|
Server : Apache/2.4.62 System : FreeBSD fbsdweb2.web.rcn.net 14.1-RELEASE FreeBSD 14.1-RELEASE releng/14.1-n267679-10e31f0946d8 GENERIC amd64 User : www ( 80) PHP Version : 8.3.8 Disable Function : NONE Directory : /domains/roger.dnai/2004book/ |
Upload File : |
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"
"http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">
<html><!-- InstanceBegin template="/Templates/2004_book.dwt" codeOutsideHTMLIsLocked="false" -->
<!-- DW6 -->
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">
<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="doctitle" -->
<title>Center for Strategic Decision Research, Peter Struck, Michele Alliot-Marie, General George Joulwan, SACEUR, General James L. Jones, SHAPE, NATO, EU, BDLI, ILA, EADS, Northrop Grumman, Under Secretary Michael Wynne, Assistant Secretary Linton Wells, Ambassador William Burns, NATO Military Committee Chairman General Harald Kujat, General Dynamics, Boeing, Global Security Terrorism, Iraq, Afghanistan, Rainer Hertrich, David Stafford</title>
<!-- InstanceEndEditable --><link rel="stylesheet" href="../2002Book/emx_nav_right.css" type="text/css">
<script type="text/javascript">
<!--
var time = 3000;
var numofitems = 7;
//menu constructor
function menu(allitems,thisitem,startstate){
callname= "gl"+thisitem;
divname="subglobal"+thisitem;
this.numberofmenuitems = 7;
this.caller = document.getElementById(callname);
this.thediv = document.getElementById(divname);
this.thediv.style.visibility = startstate;
}
//menu methods
function ehandler(event,theobj){
for (var i=1; i<= theobj.numberofmenuitems; i++){
var shutdiv =eval( "menuitem"+i+".thediv");
shutdiv.style.visibility="hidden";
}
theobj.thediv.style.visibility="visible";
}
function closesubnav(event){
if ((event.clientY <48)||(event.clientY > 107)){
for (var i=1; i<= numofitems; i++){
var shutdiv =eval('menuitem'+i+'.thediv');
shutdiv.style.visibility='hidden';
}
}
}
// -->
</script>
<style type="text/css">
<!--
.style5 {font-weight: bold;
color: #000000;
font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;
font-size: large;
}
.style7 {font-size: 2px}
.style8 {font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif}
.style16 {font-size: medium; color: #006699; font-weight: bold; }
.style17 {
font-size: x-small;
font-weight: bold;
}
.style18 {font-size: x-small}
.style197 {color: #000000}
.style209 {font-family: Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-weight: normal;}
.style217 {font-family: Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif}
.style219 {font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; font-family: Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; }
.style222 {font-weight: normal; font-style: normal;}
.style21 {font-size: 11px}
-->
</style>
<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="head" -->
<style type="text/css">
<!--
.style22 {
font-size: large;
color: #006699;
}
.style23 {
font-size: medium;
color: #006699;
}
.style24 {
color: #006699;
font-size: small;
}
.style25 {font-size: small}
.style30 {
color: #006699;
font-weight: bold;
}
-->
</style>
<!-- InstanceEndEditable -->
</head>
<body onmousemove="closesubnav(event);">
<div class="skipLinks">skip to: <a href="#content">page content</a> | <a href="../2002Book/pageNav">links on this page</a> | <a href="#globalNav">site navigation</a> | <a href="#siteInfo">footer (site information)</a> </div>
<div id="masthead">
<h1 align="center" id="siteName"><strong>Center for Strategic Decision Research</strong></h1>
<div id="globalNav"> <div id="globalLink">
<a href="/index.html" id="gl1" class="glink" onmouseover="ehandler(event,menuitem1);"><span class="style18"><span class="style21">Home</span></span></a><a href="PeterStruckKeynote.htm" id="gl2" class="glink" onmouseover="ehandler(event,menuitem2);"><span class="style18"><span class="style21">Berlin '04</span></span></a><a href="../moscow03/weissingerbaylon.htm" id="gl3" class="glink" onmouseover="ehandler(event,menuitem3);"><span class="style18"><span class="style21">Moscow '03</span></span></a><a href="../berlin02/scharping.htm" id="gl4" class="glink" onmouseover="ehandler(event,menuitem4);"><span class="style21">Berlin '02</span></a><a href="../2001Book/workshop2001.htm" id="gl5" class="glink" onmouseover="ehandler(event,menuitem5);"><span class="style21">Helsingor '01</span></a><a