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<title>CSDR 24th International Workshop on Global Security, Michele Alliot-Marie, Herve Morin, General Henri Bentegeat, General Jean-Louis Georgelin, General James L. Jones, Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Patrick Auroy, Kent Schneider, Ambassador Mahmoud Karem, Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, General Franciszek Gagor, Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins, George Joulwan, Borys Tarasyuk, Jean de Ponton d'Amécourt, General Rainer Schuwirth, General Egon Ramms, Gen Ulrich Wolf, Louis Gallois, Marwan Lahoud, Denis Ranque, Edgar Buckley, Assistant Secretary John Grimes, Tim Bloechl, EADS, Northrop Grumman, Microsoft, Robert Ranquet, Admiral Jean Betermier, Giovanni Bertolone, Robert Ranquet, Alenia Aeronautica, Roger Weissinger-Baylon, WMD, Weaapons of Mass Destruction, NATO, EU, UN, OSCE, Paris Air Show, French Defense Minister, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Climate Change, Energy, Boeing</title>
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<p><span class="style293">international workshop series<br>
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<p align="center" class="style17"><strong>Table of Contents<br>
24th International Workshop - </strong><strong>Paris '07</strong></p>
<p align="center" class="style17"><span class="style18"><span class="style219"> </span>
<span class="style219"><a href="/2007book/weissinger07.htm">Preface- Dr. Roger<br>
Weissinger-Baylon<br>
Workshop Chairman<br>
</a></span><span class="style219"><a href="/2007book/ranquet07.htm">Foreword - Ing General<br>
Robert Ranquet<br>
</a></span>
<span class="style219"><a href="/2007book/joulwan07.htm">Opening Dinner Debate - <br>
General George Joulwan<br>
Former SACEUR<br>
</a></span></span><br>
Global security challenges: <br>
Is there hope for <br>
Afghanistan or Iraq?<br>
</p>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/bentegeat07.htm">General Henri Bentegeat<br>
President of EU Military Committee</a>
<a href="/2007book/georgelin07">Gen Jean-Louis Georgelin C<strong>hef d’état</strong>-<strong>major</strong> des armées - France</a><a href="/2007book/amecourt07.htm">Mr. Jean de Ponton d'Amecourt - French Dir of Strategic Affairs</a><a href="/2007book/schuwirth07.htm">General Rainer Schuwirth <br>
Chief of Staff, SHAPE</a><a href="/2007book/ramms07.htm">General Egon Ramms <br>
Commander, Allied Joint Force Cmd, Brunssum</a>
<a href="/2007book/akram07.htm">
Amb Munir Akram<br>
Pakistan's Amb to UN</a><a href="/2007book/zhan07.htm">
Major Gen ZHAN Maohai<br>
Vice Chair of China IISS</a><br>
Energy & Climate Change<br>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/jones07.htm">General James Jones<br>
Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe</a><a href="/2007book/ashton07.htm">Mr. John Ashton<br>
UK Special Repr for Climate Change</a><br>
Security in the Balkans & Black Sea region<br>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/baramidze07.htm">Georgian Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze</a>
<a href="/2007book/tarasyuk07.htm">Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk</a>
<a href="/2007book/mediu07.htm">Albanian Defense Minister Fatmir Mediu</a><a href="/2007book/bliznakov07.htm">Bulgarian Defense Minister Veselin Bliznakov</a><a href="/2007book/bezhuashvili07.htm">Georgian Foreign Min Gela Bezhuashvili</a><a href="/2007book/ildem07.htm">Ambassador <strong> Tacan Ildem</strong><br>
Turkish Amb to NATO</a><a href="/2007book/buzhinsky07.htm">
Lt Gen Evgeniy Buzhinsky<br>
Russian Ministry of Defense</a><br>
Time for new strategies?<br>
NATO after the Riga Summit<br>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/eldon07.htm">Amb Stewart Eldon<br>
UK Ambassador to NATO</a>
<a href="/2007book/orgaz07.htm">Amb Pablo Benavides Orgaz<br>
Spanish Amb to NATO</a>
<a href="/2007book/stefanini07.htm">Amb Stefano Stefanini <br>
Italian Amb to NATO</a><a href="/2007book/dipaola07.htm">Adm Giampaolo Di Paola<br>
Italian Chief of Defense<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/gagor07.htm">Gen Franciszek Gagor Polish Chief of Defense</a><br>
How can the EU, NATO, the OSCE, and UN reform?<br>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/brichambaut07.htm">Amb Marc Perrin de Brichambaut<br>
