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<title>CSDR 24th International Workshop on Global Security, Michele Alliot-Marie, Herve Morin, General Henri Bentegeat, General Jean-Louis Georgelin, General James L. Jones, Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Patrick Auroy, Kent Schneider, Ambassador Mahmoud Karem, Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, General Franciszek Gagor, Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins, George Joulwan, Borys Tarasyuk, Jean de Ponton d'Amécourt, General Rainer Schuwirth, General Egon Ramms, Gen Ulrich Wolf, Louis Gallois, Marwan Lahoud, Denis Ranque, Edgar Buckley, Assistant Secretary John Grimes, Tim Bloechl, EADS, Northrop Grumman, Microsoft, Robert Ranquet, Admiral Jean Betermier, Giovanni Bertolone, Robert Ranquet, Alenia Aeronautica, Roger Weissinger-Baylon, WMD, Weaapons of Mass Destruction, NATO, EU, UN, OSCE, Paris Air Show, French Defense Minister, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Climate Change, Energy, Boeing</title>
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<p><span class="style293">international workshop series<br>
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<p align="center" class="style17"><strong>Table of Contents<br>
24th International Workshop - </strong><strong>Paris '07</strong></p>
<p align="center" class="style17"><span class="style18"><span class="style219"> </span>
<span class="style219"><a href="/2007book/weissinger07.htm">Preface- Dr. Roger<br>
Weissinger-Baylon<br>
Workshop Chairman<br>
</a></span><span class="style219"><a href="/2007book/ranquet07.htm">Foreword - Ing General<br>
Robert Ranquet<br>
</a></span>
<span class="style219"><a href="/2007book/joulwan07.htm">Opening Dinner Debate - <br>
General George Joulwan<br>
Former SACEUR<br>
</a></span></span><br>
Global security challenges: <br>
Is there hope for <br>
Afghanistan or Iraq?<br>
</p>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/bentegeat07.htm">General Henri Bentegeat<br>
President of EU Military Committee</a>
<a href="/2007book/georgelin07">Gen Jean-Louis Georgelin C<strong>hef d’état</strong>-<strong>major</strong> des armées - France</a><a href="/2007book/amecourt07.htm">Mr. Jean de Ponton d'Amecourt - French Dir of Strategic Affairs</a><a href="/2007book/schuwirth07.htm">General Rainer Schuwirth <br>
Chief of Staff, SHAPE</a><a href="/2007book/ramms07.htm">General Egon Ramms <br>
Commander, Allied Joint Force Cmd, Brunssum</a>
<a href="/2007book/akram07.htm">
Amb Munir Akram<br>
Pakistan's Amb to UN</a><a href="/2007book/zhan07.htm">
Major Gen ZHAN Maohai<br>
Vice Chair of China IISS</a><br>
Energy & Climate Change<br>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/jones07.htm">General James Jones<br>
Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe</a><a href="/2007book/ashton07.htm">Mr. John Ashton<br>
UK Special Repr for Climate Change</a><br>
Security in the Balkans & Black Sea region<br>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/baramidze07.htm">Georgian Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze</a>
<a href="/2007book/tarasyuk07.htm">Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk</a>
<a href="/2007book/mediu07.htm">Albanian Defense Minister Fatmir Mediu</a><a href="/2007book/bliznakov07.htm">Bulgarian Defense Minister Veselin Bliznakov</a><a href="/2007book/bezhuashvili07.htm">Georgian Foreign Min Gela Bezhuashvili</a><a href="/2007book/ildem07.htm">Ambassador <strong> Tacan Ildem</strong><br>
Turkish Amb to NATO</a><a href="/2007book/buzhinsky07.htm">
Lt Gen Evgeniy Buzhinsky<br>
Russian Ministry of Defense</a><br>
Time for new strategies?<br>
NATO after the Riga Summit<br>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/eldon07.htm">Amb Stewart Eldon<br>
UK Ambassador to NATO</a>
<a href="/2007book/orgaz07.htm">Amb Pablo Benavides Orgaz<br>
Spanish Amb to NATO</a>
<a href="/2007book/stefanini07.htm">Amb Stefano Stefanini <br>
Italian Amb to NATO</a><a href="/2007book/dipaola07.htm">Adm Giampaolo Di Paola<br>
Italian Chief of Defense<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/gagor07.htm">Gen Franciszek Gagor Polish Chief of Defense</a><br>
How can the EU, NATO, the OSCE, and UN reform?<br>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/brichambaut07.htm">Amb Marc Perrin de Brichambaut<br>
OSCE Secretary General </a><a href="/2007book/lintonen07.htm">Amb Kirsti Lintonen Finnish Amb to UN</a>
<a href="/2007book/brodi07.htm">Amb Gabor Brodi<br>