href="../2000Book/workshop2000.htm" id="gl6" class="glink" onmouseover="ehandler(event,menuitem6);"><span class="style21">Berlin '00</span></a><a href="../99Book/workshop1999.htm" id="gl6" class="glink" onmouseover="ehandler(event,menuitem6);"><span class="style21">Budapest '99</span></a><a href="../98Book/workshop98.htm" id="gl6" class="glink" onmouseover="ehandler(event,menuitem6);"><span class="style21">Vienna '98</span></a><a href="../97Book/workshop97.htm" id="gl6" class="glink" onmouseover="ehandler(event,menuitem6);"><span class="style21">Prague '97</span></a><a href="../96Book/Workshop96.htm" id="gl6" class="glink" onmouseover="ehandler(event,menuitem6);"><span class="style21">Warsaw '96</span></a><a href="../96Book/Workshop96.htm" id="gl6" class="glink" onmouseover="ehandler(event,menuitem6);"><span class="style21">Dresden '95</span></a>
</div>
<!--end globalLinks-->
</div>
<!-- end globalNav -->
</div>
<!-- end masthead -->
<div id="pagecell1">
<!--pagecell1-->
<div id="breadCrumb"><br>
<table width="722" border="0" align="center">
<tr>
<td width="66" height="68"><p><img src="logo-kevin-web.jpg" width="60" height="66"></p> </td>
<td><div align="center"><span class="style5">21st International Workshop on Global Security - Berlin, 7-10 May 2004<br>
"Global Security: A Broader Concept for the 21st Century"</span></div></td>
</tr>
</table>
</div>
<div class="style7" id="pageName"> P</div>
<div id="pageNav">
<div id="sectionLinks">
<p align="center" class="style17"><strong>Table of Contents</strong></p>
<p class="style18"><a href="/2004book/PeterStruckKeynote.htm">German Defense Minister Peter Struck</a><span class="style217"><strong><a href="/2004book/Hertrich_Rainer.htm">EADS Co-CEO Rainer Hertrich</a></strong></span><span class="style217"><strong><a href="/2004book/Joulwan_George.htm">Fmr SACEUR Gen George Joulwan</a></strong></span><span class="style217"><strong><a href="/2004book/Overview of 21st Berlin Workshop.htm">Workshop Chairman Roger Weissinger-Baylon</a></strong></span><span class="style217"><strong><a href="/2004book/Gante.htm">BDLI President Hans-Joachim Gante</a></strong></span></p>
<p align="center" class="style18"><strong>Global Security: Political-Military Perspectives</strong></p>
<p align="left" class="style18"><span class="style217"><strong><a href="/2004book/Gen_Kujat.htm">NATO Mil Comm Chair Gen Harald Kujat</a></strong></span><span class="style217"><a href="/2004book/Gen_Jones.htm">SACEUR Gen James Jones</a><a href="/2004book/Amb_Burns.htm">US Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns</a><a href="/2004book/Linkevicius.htm">Lithuanian Defense Min Linas Linkevicius</a><a href="/2004book/Di_Paola.htm">Italian Chief of Defense Adm Giampaolo Di Paola</a><a href="/2004book/Kouts.htm">Estonian Chief of Defense Adm Tarmo Kouts</a><a href="/2004book/Back.htm">CINC AFNORTH Gen Gerhard Back</a><a href="/2004book/LtGen_R_Wolsztynski.htm">French Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Richard Wolsztynski</a><a href="/2004book/perruche.htm">EU Mil Staff Director Gen Jean-Paul Perruche</a></span></p>
<p align="center" class="style18"><strong>Defense Cooperation & Alliance Transformation</strong></p>
<p align="left" class="style18"><span class="style217"><a href="/2004book/Wynne.htm">US Under Secretary of Defense Michael Wynne</a><a href="/2004book/Klein.htm">US Assist Secretary of Defense Dale Klein</a><a href="/2004book/wells.htm">US Assist Secretary of Defense Linton Wells</a><span class="style222"><a href="/2004book/Lentz.htm">US Assist Sec of Defense Office Director of Info Assurance Robert Lentz</a><a href="/2004book/Quilty.htm">MITRE Vice President John Quilty</a> <a href="/2004book/Van_Dam.htm">Netherlands Air Force Assist Chief of Staff Gen Ruud van Dam</a> <a href="/2004book/Kihl.htm">Swedish Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen Johan Kihl</a></span></span><span class="style219"><a href="/2004book/volkman.htm">US Under Secretary of Defense Office Director for Intl Coop Alfred Volkman</a><a href="/2004book/stafford.htm">Northrop Grumman Vice President David Stafford</a><a href="/2004book/Weise.htm">German Dep Armaments Director Hans-Heinrich Weise</a><a href="/2004book/Cunningham.htm">Boeing General Manager Eugene Cunningham</a><a href="/2004book/Zappa.htm">Alenia CEO Georgio Zappa</a><a href="/2004book/ranquet.htm">French Defense Ministry Dep Director Stat Affairs Gen Robert Ranquet</a></span></p>
