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<title>CSDR 24th International Workshop on Global Security, Michele Alliot-Marie, Herve Morin, General Henri Bentegeat, General Jean-Louis Georgelin, General James L. Jones, Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Patrick Auroy, Kent Schneider, Ambassador Mahmoud Karem, Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, General Franciszek Gagor, Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins, George Joulwan, Borys Tarasyuk, Jean de Ponton d'Amécourt, General Rainer Schuwirth, General Egon Ramms, Gen Ulrich Wolf, Louis Gallois, Marwan Lahoud, Denis Ranque, Edgar Buckley, Assistant Secretary John Grimes, Tim Bloechl, EADS, Northrop Grumman, Microsoft, Robert Ranquet, Admiral Jean Betermier, Giovanni Bertolone, Robert Ranquet, Alenia Aeronautica, Roger Weissinger-Baylon, WMD, Weaapons of Mass Destruction, NATO, EU, UN, OSCE, Paris Air Show, French Defense Minister, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Climate Change, Energy, Boeing</title>
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<p><span class="style293">international workshop series<br>
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<p align="center" class="style17"><strong>Table of Contents<br>
24th International Workshop - </strong><strong>Paris '07</strong></p>
<p align="center" class="style17"><span class="style18"><span class="style219"> </span>
<span class="style219"><a href="/2007book/weissinger07.htm">Preface- Dr. Roger<br>
Weissinger-Baylon<br>
Workshop Chairman<br>
</a></span><span class="style219"><a href="/2007book/ranquet07.htm">Foreword - Ing General<br>
Robert Ranquet<br>
</a></span>
<span class="style219"><a href="/2007book/joulwan07.htm">Opening Dinner Debate - <br>
General George Joulwan<br>
Former SACEUR<br>
</a></span></span><br>
Global security challenges: <br>
Is there hope for <br>
Afghanistan or Iraq?<br>
</p>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/bentegeat07.htm">General Henri Bentegeat<br>
President of EU Military Committee</a>
<a href="/2007book/georgelin07">Gen Jean-Louis Georgelin C<strong>hef d’état</strong>-<strong>major</strong> des armées - France</a><a href="/2007book/amecourt07.htm">Mr. Jean de Ponton d'Amecourt - French Dir of Strategic Affairs</a><a href="/2007book/schuwirth07.htm">General Rainer Schuwirth <br>
Chief of Staff, SHAPE</a><a href="/2007book/ramms07.htm">General Egon Ramms <br>
Commander, Allied Joint Force Cmd, Brunssum</a>
<a href="/2007book/akram07.htm">
Amb Munir Akram<br>
Pakistan's Amb to UN</a><a href="/2007book/zhan07.htm">
Major Gen ZHAN Maohai<br>
Vice Chair of China IISS</a><br>
Energy & Climate Change<br>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/jones07.htm">General James Jones<br>
Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe</a><a href="/2007book/ashton07.htm">Mr. John Ashton<br>
UK Special Repr for Climate Change</a><br>
Security in the Balkans & Black Sea region<br>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/baramidze07.htm">Georgian Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze</a>
<a href="/2007book/tarasyuk07.htm">Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk</a>
<a href="/2007book/mediu07.htm">Albanian Defense Minister Fatmir Mediu</a><a href="/2007book/bliznakov07.htm">Bulgarian Defense Minister Veselin Bliznakov</a><a href="/2007book/bezhuashvili07.htm">Georgian Foreign Min Gela Bezhuashvili</a><a href="/2007book/ildem07.htm">Ambassador <strong> Tacan Ildem</strong><br>
Turkish Amb to NATO</a><a href="/2007book/buzhinsky07.htm">
Lt Gen Evgeniy Buzhinsky<br>
Russian Ministry of Defense</a><br>
Time for new strategies?<br>
NATO after the Riga Summit<br>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/eldon07.htm">Amb Stewart Eldon<br>
UK Ambassador to NATO</a>
<a href="/2007book/orgaz07.htm">Amb Pablo Benavides Orgaz<br>
Spanish Amb to NATO</a>
<a href="/2007book/stefanini07.htm">Amb Stefano Stefanini <br>
Italian Amb to NATO</a><a href="/2007book/dipaola07.htm">Adm Giampaolo Di Paola<br>
Italian Chief of Defense<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/gagor07.htm">Gen Franciszek Gagor Polish Chief of Defense</a><br>
How can the EU, NATO, the OSCE, and UN reform?<br>
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/brichambaut07.htm">Amb Marc Perrin de Brichambaut<br>
OSCE Secretary General </a><a href="/2007book/lintonen07.htm">Amb Kirsti Lintonen Finnish Amb to UN</a>
<a href="/2007book/brodi07.htm">Amb Gabor Brodi<br>
Hungarian Amb to UN</a><a href="/2007book/rinkevics07.htm">State Sec Edgars Rinkevics - Latvian MOD</a><a href="/2007book/linkevicius07.htm">Amb Linas Linkevicius<br>
Lithuanian Amb to NATO<br>
</a>
<a href="/2007book/chizhov07.htm">Amb Vladimir Chizhov<br>
Russian Amb to the EU<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/monteforte07.htm">Vice Adm Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte<br>
Italian Mil Repr to NATO</a><br>
Dealing with middle east:<br>Views from North Africa
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/yousfi07.htm">Amb Youcef Yousfi<br>
Algerian Amb to UN and former Foreign Minister</a><a href="/2007book/karem07.htm">Amb Mahmoud Karem<br>
