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<title>CSDR 24th International Workshop on Global Security, Michele Alliot-Marie, Herve Morin, General Henri Bentegeat, General Jean-Louis Georgelin, General James L. Jones, Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Patrick Auroy, Kent Schneider, Ambassador Mahmoud Karem, Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, General Franciszek Gagor, Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins, George Joulwan, Borys Tarasyuk, Jean de Ponton d'Amécourt, General Rainer Schuwirth, General Egon Ramms, Gen Ulrich Wolf, Louis Gallois, Marwan Lahoud, Denis Ranque, Edgar Buckley, Assistant Secretary John Grimes, Tim Bloechl, EADS, Northrop Grumman, Microsoft, Robert Ranquet, Admiral Jean Betermier, Giovanni Bertolone, Robert Ranquet, Alenia Aeronautica, Roger Weissinger-Baylon, WMD, Weaapons of Mass Destruction, NATO, EU, UN, OSCE, Paris Air Show, French Defense Minister, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Climate Change, Energy, Boeing</title>
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<p><span class="style293">international workshop series<br>
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<p align="center" class="style17"><strong>Table of Contents<br>
24th International Workshop - </strong><strong>Paris '07</strong></p>
<p align="center" class="style17"><span class="style18"><span class="style219"> </span>
<span class="style219"><a href="/2007book/weissinger07.htm">Preface- Dr. Roger<br>
Weissinger-Baylon<br>
Workshop Chairman<br>
</a></span><span class="style219"><a href="/2007book/ranquet07.htm">Foreword - Ing General<br>
Robert Ranquet<br>
</a></span>
<span class="style219"><a href="/2007book/joulwan07.htm">Opening Dinner Debate - <br>
General George Joulwan<br>
Former SACEUR<br>
</a></span></span><br>
Global security challenges: <br>
Is there hope for <br>
Afghanistan or Iraq?<br>
</p>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/bentegeat07.htm">General Henri Bentegeat<br>
President of EU Military Committee</a>
<a href="/2007book/georgelin07">Gen Jean-Louis Georgelin C<strong>hef d’état</strong>-<strong>major</strong> des armées - France</a><a href="/2007book/amecourt07.htm">Mr. Jean de Ponton d'Amecourt - French Dir of Strategic Affairs</a><a href="/2007book/schuwirth07.htm">General Rainer Schuwirth <br>
Chief of Staff, SHAPE</a><a href="/2007book/ramms07.htm">General Egon Ramms <br>
Commander, Allied Joint Force Cmd, Brunssum</a>
<a href="/2007book/akram07.htm">
Amb Munir Akram<br>
Pakistan's Amb to UN</a><a href="/2007book/zhan07.htm">
Major Gen ZHAN Maohai<br>
Vice Chair of China IISS</a><br>
Energy & Climate Change<br>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/jones07.htm">General James Jones<br>
Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe</a><a href="/2007book/ashton07.htm">Mr. John Ashton<br>
UK Special Repr for Climate Change</a><br>
Security in the Balkans & Black Sea region<br>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/baramidze07.htm">Georgian Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze</a>
<a href="/2007book/tarasyuk07.htm">Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk</a>
<a href="/2007book/mediu07.htm">Albanian Defense Minister Fatmir Mediu</a><a href="/2007book/bliznakov07.htm">Bulgarian Defense Minister Veselin Bliznakov</a><a href="/2007book/bezhuashvili07.htm">Georgian Foreign Min Gela Bezhuashvili</a><a href="/2007book/ildem07.htm">Ambassador <strong> Tacan Ildem</strong><br>
Turkish Amb to NATO</a><a href="/2007book/buzhinsky07.htm">
Lt Gen Evgeniy Buzhinsky<br>
Russian Ministry of Defense</a><br>
Time for new strategies?<br>
NATO after the Riga Summit<br>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/eldon07.htm">Amb Stewart Eldon<br>
UK Ambassador to NATO</a>
<a href="/2007book/orgaz07.htm">Amb Pablo Benavides Orgaz<br>
Spanish Amb to NATO</a>
<a href="/2007book/stefanini07.htm">Amb Stefano Stefanini <br>
Italian Amb to NATO</a><a href="/2007book/dipaola07.htm">Adm Giampaolo Di Paola<br>
Italian Chief of Defense<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/gagor07.htm">Gen Franciszek Gagor Polish Chief of Defense</a><br>
How can the EU, NATO, the OSCE, and UN reform?<br>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/brichambaut07.htm">Amb Marc Perrin de Brichambaut<br>
OSCE Secretary General </a><a href="/2007book/lintonen07.htm">Amb Kirsti Lintonen Finnish Amb to UN</a>
<a href="/2007book/brodi07.htm">Amb Gabor Brodi<br>
Hungarian Amb to UN</a><a href="/2007book/rinkevics07.htm">State Sec Edgars Rinkevics - Latvian MOD</a><a href="/2007book/linkevicius07.htm">Amb Linas Linkevicius<br>
Lithuanian Amb to NATO<br>
</a>
<a href="/2007book/chizhov07.htm">Amb Vladimir Chizhov<br>
Russian Amb to the EU<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/monteforte07.htm">Vice Adm Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte<br>
Italian Mil Repr to NATO</a><br>
Dealing with middle east:<br>Views from North Africa
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/yousfi07.htm">Amb Youcef Yousfi<br>
Algerian Amb to UN and former Foreign Minister</a><a href="/2007book/karem07.htm">Amb Mahmoud Karem<br>
Egyptian Amb to EU and Repr to Med Dialogue</a><a href="/2007book/alem07.htm">Amb Menouar Alem<br>
Moroccan Amb to EU and Repr to Med Dialogue<br>
