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<p align="center" class="style17">Table of Contents<br>
25th International Workshop - Rome '08</p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-preface.html">Preface- Dr. Roger<br>Weissinger-Baylon<br>Workshop Chairman<br></a>
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-overview.html">Workshop Chairman's Overview - Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon</a>
<a href="/2008book/joulwan.html">Opening Dinner Debate - <br>General George Joulwan<br>Former SACEUR</a>
<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part One<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/la-russa.html">Italian Defense Minister<br />
Ignazio La Russa
</a>
<a href="/2008book/browne.html">British Defense Minister<br />
The Rt Hon Des Browne
</a>
<a href="/2008book/gonul.html">Turkish Defense Minister<br />
Vecdi G�n�l
</a>
<a href="/2008book/di-paola.html">NATO Military Committee Chairman<br />
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappata.html">Admiral Luciano Zappata<br />
Dep Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/camporini.html">Italian Chief of Defense<br />
General Vincenzo Camporini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappa.html">Alenia Aeronautica Chairman<br />
Dr. Giorgio Zappa
</a>
<br>Part Two<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/baramidze.html">Georgian Vice Prime Minister<br />
Giorgi Baramidze
</a>
<a href="/2008book/chizhov.html">Russian Amb to EU<br />
Vladimir Chizhov
</a>
<br>Part Three<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/eldon.html">British Amb to NATO<br />
Stewart Eldon
</a>
<a href="/2008book/akram.html">Pakistan's Amb to U.N.<br />
Munir Akram
</a>
<a href="/2008book/de-la-sabliere.html">French Amb to Italy<br />
Jean-Marc de la Sabli�re
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tkeshelashvili.html">Georgian Foreign Minister<br />
Eka Tkeshelashvili
</a>
<a href="/2008book/stefanini.html">Italian Amb to NATO<br />
Stefano Stefanini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buzhinsky.html">Lt Gen Evgeniy Buzhinsky<br />
Russian Min of Defense
</a>
<a href="/2008book/winid.html">Polish Amb to NATO<br />
Boguslaw Winid
</a>
<br>Part Four<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/tegnelia.html">DTRA Director<br />
Dr. James Tegnelia
</a>
<a href="/2008book/rood.html">U.S. Under Sec of State<br />
John Rood
</a>
<a href="/2008book/joseph.html">Former Under Sec of State<br />
Amb Robert Joseph</a>
<a href="/2008book/berdennikov.html">Russian Amb-at-large<br />
Grigory V. Berdennikov
</a>
<a href="/2008book/benkert.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Defense<br />
Joseph Benkert
</a>
<a href="/2008book/flory.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Peter Flory
</a>
<a href="/2008book/sedivy.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Jiri Sedivy
</a>
<a href="/2008book/pfirter.html">OPCW Dir Gen<br />
Amb Rogelio Pfirter
</a>
<br>Part Five<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/lather.html">SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Karl-Heinz Lather
</a>
<a href="/2008book/fitzgerald.html">Admiral Mark. P. Fitzgerald
<br />
Allied Joint Force Command Naples
</a>
<a href="/2008book/ildem.html">Turkish Amb to NATO<br />
Tacan Ildem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schuwirth.html">Fmr SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Rainer Schuwirth
</a>
<a href="/2008book/acosta.html">Global Impact CEO<br />
Ms. Renee Acosta
</a>
<a href="/2008book/soligan.html">Lt Gen James Soligan<br />
Allied Command-Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bagnall.html">Former UK Vice Chief of Defense Staff<br />
ACM Sir Anthony Bagnall
</a>
<br>Part Six
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/volkman.html">U.S. Dir of Internat. Coop.<br />
Alfred Volkman
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tozzi.html">Major General Claudio Tozzi<br />
Italian Defense Ministry
</a>
<a href="/2008book/homberg.html">EADS Senior Vice Pres<br />
Thomas Homberg
</a>
<a href="/2008book/shephard.html">Northrop Grumman VP<br />
Mr. Timothy Shephard
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buckley.html">Thales Senior VP<br />
Dr. Edgar Buckley
</a>
<a href="/2008book/harris.html">Lockheed Martin Global Pres.<br />
Dr. Scott A. Harris
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schneider.html">AFCEA CEO<br />
Kent Schneider
</a>
<a href="/2008book/patterson.html">Mr. David Patterson<br />
Univ of Tennessee
</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part Seven
<p align="center" class="style17" style="margin-bottom: 0;">
<a href="/2008book/grimes.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Def<br />
Hon. John G. Grimes
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lentz.html">U.S. Dep Asst Sec of Def<br />
Robert Lentz
</a>
<a href="/2008book/aaviksoo.html">Estonian Defense Minister<br />
Jaak Aaviksoo
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bloechl.html">Microsoft, Managing Dir.<br />
Tim Bloechl
</a>
<a href="/2008book/wolf.html">Lt Gen Ulrich Wolf<br />
NATO CIS Service Agency Dir
</a>
<a href="/2008book/monteforte.html">Italian Milrep to NATO<br />
