>
The “West” and I mean NATO and EU might enjoy an advantage in surveillance,
media, and military networks; but the rest, including fundamentalist terrorist
groups, criminal gangs, and anti-globalization activists, have exploited
the political potential of networked technologies of information collection,
transmission, and storage. </p>
<p>
Does the potential risk posed by negative synergy, cascading effects, and
unintended consequences outweigh the actual benefits of networks? </p>
<h2>FAILED AND FAILING STATES AND THE
COMPLEXITY OF GOVERNANCE </h2>
<p>
Failed and failing states provide a potential refuge for transnational
terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, pirates as well as drug
and human smugglers. They are breeding grounds for refugee crises, political
and religious extremism, environmental degradation and organized criminal
activity. Thus even if a failed state has little significance in the traditional
sense of strategic resources or geographical position, it will take on
greater strategic importance in the future by virtue of the potential base
it offers to powerful non-state actors. </p>
<p>
Allow me now a small digression. One threat which is not always considered
with proper attention is the increasing complexity of governance: we often
talk about failed states, entities with no defined and stable authority.
But what happens in our countries, in our societies? Do our political masters
today have a proper amount of authority? Are they not progressively prisoners
of localism on one side and of an evanescent public opinion on the other?
Isn’t an indefinable bureaucracy hampering any serious attempt to act any
reasonable plan to reform? Are we not heading towards a somehow anarchic
society? </p>
<p>
Just questions for sure, but questions which need an answer. </p>
<h2>OTHER FACTORS OF RISK FOR THE FUTURE
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT</h2>
<p>
Water will likely play an important role in the reconfiguration of the
future security environment. The UN estimates that by 2050, “at worst 7
billion people in sixty countries will be water-scarce, at best 2 billion
people in forty-eight countries” (water for people, water for life, pg.10).
Water scarcity, combined with shortages of food and medicine in underdeveloped
and developing countries can severely threaten human security. </p>
<p>
Lack of energy sources, especially oil, will also be a major concern to
many states. Increasing oil consumption in relation to dwindling reserves
will lead to a significant reordering of strategic interests throughout
the world. </p>
<p>
The Middle East, already vital for its oil reserves, will become more important
as demand increases. Similarly, other areas including parts of Africa,
the Caspian Region, South China Seas, and numerous equatorial areas have
already increased in strategic importance. </p>
<p>
The proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear WMD equalizes the
risks and political power across the globe by reintroducing the risk to
the military infrastructure and civilian populations of Western nations
in North America and Europe on the one hand—on the other, it poses new
security threats to states invested in maintaining the status quo and their
identities as responsible states. Of even greater concern is the very real
possibility that weapons of mass destruction could fall into the hands
of terrorist groups. In particular, the threat of nuclear terrorism combined
with the possibility of irrational suicidal behavior carries ambiguous
implications for the delicate nuclear balances of the Cold War. </p>
<h2>NATO-EU RELATIONS </h2>
<p>
The U.S. and EU are presented as both models of stability, freedom and
prosperity and as agents of transformation with a vocation to change the
world in their own image. </p>
<p>
In fact, it is not strange that there is also a basic convergence on European
and American assessments of the principal threats to these common values.
Both the NATO security strategy and the European security strategy converge
on identifying terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, and failing
states as representing the major challenges. Where there are differences,
they are more of emphasis and prioritization than of substance but, in
essence, they describe the same external world and provide the same basic
strategic threat assessment. </p>
<p>
Taking from the latest NATO Summit at Bucharest, “NATO-EU relations cover
a wide range of issues of common interest relating to security, defence
and crisis management, including the fight against terrorism, the development
of coherent and mutually reinforcing military capabilities, and civil emergency
planning…We recognize the value that a stronger and more capable European
defence brings, providing capabilities to address the common challenges
both NATO and the EU face. We therefore support mutually reinforcing efforts
to this end. Success in these and future cooperative endeavours calls for
enhanced commitment to ensure effective methods of working together. We
are therefore determined to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership as
agreed by our two organizations, to achieve closer cooperation and greater
efficiency, and to avoid unnecessary duplication in a spirit of transparency,
and respecting the autonomy of the two organizations.” </p>
<p>
Renewing the auspices of a more tight cooperation between the two organizations,
I think that the revision of the NATO Strategic Concept and the European
Security Strategy should go along hand-in-hand in answering the basic questions
for security: </p>
<UL>
<LI>
Security is for whom, from what, and how? </LI>
<LI>
What are the priorities, to what threat, and why? </LI>
<LI>
How do we assess factors of immediacy and duration, perception and lethality? </LI>
</UL>
<p>
This aspect is crucial both from a political and operational perspective
when a top-down approach to the issue is considered. </p>
<p>
Transatlantic relations are a key element of the common threat assessment,
as well as the relationship with Russia, which, whether one likes it or
not, will be a vital ally in the next decades. </p>
<h2>CONCLUDING REMARKS </h2>
<p>
In closing, I wish us all success in seeing the new challenges for what
they are and thinking of the way we can address those, possibly not for
our generation’s benefit but certainly for the benefit of our sons and
daughters and our grandchildren. </p>
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