</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">WMD and cyber threats
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/pfirter07.htm">Amb Rogelio Pfirter<br>
Director-General, OPCW</a>
<a href="/2007book/hopkins07.htm">Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins<br>
Assist to U.S. Sec of Defense - Nuclear & Chemical & Biological</a><a href="/2007book/aaviksoo07.htm">Estonian Defense Minister<br>
Jaak Aaviksoo</a><a href="/2007book/grimes07.htm">Hon John Grimes<br>
US Assistant Secretary of Defense - NII<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/lentz07.htm">Mr. Robert Lentz<br>
US Dep Asst Sec for NII<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/wolf07.htm">Lt General Ulrich Wolf<br>
Dir of NATO CIS Service Agency<br>
</a>
<a href="/2007book/bloechl07.htm">Mr. Tim Bloechl<br>
Microsoft Exec Director</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">How industry can help address the global challenges<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/lahoud07.htm">Mr. Marwan Lahoud<br>
Chief Operating Office EADS</a><a href="/2007book/schneider07.htm">Mr. Kent Schneider<br>
President, Defense Group<br>
Northrop Grumman IT<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/auroy07.htm">Mr. Patrick Auroy<br>
Deputy Director,<br>
French DGA
<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/volkman07.htm">Mr. Alfred Volkman<br>
Dir, Defense Cooperation<br>
US Dept of Defense<br>
</a>
<a href="/2007book/linnenkamp07.htm">Dr. Hilmar Linnenkamp<br>
Dep CEO, EDA</a>
<a href="/2007book/lind07.htm">Mr. Jan-Olof Lind<br>
Swedish National Armaments Director</a>
<a href="/2007book/buckley07.htm">Dr. Edgar Buckley<br>
Thales Senior Vice President</a>
<a href="/2007book/trice07">Dr. Robert Trice<br>
Lockheed Martin <br>
Senior Vice President<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/bertolone07.htm">Ing. Giovanni Bertolone<br>
CEO, Alenia Aeronautica</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">The way ahead & why current approaches don't work
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/martinusz07.htm">Amb Zoltan Martinusz<br>
Hungarian Amb to NATO<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/ducaru07.htm">Amb Dumitru Sorin Ducaru<br>
Romanian Amb to NATO</a><a href="/2007book/kujat07.htm"> General Harald Kujat<br>
Former Chair of NATO Military Committee</a>
</div>
</div>
<div id="content">
<div class="story"><!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="EditRegion3" -->
<table width="99%" border="0">
<tr>
<td bgcolor="#006699" height="18" colspan="5"><div align="center" class="style285" style="font-weight: bold; color: #FFFFFF">Paris '07 Workshop</div></td>
</tr>
</table>
<div class=Section1><p align="center" class=style26>The Definition of Security:
Rehashing an Old Debate</p>
<div align="center">
<table width="813" border="0">
<tr>
<td width="522"><div align="center" class=""><em><img src="2007images/DSC_0627 Ranjan Mathai, Mahmoud Karen,Werner Fasslabend, Gen Zhan Maohai DAY II.JPG" alt="Egyptian Amb Mahmoud Karem" width="514" height="261"></em></div></td>
<td width="10" rowspan="2"><div align="center"></div></td>
<td width="267" rowspan="2"><div align="center" class="style27">
<div class=style27>
<h1 style='margin-left:0in;text-indent:0in'><span class="style26">Ambassador
Mahmoud Karem<br>
Egyptian Ambassador to the EU and </span></h1>
<h1 style='margin-left:0in;text-indent:0in'><span class="style26">Representative to the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue</span></h1>
<h1 style='margin-left:0in;text-indent:0in'><br>
</h1>
</div>
</div></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian Ambassador to the EU Mahmoud Karem (2nd from left) with Indian Ambassador to France Ranjan Mathai, former Austrian Defense Minister Dr. Werner Fasslabend, and Chinese Major General Maohai Zhan (from left to right).</td>
</tr>
</table>
</div>
<div align="center"></div>
<p align="center" class="style26"><em>"<strong>Prolonging the conflict, avoiding the capture of historic moments or windows of opportunities to grab peace, </strong></em><em><strong>is a
<br>
matter of serious concern for students of history as well as for leaders assiduously working for the
cause
of
nation <br>
building. The argument from a</strong>rab citizens occasionally...[is] that Israel is working to prolong the </em><em>conflict
in
order <br>
to keep Israel
undivided domestically, to <em>w</em>eaken the Arab world, and to
push for an
unavoidable
clash between <br>
peoples and leaders, leading possibly to
the...decay of Arab unity
and
cohesion.
Proponents</em> <em>of this view
<br>
also
argue that such delaying tactics
may
be used to
usurp
more land and create a new fait accompli"</em></p>
<p align="center" class="style26">OPENING
REMARKS</p>
<p>I have been asked to give a thought-provoking presentation,
to explain as well as to shed light on Arab public opinion.� I intend to do
just that. But in order to fulfil this task I wish to present, before starting,
the disclaimer that the views expressed in this presentation are those of the
author alone and do not reflect the views of his government.</p>
<p>Globalization has indeed affected us all. The
world has become smaller and more intertwined, with reciprocal dependence
growing. Most of the present-day challenges and threats are trans-national.