Vice Adm Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lintonen.html">Finnish Amb to UN<br />
Kirsti Lintonen
</a>
<a href="/2008book/silvestri.html">Dr. Stefano Silvestri<br />
Istituto Affari Internazionali
</a>
<a href="/2008book/yousfi.html">Algerian Amb to UN<br />
Youcef Yousfi
</a>
<a href="/2008book/karem.html">Egyptian Amb to EU<br />
Mahmoud Karem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tarasyuk.html">Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister<br />
Borys Tarasyuk
</a>
</div>
</div>
<div id="content">
<div class="story">
<h2 class="workshop_year">Rome '08 Workshop</h2>
<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="Main Content" -->
<h1>
Transforming NATO to Meet the New Global Challenges </h1>
<h2 style="margin-bottom: 0;">
Rt Hon Des Browne MP</h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0;">British Defense Minister </h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0;"><img src="images/browne.png" alt="Rt Hon Des Browne MP" width="209" height="250"></h2>
<h2 style="margin-bottom: 0;"> </h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0;">INTRODUCTION </h2>
<p>
It is a great pleasure to be here with you today. These meetings are our
opportunity to discuss the issues that we all agree are important. Fundamentally
they give us an opportunity to set the agenda for how we handle international
security, both as individual nations and as a global community. </p>
<p>
It is appropriate that they take place here in Rome. I have a great deal
of awe and respect for the history of this city—as I am sure all of us
do. Across the centuries this great and beautiful city has been home to
men and women who have transformed our world. And the base of an empire
that—at its height— spanned the known world. It is the centre of a religion
that touches the four corners of the earth. To speak of grand alliances
and world changing events is nothing new here. </p>
<h2> NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL REFORM </h2>
<p>
Today, I want to talk about the need to reform our international institutions
in the light of the new global challenges we face. In particular, I want
to focus on the transformation of NATO. Celebrating its sixtieth anniversary
next year, and still vigorous in terms of operations—an alliance that new
allies are queuing up to join and into which our formidable old ally, France,
this week has announced it is ready to reintegrate fully. </p>
<p>
I think it is fair to say that we have been very well-served by the institutions
founded shortly after the end of the Second World War. The immediate post-war
years spawned a remarkable new era in co-operation—with the foundation
of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund,
NATO and others. Across the globe there are few aspects of our work that
have not been heavily shaped by these international institutions, and both
our security and our prosperity have benefited hugely as a consequence. </p>
<p>
The post-war leaders of North America and Europe were true visionaries.
But as Gordon Brown said in his Kennedy Memorial Lecture no-one “could
have foreseen the sheer scale of the new global challenges that our growing
interdependence brings: their scale, their diversity and the speed with
which they have emerged: the globalisation of the economy; the threat of
climate change; the long struggle against international terrorism; and
the need to protect millions from violence and conflict and to face up
to the international consequences of poverty and inequality.” </p>
<p>
These new challenges have tested our international institutions—and although
they have shown that they can adapt and change, it is also increasingly
apparent that they are starting to struggle with the new strategic environment. </p>
<p>
It is not that they cannot cope —that is self-evidently not true. But they
are not as effective as we would like them to be. And relying on them as
much as we do, and supporting them with as much money and effort as we
do, their effectiveness matters to us deeply. </p>
<p>
Besides their effectiveness there is another related issue —that of internal
efficiency. Over time all institutions build bad habits, cumbersome processes,
working practices that are more hindrance than help. The great institutions
that were set up after the Second World War have fifty or sixty years of
accumulated habit and practice and a lot of it is bad. A habit gained or
an interest vested is often a habit ingrained or an interest that no one
can divest. They lack internal mechanisms that are strong enough to bring
necessary change from within, even if those at the helm are themselves
strong proponents of renewal. And if they work by consensus, these tendencies
are often reinforced. </p>
<p>
So we need to refresh our vision for the way these fundamentally sound
institutions work for us. We need to ensure that they are equipped to deal
with new threats and that they work more closely with each other to achieve
this objective. And we also need to help them function better, through
a clearer focus on what we need them to deliver. Improving working practices,
measuring outputs and stripping away bad habits and vested interests. </p>
<p>
The effort to achieve these goals needs to be led by us all in our dual
capacities as beneficiaries and providers. I use the word “led” advisedly.