Egyptian Amb to EU and Repr to Med Dialogue</a><a href="/2007book/alem07.htm">Amb Menouar Alem<br>
Moroccan Amb to EU and Repr to Med Dialogue<br>
</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">WMD and cyber threats
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/pfirter07.htm">Amb Rogelio Pfirter<br>
Director-General, OPCW</a>
<a href="/2007book/hopkins07.htm">Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins<br>
Assist to U.S. Sec of Defense - Nuclear & Chemical & Biological</a><a href="/2007book/aaviksoo07.htm">Estonian Defense Minister<br>
Jaak Aaviksoo</a><a href="/2007book/grimes07.htm">Hon John Grimes<br>
US Assistant Secretary of Defense - NII<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/lentz07.htm">Mr. Robert Lentz<br>
US Dep Asst Sec for NII<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/wolf07.htm">Lt General Ulrich Wolf<br>
Dir of NATO CIS Service Agency<br>
</a>
<a href="/2007book/bloechl07.htm">Mr. Tim Bloechl<br>
Microsoft Exec Director</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">How industry can help address the global challenges<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/lahoud07.htm">Mr. Marwan Lahoud<br>
Chief Operating Office EADS</a><a href="/2007book/schneider07.htm">Mr. Kent Schneider<br>
President, Defense Group<br>
Northrop Grumman IT<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/auroy07.htm">Mr. Patrick Auroy<br>
Deputy Director,<br>
French DGA
<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/volkman07.htm">Mr. Alfred Volkman<br>
Dir, Defense Cooperation<br>
US Dept of Defense<br>
</a>
<a href="/2007book/linnenkamp07.htm">Dr. Hilmar Linnenkamp<br>
Dep CEO, EDA</a>
<a href="/2007book/lind07.htm">Mr. Jan-Olof Lind<br>
Swedish National Armaments Director</a>
<a href="/2007book/buckley07.htm">Dr. Edgar Buckley<br>
Thales Senior Vice President</a>
<a href="/2007book/trice07">Dr. Robert Trice<br>
Lockheed Martin <br>
Senior Vice President<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/bertolone07.htm">Ing. Giovanni Bertolone<br>
CEO, Alenia Aeronautica</a>
<p align="center" class="style17">The way ahead & why current approaches don't work
<p align="center" class="style17"><a href="/2007book/martinusz07.htm">Amb Zoltan Martinusz<br>
Hungarian Amb to NATO<br>
</a><a href="/2007book/ducaru07.htm">Amb Dumitru Sorin Ducaru<br>
Romanian Amb to NATO</a><a href="/2007book/kujat07.htm"> General Harald Kujat<br>
Former Chair of NATO Military Committee</a>
</div>
</div>
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<table width="100%" border="0">
<tr>
<td bgcolor="#006699" height="18" colspan="5"><div align="center" class="style285" style="font-weight: bold; color: #FFFFFF">Paris '07 Workshop</div></td>
</tr>
</table>
<div class=Section1>
<p align="center" class="style26">The Future of Afghanistan and NATO</p>
<div align="center">
<table width="644" border="0">
<tr>
<td width="336" height="75"><div align="center" class=""><img src="2007images/Eikenberry DSC_1249 Lt Gen Karl Eikenberry and General Joulwan DAY IV.JPG" alt="Lt Gen Karl Eikenberry with Gen George Joulwan with Gen George Joulwan" width="328" height="214"></div></td>
<td width="298" rowspan="2"><div align="center" class="style27">
<div>
<p class="style26">Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry<br>
Deputy Chairman of the <br>
NATO Military Committee</p>
<p class="style26"> </p>
<p class="style26"><br>
</p>
</div>
</div></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td height="53">Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry (left), Deputy Chairman of NATO Military Committee and former Commander of Combined Forces Command--Afghanistan, with former SACEUR General George Joulwan.</td>
</tr>
</table>
</div>
<p align="center" class="style26"><em> "...the greatest long-term impediment to success
of our mission in Afghanistan would be what I would call the irretrievable loss
of confidence of the Afghan people in their government...what is needed is a
much more ambitious effort for the development of governing institutions, a
much more aggressive ...and comprehensive approach in the area of
justice."</em></p>
<p>I will start with a very brief story and then I will get
into the remarks.� The story is one that I think everyone here would find
interesting with me being a U.S. military officer.� The story is two people who
are making a trip in a hot air balloon across the United States and they get
over the clouds.� They get completely lost and they don�t have a global
positioning system device, so they drop through the clouds to try to figure out
their location and they look out below them and there is a huge building which
is surrounded by an even larger parking lot. The navigator of the balloon
shouts down to a man that he sees walking towards his automobile and asks the
question:� Where are we?� And the person looks up and answers:� You are in a
balloon.� And so they rise back to the cloud cover and they keep on drifting
and the navigator about a minute later turns to the pilot and says:� I know