OSCE Secretary General </a><a href="/2007book/lintonen07.htm">Amb Kirsti Lintonen Finnish Amb to UN</a>
<a href="/2007book/brodi07.htm">Amb Gabor Brodi<br>
Hungarian Amb to UN</a><a href="/2007book/rinkevics07.htm">State Sec Edgars Rinkevics - Latvian MOD</a><a href="/2007book/linkevicius07.htm">Amb Linas Linkevicius<br>
Lithuanian Amb to NATO<br>
</a>
<a href="/2007book/chizhov07.htm">Amb Vladimir Chizhov<br>
Russian Amb to the EU<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/monteforte07.htm">Vice Adm Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte<br>
Italian Mil Repr to NATO</a><br>
Dealing with middle east:<br>Views from North Africa
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/yousfi07.htm">Amb Youcef Yousfi<br>
Algerian Amb to UN and former Foreign Minister</a><a href="/2007book/karem07.htm">Amb Mahmoud Karem<br>
Egyptian Amb to EU and Repr to Med Dialogue</a><a href="/2007book/alem07.htm">Amb Menouar Alem<br>
Moroccan Amb to EU and Repr to Med Dialogue<br>
</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">WMD and cyber threats
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/pfirter07.htm">Amb Rogelio Pfirter<br>
Director-General, OPCW</a>
<a href="/2007book/hopkins07.htm">Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins<br>
Assist to U.S. Sec of Defense - Nuclear & Chemical & Biological</a><a href="/2007book/aaviksoo07.htm">Estonian Defense Minister<br>
Jaak Aaviksoo</a><a href="/2007book/grimes07.htm">Hon John Grimes<br>
US Assistant Secretary of Defense - NII<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/lentz07.htm">Mr. Robert Lentz<br>
US Dep Asst Sec for NII<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/wolf07.htm">Lt General Ulrich Wolf<br>
Dir of NATO CIS Service Agency<br>
</a>
<a href="/2007book/bloechl07.htm">Mr. Tim Bloechl<br>
Microsoft Exec Director</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">How industry can help address the global challenges<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/lahoud07.htm">Mr. Marwan Lahoud<br>
Chief Operating Office EADS</a><a href="/2007book/schneider07.htm">Mr. Kent Schneider<br>
President, Defense Group<br>
Northrop Grumman IT<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/auroy07.htm">Mr. Patrick Auroy<br>
Deputy Director,<br>
French DGA
<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/volkman07.htm">Mr. Alfred Volkman<br>
Dir, Defense Cooperation<br>
US Dept of Defense<br>
</a>
<a href="/2007book/linnenkamp07.htm">Dr. Hilmar Linnenkamp<br>
Dep CEO, EDA</a>
<a href="/2007book/lind07.htm">Mr. Jan-Olof Lind<br>
Swedish National Armaments Director</a>
<a href="/2007book/buckley07.htm">Dr. Edgar Buckley<br>
Thales Senior Vice President</a>
<a href="/2007book/trice07">Dr. Robert Trice<br>
Lockheed Martin <br>
Senior Vice President<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/bertolone07.htm">Ing. Giovanni Bertolone<br>
CEO, Alenia Aeronautica</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">The way ahead & why current approaches don't work
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/martinusz07.htm">Amb Zoltan Martinusz<br>
Hungarian Amb to NATO<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/ducaru07.htm">Amb Dumitru Sorin Ducaru<br>
Romanian Amb to NATO</a><a href="/2007book/kujat07.htm"> General Harald Kujat<br>
Former Chair of NATO Military Committee</a>
</div>
</div>
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<table width="99%" border="0">
<tr>
<td bgcolor="#006699" height="18" colspan="5"><div align="center" class="style285" style="font-weight: bold; color: #FFFFFF">Paris '07 Workshop</div></td>
</tr>
</table>
<div class=Section1>
<div align="center">
<p class="style26">How to Reduce WMD Proliferation: the New Risks and Responses</p>
<table width="76%" border="0">
<tr>
<td width="299"><div align="center" class="">
<img src="2007images/DSC_0698 Panel Proliferation of WMD - Rogelio Pfirter and Arthur Hopkins DAY II.JPG" alt="Dr Arthur Hopkins, Special Assist to US Sec of Defense with Am. Pfirter" width="283" height="311" longdesc="../2006book/img/hopkins.jpg">
</div></td>
<td width="11" rowspan="2"><div align="center"></div></td>
<td width="415" rowspan="2"><div align="center" class="style27">
<div>
<p class="style26">Arthur T.
