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<p align="center" class="style17">Table of Contents<br>
25th International Workshop - Rome '08</p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-preface.html">Preface- Dr. Roger<br>Weissinger-Baylon<br>Workshop Chairman<br></a>
<a href="/2008book/weissinger-overview.html">Workshop Chairman's Overview - Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon</a>
<a href="/2008book/joulwan.html">Opening Dinner Debate - <br>General George Joulwan<br>Former SACEUR</a>
<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part One<p>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/la-russa.html">Italian Defense Minister<br />
Ignazio La Russa
</a>
<a href="/2008book/browne.html">British Defense Minister<br />
The Rt Hon Des Browne
</a>
<a href="/2008book/gonul.html">Turkish Defense Minister<br />
Vecdi G�n�l
</a>
<a href="/2008book/di-paola.html">NATO Military Committee Chairman<br />
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappata.html">Admiral Luciano Zappata<br />
Dep Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/camporini.html">Italian Chief of Defense<br />
General Vincenzo Camporini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/zappa.html">Alenia Aeronautica Chairman<br />
Dr. Giorgio Zappa
</a>
<br>Part Two<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/baramidze.html">Georgian Vice Prime Minister<br />
Giorgi Baramidze
</a>
<a href="/2008book/chizhov.html">Russian Amb to EU<br />
Vladimir Chizhov
</a>
<br>Part Three<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/eldon.html">British Amb to NATO<br />
Stewart Eldon
</a>
<a href="/2008book/akram.html">Pakistan's Amb to U.N.<br />
Munir Akram
</a>
<a href="/2008book/de-la-sabliere.html">French Amb to Italy<br />
Jean-Marc de la Sabli�re
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tkeshelashvili.html">Georgian Foreign Minister<br />
Eka Tkeshelashvili
</a>
<a href="/2008book/stefanini.html">Italian Amb to NATO<br />
Stefano Stefanini
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buzhinsky.html">Lt Gen Evgeniy Buzhinsky<br />
Russian Min of Defense
</a>
<a href="/2008book/winid.html">Polish Amb to NATO<br />
Boguslaw Winid
</a>
<br>Part Four<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/tegnelia.html">DTRA Director<br />
Dr. James Tegnelia
</a>
<a href="/2008book/rood.html">U.S. Under Sec of State<br />
John Rood
</a>
<a href="/2008book/joseph.html">Former Under Sec of State<br />
Amb Robert Joseph</a>
<a href="/2008book/berdennikov.html">Russian Amb-at-large<br />
Grigory V. Berdennikov
</a>
<a href="/2008book/benkert.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Defense<br />
Joseph Benkert
</a>
<a href="/2008book/flory.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Peter Flory
</a>
<a href="/2008book/sedivy.html">NATO Asst Sec Gen<br />
Jiri Sedivy
</a>
<a href="/2008book/pfirter.html">OPCW Dir Gen<br />
Amb Rogelio Pfirter
</a>
<br>Part Five<br>
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/lather.html">SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Karl-Heinz Lather
</a>
<a href="/2008book/fitzgerald.html">Admiral Mark. P. Fitzgerald
<br />
Allied Joint Force Command Naples
</a>
<a href="/2008book/ildem.html">Turkish Amb to NATO<br />
Tacan Ildem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schuwirth.html">Fmr SHAPE Chief of Staff<br />
General Rainer Schuwirth
</a>
<a href="/2008book/acosta.html">Global Impact CEO<br />
Ms. Renee Acosta
</a>
<a href="/2008book/soligan.html">Lt Gen James Soligan<br />
Allied Command-Transformation
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bagnall.html">Former UK Vice Chief of Defense Staff<br />
ACM Sir Anthony Bagnall
</a>
<br>Part Six
<p align="center" class="style17">
<a href="/2008book/volkman.html">U.S. Dir of Internat. Coop.<br />
Alfred Volkman
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tozzi.html">Major General Claudio Tozzi<br />
Italian Defense Ministry
</a>
<a href="/2008book/homberg.html">EADS Senior Vice Pres<br />
Thomas Homberg
</a>
<a href="/2008book/shephard.html">Northrop Grumman VP<br />
Mr. Timothy Shephard
</a>
<a href="/2008book/buckley.html">Thales Senior VP<br />
Dr. Edgar Buckley
</a>
<a href="/2008book/harris.html">Lockheed Martin Global Pres.<br />
Dr. Scott A. Harris
</a>
<a href="/2008book/schneider.html">AFCEA CEO<br />
Kent Schneider
</a>
<a href="/2008book/patterson.html">Mr. David Patterson<br />
Univ of Tennessee
</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">Part Seven
<p align="center" class="style17" style="margin-bottom: 0;">
<a href="/2008book/grimes.html">U.S. Asst Sec of Def<br />
Hon. John G. Grimes
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lentz.html">U.S. Dep Asst Sec of Def<br />
Robert Lentz
</a>
<a href="/2008book/aaviksoo.html">Estonian Defense Minister<br />
Jaak Aaviksoo
</a>
<a href="/2008book/bloechl.html">Microsoft, Managing Dir.<br />
Tim Bloechl
</a>
<a href="/2008book/wolf.html">Lt Gen Ulrich Wolf<br />
NATO CIS Service Agency Dir
</a>
<a href="/2008book/monteforte.html">Italian Milrep to NATO<br />
Vice Adm Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte
</a>
<a href="/2008book/lintonen.html">Finnish Amb to UN<br />
