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<p align="center" class="style17">Table of Contents<br>
25th International Workshop - Rome '08</p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-preface.html">Preface- Dr. Roger<br>Weissinger-Baylon<br>Workshop Chairman<br></a>
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-overview.html">Workshop Chairman's Overview - Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon</a>
<a href="/2008book/joulwan.html">Opening Dinner Debate - <br>General George Joulwan<br>Former SACEUR</a>
<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part One<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/la-russa.html">Italian Defense Minister<br />
Ignazio La Russa
</a>
<a href="/2008book/browne.html">British Defense Minister<br />
The Rt Hon Des Browne
</a>
<a href="/2008book/gonul.html">Turkish Defense Minister<br />
Vecdi G�n�l
</a>
<a href="/2008book/di-paola.html">NATO Military Committee Chairman<br />
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappata.html">Admiral Luciano Zappata<br />
Dep Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/camporini.html">Italian Chief of Defense<br />
General Vincenzo Camporini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappa.html">Alenia Aeronautica Chairman<br />
Dr. Giorgio Zappa
</a>
<br>Part Two<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/baramidze.html">Georgian Vice Prime Minister<br />
Giorgi Baramidze
</a>
<a href="/2008book/chizhov.html">Russian Amb to EU<br />
Vladimir Chizhov
</a>
<br>Part Three<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/eldon.html">British Amb to NATO<br />
Stewart Eldon
</a>
<a href="/2008book/akram.html">Pakistan's Amb to U.N.<br />
Munir Akram
</a>
<a href="/2008book/de-la-sabliere.html">French Amb to Italy<br />
Jean-Marc de la Sabli�re
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tkeshelashvili.html">Georgian Foreign Minister<br />
Eka Tkeshelashvili
</a>
<a href="/2008book/stefanini.html">Italian Amb to NATO<br />
Stefano Stefanini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buzhinsky.html">Lt Gen Evgeniy Buzhinsky<br />
Russian Min of Defense
</a>
<a href="/2008book/winid.html">Polish Amb to NATO<br />
Boguslaw Winid
</a>
<br>Part Four<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/tegnelia.html">DTRA Director<br />
Dr. James Tegnelia
</a>
<a href="/2008book/rood.html">U.S. Under Sec of State<br />
John Rood
</a>
<a href="/2008book/joseph.html">Former Under Sec of State<br />
Amb Robert Joseph</a>
<a href="/2008book/berdennikov.html">Russian Amb-at-large<br />
Grigory V. Berdennikov
</a>
<a href="/2008book/benkert.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Defense<br />
Joseph Benkert
</a>
<a href="/2008book/flory.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Peter Flory
</a>
<a href="/2008book/sedivy.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Jiri Sedivy
</a>
<a href="/2008book/pfirter.html">OPCW Dir Gen<br />
Amb Rogelio Pfirter
</a>
<br>Part Five<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/lather.html">SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Karl-Heinz Lather
</a>
<a href="/2008book/fitzgerald.html">Admiral Mark. P. Fitzgerald
<br />
Allied Joint Force Command Naples
</a>
<a href="/2008book/ildem.html">Turkish Amb to NATO<br />
Tacan Ildem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schuwirth.html">Fmr SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Rainer Schuwirth
</a>
<a href="/2008book/acosta.html">Global Impact CEO<br />
Ms. Renee Acosta
</a>
<a href="/2008book/soligan.html">Lt Gen James Soligan<br />
Allied Command-Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bagnall.html">Former UK Vice Chief of Defense Staff<br />
ACM Sir Anthony Bagnall
</a>
<br>Part Six
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/volkman.html">U.S. Dir of Internat. Coop.<br />
Alfred Volkman
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tozzi.html">Major General Claudio Tozzi<br />
Italian Defense Ministry
</a>
<a href="/2008book/homberg.html">EADS Senior Vice Pres<br />
Thomas Homberg
</a>
<a href="/2008book/shephard.html">Northrop Grumman VP<br />
Mr. Timothy Shephard
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buckley.html">Thales Senior VP<br />
Dr. Edgar Buckley
</a>
<a href="/2008book/harris.html">Lockheed Martin Global Pres.<br />
Dr. Scott A. Harris
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schneider.html">AFCEA CEO<br />
Kent Schneider
</a>
<a href="/2008book/patterson.html">Mr. David Patterson<br />
Univ of Tennessee
</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part Seven
<p align="center" class="style17" style="margin-bottom: 0;">
<a href="/2008book/grimes.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Def<br />
Hon. John G. Grimes
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lentz.html">U.S. Dep Asst Sec of Def<br />
Robert Lentz
</a>
<a href="/2008book/aaviksoo.html">Estonian Defense Minister<br />
Jaak Aaviksoo
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bloechl.html">Microsoft, Managing Dir.<br />