Hungarian Amb to UN</a><a href="/2007book/rinkevics07.htm">State Sec Edgars Rinkevics - Latvian MOD</a><a href="/2007book/linkevicius07.htm">Amb Linas Linkevicius<br>
Lithuanian Amb to NATO<br>
</a>
<a href="/2007book/chizhov07.htm">Amb Vladimir Chizhov<br>
Russian Amb to the EU<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/monteforte07.htm">Vice Adm Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte<br>
Italian Mil Repr to NATO</a><br>
Dealing with middle east:<br>Views from North Africa
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/yousfi07.htm">Amb Youcef Yousfi<br>
Algerian Amb to UN and former Foreign Minister</a><a href="/2007book/karem07.htm">Amb Mahmoud Karem<br>
Egyptian Amb to EU and Repr to Med Dialogue</a><a href="/2007book/alem07.htm">Amb Menouar Alem<br>
Moroccan Amb to EU and Repr to Med Dialogue<br>
</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">WMD and cyber threats
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/pfirter07.htm">Amb Rogelio Pfirter<br>
Director-General, OPCW</a>
<a href="/2007book/hopkins07.htm">Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins<br>
Assist to U.S. Sec of Defense - Nuclear & Chemical & Biological</a><a href="/2007book/aaviksoo07.htm">Estonian Defense Minister<br>
Jaak Aaviksoo</a><a href="/2007book/grimes07.htm">Hon John Grimes<br>
US Assistant Secretary of Defense - NII<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/lentz07.htm">Mr. Robert Lentz<br>
US Dep Asst Sec for NII<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/wolf07.htm">Lt General Ulrich Wolf<br>
Dir of NATO CIS Service Agency<br>
</a>
<a href="/2007book/bloechl07.htm">Mr. Tim Bloechl<br>
Microsoft Exec Director</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">How industry can help address the global challenges<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/lahoud07.htm">Mr. Marwan Lahoud<br>
Chief Operating Office EADS</a><a href="/2007book/schneider07.htm">Mr. Kent Schneider<br>
President, Defense Group<br>
Northrop Grumman IT<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/auroy07.htm">Mr. Patrick Auroy<br>
Deputy Director,<br>
French DGA
<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/volkman07.htm">Mr. Alfred Volkman<br>
Dir, Defense Cooperation<br>
US Dept of Defense<br>
</a>
<a href="/2007book/linnenkamp07.htm">Dr. Hilmar Linnenkamp<br>
Dep CEO, EDA</a>
<a href="/2007book/lind07.htm">Mr. Jan-Olof Lind<br>
Swedish National Armaments Director</a>
<a href="/2007book/buckley07.htm">Dr. Edgar Buckley<br>
Thales Senior Vice President</a>
<a href="/2007book/trice07">Dr. Robert Trice<br>
Lockheed Martin <br>
Senior Vice President<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/bertolone07.htm">Ing. Giovanni Bertolone<br>
CEO, Alenia Aeronautica</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">The way ahead & why current approaches don't work
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/martinusz07.htm">Amb Zoltan Martinusz<br>
Hungarian Amb to NATO<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/ducaru07.htm">Amb Dumitru Sorin Ducaru<br>
Romanian Amb to NATO</a><a href="/2007book/kujat07.htm"> General Harald Kujat<br>
Former Chair of NATO Military Committee</a>
</div>
</div>
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<table width="100%" border="0">
<tr>
<td bgcolor="#006699" height="18" colspan="5"><div align="center" class="style285" style="font-weight: bold; color: #FFFFFF">Paris '07 Workshop</div></td>
</tr>
</table>
<p align="center" class="style26">NATO�s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan�The Operational Commander�s View</p>
<div class=Section1>
<div align="center">
<table width="664" border="0">
<tr>
<td width="326" height="75" class="style29"><div align="center" class=""><img src="2007images/DSC_0616 General Egon Ramms, Gen George Joulwan DAY II.JPG" alt="General Egon Ramms" width="317" height="293"></div></td>
<td width="328" rowspan="2" class="style30"><div align="center" class="style27">
<div>
<p class="style26">General Egon Ramms<br>
Allied Joint Force Commander Brunssum and
NATO Operational Commander for Afghanistan</p>
<p class="style26"> </p>
<p class="style26"><br>
</p>
</div>
</div></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td height="53"><em>General Egon Ramms (right), Allied Joint Force Commander Burnssum, with General George Joulwan, former SACEUR.</em></td>
</tr>
</table>
</div>
<p align="center" class="style26"><em>"Each time we use kinetic military means, we run the risk of civilian casualties
and collateral damage and we make the task of winning over the support of the