exactly where we are.� We are over the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.� and the pilot asks the navigator: From that answer, how can you possibly know that?�
And he says, Well, think about the answer:� it was concise, it was accurate,
and it was of no help whatsoever.� </p>
<p>����������� What I would like to do is just very briefly
talk about three aspects of Afghanistan.� Three points:� I would like to talk
about how do we think operationally we are going to do in the near term?� How
about the longer term?� And then, thirdly, some thoughts about NATO�s
involvement.</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">The Near Term</p>
<p>First of all, the near term.� What do I mean by the near
term?� Let�s say 2007, the first part of 2008.� I have got a reasonable degree
of confidence in how we will do in this near term and why do I say that,
especially after the levels of violence that we experienced in 2006.� I think
that there has been a set of adjustments that have been made on the ground by
NATO, by the United States, that have got us postured reasonably well for this
short term.� Let�s review what is in the short term prognosis.� </p>
<p>First, in terms of security, NATO did successfully complete
their military transition of mission expansion in 2006, very difficult for
NATO, for any kind of militaries we would say, a relief in place is a difficult
operation.� But think about the idea that NATO, now out of sector, first time
they have taken on a ground campaign of this nature, did a relief in place in the
U.S. coalitions, first time that they have been involved in Afghanistan.� And
despite the difficulties which obtained in that transition, they are still
there and importantly, they have got a lot more presence than we had in Afghanistan when I say we, now putting on the U.S. coalition hat, we now for me is NATO.� And NATO
has a lot more presence in Afghanistan which is very necessary.� The level of�
effect that international soldiers achieve in Afghanistan, let�s say, soldier
for soldier, of course is far greater than a place than a place like Iraq and I
would like to take one example:� Helmand province, Southern Afghanistan, where
now we have a large British task force.� About fourteen months ago at this time
in Helmand province in Southern Afghanistan, the international military force
presence was about 120 U.S. special forces� and civil military affairs
specialists.� Now NATO has the British-led task force almost 4,000 soldiers in
that troubled province.� Those kinds of difference in numbers matter and then
very importantly the United States made a decision after Secretary Gates
visited Afghanistan in January when I was still in command, made a decision to
contribute another infantry brigade, about 4,000 soldiers into Afghanistan above the levels that we had anticipated.� And that is giving the operational
commander, General Dan McNeal, a lot of capability not just to react in extremis
but, more importantly, to seize the initiative with those forces.</p>
<p>Second point about security: the Afghan national security
forces.� If you look at a period of time from 2002 to 2006, again 2006, a more
troubled year and we have levels of violence that we simply did not anticipate
in 2005.� Afghan national security force presence 2005-2006, very little of the
national army, and the police force was simply insignificant, in fact the
police force in Southern Afghanistan and many parts of Afghanistan is part of
the problem.� Now we have a growing Afghan national army capability, very
respected institution in Afghanistan, good partnering with NATO, and we are
making good progress there.� National police forces, much more difficulty, the
police force program was unfortunately very late in developing with a
comprehensive approach but now it is in place but we are not going to see huge
gains in the police until several more years. But more for what we are facing
in Southern Afghanistan, Eastern Afghanistan, and even now this year with
additional investments by the international community, important on the United
States which just invested about another five billion dollars in the army and
the police, we will start to get payoffs later this year and in 2008.</p>
<p>Politically, we are in a better position right now in
Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, the more trouble there is certainly than we
were two years ago.� President Karzai has made a set of decisions over the last
several years where the most venal governors who are really part of the problem
like the police, and some of the leaders at the district level, have been
replaced.� We have got more competence there.</p>
<p>And then lastly, in the domain of reconstruction, doing
better in that area as well.� Another investment by the United States earlier this year, about a billion more dollars in road, power, water and
reconstruction funds that are now starting to flow into Southern and Eastern Afghanistan.� I would also command though other members of NATO and the
international community that have put more investments in there</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">The Longer Term</p>