Tim Bloechl
</a>
<a href="/2008book/wolf.html">Lt Gen Ulrich Wolf<br />
NATO CIS Service Agency Dir
</a>
<a href="/2008book/monteforte.html">Italian Milrep to NATO<br />
Vice Adm Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lintonen.html">Finnish Amb to UN<br />
Kirsti Lintonen
</a>
<a href="/2008book/silvestri.html">Dr. Stefano Silvestri<br />
Istituto Affari Internazionali
</a>
<a href="/2008book/yousfi.html">Algerian Amb to UN<br />
Youcef Yousfi
</a>
<a href="/2008book/karem.html">Egyptian Amb to EU<br />
Mahmoud Karem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tarasyuk.html">Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister<br />
Borys Tarasyuk
</a>
</div>
</div>
<div id="content">
<div class="story">
<h2 class="workshop_year">Rome '08 Workshop</h2>
<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="Main Content" -->
<h1>
Crisis Management </h1>
<h2 style="margin-bottom: 0;">
Air Chief Marshal Sir Anthony Bagnall GBE KCB FRAeS</h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0;">Former UK Vice Chief of Defense Staff </h2>
<p align="center" style="margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0;"><img src="images/bagnall.png" alt="Sir Anthony Bagnall" width="170" height="222"></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0;">
Prior to my retirement in 2005, I was the U.K. Vice Chief of Defense from
2001 until that time. In that position, I was closely involved with the
aftermath of September 11 and the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. I would
like to start my presentation by making a few general remarks. </p>
<h2>THREE KEY ISSUES </h2>
<p>
First, we have not yet talked about one key word, which is money. In my
view and experience, the availability of resources and money has been a
key factor and, to some extent, has driven policy. Certainly it has driven
policy in my own country. </p>
<p>
Second, I would like to touch on political will. Over the years there has
been strong U.K. access to the U.S. for historic reasons. The strength
of U.K. access to the EU and Europe, however, is a very interesting question,
because our prime minister, Gordon Brown, has a stronger European linkage
in his mind than perhaps some of his predecessors had. </p>
<p>
Then there is the question of events. In my 41 years of experience in the
Royal Air Force, events drove the response. In some cases, such as the
foot and mouth crisis, the firemen’s strike, and other national events,
there were choices to be made. Do we have enough manpower? Do we have enough
resources? How do we deal with the events? In other cases—September 11
is a very good example of a time when something had to be done—we did indeed
start off with a coalition of the willing, but then built from there into
a stronger operation. The difficulty arises with things like equipment
programs: It takes many years to buy new aircraft, new ships, and new tanks.
Therefore, flexibility has to be built into those platforms. </p>
<h2>THE CHALLENGES </h2>
<p>
Let me now touch on some of the challenges we face in preparing for particular
events and for all operations. </p>
<p>
<I>Nature/Scale of the event</I>. The first challenge involves the nature and
scale of the happening or event that we are responding to. </p>
<p>
<I>Timeline.</I> Does something have to be done today or do we have months or
weeks for force generation to deal with the equipment fit on our aircraft
or on our ships and to put urgent operational requirements in place? </p>
<p>
<I>Political will.</I> At what point does a nation say, “This event is in my backyard”
or “Because of our membership in this alliance we have got to respond to
it”? How far across the world, in what nations, does something have to
be done? And how does this tie in with the aspirations of the NGO participants
who have a much wider global reach? </p>
<p>
<I>Peacetime structures.</I> In 1996 in the U.K. we set up a Permanent Joint Headquarters.
I sat in on a particular meeting in which two of the service chiefs said,
“Over my dead body will we have a single joint headquarters; it will never
work.” The fact is that it has worked, and several other nations have looked
at what the U.K. has done and said, “This is not a bad idea, let’s do something
similar.” </p>
<p>
There is also the question of the strength of the peacetime structures,
where you invest your scarce resources. One lesson we learned in the U.K.
is that you do not invest money in attachés around the world to work with
the diplomatic staffs at your peril. We did not have much attaché presence
in some countries in and around Afghanistan. We had to parachute them in
and they did a pretty good job at building relationships. I would like
to pay tribute to the diplomatic staffs in the Foreign Office and in the
Department for International Development (DFID) for the way they worked
together on the ground. </p>
<p>
<I>Coalition.</I> Who is in the coalition? Is it a coalition of the willing? </p>
<p>
<I>Media</I><I> and public support.</I> Is public opinion supporting a particular operation?