local population more and more difficult. Deciding when and how to respond to
asymmetric attacks is one of the most challenging elements of this campaign..."</em></p>
<p>As the acting commander of the NRF8 and
the NATO operational commander for Afghanistan, I have a very special vantage
point from which to address the topic of this very important event. We
practitioners in the realm of international security share a great
responsibility to the citizens of our nations as well as the people of the
nations in which our forces are deployed. How well we do our jobs will have a
lasting impact on the lives of generations to come. For NATO, how skilfully my
colleagues and I implement the decisions of the North Atlantic Council will
also determine whether NATO itself�an institution created nearly 60 years ago�can
adapt to the changing environment we now face.</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE AND THE ISAF
MISSION</p>
<p>��������� The part of NATO that I
command has responsibility for all of Afghanistan. For those of you not
familiar with military terminology, my role as the operational-level commander
places me between the in-theatre commander of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF), General (U.S.) Dan McNeill, in Kabul, and the Supreme
Allied Commander, General (U.S.) John Craddock, at SHAPE. A third U.S. four-star
admiral overseeing the activities of the separate U.S.-led Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan is also involved. Keeping a European view of the
situation within NATO is also my responsibility, which I take quite seriously
and which I feel serves an important purpose.</p>
<p>��������� So my first conclusion is
that the NATO command structure has demonstrated the flexibility necessary to
meet the challenges.������� </p>
<p>��������� The second question
raised by the Afghanistan mission is whether the internal organization of the
ISAF mission is correct. At the strategic level, SHAPE responds to the
decisions of the political level and provides strategic advice to that level.
My headquarters, Joint Force Command Brunssum, comes next and is tasked with
translating the broad strategic guidance from SHAPE into operational tasks.
Brunssum also develops the operational plans and the overall campaign plan for
the ISAF mission and provides any support needed between manning and
transportation for ISAF in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>��������� Next in the chain of
command is ISAF headquarters in Kabul and the forces of ISAF throughout
Afghanistan. Whereas Brunssum looks 12 to 18 months into the future, ISAF is
focused on the here and now and on the next few months. The very important
tasks of ISAF are managed by General McNeill, an extraordinary officer with
extensive experience in Afghanistan. General McNeill is supported by a
multinational staff. Below ISAF we have five regional commanders and 25
Provincial Reconstruction Teams. </p>
<p>��������� The operation in
Afghanistan is a very complicated one, requiring each level of the chain of
command to perform its unique tasks. We each depend on each other, but we must
not duplicate each other�s efforts. In such an operation, it is unfortunately
inevitable that bad things happen�casualties�to friendly forces and civilians,
and collateral damage and accidents must be minimized. </p>
<p>��������� So my second
conclusion�which you may also take as a recommendation�would be that the NATO
structure is well suited for the kinds of operations we are performing in Afghanistan,
so long as each level keeps its focus on its unique and important
responsibilities and ambassadors do not deal with tactical issues.</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">THE NEED FOR ACTION</p>
<p>The Operation Plan for ISAF has
held up pretty well, but a plan cannot be a static thing, no more than
political guidance can be static. Because opposing forces are not static�they are dynamically
adjusting their strategy and tactics all the time�we must not be static either.
Our
operations must anticipate the opponent�s next moves and pre-empt those that
would give him an advantage. Indeed, we must stay several moves ahead of the
creative and determined opponent or opponents whom we face. </p>
<p>��������� In the case of
Afghanistan, our opponents have chosen to escalate their violence and use
terrorist tactics against the civilian population. Suicide attacks and use of
IEDs have increased. This has forced ISAF to also use a broader spectrum of
means to combat the attackers. However, we face a difficult choice in doing so.