<p>Now, longer term 2008-2009.� I have to state that I am
increasingly concerned about the longer term in Afghanistan.� Why is that?�
Because here is, not to say what has already been said again, yet however we
variously want to define it, comprehensive approach, the non-military effort,
we are not putting enough level of effort into this for long-term success. I
testified in front of the United States House Armed Services Committee in
February of this year and I said the greatest long-term impediment to success
to our mission in Afghanistan would be what I would call the irretrievable loss
of confidence of the Afghan people in their government and what is needed is a
much more ambitious effort for the development of governing institutions, a
much more aggressive approach and comprehensive approach in the area of
justice. Now let�s take justice as an example, we are making a lot of effort
right now to build police. NATO, the EU are involved in different ways in the
delivery of police but police don�t equal justice in a representative
government.� They don�t equal justice in any form of society and so as we
concentrate on the police, or to use the American acronym about the three
Cs�cops, courts, correctional institutes�nobody is working in an aggressive
manner on courts or on correctional institutes.� Police can deliver short-term
security, they don�t deliver a justice system.� And then, in the areas of
reconstruction and development, summarily, although in the short-term, in the
near term, I am confident that we have enough in place to keep the momentum
going, in terms of physical infrastructure development, the provision of social
services we need a much more massive effort right now.</p>
<p align="center" class="style26">NATO�s Involvement</p>
<p>And then the third area, how is NATO doing at this point in
time?� First of all, what is NATO bringing?� I already mentioned one upfront
about our presence.� NATO also is bringing, whether it is wearing a EU hat,
whether it is wearing a partner hat, NATO is bringing in more on the
non-military side.� Any commander on the ground in Afghanistan will be on the
ground for perhaps a month before he or she will come to the conclusion, what I
need more is not more infantry forces, what I need more of, I need more roads,
I need more power, I need more in the way of competent Afghan police forces.�
So what we have now is NATO commanders going back to very wealthy countries,
partner commanders going back to very wealthy countries, capitals, and asking
more for the reconstruction side.� The third point is a point that I could not
anticipate with NATO transition in terms of what is NATO bringing in.� NATO is
not a coalition of the willing, it is a real coalition and it has been very
interesting to watch Taliban and the extremists in terms of their image war
efforts where heretofore it was the crusading U.S. superpower infidel spoiling
Muslim lands.� Now you have got twenty-six Alliance countries, eleven partner
countries, and it has made it much more difficult for the extremist message to
get resonance in that domain.� </p>
<p>Now what does NATO need to be doing to achieve more success
on the ground?� First, operationally NATO must find a way to over time remove
caveats.� We can emphasize caveats too much and it can become kind of a
tactical argument.� Somebody has got to be in Northern Afghanistan and for that
matter, the Germans have taken more casualties and had more killed in action in
Northern Afghanistan than other nations who are committed to Southern
Afghanistan had over the course of this year.� So we don�t want to get into
what I think would be a very unhelpful debate about what part of Afghanistan is dangerous.� On the other hand, the notion of having operational restrictions
placed upon forces does hurt our overall effort there.� It is not necessarily
that we don�t have enough capability in Afghanistan.� If you were to remove
caveats and remove operational restrictions, not just forces being placed in
the North that could go into Southern Afghanistan but restrictions on the way
we operate our helicopter fleet, the way that different kinds of capabilities
are restricted for use, if those could be lifted, then the force shortage
problems that we say we are facing, a lot of those frankly would go away.</p>
<p>Secondly, I think more profoundly that the idea of having
these kinds of restrictions placed upon forces give the military Alliance a defensive kind of mentality.� And we talk about what we are going to do in
extremis.� That should not be the debate.� It is how we are going to win and
when you have debates about restrictions, we will only use these forces in
extremis, you are not going to win a counter-insurgency effort that way.� You
have to have an aggressive approach.� Here I am not talking about kinetic
aggressive approach, I am talking about a comprehensive aggressive approach in which
the military plays a supporting role.� </p>
<p>The third point about caveats that I am worried about at
this point in time is that the Dutch mandate ends parliamentary-wise in late
2008 and the Canadian mandate ends in 2009.� I cannot speak for what will go on