They emanate from different sources, not only non-governmental and non-state
actors, and they come not only as international terrorism or the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems but from regional and
interstate conflicts, failing or failed states, energy insufficiency, diseases,
migration, water security, cyber-crimes, poverty, infectious diseases, the
environment, and organized crime, among others. And they have all impinged one
way or another on our national security.<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"
title=""><span class=FootnoteCharacters><span class=FootnoteCharacters>[1]</span></span></a>
Some sceptics have argued that the international agenda suffers from a priority
disorder, especially regarding the lack of security and the fact that 40% of
the world's population live below the level of $2 a day.</p>
<p>As one historian recently put it, "The 20<sup>th</sup>
century was one of the bloodiest eras in history. Between 167 million and 188
million people died because of violence". The 21<sup>st</sup> century
could be no better if we overlook the principles on which global security and
peace are anchored.</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">THE NATURE OF TODAY�S MIDDLE EASTERN CHALLENGES</p>
<p>Today, regional disputes have
turned into long chronic conflicts that impact international peace and
security, developing into a breeding terrain for injustice and a culture of
hatred and despair. Additionally, ethnic and religious intra-regional conflicts
have now led to ethnic cleansing and religious cleansing. The Middle East is
torn by attempts to incite wars between minorities and factions, such as the
Shia and the Sunni, the Christians and the Moslems. A war of conflicting fatwas
also exists, exacerbating factionalism and deepening confrontation with the
West.� </p>
<p>Islamophobia and Europhobia
are also alive and well. The recent cartoon crisis in Denmark plus statements by parliamentary figures in some European countries and in the Netherlands have amplified negative stereotypes on both sides.
The report of
the SG High-Level Group dated November 13, 2006, and entitled �Alliance of
Civilizations� stated that �Diversity of civilizations and cultures is a basic
feature of human society and a driving force of human progress. Civilizations
and cultures reflect the great wealth and heritage of humankind; their nature
is to overlap, interact, and evolve in relation to one another. There is no
hierarchy among cultures, as each has contributed to the evolution of
humanity.� The history of civilizations is in fact a history of mutual borrowing
and constant cross-fertilization.� It is through concerted and multifaceted
inter-cultural dialogue, not through polarized perceptions nor by fueling
mutual suspicions and fears, that we work together to address these negative
trends. We must end stereotypes and generate common understanding</p>
<p>Even
in the EU-Mediterranean policy or the Barcelona process, the Middle East is perceived more and more not as responding to
the southern countries� development challenges but rather as responding to the
imaginary �threats� that these southern countries pose (migration, geopolitical
insecurity, religious antagonisms, and so on). Concomitantly,
little is being done to develop trade and encourage investment, as noted by a
distinguished Arab U.N. official.<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title=""><span
class=FootnoteCharacters><span class=FootnoteCharacters>[2]</span></span></a>
While the EU is the Arab world's largest external partner, the Arab region
represents only 7% of the EU�s total trade. Investment capital presents another
glaring discrepancy. Today, the Middle East's share of international trade
and FDI is less than 1.5%, half of which is with the European Union. Medium-size
economies, such as Sweden's, attract more capital than all the countries of the
Middle Eastern world put together.</p>
<p>Another challenge impinging on our region is war by proxy, or the surreptitious
management of conflict by proxy. Groups operating in Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, Somalia, and Sudan, for instance, rely on material support from extraneous as well as
regional powers and even occasionally from non-state actors.� These powers in
turn use these groups to incite violence, derail the direly needed peace
process, and delay, for instance, the implementation of a particular United
Nations resolution that was painstakingly negotiated. </p>
<p align="center" class="style26">Egypt�s Work Toward Peace</p>
<p>You must acknowledge that Egypt does not stir up, father, nor pull the strings of any such movement, nor does it
patronize or condone such a <i>modus operandi</i> to forge a particular
consequence or outcome. On the contrary, Egypt under President Mubarak has
chosen the more difficult path of brokering peace, placing teams on the
grounds, making sacrifices while preventing escalation, and diffusing
intra-factional disputes�in other words playing an exemplary role of peace
building, peace making, and peace keeping. In this context it is necessary to underline the
need to revisit collective security, by denying the selective application of
charter principles, double standards in place of universal respect for the rule
of law, international legitimacy and principles and provisions of the UN
charter.</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">CONFLICTING
DEFINITIONS OF SECURITY: A DOCTRINAL DIVIDE IN THE MIDDLE EAST</p>
<p >At present conflicting definitions of security by the parties in our region remain
alive and well and center on whether solving the Arab-Israeli conflict will or
will not lead to achieving regional security. The Arab leadership as well as
private citizens believe in the symbiotic link between solving the conflict and
achieving regional security. This has recently led to Arab peace initiatives
reflecting not only a keen desire to achieve a long and lasting peace, but also
a deep sense of conflict fatigue. Recent statements by the king of Saudi Arabia in which he noted that the region has long gambled on war and now should
gamble on peace are indeed expressive and illustrative. The proponents of the
king�s view also believe in the positive correlation between the lack of a
political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the rise of terrorism,
fundamentalism, and the culture of animosity and hatred. </p>
<p>This setting is inflammatory, especially in young societies such as Egypt, in which about a quarter of its 77 million people are younger than 20. Naturally the
presence of foreign forces in the midst of our region, who are there under
various pretexts, fuels these sentiments and leads to additional radicalism.