Each time we use kinetic military means, we run the risk of civilian casualties
and collateral damage and we make the task of winning over the support of the
local population more and more difficult. Deciding when and how to respond to
asymmetric attacks is one of the most challenging elements of this campaign and
one that we are learning about while we are conducting the mission.</p>
<p>��������� The picture I have
drawn of the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan underscores the importance of the
dynamic process of sustaining the political consensus behind NATO�s ISAF
mission. Why is this critical? Because, as the situation in ISAF today clearly
illustrates, the demands for resources for any mission will require the full
support of all the participants. ISAF is too large, too complex, and too demanding
to be left to just a few members of the Alliance. The NAC�s political decisions
must be backed by commitments of human, materiel, and financial resources from <i>all</i>
the member-states. I find it a little embarrassing that some non-members of
NATO, for example, Australia and New Zealand, are doing more in ISAF than many
member-nations of the Alliance. In my mind, this is a sign of a political
process in need of some attention.</p>
<p>��������� The result of the
reluctance of nations to fully support the ISAF mission has practical impact on
the ground. The shortages of helicopters and other key enablers in ISAF are no
secret. The persistence and severity of these shortfalls are increasing the
risk to our soldiers. We are putting our soldiers in the position of being told
to do a dangerous job but being denied the training, equipment, and resources
to do it. This is the situation in which we find ourselves today. So my third
conclusion is that while I recognize that the way forward at the political
level is sometimes difficult, it must remain dynamic and forward-looking. Most
important of all, political decisions must be backed up by all the participants
with the means to carry out those decisions. Again, I think NATO�s existing
structures are capable of carrying out that task but there remains much to be
done in this area.</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">BURDEN SHARING AND BURDEN SHIFTING</p>
<p>��������� One final word on
resources has to do with burden sharing and burden shifting. In Afghanistan we
have seen that the demands of the geography and the nature of the operation are
beyond the capabilities of many of the Allies who voted for the mission in the
first place. Only a handful of nations have the training, equipment, and
resources suitable for use in Afghanistan. These deficiencies reflect decades
of stagnant defense budgets, some failures to plan properly, and some
reluctance to modernize forces, thereby making them less useful�in general, a
rather widespread failure to invest in the tools needed to address the current
threats, not to mention emerging threats such as cyber-attacks like those
recently experienced by Estonia.</p>
<p>��������� All too frequently in
Afghanistan today we encounter sophisticated IEDs, but only a handful of
nations have any counter-IED expertise, training, or equipment. We encounter
suicide bombers, but only a few nations can provide actionable intelligence to
address that threat. We engage complex targets requiring precision and video
surveillance, but, again, only a few nations can deliver those capabilities.
The solutions to these shortcomings will take time, but they must not become an
excuse for inaction and their absence must also not become a reason to do
nothing. ISAF needs more helicopters, but nations whose helicopters are
unsuited for use in Afghanistan could still provide other critically short
assets, perhaps an infantry battalion without the helicopters. A nation that
cannot supply UAVs could still provide trainers for the Afghan National Army.
Many ISAF requirements have remained unfilled for months, and most are not
high-technology requirements that only a few nations can meet. So this issue of
force generation is one that I would have to say is not yet responding to the
changed threat environment we face today.</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">SUCCESSES IN AFGHANISTAN</p>
<p>��������� To this point I have
described a NATO system that is fundamentally sound but which seems lately to
be faltering in some key areas. That is not to say that the ISAF mission itself
is endangered. Our operations in Afghanistan in the past year have succeeded in
placing the opposing forces under great pressure. In places, Afghan citizens
are responding with an increasing willingness to cooperate with ISAF�as we,
with our Afghan partners, demonstrate the ability to sustain a security
presence in a given location, the people have begun to show their support for
ISAF and the Afghan government and against the radical opposing elements among
them. This is critical to our success�we must gain and maintain the support of
the people.</p>
<p>��������� Toward that end, we
have been successful in eliminating many top opposition commanders and other
leaders and in inflicting significant losses on the opposing forces when they
made the mistake of confronting our forces directly. We have made a great deal
of progress in improving security in the most heavily contested areas in the
south and east. Our casualties have been high, it is true, and I regret each
one individually. But the price we have paid has not been in vain and we all
should keep sight of that fact.</p>
<p>��������� However, the ISAF
campaign is now moving to a critical phase that requires a better understanding
of the task before us and a renewed effort by the member-nations. As the NATO
Secretary General has correctly stated, and as everyone at this workshop well
understands, the stabilization of Afghanistan will not be achieved solely by
military means. The threat to Afghanistan�s stability today derives from where
we started. In December 2001, Afghanistan was a failed state that harbored a
large terrorist infrastructure that had been ruled by a radical fundamentalist
dictatorship. Every measure of wealth, education, and human welfare placed
Afghanistan at or near the bottom. Hunger was the norm. But the international
community has done much to minister to this very sick patient and since 2003
NATO has expanded its role to reach the current level of support for restoring
security.</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">EMPLOYING THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH</p>
<p>��������� Today, Afghanistan is
not a failed state. It has an elected president and parliament, a growing
economy, and an improving infrastructure. But it also has an active insurgency.