Hopkins, Ph.D.<br>
Special Assistant to the U.S. Secretary of Defense<br>
for Nuclear & Chemical & Biological Warfare </p>
<p class="style26"> </p>
</div>
</div></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left" valign="top">Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins (right), U.S. Special Assistant to the Sec. of Defense, with Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter.</td>
</tr>
</table>
</div>
<p align="center" class="style26"><em>"The most efficient
and effective measures are taken upfront, early in the process, when
nonproliferation <br>
measures such as treaties, agreements, and other cooperative
measures can actually unite nations<br>
in dialogue about their common goals for
global threat reduction. But nonproliferation measures <br>
have limits, some of
which are reached when national interests override and universality is <br>
not
achieved, most notably as a result of threats from non-state actors.</em>"</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">OPENING REMARKS</p>
My thanks go to
Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon for the kind invitation to again participate in
this important workshop. Last year�s Berlin discussions and the current
participation of so many thoughtful people have created high expectations for
this year�s gathering. The diversity of opinion, just within this group, is a
basis for understanding the most important elements of global security and
serves as strong testimony to the fact that we do share so many interests and
values. However, we all recognize that our common interests in global security
are gravely threatened by the prospects of global terrorism, and by potential
threats from the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. </p>
<p align="center" class="style26">AN UPDATE ON PROLIFERATION </p>
<p>My comments today will start with updating what I reported last year: the risks
of, and the responses to, proliferation. Today I would like to offer some
observations on new risks and responses</p>
<p>�������� In June
2006, the risks of nuclear, chemical, and biological proliferation were well
recognized. We noted the increasing numbers of nations that wanted to acquire
nuclear weapons. Public headlines about Dr. A. Q. Khan were fresh and
discussions with North Korea and Iran were major news, best described as
difficult. Medical pandemics were also in the news, and the growing biological
threat potential was becoming common knowledge. Now, a year later, North Korea has conducted a nuclear test and Iran is further along with its enrichment programs. We
still haven�t identified the anthrax attacker in the U.S. and Iraq has seen the use of toxic industrial chemicals as indiscriminate weapons of mass
destruction. </p>
<p> ��������� In
April of 2007, the <i>New York Times</i> reported in a front-page story, with the headline �Fears of an Arms Race,� that a dozen states in the Middle East are seeking International Atomic Energy Agency help in starting nuclear programs. The article went on to note that �the rush of activity is intended to counter the threat of a nuclear Iran.� Turkey and Egypt are specifically identified, and Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates are said to be considering, or planning for, nuclear power. The <i>Wall Street Journal</i> summarized nuclear proliferation quite
succinctly: �The problem with nuclear weapons today can be summed up as
follows: They are going out of fashion where they are needed most, and coming
into fashion where they are needed least.� </p>
<p> ��������� In
addition to nuclear concerns, other threats have evolved over the past year.�
For example, biotechnology remains a major concern as dual-use technologies
make counterproliferation more difficult and genetic engineering leads to
prospects of threats that might actually diminish the value of existing vaccines
and countermeasures. Nanotechnology that could be used to enhance biochemical
agents or evade medical countermeasures is a growing concern. The emerging
public health threats are gaining more attention, especially when coupled with
the accelerating vectors provided by global connectivity and modern
transportation. And with respect to chemicals, we�ve recently seen a toxic
industrial chemical, chlorine, used as a terrorist weapon. </p>
<p> ��������� At the
same time, there have been some positive developments. It has been a productive
year in terms of securing nuclear weapons and materials in some former Soviet
states. It also has been a remarkable and productive year in chemical weapons
destruction. The holding of conferences such as this one during the past year
indicate that international awareness and concern are growing.� </p>