This is an issue of leadership. We must not shy away from the opportunities
that we have to make a difference, not just to our national security, but
to international peace and stability. Effective and efficient institutions
are a key part of this. </p>
<h2>NATO REFORM </h2>
<p>
For those of us who have the privilege to work in defence, the pre-eminent
international organisation is NATO. NATO is about common transatlantic
values, indivisible security and solidarity. </p>
<p>
All NATO Allies are in Afghanistan conducting the biggest and most complex
mission ever undertaken by the Alliance </p>
<p>
They are in Kosovo where NATO remains a vital bulwark for peace, at a time
of continuing tension. Through NATO, allies play an extensive role in training
and security sector reform, for which NATO has the most effective mechanisms
in the world, bar none. You only have to look at Eastern Europe to see
why that is the case. </p>
<p>
At the same time, the Alliance continues to grow with new members and new
partnerships. The Bucharest NATO Summit in April was attended by some sixty
nations and leaders of key international organisations. In facing problems
with global reach, NATO is demonstrating a commitment to work with partner
institutions and nations around the globe. </p>
<p>
These are not the symptoms of a moribund organisation. Nevertheless, I
am concerned that doing these things is more of a struggle for NATO than
it should be. And if it is a struggle for NATO as a whole, then it is a
struggle for each individual member state as well. </p>
<p>
Three years ago, in 2005, my predecessor as Defence Secretary, John Reid,
spoke at this Workshop. Then, he said that “If NATO is to prove its continued
relevance on the global stage, it must seize the process of Transformation
with both hands.” I think that, with Afghanistan, with Kosovo, with international
security sector reform, NATO is proving its continued relevance. But now
we need to consolidate those gains, and look long and hard at where reform
is needed most urgently. </p>
<p>
I think we can all agree that reform should take us towards three clear
objectives for NATO: </p>
<UL>
<LI>
Well-planned and well-managed operations; </LI>
<LI>
An ability to help identify and deliver the capabilities needed to support
both current and future operations; and </LI>
<LI>
A framework of partnerships that will allow us to work with others who
share our interests and can contribute to them including as part of a more
comprehensive approach. </LI>
</UL>
<h2>Well-Planned and Well-Managed Operations </h2>
<p>
Operations are central to NATO’s purpose. And Afghanistan is our most important
operation. Through this NATO operation, we are reinforcing our collective
security at home, and giving Afghanistan the chance to build a secure and
hopeful future for its people. But the requirements for success in Afghanistan
also match very closely NATO’s requirements for change in its approach
to delivering collective defence and security more generally. Operations
there are the main driver for transformation. Afghanistan is forcing us
all to change the way we approach complex 21<SUP>st</SUP> Century threats with 21<SUP>st</SUP>
Century means. </p>
<p>
In the British Government, we have thought hard about our approach. Experience
in Afghanistan has been hugely significant as a motor for many changes
we have sought to make both in defence and in our wider determination to
help international organisations deliver better. We are not alone. Canada,
also in light of its experience in Afghanistan, has carried out a far-reaching
analysis of its defence posture and priorities, including through the Manley
Commission. An analysis which has reinforced Canada’s role as a stalwart
and highly capable NATO Ally. The Netherlands and Denmark, too, have examined
thoroughly their own transformation needs through their experience in Afghanistan,
and so equipped themselves to deal with the complex challenges that we
must now deal with in this new century. </p>
<p>
I hope all Allies will grasp the need to use this operation in their own
transformation. And NATO must do so too. </p>
<h2>Ability to Help Identify and Deliver the Required Capabilities </h2>
<p>
Now, it is true that, in NATO, we have come a long way in recognising the
importance of expeditionary capabilities in dealing with the broad range
of threats the Alliance is likely to face. This is particularly true since
the endorsement of the Comprehensive Political Guidance at the 2006 Riga
Summit. We have developed the NATO Response Force as a means of deploying
such capabilities. </p>
<p>
But, there remains far too big a mismatch between our aspirations and what
we actually deliver. The NATO Response Force is not getting the forces
or capabilities it needs in order to carry out the full range of missions
for which it was designed. As a consequence, there are concerns as to its
longer term viability. We are lacking sufficient capabilities in key areas,
such as strategic and intra-theatre lift. Capabilities which affect our
ability to prosecute current and future operations in the way we might
want. And that shortfall puts added strain on the forces and capabilities
which are available. </p>
<p>
As a measure of how we are doing to improve this situation, NATO has developed
targets, including that 40% of land forces should be deployable. Eleven