There has been significant apathy in the U.K. regarding our operations
in Iraq, yet much greater public support for the Afghanistan operation,
where something has to be done for the good of that nation. </p>
<p>
<I>Intelligence.</I> How much should we invest in intelligence gathering? With
whom do we share our intelligence? I believe we got a lot better at intelligence
gathering after September 11. Before that time, some intelligence sharing
was taking place bilaterally. But in 2003, the U.K. set up a Joint Terrorism
Analysis Centre (JTAC) where people from the various agencies responsible
for dealing with terrorism work in the same room 24 hours a day and seven
days a week. They are there to alert people when there is a need. </p>
<p>
<I>Managing after a conflict.</I> How do we deal with conflict aftermath? The
U.K. has put an awful lot of time, effort, and money into how to deal with
the aftermath in Iraq once the war is won, no matter how long that war
goes on. I think we have all seen the difficulty we had in the U.K. getting
people to take a common approach in terms of time, energy, drive, and money,
and how to improve on that. It is sad to hear that we are still worrying
about electricity and about other basic things in Iraq despite the time
we have had to deal with this as a nation. </p>
<h2>THE REALITIES </h2>
<p>
I would now like to talk about the EU and NATO headquarters. I personally
have no difficulty with the idea of a single headquarters to deal with
NATO matters and with attaching an EU planning cell to it. I do have questions
for our ministers, however, about a separate, stand-alone EU headquarters:
How big would it be? What would its role be? Would it just do planning?
Where would its resources—ships, tanks, airplanes, people—come from? How
would it conflict with planning to respond to a crisis that almost certainly
would be going on in NATO headquarters and in national capitals? How many
staff cars would it have? How many drivers? How many national support elements
would be attached to it? What would the cost be? Those are my concerns
here, not the ideology of it, because we need to have some mechanism for
joining in a far more intimate manner EU and NATO planning efforts.<I> </I></p>
<p>
The other realities that must be dealt with include: </p>
<p>
<I>Different cultures</I>. There are differing cultures within nations, with some
nations more upfront than other nations. </p>
<p>
<I>Urgent operational requirements.</I> How many ships, tanks, and airplanes are
fully equipped for operating in the heat of the desert (the temperature
in Kuwait can be over 40 degrees Celsius)? High temperatures need cooling
devices, and weapons rest to deal with the heat. In the U.K. we have dealt
with NBC training and cold-weather suits, for the climate that we are used
to, so it took us a while to get ready. There are also other hugely important
things like body armor. How much money do you spend on body armor? How
many sets do you need? Do you have a set for every man and woman who may
go to war or do you have a set for those who are most likely to go to war?
This was a huge political issue in the U.K. during my time as the vice
chief. It did not represent a lot of money but it was something we had
not given enough attention to at an early stage. I know that such lessons
have been well taken abroad by the nations already. </p>
<p>
<I>Reserves.</I> How many reserves do we need? What skill sets do they have? What
is their readiness? </p>
<p>
<I>Peacetime readiness/Force structures</I>. How many of your forces are at very
high readiness? What is the cost of that? How many are back here at a month’s
readiness? What is the training bill that goes with readiness? </p>
<p>
<I>Rules of engagement.</I> Different nations have different national priorities.
Let me talk about just one example, the matching of dropping bombs from
airplanes to potential targets and collateral damage. What is an acceptable
degree of collateral damage when you are fighting a war? Is it the risk
that no one will be killed other than the enemy? Is it the risk that 10
people may die if you hit the train on the bridge? There are clear guidelines
and clear directions on this in the U.K. and they are never broken. </p>
<p>
<I>Manpower.</I> What level of manpower do you have in peacetime? In the U.K.
we have cut back in the army, navy, and air force over the years and rightly
so, because, during World War II, it took about a thousand bombers to bomb
Dresden with 10 people on each Lancaster. Today, the same effect can be
achieved in a conventional operation with one or two platforms with standoff
weapons from a great distance. </p>
<p>
<I>Role of civilians and the military.</I> Is the peacetime force structure large
enough? How do we deal with time away from home? What are the pressures
on the families? </p>
<h2>THE SOLUTIONS </h2>
<p>
There is a huge, crucial need in my view for peacetime training with the
NGOs—with those headquarters wherever they are within the national capitals.
It is also essential to get the top people involved in those training events.
In the U.K.’s case, we were fortunate: The prime minister held certain
types of exercise and we played down the chain. When the chiefs of staff
met in London every day, the battle rhythm started at about 6:30, going
through chiefs of staff meetings with all the players we needed and who
were joining up around the table. Exercises are important, be they virtual
or live. </p>
<p>
The final point I would like to make is that all this needs to be joined
up by good information, by common data, by common understanding, and, above
all, by intraoperability. </p>
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