<p align="center" class="style26">A FRAMEWORK FOR REDUCING THE THREAT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION </p>
<p> When we talk about reducing threats from weapons of
mass destruction, we have learned from history that there is no single action
that will make the world safer. In practice, we have to take a number of steps
to dissuade the acquisition of WMD, prevent its use, identify bad actors,
assure that we have the ability to retaliate effectively, and recover from a
WMD attack if necessary. A framework that includes the three elements of
nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management helps to
organize our thinking and underscores the fact that each is necessary, but not
one is solely sufficient, to reduce global threats.�� </p>
<p> The most efficient
and effective measures are taken upfront, early in the process, when
nonproliferation measures such as treaties, agreements, and other cooperative
measures can actually unite nations in dialogue about their common goals for
global threat reduction. But nonproliferation measures have limits, some of
which are reached when national interests override and universality is not
achieved, most notably as a result of threats from non-state actors.�
Recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of nonproliferation�s cooperative
nature, counterproliferation options are necessary to help with deterrence. But
experience has taught that investments such as missile defense and offensive
counterforce weapons are very expensive and also potentially limited in
reducing WMD threats.� </p>
<p>��������� The third element
of this framework, the ability to manage the consequences of WMD use, is
absolutely necessary, but certainly not sufficient, to reduce threats.� Like
the other two categories, nonproliferation and counterproliferation, recovery
from a WMD attack would be time consuming, imperfect at best, and expensive in
both dollars and, most importantly, in terms of human lives. </p>
<p> ��������� Overall,
global security does require all the elements of nonproliferation, counterproliferation,
and consequence management, but the challenge is defining the balance among
them. Realistically, the nature of WMD threat reduction is that no one nation
has a monopoly on the science, technology, and intellectual capacity needed to dissuade
or prevent or otherwise deny proliferation or use.� </p>
<p> ��������� At the
last workshop I noted three imperatives for controlling the risks of
proliferation: #1�controlling nuclear proliferation; #2�controlling WMD
materials; and #3�sustaining strong international partnerships. It is
interesting to look at events a year later and assess where we stand with
respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological threat reduction progress.�����������</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION PROGRESS</p>
<p> ��������� With
respect to controlling WMD materials, at the 2006 workshop I talked about the
limited success of the Nonproliferation Treaty, the need for full
implementation of the IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol, and the Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership, or GNEP, concept. GNEP is a way to support international
nonproliferation goals. It is a concept for partnering to develop advanced safeguards and security
technology and protect against the diversion of nuclear materials. It is
interesting to note that, according to the BBC, the Russian offer to assist Iranian nuclear development
apparently contained what they called a �confidential protocol� that included
provisions similar to GNEP for returning spent fuel rods to Russia. GNEP, along with the Proliferation Security Initiative (a global effort to stop
trafficking of WMD) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, are
potentially effective nonproliferation measures to reduce nuclear threats.
Their common thread is global partnership. </p>
<p> ��������� One new
idea that would support nuclear nonproliferation is based on attribution. So
far, much of the serious technical and political thinking about reining in nuclear proliferation has focused on
denying proliferators the ability to successfully attack. Complementing the
deterrence of proliferation by denial, an interesting dialogue has been taking
place on the possible effectiveness of deterrence through attribution. </p>
<p>��������� What�s new here is
the prospect of multinational partnerships in forensics, with technologies,
techniques, and data shared among nations that have developed nuclear weapons
or are producing fissile material for peaceful purposes. With collaboration and
technology sharing, teams of nations could enable nuclear forensics experts to
determine the origin of nuclear weapons, fission fragments, and fissile material.