However, some Israelis believe the opposite. They argue that the reasons for
lack of security in our region as well as the root causes of regional
instability remain embedded in economic malaise, terrorism, weak political
participation, lack of reform, viable institutionalization, and denial of an
active and positive political process. </p>
<p align="center" class="style26">Consequences of the Arab-Israeli Conflict</p>
<p>Whatever the final assessment, it remains axiomatic that the strain of the continuation
of the Arab-Israeli conflict on daily lives in the Middle East has forced the
region to degenerate into a culture of confrontation, with a sense of
insecurity permeating both Arabs and Israelis. Prolonging the conflict by not
leveraging historic moments or taking advantage of windows of opportunity to
grab peace is a matter of serious concern for students of history as well as
for leaders assiduously working for the cause of nation building. </p>
<p> Arab citizens occasionally argue that Israel is working to prolong the conflict in
order to keep Israel undivided domestically, to weaken the Arab world, and to
push for an unavoidable clash between peoples and leaders, leading possibly to
the disintegration of the Arab state and the decay of Arab unity and cohesion.
Proponents of this view also argue that such delaying tactics may be used to
usurp more land and create a new <i>fait accompli</i> (a separating wall, an
expansion of settlements, or a change in demographics). For this
procrastinating tactic to succeed, they argue, it becomes necessary to play on
Israeli domestic politics and U.S. presidential or congressional elections as
an alibi to defer and stagnate peace endeavors. </p>
<p>Although some elements in these arguments may be branded as weak and inconclusive, they
remain shared by some analysts and a sector of Arab public opinion. The
challenge therefore must remain focused on the need to capture time for
fostering peace efforts and to avoid making the Middle East a region of
successive lost opportunities. In this context a serious divide exists and,
until this asymmetry is corrected, the doctrinal defense divide will remain.� </p>
<p>The paradox is that regional neighbors living side by side know each other�s
weaknesses and strength very well. This knowledge of one�s adversary has sometimes
been put into play not for the sake of making peace but for spoiling peace, or
for maintaining the status quo, achieving a stalemate, or returning to the
status ante. For example, whenever we are close to an agreement, an operation
takes place that claims the lives of civilians either by Israeli incursions or
firing al qassam rockets. Such actions reverse or stall the peace efforts of
many parties�this has happened many times.</p>
<p>This vicious cycle must be
broken. We must stop giving dark forces the chance to manipulate or stall peace
attempts and to go against the solid political will of the international
community, international legitimacy, and peace building efforts.</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">The Rise of Factionalism</p>
<p>One other factor impinging on the
definition of security is the rise of factionalism, ethnic confrontations, and
fear of different ethnic or minority asymmetries. To elucidate, political
analysts are torn in a comparative analytical schism between Sunni jihadism and
Shia transnationalism.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title=""><span
class=FootnoteCharacters><span class=FootnoteCharacters>[3]</span></span></a>� The
trend today is appalling; instead of promoting a national homogeneous mosaic in
old, traditional societies in the Middle East, we are seeing intervention in
the internal affairs of states by playing one minority against the other or one
minority against the majority. Minorities are encouraged to find refuge in the
outside world and to seek support for their case. In some cases, such actions
may be warranted, in order to arrest certain negative activities taken by some
governments that violate humanitarian norms, international legitimacy, and the
letter and spirit of the charter of the U.N.� In other cases, however, such
attempts seem to be made in the name of doctrines such as human security,
humanitarian intervention, constructive instability, responsibility to protect,
or even regime change. Maintaining the delicate balance between the
fundamentals of socio-economic and historical factors must be carefully weighed
against the consequences of fomenting internal disorder.<a href="#_ftn4"
name="_ftnref4" title=""><span class=FootnoteCharacters><span
class=FootnoteCharacters>[4]</span></span></a></p>
<p align="center" class="style26">The
Fear of Amalgamation</p>
<p>Note
also the diverse threat impinging on the national security of states in our
region from fear of disintegration or amalgamation into a wider whole, where a
state�s national history and identity do not belong.� A classic model is the
one offered by the eastern European bloc after the end of the Cold War, in
which we saw the emergence of a wide array of new states and the disintegration
of an old bloc. This situation led to what the foreign minister of Russia referred to in May of 2007 as �historical revisionism.� </p>
<p>It is
interesting to note that some analysts have said that during the Cold War one
of the methods used to bring about change and to speed up the downfall of
Communist eastern Europe was based on expanding the role of religion. Religion
was perceived to foment social unrest, as well as to accelerate the
much-sought-after dialectical conversion from communism to capitalism. Since
the church proved to be a formidable force in this regard, the argument in the
mind of some policymakers has been, Why not emulate the role assigned to
religion in the Middle East in the hope of producing a quicker result for
change and reform? To this end we argue that doing so would surely result in
failure. In the Middle East, the forces of religion are old and deeply
entrenched in the ethos of the society. Religion has never been absent, nor
will it ever be. On the contrary, the protective role of religion in
confronting the sweeping forces of modernization, westernization, and
materialism shall always remain. Any attempt to tamper with religion will be
considered an attempt to uproot old and traditional values and beliefs anchored
in long-time practice. Tampering with religious forces in the Middle East is a
recipe for failure, and is tantamount to playing with fire,<a href="#_ftn5"
name="_ftnref5" title=""><span class=FootnoteCharacters><span
class=FootnoteCharacters>[5]</span></span></a> for religion should become a model for
compassion and cohabitation rather than manipulation and confrontation. We must
underscore the fact that the Middle East was the birthplace of the three holy
religions and hence should become a model for coexistence and tolerance.</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">The Greater Middle East</p>
<p>A few years ago the Middle East was offered a formula that remains alive and well,
namely, that of �the Greater Middle East.� This scheme is viewed by many
scholars in our region as an implicit attempt to melt Arab identity, and
possibly the Arab League, into a larger incoherent whole. Countries of the
region responded to the idea by deeming it necessary to map their own future.