<p align="center" class="style18"><strong>Black Sea Region,<br>
Ukraine, & Russia </strong></p>
<p class="style18"><span class="style219"><a href="/2004book/Pascu.htm">Romanian Defense Minister Ioan Pascu</a> <a href="/2004book/gonul.htm">Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul</a> <a href="/2004book/svinarov.htm">Bulgarian Defense Minister Nikolai Svinarov</a></span><span class="style209"><span class="style197"><a href="/2004book/bezhuashvili.htm">Georgian Defense Minister Gela Bezhuashvili</a></span><span #invalid_attr_id="10px 0px 0px 10px"><span class="style197"><a href="/2004book/Khandogiy.htm">Ukrainian Ambasador to NATO Volodymyr Khandogiy</a></span></span></span><span class="style219"><a href="/2004book/Skvorzov.htm">Russian Armed Forces Dep Chief of Defense Gen Alexander Skvorzov</a><a href="/2004book/Cede.htm">Austrian Ambassador to NATO Franz Cede</a><a href="/2004book/Meckel.htm">German Bundestag Member Marcus Meckel</a><a href="/2004book/Piontkovskiy.htm">Strategic Studies Ctr Director Andrei Piontkovskiy </a></span></p>
<p align="center" class="style18"><strong>Security for 21st Century</strong></p>
<p class="style18"><span class="style219"><a href="/2004book/Habibie.htm">Former Indonesian President B.J. Habibie</a></span><span class="style217"><a href="/2004book/Sedivy.htm">Fmr Czech Armed Forces Chief of Gen Staff Gen Jiri Sedivy </a><a href="/2004book/chandra.htm"> Indian Dep Natl Security Adv Satish Chandra</a><a href="/2004book/mehta.htm">Indian Armed Forces Gen Ashok Mehta</a><a href="/2004book/deruyt.htm">Belgian Ambassador to UN Jean de Ruyt </a><a href="/2004book/perrin.htm"> French Defense Ministry Strat Affairs Dir Marc Perrin de Brichambaut</a><a href="/2004book/gergorin.htm"> EADS Exec Vice President Jean-Louis Gergorin</a></span><span class="style217"><a href="/2004book/Maulny.htm">IRIS Dep Director Jean-Pierre Maulny</a></span><span class="style217"><a href="/2004book/fasslabend.htm">Fmr Austrian Defense Min Werner Fasslabend</a></span><span class="style217"><a href="/2004book/Novotny.htm">Czech Ambassador to India Jaromir Novotny </a><a href="/2004book/naumann.htm">Fmr NATO Mil Comm Chair Gen Klaus Naumann </a><a href="/2004book/George.htm">UK Parliament Member Bruce George</a></span><br>
</p>
</div>
</div>
<div id="content">
<div class="story"><!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="EditRegion1" -->
<!-- Start of StatCounter Code -->
<script type="text/javascript">
var sc_project=3086157;
var sc_invisible=0;
var sc_partition=27;
var sc_security="33bf0688";
</script>
<script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.statcounter.com/counter/counter_xhtml.js"></script><noscript><div class="statcounter"><a class="statcounter" href="http://www.statcounter.com/"><img class="statcounter" src="http://c28.statcounter.com/3086157/0/33bf0688/0/" alt="free website hit counter" /></a></div></noscript>
<!-- End of StatCounter Code -->
<div class="story">
<h1 align="center"><span class="style22">The Technology Transfer Paradox</span></h1>
<p align="center" class="style23">Mr. Jean-Pierre Maulny<br>
Deputy Director, IRIS (Paris)</p>
<div align="center">
<table width="60%" border="0">
<tr>
<td><img src="Maulny_12k.jpg" width="119" height="140"></td>
<td> </td>
<td><div align="left"><span class="style81"><span class="style196 style24"><strong>Jean-Pierre Maulny</strong></span><br>
<span class="style25"><em>"The situation is now chaotic, without a clear line of confrontation between one group of states and another...Libya was once a rogue state but recently changed its status by revealing its nuclear military program and then abandoning it...Pakistan, a key United States ally against terrorism ...</em></span></span><span class="style25"><em>cannot be categorized as a secure one in the future."</em></span></div></td>
</tr>
</table>
</div>
<h2 align="center"> <br>
</h2>
<h3 align="center"><span class="style16">CHANGES IN THE WORLD ORDER</span></h3>
<p align="left" class="style25">Today we are in a paradoxical situation regarding technology transfer, and it i s not easy to know what we need to do without taking this paradox into account. Before 1989, the world order was fairly simple. We had the West, we had the East, and it was impossible to transfer strategic technologies from the West to the East with the COCOM that had been implemented in 1949. Prior to 1989, economic globalization had also not taken place, and there was no sophisticated technology for global network communication. During that time we can say that the world was divided in all senses of the term- it was a closed world, not an open one. </p>