Kirsti Lintonen
</a>
<a href="/2008book/silvestri.html">Dr. Stefano Silvestri<br />
Istituto Affari Internazionali
</a>
<a href="/2008book/yousfi.html">Algerian Amb to UN<br />
Youcef Yousfi
</a>
<a href="/2008book/karem.html">Egyptian Amb to EU<br />
Mahmoud Karem
</a>
<a href="/2008book/tarasyuk.html">Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister<br />
Borys Tarasyuk
</a>
</div>
</div>
<div id="content">
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<h2 class="workshop_year">Rome '08 Workshop</h2>
<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="Main Content" -->
<h1>
Afghanistan, Pakistan, the U.S., and NATO </h1>
<h2 style="margin-bottom: 0;">
Ambassador Munir Akram</h2>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0;">Pakistan Ambassador to the United Nations </h2>
<p style="margin-bottom: 0;"></p>
<p align="center" style="margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0;"><img src="images/akram.jpg" alt="Ambassador Munir Akram" width="114" height="139"></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0;">
The present situation in Afghanistan and the frontier regions of Pakistan
is the result of a number of developments that have taken place since December
1979. The process of radicalization in the region was the outcome of a
series of strategic mistakes, including the use of Islamic extremists in
the war against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. </p>
<h2>EVENTS THAT HAVE LED TO THE CURRENT SITUATION </h2>
<p>
After September 11, when the United States intervened in Afghanistan, Pakistan
had advised against using the Northern Alliance (which was largely a non-Pashtun
coalition) to oust the Taliban regime from power. Our advice was not heeded.
In October 2001, the Taliban left Kabul and dispersed to the south and
the east, back to its home areas. Those in the Taliban were not militarily
eliminated or defeated. </p>
<p>
But Afghanistan’s south and east stayed mostly dormant and neglected until
2003. It was only after the physical ingress of NATO into the region that
the insurgency seriously commenced. Between 2003 and 2006, the insurgency
became organized in five command countries led by, among others, Mullah
Omer, Jalaluddin Haqqani, Mullah Dadullah, and Gulbedin Hikmatyar. The
spread and intensity of the insurgency was the result of several factors: </p>
<p>
1. Natural (Pashtun) local sympathy for the largely Pashtun Taliban </p>
<p>
2. Further alienation of the Pashtun tribal leaders because of indiscriminate
bombing and military tactics resulting in civilian casualties; political
exclusion, especially after parliamentary elections; Tajik and non-Pashtun
control of the Afghan National Army (less now); disenchantment of the common
people/villages because of counterinsurgency tactics; the absence of development;
corruption and injustice, especially at the local level; selective destruction
of poppy crops; and growing insecurity (being caught in the cross-fire). </p>
<p>
Cross-border support from FATA ((Federally Administered Tribal Areas) to the insurgency (mainly recruits,
rest, and regrouping) was only a partial and arbitrary cause of the insurgency.
Its major location and motivation was and remains within Afghanistan. </p>
<h2>PAKISTAN’S EFFORTS TO STOP CROSS-BORDER INFILTRATION</h2>
<p>
Pakistan has taken several measures, including 1,000 check posts, over
100 military operations in FATA, and capturing or killing 2,000 Al-Qaeda
and Taliban leaders/commanders, to check cross-border infiltration. While
these measures had considerable impact on cross-border movement, the security
environment in FATA and in neighboring “settled” areas deteriorated sharply.
In 2007, Al-Qaeda and some Taliban-linked groups turned on Pakistan and
its security forces, and there were more suicide bombings in Pakistan than
Afghanistan that year, with 2,000 civilian casualties. The main result
was greater popular alienation from FATA’s “forward strategy.” Paradoxically,
within FATA and NWFP, there was also popular disenchantment with Islamic
militancy. The February 18 elections led to the success of the secular,
Pashtun candidates of the ANP even in FATA. </p>
<h2>PAKISTAN’S NEW STRATEGY</h2>
<p>
The new government is committed to adopting a new strategy to (1) end suicide
bombings, (2) pacify FATA, (3) halt the spread of Taliban and militant
influence, and (4) continue to cooperate with and support the stabilization
of Afghanistan. Negotiations to halt the violence have been opened at several
levels. The cause of violence in each of the FATA agencies is different.
In the Swat district of NWFP, for example, the underlying cause is land
disputes and the demand for speedy justice. The most critical negotiations
relate to South Waziristan, where Behtullah Mehsud and the “Pakistani Taliban”
are located. </p>
<p>
The concept of these peace deals is consistent with long-standing tribal
customs and traditions, placing collective responsibility on the tribes
for the maintenance of law and order in their areas. Of course, the tribal
leaders have to bring the insurgents active in their area into these peace
agreements. The implementation and effect of these agreements will be slow.