They argued that Arab idiosyncrasies should not be diffused by other identities
nor with extra-regional features, since the Arab world is a region fashioned by
a common culture, common language, mutual history, joint religion, and shared
identity. Diluting this through bordering regions would be tantamount to
committing heresy in international relations theory terms, particularly if the
tenants of the system�s theory were applied. A broader Middle East would be
less coherent, less similar, and less prone to change. The distinct and <i>sui
generis</i> character of the region must be taken into account, and simplistic
groupings or sweeping generalizations of commonalities due to a geographic
imperative avoided. Inducing change through electric shocks, especially in old
and traditional societies, is a matter of serious concern.� Political and
economic reform should be carried out but with the pace and rhythm each society
chooses for itself.</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">CONFLICTING
DOCTRINES OF DEFENSE SECURITY IN
THE MIDDLE EAST</p>
<p>Defense
doctrines are predicated on the overall structure of a region.<a href="#_ftn6"
name="_ftnref6" title=""><span class=FootnoteCharacters><span
class=FootnoteCharacters>[6]</span></span></a>
In the case of the Middle East we can
posit that defense doctrines remain wide apart, in dire need of restructuring
and in want of a series of confidence-building measures. I would argue that the
closer we are to a political settlement of the Arab- Israeli conflict, the less
military spending there would be. To understand the link we must assess such a
doctrinal divide.�</p>
<p>Let us first discuss the issue of WMDs. The proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, including nuclear weapons�or rather the fear of such proliferation�is
actually one of the major causes of world crises. The few positive developments
by South Africa and Libya in dismantling their nuclear programs were
overshadowed by crises in the Indian subcontinent, the Korean Peninsula, Iraq, and Iran. Some of these crises not only still simmer but have regrettably
denigrated into regional dimensions that undermine world peace and security,
similar to crises witnessed during the height of the Cold War.</p>
<p>I would like however to claim that the tensions
arising from these crises could be attributed to the policies for dealing with
them rather than to the nature of the threats. After all, the nuclear tests in
the Indian subcontinent were actions motivated by a strategic choice for parity
and security of bilateral and regional perspectives. Despite the initial
condemnations, the tests were gradually condoned, sanctions were later lifted,
and even a strategic agreement on nuclear issues was signed with one of the
relevant parties. Similarly, the crisis in the Korean Peninsula persisted for
years, until the DPRK concealed and then tested its first nuclear device.�
After six talks, a light at the end of the tunnel seemed to appear.� In Iraq, proliferation claims were drummed up and nuclear, chemical, and biological threats
were dramatized to warrant regime change.� Military intervention on a massive
scale was carried out, only to reveal later that a rigorous 10-year U.N.
inspection system had almost demilitarized Iraq, leading to the assumption that
the need for military intervention under that pretext was totally
unsubstantiated.� </p>
<p>In the case of Iran, almost daily we are bombarded
with threats and counter-threats coupled with intransigence and conditional
ties over direct talks among concerned parties. Here I wish to state that a
negotiated deal must be our target regardless of our individual opinion about
the nature of the Iranian political system; Iranians must be the ones to choose
the system they need. </p>
<p align="center" class="style26">Threat
Common Denominators </p>
<p>Despite the seemingly diverse nature of all these
threats, there are common denominators and conclusions that I would like to
underline:</p>
<p>1. WMD proliferation was defined to
label certain states as security threats and indeed as targets for possible
punitive measures, either by the international community or by concerned groups
of like-minded countries. Now matters are becoming more rational with the
efforts of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 committee.</p>
<p>2. International mechanisms and
frameworks have been randomly utilized or at best selectively involved. The
U.N., IAEA, NPT, and UNSC were sometimes undermined, abused, or completely
sidelined. To say the least, their role was always secondary to that of
maximizing national power interests and politics.</p>
<p>3. The threat perception has been
increasingly shaped by ideology and sometimes clich�. Arguments have floated
about concerning the "democratic peace theory" dividing the world
into democratic friends and undemocratic enemies. Regime change has been
perceived as less expensive and easier compared to multilateral engagements.