The experts would do so with enough authority and credibility to deter nuclear
threats and proliferation by essentially insuring attribution and denying the
sanctuary of anonymity. A potential benefit may be dissuading both suppliers
and terrorists by essentially fingerprinting the nuclear materials to identify
the aggressors and their outlaw collaborators. Articles in the October 2006 <i>Nonproliferation
Review</i> and the spring 2007 <i>Washington Quarterly</i> both discuss the
strategic and political issues as well as the technical hurdles in creating an
international nuclear forensics capability. Perhaps this forum will help.� </p>
<p align="center" class="style26">CHEMICAL THREAT REDUCTION PROGRESS</p>
<p>��������� Earlier I mentioned
the recent terrorist use in Iraq of the chemical chlorine as a weapon. In April
2007, a suicide bomber used a truck with explosives and chlorine to kill 27
people. Three other attacks with chlorine sickened�that is, burned the lungs
of�350 civilians. In addition to the obvious humanitarian, legal, and treaty
concerns, these actions highlight the need for all nations to examine and
strengthen industrial security and transportation practices for toxic
industrial chemicals. </p>
��������� During the year
before the workshop, I had the privilege of delivering periodic progress reports on the U.S. chemical weapons destruction program to the 182-nation Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the OPCW, in The Hague. The worldwide commitments, and especially the U.S. and Russian efforts to
destroy what is the overwhelming majority of the world�s stockpile of chemical weapons, are true success stories. These nations committed billions of dollars
and rubles, respectively, to eliminate all chemical weapons by 2012. Both
nations also learned to deal with the tyranny of timetables when safety, not
just a timeline, is the metric that�s most important to citizens. We have also
all learned to deal with technical surprises and with munitions that are over
50 years old and not really designed to be demilitarized in a safe, controlled
environment. We also have learned how to successfully address the concerns of
local communities, environmental advocates, regulatory communities, and
political stresses. Both countries are now on track to meet near-term
destruction goals and are setting the example for collaboration and cooperation
for possessor states.� </p>
<p>��������� In fact, in
addition to living up to our commitment to completely destroy our Cold War
legacy stockpile of 30,000 tons of chemical weapons, the United States
continues to be the world�s most generous partner in chemical threat reduction
efforts. We are in the final stages of our $1.039 billion program to assist
Russia in constructing a chemical weapons destruction facility at a place in
Siberia called Shchuch�ye. That facility will greatly contribute to Russia�s
ability to live up to its commitment to destroy its 40,000-ton chemical weapons
stockpile.� </p>
<p>��������� Our active support
of both Russia and Albania is just one element of another success story, the
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. Fifteen years after its inception,
the program has not only contributed to chemical weapons destruction, but it
has also strengthened the security of nuclear stockpiles, eliminated hundreds
of strategic offensive systems, enhanced security at biological research facilities
in former Soviet states, and generally created an atmosphere in which shared
goals and mutual trust have enabled many nations, some former adversaries, to
unite in the interest of reducing WMD threats. CTR is one of several U.S.
programs that, in total, have provided more than nine billion dollars of
nonproliferation-related assistance to former Soviet states. </p>
<p align="center" class="style26">BIOLOGICAL THREAT REDUCTION PROGRESS</p>
<p>��������� Biological threats
are certainly not new. History has seen the use of filth, cadavers, animal
carcasses, and contagion in attacks on armies, civilian populations, and food
and water supplies. Worldwide literature even includes stories of how fleas
from plague-infested rats could be used by terrorists to start a plague
epidemic.� Fortunately, most state-sponsored offensive programs have been
stopped, and replaced by defensive programs for detection, protection,
vaccines, and therapeutics. </p>
<p>��������� What is new,
however, is DNA synthesis technology. The ability to synthesize novel life
forms (or genomics) could lead to much that is good for society, such as novel
treatments for diseases and new ways to prevent infections. It also has the
potential to be misused, to create dangerous pathogens. This especially
dangerous dual-use technology will require special attention, and strategies,
to prevent its misuse.� </p>
<p>��������� The U.S. National
Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity has been looking at the effectiveness of
national policies and regulations to strengthen biosecurity, to develop
recommendations for more efficient and effective oversight of dual-use life
science research, and to help foster international dialogue. The board
concluded that it is possible to construct infectious agents from synthetic or
recombinant DNA fragments. It certainly isn�t easy, and the process requires
some art, but the technology is internationally available. (Note the obvious
parallels here with nuclear energy technology.) Currently there are laws
against knowingly producing, synthesizing, or engineering select biological
pathogens, but one of the board�s key findings is the need for more governance
and harmonized international cooperation to provide oversight as well as
guidance for the providers of nucleic acids and genomes as well as their
consumers, the international research community.� </p>
<p align="center" class="style26">THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION </p>
<p>��������� All of the previous
information just adds to the obvious fact that international cooperation and
collaboration will continue to be crucial. Today, no one nation has a monopoly
on technical innovation, military capabilities, or operational skill. All the
nations that are represented at this workshop, and many that are not, are
vitally interested in the same global security concerns.� </p>
��������� I�d like to leave
you with the observation that there are effective solutions, but they are
complex and must include the full spectrum of nonproliferation,
counterproliferation, and consequence management. All three areas rely on
partnerships, and our experience has shown that some key steps have contributed
to successful partnerships. These steps include participating in dialogue and
collaborating in science and technology, exercises, training, and cooperative
threat reduction measures. However, as a U.S. defense policy official stated in
testimony to Congress in May 2007: �The first line of defense in combating
weapons of mass destruction is international cooperation.�� </p>
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