politically in those capitals but unless we have a more equal sharing approach
as perceived in those capitals about who will do what, is there a possibility�
in The Hague, is there a possibility in Ottawa that they will not keep their
forces and missions committed to Southern Afghanistan?� </p>
<p>Second, Afghan national security forces. �NATO has made
improvements in that area, much more has to be done.� There is a huge material
investment that has been made by the United States.� The best way to get a
return on investment for that equipment and all that training support, money
for facilities, is for NATO forces to more aggressively partner with the Afghan
national security forces.� We need for them to provide more trainers with the
Afghan national security forces.� Time is going through the hourglass right
now.� Understandably, the Afghans now six, seven years after the collapse of
the Taliban, want to be in control of their own sovereignty. �There is no other
greater manifestation of sovereignty than having control of your country, then
you have a monopoly on the imposition of security.� The Afghans want that.� We
have to help deliver but their patience is starting to wear thin in terms of NATO
forces, U.S. forces being in the lead and very frankly when competent Afghan
national security forces are in the lead, they succeed where we cannot
succeed.� They can go into a valley that U.S. forces or NATO forces have been
fighting in for four or five years taking casualties, they can go into that
same valley once they have the capability and the commander will walk into the
valley, will gather up the tribal chiefs, will take them into the local Mosque,
he will pray with them and within a month, will have a radical turn in the
security environment there.� Only Afghans can do that and we talk about Afghan
lead but we need to make the necessary investments to produce an Afghan lead.</p>
<p>The third and final area has already been addressed very eloquently
and this is the so-called comprehensive approach.� NATO has somewhat of a
dilemma here though.� NATO is a military alliance, so how do you then evolve
from what has traditionally been a more narrow military mission to the
comprehensive approach?� Well, you need to be engaged with the United Nations,
you need to be engaged with the EU but it is still a dilemma.� What I would
argue is that NATO has to have some kind of political-military transformation
as well.� Heretofore with the exception of the Kosovo air war, there has been a
set of missions where NATO has not had to be tremendously dynamic on the
politico-military strategic front.� But now in Afghanistan, we are fighting
what is a sub-regional conflict against what we would say is an interactive
enemy who keeps adapting against us.� So where is the political cohesion and
the direction from NATO that is setting strategic goals and objectives to the
operational commander and then guaranteeing the necessary ways and means for
that operational commander to succeed?� How are we going to do that?� It is not
going to evolve from the debate among the twenty-six permanent
representatives.� There is political will and political direction that must be
given to those permanent representatives for us to succeed.� </p>
<p>The last and final point I will make is with regard to what
I see as opportunity for NATO.� Clearly NATO has a superb opportunity to
accelerate real military transformation through the experience of Afghanistan and in various ways I do see that happening.� It is going to be a slow process
but I do see it happening in certain domains.� There is opportunity that must
be seized upon, let�s say at the defense level.� Let us talk about the
identification of real requirements and then translating requirements into
capabilities.� I could tell you if you go around and talk to each NATO
commander on the ground in Afghanistan, they would give you the same short list
of what we-- i.e., NATO and also the U.S. coalition that remains behind there--lack
the most right now: persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR),
how we can get better situational awareness capability for our forces and they
will talk about Blue Force Tracker.� In the year 2007, there are ways to use
software to integrate a lot of different systems.� We can talk about
counter-IEDs but there I think there has been good progress with several of the
allies in taking on the counter-IED mission.� We can talk about what we would
call counter-battery fire but the enemy still remains very adept at using
rocket fire and mortar fire, indirect fires against us, what are ways that we
can improve to counter those?</p>
<p>So whether it is in the operational area, whether it is in
what we call the more defense policy arena, I think we should be looking at
Afghanistan as an opportunity and kind of engine of transformation which
probably gets back to the categorization that was given for how NATO now that
we are in Afghanistan must do. We must succeed because if we fail in Afghanistan, the consequences for the Alliance are more obvious to this group than it is to me.</p>
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