Why? I believe it is not so much because the radical Taliban and other opposing
forces have become so strong, but because the government of Afghanistan remains
so weak. This is something for which the international community bears some
responsibility. </p>
<p>��������� Reconstruction has
taken too long. Too much development assistance has been wasted and too little
attention has been paid to developing a competent, honest, and responsive
government and to developing Afghan human capacity. Even today, there is no
lead nation for training Afghan civil service workers. </p>
<p>��������� But what do these
failings have to do with NATO? Indeed, a few nations have raised this very
question in the political discussions that occur in Brussels. The argument is
made that NATO is, after all, only a military alliance. It is said that NATO
lacks the expertise or the skills to address the shortcomings of governance and
economic development. These are 100%-correct observations. I have no economic
planning staff in my headquarters, no one capable of training lawyers and
judges, no banking experts, no agronomists, no urban planners. There is no way
around these limitations. With proper support from the nations, I can provide
the 20 or 30% of the solution to Afghanistan�s problems that relate to security
and military matters. But who will provide the other 70 or 80%?</p>
<p>��������� Let me offer the
opinion of a simple soldier. As the operational commander, I have the task of
bringing security to Afghanistan�a necessary but not sufficient condition for everything
else that the international community is trying to achieve. The Riga Summit
Declaration stated the situation much better than I could do. It said, and I
quote, �Today�s challenges require a comprehensive approach by the
international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military
instruments. . ." </p>
<p>��������� From the operational
perspective, what this statement means seems quite clear; however, how to bring
it about is another matter. To me, the work being done by ISAF is an integral
part of the comprehensive approach. The strengthening of Afghan security with
NATO and Afghan forces is gradually bringing the security needed to permit the
other requirements to be met. I can even go a step further and say that if I
had the resources I have asked for, I could support some of those people and
institutions that might provide the additional elements of the comprehensive
approach that are beyond my capabilities.</p>
<p>��������� For example, I might
find that a good governor is unable to extend his reach in his province due to
a key road that needs to be secured, or because he lacks communications or
occasionally needs a helicopter to get to remote areas. Perhaps a team of
engineers needs to survey the snow cover to determine whether a valley is
threatened by flooding. Or maybe a medical training team needs security to
train a group of midwives. These are things a well-resourced military force
could provide in support of the comprehensive approach. We could help
strengthen governance and demonstrate the ability of the government to deliver
services to its people. These clearly non-military tasks would be supported by
ISAF but not provided by ISAF.</p>
<p>��������� Another example of how
ISAF might support the comprehensive approach involves intelligence. Suppose an
area is assessed by intelligence and through the personal involvement of the
PRT is ready to shift allegiance to the government, but it needs better
security to allow engineers to feel safe enough to begin reconstruction
efforts. ISAF could target that location not with 500- pound bombs but with a
security advisory team to show the villagers how to improve their own security.
Again, the reconstruction would be left to the experts, but ISAF could enable
those experts to do their work by enabling the Afghans to create the necessary
security conditions.</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">U.N. RESPONSIBILITY</p>
<p>��������� At a higher level, the
task of organizing a comprehensive approach in Afghanistan needs to find a
sponsor and a home. Is this a task for ISAF? Is it a military task? I say,
clearly not. Should it be done by the United Nations? I think it should. The
mandate exists and recently UNAMA has shown greater interest in cooperating
more closely with ISAF.</p>
<p>��������� If the U.N. stays away
from dangerous provinces because it fears for the safety of its staff, this is
the wrong approach. ISAF must help the Afghan National Security Forces protect
U.N. field offices in dangerous locations since this is precisely where the
U.N.�s presence is most needed. Likewise, the U.N. must be willing to co-locate
with a PRT or other ISAF field installation if that is the only viable option.