The application in the last few years of the so-called Doctrine of Preemptive
Strikes and Coercive Democratization has proved beyond doubt that power has its
limitations and that such theories have adverse repercussions and produce
limited results. We all need to be reeducated that democracy is indeed an
evolutionary process rather than a revolutionary one, and that it has to be
homegrown to hold ground.</p>
<p>4. Double standards and selective
enforcement have been increasingly undermining the NPT nonproliferation system
to the breaking point. Serious effort has to be made to bolster the
universality and integrity of NPT while ensuring the full use of peaceful
nuclear energy in accordance with Article IV of the treaty. Cohesion and
predictability are urgently needed to maintain the rule-based order on which
nonproliferation heavily depends. No back-tracking on the "fruits" of
NPT signatories should be envisaged; on the contrary, means must be devised to
enable all signatories to utilize and reap NPT's full benefits, including
enrichment as stipulated in the treaty within a transparent, safe, monitored,
and verifiable safeguard system and in full conformity with the tenants of the
agency's additional protocol.</p>
<p>5. No country in the world is powerful enough to
prevent future nuclear proliferation violations without the framework of the
universal rules that all states accept and enforce. To put it in the words of
Dr. George Pekovich, in one of the recent Carnegie Endowment papers, "Any
strategy of ignoring international rules to change regimes America does not like and changing rules to reward those America favors is doomed to fail." I
would add that multilateral diplomacy rather than military force should be the
ultimate way to deal with the issues at hand.</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">Weak and Failed States</p>
<p>Regarding weak and failed states, I would like to
draw your kind attention to the following elements based on my personal
observations of developments in both Afghanistan and Somalia. I believe that
these threats have a lot to do with the third group of threat aspects emanating
from terrorism and organized crime.</p>
<p>1. The collapse of any given government, resulting
in the absence of law and order triggered by or resulting in civil wars, political
unrest, or tribal, ethnic, or sectarian strife, are viewed today as catalysts
for radicalization and extremism, which in turn give way to the rise of
terrorist organizations and fundamentalist ideology. Therefore, there is a need
to formulate international understanding on how best to contain such cases,
prevent spillovers into neighboring countries, invest in regional and sub-
regional arrangements, exert pressure for reconciliation and dialogue, and,
finally and perhaps most effectively, support economic and social development. </p>
<p>Egypt has proposed in many instances the need to
pursue an in-depth and detailed discussion on political Islam with our European
partners. We should not forget that it was the Marshall Plan that rebuilt Europe after the Second World War. Had all or some of its principals been implemented to
support the Somali transitional government, we would not have facilitated the
emergence of Islamic courts, nor would we have had to deal later with foreign
military intervention or aerial strikes from a neighboring state, strikes whose
outcome is far from certain. The same applies to Afghanistan. There is no
question that the U.N. remains the best-vested and most credible nation-builder
that we have. To achieve that, the U.N. has to be politically empowered and
sufficiently financed.� The success stories in both Kampuchea and Mozambique must be emulated.</p>
<p>2. There are a good number of signs that
post-conflict reconstruction efforts are the foreign policy issue <i>du jour </i>in
many capitals. The U.S.-led endeavors in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated that the planning, financing, coordination, and execution for
rebuilding war-torn countries are inadequate. I would like to note, though,
that focusing on post-conflict reconstruction alone would be a mistake�equal
emphasis must be accorded to building good local governance in a large number
of weak and impoverished states. Interstate conflicts and lawlessness in a
particular country nurture chaos, creating a breeding ground for terrorism,
trade in small arms and light weapons, smuggling, and drug production and
trafficking, all with serious effects beyond the boundaries of the country. I
even believe that these byproducts of weak and failed states ultimately affect
the global economy and global stability. </p>
<p>It was rightly said that state-building through
socio-economic development is indeed not an act of simple charity but a smart
investment in regional and global security, but there are pivotal areas that
are usually neglected. Most of the efforts are geared to the overriding
imperative of assembling a strong coalition and a strong military presence. In
most cases this is done at the expense of social care, building on local
authority, and developing a strong educational and health care system that
conforms with local traditions and values. Coalition forces should not be seen
as offsetting local values or norms.<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" title=""><span
class=FootnoteCharacters>[7]</span></span></a>� </p>
<p>3. The fluid nature of terrorist organizations
makes them extremely difficult to contain and to understand not only the
philosophy and motivations behind their ideology but also their infrastructure
and financing network. Ideologies are not fought with traditional armies; they
are fought with dialogue, reasoning, and a counter-ideology of values that
promises and delivers a better quality of life, security, development,
education, and basic needs.<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" title=""><span
class=FootnoteCharacters>[8]</span></span></a></p>
<p align="center" class="style26">Clashing Cultural Identities</p>
<p>Regarding the clash of cultural identities, I
would simply like to state that we live in an increasingly complex world in which
polarized perceptions, fueled by injustice and inequality, often lead to