of the 26 Allies are still not reaching this target. If all eleven were
to do so, we could expect 34,000 additional deployable land forces for
operations, including for the NATO Response Force. </p>
<p>
I am glad to say that there is a gradual upward trend towards meeting this
target—though the UK would like to see the target itself raised to a level
which would allow us to provide fully for all our commitments. But I sometimes
wonder whether the concept of improving usability in NATO is not embraced
with much warmth by some Allies. Indeed, in some quarters, it is an exercise
conducted through gritted teeth. </p>
<p>
We cannot afford to be equivocal about transformation. Resources need to
be switched away from non-deployable capabilities. The United Kingdom and
other Allies such as France have sought to find innovative ways of developing
such capabilities through initiatives to make more helicopters and strategic
lift aircraft available for operations. But there is no getting away from
the fact that these capabilities require investment, and that means proper
investment in defence and proper prioritisation on the things that we need
most. </p>
<p>
We need to help the Alliance understand better its real priorities, and
then encourage it to focus and organise itself to deliver them most effectively. </p>
<p>
We also need to be sure that resources—money, of course, but even more
importantly, people and their ability to think and act—are being used efficiently
against the priorities: operations, capabilities and partnerships. </p>
<p>
I am not sure that today I could claim the Alliance is either clearly focused
on the things we most need, or on delivering them as efficiently and effectively
as possible. </p>
<p>
I could point to a non-deployable command structure that is scarcely optimised
for the type of operations we now conduct; or to a rigid committee structure
and culture which inhibits cross-cutting thinking and advice and is disinclined
to emphasise delivery. It is hard to prioritise investment decisions, which
still tend to be driven too much by potential equipment solutions than
by an analysis of capability requirements. The budgetary consequences of
our decisions are not as clear as they should be at the moment of decision. </p>
<p>
We need to help NATO take a fresh look at how it is organised to deliver.
Driving change in consensus-based organisations is notoriously hard and
vulnerable to special interest lobbies. NATO Defence Ministers have a particular
responsibility to give political leadership in this task—I use the word
leadership again—putting the interests of the organisation as a whole above
the parochial. </p>
<p>
A modernised NATO emphatically is not about doing less with less or somehow
cutting down what we desire to do. It is about doing properly what already
we have said we need to do, by making better use of the resources which
Allies are ready to commit. And a well-managed and well-focused Alliance
is far more likely to attract investment for the long term. </p>
<h2>A Framework of Partnerships </h2>
<p>
Modernisation is also about letting NATO show us how it can add more value
to the sum of the 26 Allies. NATO’s great reservoir of knowledge and expertise
about national capabilities, for example, should serve as the basis for
new ideas for fostering initiatives between Allies, to deliver capabilities
we need. We should be much more open to working with partners to deliver
these capabilities. I am delighted with the work we are already doing with
Ukraine on helicopters, for example. And the NATO-EU Capability Group shows
how we can work more closely with others in many other fields. </p>
<p>
The third pillar of NATO’s transformation, that of partnerships, is a very
important one. </p>
<p>
Globalisation brings new threats and challenges. But it also brings new
partners who share our values and interests in tackling them. NATO has
had huge success in building bridges and relationships with like-minded
partners. And Afghanistan is, again, testament to that with 14 ISAF partners
working with us. Our relationships with our ISAF partners; with the Government
of Afghanistan; with key neighbours like Pakistan; and through the NATO-Russia
Council are vitally important. </p>
<p>
But we have been slow to adapt our own working practices to make it easy
for our partners to work with us. Australia is a key ISAF partner which,
sadly demonstrated by the Bali bombings, has common purpose with us in
tackling extremism in Afghanistan. Australia has committed significant
numbers of troops who put their lives on the line with us, and yet it has
been hard work for Australia to get its say in our collective approach
and planning in NATO. It is wrong that our partners have to struggle so
much to work in proper partnership with us—a classic case of process defying
common sense—but not the only one, alas. </p>
<p>
The need for NATO to work alongside other organisations, especially the
United Nations and European Union, is equally strong. The fact that they
cannot is a victory for dogma over pressing operational need. It is incomprehensible
to me, the Defence Secretary of a country in all three organisations, that
we should have such difficulty in working together. I do not belittle national
concerns which conspire to make co-operation so hard, but I do not accept
that our armed forces should be expected to pay the price for this on operations.