<p align="left" class="style25">The world that has emerged since 1989 is not at all comparable. First of all, there is the movement toward economic globalization and the development of new communications and information technologies. Globalization is not just a gimmick- the world economy and industry are now interdependent. For example, the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives wants to pass legislation known as the " Buy American Act," which would prohibit the U.S. from using foreign suppliers for the U.S. military. But this would be impossible, because American industry is no longer able to build some of the components that are used in armaments. U.S. defense manufacturers also use some German and Japanese machine tools and the " Buy American Act" would require that all U.S. defense manufacturers use U.S.-made machine tools. It is impossible for the U.S. to produce machine tools overnight, and it would cost a lot for U.S. manufacturers to do so at a good price. In Europe, we face the same problem, because European defense manufacturers are dependent on certain U.S. technologies and components. </p>
<p align="left" class="style81 style25">In the communications sector, we know that the Internet has revolutionized everything. Today, it is possible to be in contact with everyone in the world and to transmit data and knowledge in real time. The world is decidedly now a culturally and scientifically open world, not a closed world. Even Al-Qaeda uses the tools of the Western way of life, with the technological capability to transfer money and data in real time. Al-Qaeda is today the symbol of our internationalized open world. </p>
<p align="left" class="style81 style25">Both the movement toward economic globalization and the development of new information and communication technologies have been occurring very rapidly over the last 15 years. </p>
<h3 align="center"><span class="style16">CHANGES IN THE GEOSTRATEGIC LANDSCAPE</span></h3>
<p align="left" class="style25">The geostrategic situation is also evolving. The year 1989 signified the victory of democracy and capitalism. Some would say, as George Bush père said, that a new world order was born with the end of the East-West confrontation. But the new world is not happening. The situation is now chaotic, without a clear line of confrontation between one group of states and another group of states. The situation is more fluid. For example, Libya was once a rogue state but recently changed its status by revealing its nuclear military program and then abandoning it. Another example is Pakistan, a key United States ally against terrorism but a state that cannot be categorized as a secure one in the future. </p>
<p align="left" class="style25">There is also more fluidity in what has been termed the Western camp. NATO is still a reality but it is not the reality it was in 1989. There is suspicion between allies, especially between France and the United States. Today France is closer to NATO than it was in 1989, but it is also further from the U.S. than it was in 1989. The war against terrorism is a real war, not the virtual war that was the East-West confrontation. </p>
<p align="left" class="style25">In this context, the United States has tended to implement a ban on technology transfer with the goal of maintaining a technological advantage against the enemy and potential enemies. But the question is not as simple as it was before 1989: Who is the enemy and how can the ban be constructed? </p>
<h3 align="center"><span class="style16">THE PARADOX IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER</span></h3>