violence and conflict, threatening international stability. Over the past few
years, wars, occupations, and acts of terror have exacerbated suspicion and
fear within and among societies. Some political leaders and sectors of the
media as well as radical groups have exploited this environment, painting
images of a world made up of mutually exclusive cultures, religions, or
civilizations, historically distinct and destined for confrontation.<a
href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" title=""><span class=FootnoteCharacters><span
class=FootnoteCharacters>[9]</span></span></a></p>
<p>The report presented by the U.N. High-Level
Group in November of 2006 in Istanbul (the report that was co-sponsored by the
prime ministers of Spain and Turkey) concluded that this issue represents a
real danger to discourse among countries and put forward a host of measures
that must be taken if we are to increase the margins of consensus and dialogue
along with the values of mutual
respect among peoples of different cultural and religious traditions. The report stressed that it is
of the utmost importance to counter the stereotypes and misconceptions that entrench patterns of
hostility and mistrust among societies, a matter that is essential for forging
the collective political will to address the world�s imbalances with a view
toward diminishing hostility and promoting harmony among the nations and
cultures of the world. </p>
<p align="center" class="style26">OUTCOMES OF THE RIYADH ARAB SUMMIT</p>
<p>Coming from the Middle East, I would like to seize
this opportunity to shed light on the outcome of the Arab Summit that
convened in Riyadh (KSA) on March 27-28, 2007. These three resolutions are
relevant to our discussion:</p>
<p>1. The first resolution deals with developing a
unified Arab position on establishing a Middle East free of nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>2. The second resolution deals with the
development of peaceful programs for nuclear energy.</p>
<p>3. The third resolution deals with the
establishment of a pan-Arab program for peaceful applications of nuclear
energy.</p>
<p>Without dwelling too much on the specifics of the
three resolutions, which are political in essence, I would like to stress
several points that the western media always reports on with suspicion and
sometimes with superficial interpretations. The issue of nuclear energy is
always reported on in conjunction with two problematic topics�the Iranian
nuclear program and Israel's nuclear ambiguity. Moreover some question the
reason behind the Arabs� so-called sudden interest in nuclear energy at a time
when 25% of proven oil and gas reserves lie in the region. With this in mind I
wish to stress the following:</p>
<p>1. All 22 member-states of the Arab League are
signatories of the Nonproliferation Treaty, therefore all remain entitled to
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.</p>
<p>2. The Arab states have endeavored for many years
to establish an ME zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, including
nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>3. The threat to regional and international peace
lies with those countries that have covert nuclear capabilities, namely Israel, whose prime minister openly declared in December 2006� that his country possesses
nuclear weapons. As long as Israel remains the only country in the region whose
nuclear capabilities are condoned based on convoluted assumptions that they are
needed for protection from belligerent neighbors or to ensure the country�s
existence, the whole system of nonproliferation will be severely undermined.�
Nuclear weapons do not ensure the existence of any country; what ensures Israel's security is peace with its neighbors.</p>
<p>4. The Arab countries� need for nuclear energy is
often understated. Countries such as Egypt, whose population doubles every 20
years and whose proven reserves of oil and gas are very modest, certainly needs
sustained supplies of energy for future development. Other countries such as
the Gulf states need cheaper energy to produce drinking water. While they may
be rich in fossil fuels they have dire shortages of fresh water. These are but
a few examples.</p>
<p>5. One of the resolutions adopted by the Riyadh
Summit recommended that all Arab states establish independent national structures
assigned to monitor the importing of nuclear materials and isotopes with a view
to establishing full clarity and transparency with the international community
and international organizations. Compliance with treaties and international
obligations are the focus of the Arab drive for the peaceful use of nuclear
energy. This must be commended and supported by the international community.</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">CONCLUDING REMARKS</p>
<p>In conclusion, it is clear that today our security
is threatened in a number of ways. We are all confronted with the scourge of
terrorism.� We must collectively deal with the threats emanating from the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, because the risks pose potential
threats to international peace and security.</p>
<p>Not one nation is immune from these threats. Not
one state is capable of tackling them alone. The only way to deal with such
threats is through international cooperation. Threats to security know no
borders, hence we must use our growing collective efforts and global cooperation
to defeat them. </p>
<p>For the past few years, NATO has been trying to
promote a <i>modus vivendi</i> of collective and concerted actions, not just
among its own member-states but with other nations and organizations as well.
NATO has also been trying to build a large network of partnerships with
countries throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, the Mediterranean, the Middle
East, and Australia and Japan.</p>
<p>However, NATO's engagement outside its traditional
area of operation has raised several questions in many regions. It is
imperative that NATO clarify its intentions toward and goals for the Middle East in order to convince global populations of its goal of cooperation; this would
lead to improving NATO's image and to rectifying an historical problem.