Again, ISAF can play a supporting role, but must not step into a lead role in
areas for which we lack the necessary skills.</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">THE AFGHAN MODEL</p>
<p>��������� Is what I am describing
simply a na�ve and idealistic dream? I am certain that it is not because I have
seen it being done today in Afghanistan. Once again it is the Americans who are
leading the way. The United States has put enormous effort, huge amounts of
money, and its best people into Afghanistan. The U.S. has suffered the most
combat casualties and losses of equipment, yet it has sustained its effort over
many years. I am very appreciative of the U.S. commitment and would like to see
other nations make a proportionate level of effort. Soldiers of the (U.S.) 10<sup>th</sup>
Mountain Division recently completed their extended 16-month tours of duty in
Afghanistan�which greatly exceeds the four-month tours of duty of many ISAF
soldiers, who have a fortnight's leave halfway through. The soldiers of the 10<sup>th</sup>
Mountain Division did an excellent job, too, especially in regard to winning
hearts and minds, reconstruction, and development. During a recent visit to
ISAF�s Regional Command-East I had the opportunity to assess the work of MGEN
Rodriguez in RC-S and his extremely able team, particularly a task force
commander named Colonel Nicholson. It was there, a few weeks ago, that I saw
the comprehensive approach in action. </p>
<p>��������� While the debate
continues in Brussels about whether the comprehensive approach should be
pursued in NATO operations and how to do it, men and women in Afghanistan are
simply doing it. Combat operations, Special Forces missions, psychological task
forces, broadcasting, reconstruction and development, quick impact projects, Provincial
Reconstruction Teams, U.S. and other nations' aid projects�all are woven
together like a handsome Afghan carpet in a very impressive way. Civilians and
military members work together harmoniously and with great dedication in a
well-conceived and coordinated counterinsurgency effort. Americans, and Allies,
are working with Afghan leaders, elders, and the general population in a very
effective way. It is something everyone here would do well to see for
themselves. It will give you hope, as it did to me, that it is possible to
bring all the complex pieces of this campaign together where it matters most,
at the village, district, and province levels.</p>
<p>��������� One thing the Americans
are doing that should serve as a model is their placing emphasis on improving
the quality and availability of good governance in their area of operation.
Leveraging their access to vast resources, PRT and Task Force commanders spend
most of their time working with Afghan counterparts and civilians to address
local needs. Their approach is to use minimal force when force is needed, and
to conduct most operations partnered with Afghan units. In doing so, they are
gradually building Afghan capacity with an eye to a decreasing and less visible
ISAF role in the foreseeable future. To be sure, the area of operations is
still dangerous and hotly contested, but it is not a barren battlefield.
Rather, it is an area in which the people are becoming hopeful.</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">THE WAY FORWARD</p>
<p>��������� My final note is this:
The international community has much to be proud of in Afghanistan and we
should feel satisfied with how far we have come. At the same time, Afghanistan
was a terrible mess when we arrived and many of its deficiencies are not
susceptible to quick solutions. By deciding to hand over responsibility for all
of Afghanistan to NATO, the Alliance has taken a step into the unknown. </p>
<p>��������� In doing so we have
revealed some of NATO�s shortcomings but, in my view, no fatal flaws. By
recognizing at this stage that the task before us demands skills and resources
that NATO does not have�and should not have�we have identified the way forward.
Now we need to shelve the esoteric debate about whether the comprehensive
approach is a good thing and how it should be defined and simply move on to its
implementation as best we can. We do not have time for philosophical
contemplation. We have a model that seems to be working well and that I am sure
we could enhance with ideas from other nations currently operating PRTs and
forces elsewhere in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>��������� What the Afghan people
want�and what our publics want�is progress toward achievable goals. I believe
with the proper support of the members of the Alliance, the many other non-NATO
nations already engaged there, and those nations still considering joining this
very honorable effort, we can be successful. But the road to success must be
travelled together with the Afghan government and the Afghan security forces.
We in ISAF and NATO have to enable the ANSF to do their work and the AFG
government to take responsibility. Those are the big tasks we need to fulfil
before we can step back to the second line, which is the prerequisite for later
withdrawal. We cannot leave 70% of the work to be done in Afghanistan undone.
That is the reason I do not use the phrase �exit strategy."</p>
<p>��������� For my part I intend to
ensure that my headquarters and ISAF and its soldiers meet every operational
demand of this mission at the highest professional standard, with the urgency
and dedication that this important task deserves. </p>
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