<p align="left" class="style25">It is at this level that the paradox begins to take effect. Taking into account that economic and industry globalization are taking place at the same time as the development of new information and communications technologies, it is much more difficult to forbid technology transfers. The tendency is thus to strengthen the means of control. But it is difficult to have a clear policy on the subject because the notion of allies is different in the United States than it was prior to 1989. For example, we can say that the Spain of Aznar was a strong ally of the U.S. but the Spain of Zapatero may not be. Similarly, France and Germany were not strong allies of the United States in 2003, but as Nicholas Burns recently said the situation is better now. The notion of what an ally is is highly relative for the United States, and it can change at any time. So when the United States want to prohibit technology transfer in a world in which it is very easy to transfer technology and in which the notion of an ally can be very relative and contingent, the natural course is to block transfer even for some communal components and to any type of state. I do no t say this is a conscious policy for the U.S. today, but I think it is the tendency. </p>
<p align="left" class="style25">So the paradox of our contemporary world is that the natural tendency of the United States is to close the world though the world is naturally open. The fact that we do not have an organized world- democracies and NATO are not part of an entity with unified policies and the rogue states and terrorist organizations are not members of one club or bloc- does not simplify the situation. </p>
<p align="left" class="style25">It is my belief that we cannot remain in this paradox, that we have to resolve it. We cannot stay in this paradox because it is forcing us to use an inefficient policy to fight the real threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. </p>
<p align="left" class="style25">Right now, the general feeling is that the United States wants to maintain their technological superiority because they believe this superiority is the only real guarantee for their security. This position is not the best for two reasons: For technical reasons it cannot be efficient because it totally contradicts the capitalistic modern world that I described. For political reasons, it is not an opportune policy because U.S. allies and potential allies are its victims. </p>
<p align="left" class="style25">I believe that you cannot employ the mechanisms of a closed world in a world that is in fact open. Regarding technology transfer, you would have to involve the largest possible number of states in your policy, and this would only be possible if you strictly limited the technology that was not desirable to transfer. Such a policy would deal only with weapons of mass destruction though it should also strengthen the means of controlling violations of treaties that forbid weapons of mass destruction. It also seems that you would have to verify whether or not dual-use technologies were being diverted from their civil uses. </p>
<h3 align="center"><span class="style16">CONCLUDING REMARKS </span><span class="style30"></span></h3>
<p align="left" class="style25"> To sum up, I think it is difficult to have a confrontational world within an open world. The principal issue is not U.S. unilateralism, but the fact that to obtain satisfactory results in an open world one must continually negotiate. Today, the United States does not negotiate; they apply the mechanisms of a closed world. This is inefficient because the more they apply these mechanisms, the more they stifle globalization and the development of information and communications technologies, and the harder it becomes to obtain results. The issue today is not identifying threats and enemies, for of course Islamic terrorism and states such as North Korea are threats, but the issue is how to manage these threats. The way to do so is to have broad cooperation and to limit the ban on technology transfer to that which is strictly necessary. </p>
<h1 class="style196"> </h1>
<h2 class="style196"><br>
<br>
</h2>
</div>
<!-- InstanceEndEditable --></div>
<div class="story">
<table width="100%" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary="">
<tr valign="top">
<td class="storyLeft"> <p>
</p></td>
</tr>
</table>
</div>
</div>
<!--end content -->
<div class="style8" id="siteInfo"> <a href="#">Top of page </a> | <a href="/index.html">Home</a> | ©2003
Center for Strategic Decision Research</div>
</div>
<!--end pagecell1-->
<br>
<script type="text/javascript">
<!--
var menuitem1 = new menu(7,1,"hidden");
var menuitem2 = new menu(7,2,"hidden");
var menuitem3 = new menu(7,3,"hidden");
var menuitem4 = new menu(7,4,"hidden");
var menuitem5 = new menu(7,5,"hidden");
var menuitem6 = new menu(7,6,"hidden");
var menuitem7 = new menu(7,7,"hidden");
// -->
</script>
</body>
<!-- InstanceEnd --></html>