The prize of the U.N., NATO and the EU working properly together alongside
other international and regional organisations is more effective operations. </p>
<p>
I have said what I think it is we need in a transformed NATO—well-managed
operations with the capabilities and the partnerships to deliver them and
the level of ambition we have set ourselves in NATO. I have also mentioned
some of the challenges, such as structural inefficiencies, and opportunities
to make progress, notably in learning from our collective experience in
Afghanistan. </p>
<h2>POLITICAL WILL AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION </h2>
<p>
But there is a further, underlying issue which frustrates our ability to
meet these three objectives. We must, in NATO, address the issues of political
will and public perception. </p>
<p>
The public and politicians of many European NATO Allies do not yet see
expeditionary operations and capabilities as directly linked to their defence
and security. Trust me, they are. NATO is in Afghanistan taking on extremism
and the roots of that extremism because it is a grave and proven threat
to our public and to the security of every citizen in every NATO country,
from Istanbul to New York. The tentacles of this extremism have spread
far and wide, but its roots have been in the Taleban-protected training
camps and safe havens of Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, NATO is acting for
our collective defence in its truest and noblest sense. </p>
<p>
The inclination to re-focus on patrolling the home turf is deeply ingrained,
but deeply flawed. And the accompanying notion that providing much needed
security outside NATO’s core area somehow competes with or detracts from
our collective defence is to ignore the reality that they are the same
thing, requiring the same kind of forces. </p>
<p>
NATO and its Allies need to focus harder on making the case for change:
we have one set of forces which can be used for crisis response or for
collective defence under Article 5; our defence will often need to happen
far from home; increasingly we shall need to work more closely with others—international
organisations and partner nations—in delivering a broader vision of security.
We, as the political leaders, must be the agents for that change. </p>
<p>
I do not see the challenge as fundamentally different from explaining why
we need to act on climate change, or take action to avoid shortages in
key natural resources. Globalisation means we need to lift public attention
beyond the ‘here and now’, beyond our respective back yards. Climate change
does not just affect the Arctic; security is not just about guarding the
garden gate. Our publics need to know that defence and security are enhanced
by flexible and expeditionary forces; that we can rely on NATO, so equipped,
to deliver wherever and whenever a threat might dictate. It is our duty
to tell them that. </p>
<p>
So public perceptions of how NATO provides for our collective defence and
responds to crises now have to change further. And it is the responsibility
of elected politicians to get this message across, not to fuel with money,
men and machines we can ill-afford to mis-allocate perceptions of threats
which collectively we have agreed are no longer there. </p>
<h2>CONCLUSION </h2>
<p>
I think that Defence Ministers can contribute hugely to make internal change
in NATO happen. That is why I have proposed to the Secretary-General that,
in September, in London, we hold a special meeting purely devoted to NATO’s
transformation and how we can help it move forward. There are some practical
issues and some very political issues that we need to consider. I am clear
that we will not transform NATO overnight. But I am equally clear that
it is time to switch off autopilot and engage with the real issues. </p>
<p>
I am a strong believer in the long-term business case for this Alliance.
NATO has strategic patience and institutional depth in managing operations
that we should never underestimate. As a focus for bringing our armed forces
together and promoting their interoperability, NATO has no peer. And in
developing a more comprehensive approach with partners, NATO has a huge
role and opportunity to harness defence into a broader international approach
to security. </p>
<p>
We now need to endorse the modern vision of NATO as an expeditionary Alliance,
capable of acting to provide security at home, on our periphery or further
afield. An Alliance in which we are ready to invest. And we need a NATO
that will put that investment to most productive use. </p>
<p>
We all need to take on the mantle of leadership. We need to remind ourselves,
our fellow politicians, and our people that this is not purely a theoretical
exercise. This is about being more effective on the ground, whether in
the fields of Kosovo or in the dust of Afghanistan, so that our collective
security, and the stability of the world, can be more firmly guaranteed
in these uncertain times. </p>
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