Explaining the collateral and civilian damages that have resulted from aerial
operations in Afghanistan is a challenge NATO must meet. </p>
<p>Furthermore, I would like to outline that in the
framework of NATO's transformation, its activities has become not only limited
to military actions, but also that NATO has strengthened its political
dimension through intensified political consultations.� However, political
decisions should always be part of the international community�s response and
lead to closer contact with the United Nations.</p>
<p>In 1994 NATO launched the Mediterranean Dialogue
initiative with five countries, including Egypt, in the southern Mediterranean
region.� The aim of this initiative is to foster confidence between the two
sides, address common security threats, and dispel any misperceptions about
NATO after the end of the Cold War. Egypt strongly supports this dialogue, and
over the past few years there has been good progress in relations between the
two sides. We have had more frequent and fruitful political discussions on a
wider range of issues, and contact and cooperation between NATO and each of the
seven Mediterranean countries have increased significantly. Progress has also
been made in several areas of practical cooperation. </p>
<p>Egypt and NATO have moved closer in the past few
years. We welcome this trend and look forward to reinforcing it.� We should
discuss the way we look at security today and minimize the doctrinal divide. We
need to identify the main risks and threats before us, how we can work together
to meet those challenges, and how we can overcome any lingering doubts or
misconceptions in our relationship. Much needs to be
done.���</p>
</div>
<div><br clear=all>
<hr align=left size=1 width="33%">
<div id=ftn1>
<p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class=FootnoteCharacters>[1] </span></a>
Since the end of the Cold War
the world community has been introduced to various new concepts of security
threats. Our perception of global threats has also evolved during the last few
decades to include menaces such as pandemics, heat-trapping gas emissions,
changing weather patterns, dwindling energy supplies, poverty, and
underdevelopment among the list of other more familiar threats of a political�
and military nature, notably among which are terrorism, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, wars emanating from colliding interests, or strife
over land or simply over maintaining primacy or achieving strategic advantage.</p>
</div>
<div id=ftn2>
<p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title=""><span class=FootnoteCharacters>[2] </span></a>
Dr. Heba El-Kholy, Unitged Nations Resident Coordinator
and UNDP Resident Representative in a speech before the European Parliament
December 7, 2007.</p>
</div>
<div id=ftn3>
<p><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title=""><span class=FootnoteCharacters>[3]</span></a>
Take the case of Egypt, for example, where the Bedouins, Copts, and Nubians have always been an integral part of the national character and identity, a reason for fomenting national cohesion rather than disunity.</p>
</div>
<div id=ftn4>
<p><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title=""><span class=FootnoteCharacters>[4]</span></a>
During the last few decades there has been a remarkable
increase in inter-state and cross boarder crises triggered by minority
politics. Due to the nature of our globalized world, minorities have become
more and more willing to raise their profiles and take stock of their perceived
status within their communities. This awareness is indeed a positive
development as long as their aim is to attain acknowledgement or equality,
since ethnic, religious, and cultural differences exist in almost all countries
even more than we might realize.</p>
<p>Having said so, I would like to add that in many conflicts that have minority
dimensions, the position and reactions of the world community have not always
been successful or helpful even to those minorities who demanded international
or regional interventions. In my opinion, tribal, ethnic, religious, and
sectarian minority aspirations have been on the rise because of several
factors, among which are:</p>
<p>The tendency to politicize these issues as tools of foreign policy and justifications for regional or international pressure to effect behavioral
policy changes, thus in turn raising the ceiling of demands and aspirations of minority groups, and in some cases hindering reconciliation processes; and the
increasing level of acceptance on the part of the international community for solutions based on minority lines (in particular ethnic, tribal, and sectarian
divisions) rather than national identities. (Examples could be cited in the Great Lakes region, e.g., Yugoslavia, as well as in today's Kosovo and Iraq.) It is my view that solid, lasting, and long-term solutions for any conflicts should not be hostage to divisive minority thinking or to the tendency to appease under-privileged groups. Instead these solutions should aim to harmonize relations among the target community and preserve their unity while acknowledging the specificities and rights of all minority groups and providing guarantees for the observance of these rights. The interventions of the international community must be aimed at supporting the forces of reconciliation and inclusion coupled with a political will to act as an arbitrator whenever necessary.</p>
</div>
<div id=ftn5>
<p><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" title=""><span class=FootnoteCharacters>[5]</span></a>
Some analysts argue that President Sadat in the late 1970s sought to offset the rising role of the influential Coptic
Pope Shenoda by bringing back to domestic politics, political Islam and that, as a result, things got out of hand ,leading to his assassination by Muslim
fundamentalists</p>
</div>
<div id=ftn6>
<p><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" title=""><span class=FootnoteCharacters>[6]</span></a>
Some scholars ask,�Could an Iranian nuclear power situation force regional parity and stability
such as is found in the model of the Indian subcontinent, the case of India and Pakistan?� Or would such a step lead to a nuclear race in the region, with other players
sending the area to the brink of a nuclear arms race?� Has the use of force successfully changed the situation in Iraq and Lebanon, where we saw the failure of a regular army in the wake of irregular military resistance? Could the stability of the Gulf region be better served if Iran were to join the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)?� Or is Iran a permanent source of threat to some Gulf countries in the wake of unresolved disputes over some islands?� Is the presence of foreign forces in Qatar CENTCOM an element of instability causing the host nation problems rather than solutions?� Or is the presence of CENTCOM a reason for the security and logistical support for the implementation of U.N. resolutions and international legitimacy? These are all provocative, conceptual questions that add to our dilemma.</p>
</div>
<div id=ftn7>
<p><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" title=""><span class=FootnoteCharacters>[7]</span></a>
A good example is the Egyptian
medical hospital in Afghanistan that is frequently visited by the locals since
the resident doctors are Moslems, allowing for medical care for female patients
by female doctors and so on.</p>
</div>
<div id=ftn8>
<p><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" title=""><span class=FootnoteCharacters>[8]</span></a>
Some argue that the overriding
success of Hamas in legislative elections in Palestine was due to the failure
of Fattah to present the population with the services needed.� This case of
neglect was used by Hamas to build hospitals, schools, etc., as an alternative
to the poor services and endemic corruption present.</p>
</div>
<div id=ftn9>
<p><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" title=""><span class=FootnoteCharacters>[9]</span></a>
As Steve C. Ropp argued,� �The potential rise of populism in Europe and South America should not be viewed by policy planners as posing just another specific type
of security threat. For unlike the traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive ones normally considered in future scenarios, populism poses a
potential challenge to the underlying political substructure that has given us the collective material capability and moral legitimacy to deal with all of
these threats. In the final analysis, our ability to project power to deal with the whole spectrum of security challenges that the United States will face in
the future depends upon our ability to deal with the potential challenges emerging from within representative democracy itself.� Populism as Ropp argues
can even lead to state failure.</p>
</div>
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