No doubt, there will be periodic reversals. However, the strategy is comprehensive,
and contains military, political, and economic elements. The local militias,
especially the F.C., will need to be strengthened and equipped to assume
larger security functions. The Pakistan Army will be located in identified
positions and posts and respond to security threats as and when required. </p>
<p>
The widespread assertions that the peace talks with FATA tribes and militants
have led to an increase in cross-border attacks in Afghanistan are at best
premature. The rising incidents in Afghanistan take place mostly at a distance
from the border. As well, fighting always escalates during the spring and
summer. In response to these concerns, specific clauses are being added
to the agreements, especially within South Waziristan, committing the tribes
to prevent cross-border attacks and to expel Al-Qaeda elements and other
foreigners. </p>
<h2>ISSUES PAKISTAN FACES</h2>
<p>
While there have been well-publicized complaints from coalition commanders
about the rise in cross-border attacks, Pakistan too has many reasons to
complain. At the operational level, Pakistan confronts the following difficulties: </p>
<p>
1. Insufficient check posts and troops on the Afghan side of the border:
Pakistan has established 1,200 check posts, and there are less than 100
on the other side </p>
<p>
2. Inadequate real-time intelligence-sharing by the coalition/Afghanistan </p>
<p>
3. Coalition/Afghan National Army incursions into Pakistan territory </p>
<p>
4. Not being supplied with the equipment requested by Pakistan for counterinsurgency
purposes (night vision equipment, UAVs, electronic surveillance, helicopters) </p>
<p>
5. Inflow into Pakistan/FATA of foreign fighters—Uzbeks, Chechens, etc.—from
and through Afghanistan </p>
<p>
6. Attacks on Pakistan territory, especially artillery and aerial attacks
(without warning or coordination); one of the most serious was a recent
attack on Pakistani check posts that killed 12 Pakistani soldiers </p>
<p>
At the political level, we also face several problems with the Afghan government
and, at times, with coalition partners, including: </p>
<p>
1. Nonrecognition of the border by Kabul (if there is no border, how can
there be “cross-border” movement?) </p>
<p>
2. Opposition to border control measures, e.g., fencing of parts of the
border, the distinction of biometric I.D. cards to check 40,000 daily legal
crossings </p>
<p>
3. The reluctance and refusal to relocate Afghan refugee camps close to
the border on the other side (as a means of reducing the cross-border problem
and allegations regarding “safe havens” in Pakistan) </p>
<p>
4. Indian consulates in Kandhar and Jalalabad being involved in activities
negatively affecting Pakistan’s security and stability </p>
<p>
5. Provocative statements by Afghan leaders and officials blaming Pakistan
for all of Afghanistan’s security problems, including the recent atrocious
threat from Karzai to intervene in Pakistan territory </p>
<p>
6. Threats mainly from U.S. legislators to cut off “assistance” to Pakistan
and unjustified delays in reimbursements </p>
<h2>PAKISTAN-U.S. RELATIONS</h2>
<p>
Pakistan-U.S. cooperation is currently strained. The political and operational
challenges being confronted in the campaign to eliminate terrorism and
to stabilize Afghanistan need to be addressed urgently through strategic
dialogue between Pakistan and the United States. The U.S. and NATO also
need to review their strategic objectives vis-à-vis Afghanistan and to
redefine “success.” They will: 1) not be able to transform Afghanistan
overnight into a modern democracy; 2) not be able to change the conservative
Islamic ideology and beliefs of the people of Afghanistan; and 3) not be
able to eliminate or ignore the major power components in Afghanistan,
especially the Pashtun tribes. The new strategy will need to be truly comprehensive,
including political, economic, and military components. </p>
<p>
The political strategy should aim at reconciliation. It should be designed
to 1) isolate the violent extremists from the moderate, non-violent, and
non-involved majority; 2) win hearts and minds through practical assistance
(health, food, housing, agricultural support); 3) build peace through grass-roots
measures, district by district, village by village; and 4) utilize traditional
modalities, for example, the Jirga system, for dispute settlement and accommodation. </p>
<p>
The economic strategy should utilize the “power of finance” to win the
cooperation of tribal and local leaders, have urgently needed and locally
required reconstruction and job-creation projects as the priority, improve
transport and communications, encourage local entrepreneurship, and find
a viable solution to the poppy problem, for example, buy up the crops of
small farmers. </p>
<p>
The military option should remain the option of last, not first, resort.
While the larger presence of coalition forces may be required in the short
term, given Afghan antipathy to foreigners, these forces should be progressively
replaced with strengthened elements from the Afghan National Army, especially
local militias. The major military targets should be Al-Qaeda terrorists,
hard-core militants, and criminal elements, not part-time (Taliban) fighters. </p>
<p>
None of the components of this strategy will work unless governance and
the system of justice are improved throughout Afghanistan. </p>
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