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<title>Center for Strategic Decision Research, Peter Struck, Michele Alliot-Marie, General George Joulwan, SACEUR, General James L. Jones, SHAPE, NATO, EU, BDLI, ILA, EADS, Northrop Grumman, Under Secretary Michael Wynne, Assistant Secretary Linton Wells, Ambassador William Burns, NATO Military Committee Chairman General Harald Kujat, General Dynamics, Boeing, Global Security Terrorism, Iraq, Afghanistan, Rainer Hertrich, David Stafford</title>
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<td width="66" height="68"><p><img src="logo-kevin-web.jpg" width="60" height="66"></p> </td>
<td><div align="center"><span class="style5">21st International Workshop on Global Security - Berlin, 7-10 May 2004<br>
"Global Security: A Broader Concept for the 21st Century"</span></div></td>
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<p align="center" class="style17"><strong>Table of Contents</strong></p>
<p class="style18"><a href="/2004book/PeterStruckKeynote.htm">German Defense Minister Peter Struck</a><span class="style217"><strong><a href="/2004book/Hertrich_Rainer.htm">EADS Co-CEO Rainer Hertrich</a></strong></span><span class="style217"><strong><a href="/2004book/Joulwan_George.htm">Fmr SACEUR Gen George Joulwan</a></strong></span><span class="style217"><strong><a href="/2004book/Overview of 21st Berlin Workshop.htm">Workshop Chairman Roger Weissinger-Baylon</a></strong></span><span class="style217"><strong><a href="/2004book/Gante.htm">BDLI President Hans-Joachim Gante</a></strong></span></p>
<p align="center" class="style18"><strong>Global Security: Political-Military Perspectives</strong></p>
<p align="left" class="style18"><span class="style217"><strong><a href="/2004book/Gen_Kujat.htm">NATO Mil Comm Chair Gen Harald Kujat</a></strong></span><span class="style217"><a href="/2004book/Gen_Jones.htm">SACEUR Gen James Jones</a><a href="/2004book/Amb_Burns.htm">US Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns</a><a href="/2004book/Linkevicius.htm">Lithuanian Defense Min Linas Linkevicius</a><a href="/2004book/Di_Paola.htm">Italian Chief of Defense Adm Giampaolo Di Paola</a><a href="/2004book/Kouts.htm">Estonian Chief of Defense Adm Tarmo Kouts</a><a href="/2004book/Back.htm">CINC AFNORTH Gen Gerhard Back</a><a href="/2004book/LtGen_R_Wolsztynski.htm">French Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Richard Wolsztynski</a><a href="/2004book/perruche.htm">EU Mil Staff Director Gen Jean-Paul Perruche</a></span></p>
<p align="center" class="style18"><strong>Defense Cooperation & Alliance Transformation</strong></p>
<p align="left" class="style18"><span class="style217"><a href="/2004book/Wynne.htm">US Under Secretary of Defense Michael Wynne</a><a href="/2004book/Klein.htm">US Assist Secretary of Defense Dale Klein</a><a href="/2004book/wells.htm">US Assist Secretary of Defense Linton Wells</a><span class="style222"><a href="/2004book/Lentz.htm">US Assist Sec of Defense Office Director of Info Assurance Robert Lentz</a><a href="/2004book/Quilty.htm">MITRE Vice President John Quilty</a> <a href="/2004book/Van_Dam.htm">Netherlands Air Force Assist Chief of Staff Gen Ruud van Dam</a> <a href="/2004book/Kihl.htm">Swedish Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen Johan Kihl</a></span></span><span class="style219"><a href="/2004book/volkman.htm">US Under Secretary of Defense Office Director for Intl Coop Alfred Volkman</a><a href="/2004book/stafford.htm">Northrop Grumman Vice President David Stafford</a><a href="/2004book/Weise.htm">German Dep Armaments Director Hans-Heinrich Weise</a><a href="/2004book/Cunningham.htm">Boeing General Manager Eugene Cunningham</a><a href="/2004book/Zappa.htm">Alenia CEO Georgio Zappa</a><a href="/2004book/ranquet.htm">French Defense Ministry Dep Director Stat Affairs Gen Robert Ranquet</a></span></p>
<p align="center" class="style18"><strong>Black Sea Region,<br>
Ukraine, & Russia </strong></p>
<p class="style18"><span class="style219"><a href="/2004book/Pascu.htm">Romanian Defense Minister Ioan Pascu</a> <a href="/2004book/gonul.htm">Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul</a> <a href="/2004book/svinarov.htm">Bulgarian Defense Minister Nikolai Svinarov</a></span><span class="style209"><span class="style197"><a href="/2004book/bezhuashvili.htm">Georgian Defense Minister Gela Bezhuashvili</a></span><span #invalid_attr_id="10px 0px 0px 10px"><span class="style197"><a href="/2004book/Khandogiy.htm">Ukrainian Ambasador to NATO Volodymyr Khandogiy</a></span></span></span><span class="style219"><a href="/2004book/Skvorzov.htm">Russian Armed Forces Dep Chief of Defense Gen Alexander Skvorzov</a><a href="/2004book/Cede.htm">Austrian Ambassador to NATO Franz Cede</a><a href="/2004book/Meckel.htm">German Bundestag Member Marcus Meckel</a><a href="/2004book/Piontkovskiy.htm">Strategic Studies Ctr Director Andrei Piontkovskiy </a></span></p>
<p align="center" class="style18"><strong>Security for 21st Century</strong></p>
<p class="style18"><span class="style219"><a href="/2004book/Habibie.htm">Former Indonesian President B.J. Habibie</a></span><span class="style217"><a href="/2004book/Sedivy.htm">Fmr Czech Armed Forces Chief of Gen Staff Gen Jiri Sedivy </a><a href="/2004book/chandra.htm"> Indian Dep Natl Security Adv Satish Chandra</a><a href="/2004book/mehta.htm">Indian Armed Forces Gen Ashok Mehta</a><a href="/2004book/deruyt.htm">Belgian Ambassador to UN Jean de Ruyt </a><a href="/2004book/perrin.htm"> French Defense Ministry Strat Affairs Dir Marc Perrin de Brichambaut</a><a href="/2004book/gergorin.htm"> EADS Exec Vice President Jean-Louis Gergorin</a></span><span class="style217"><a href="/2004book/Maulny.htm">IRIS Dep Director Jean-Pierre Maulny</a></span><span class="style217"><a href="/2004book/fasslabend.htm">Fmr Austrian Defense Min Werner Fasslabend</a></span><span class="style217"><a href="/2004book/Novotny.htm">Czech Ambassador to India Jaromir Novotny </a><a href="/2004book/naumann.htm">Fmr NATO Mil Comm Chair Gen Klaus Naumann </a><a href="/2004book/George.htm">UK Parliament Member Bruce George</a></span><br>
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<h1 align="center" class="style196 style82 style84 style85">Enhancing the Efficiency of Peace Operations</h1>
<p align="center" class="style196 style82 style85 style87">Vice Admiral Tarmo Kouts<br>
Chief of Defense, Estonian Armed Forces</p>
<p ALIGN="left" class="style8 style86"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17">I would like to start my remarks by briefly describing, from the perspective of a task force commander, the environment in which an expeditionary operation is likely to be conducted. Then I will move to the strategic level and address the same issues from a different angle. All of my observations are based on experience, through Estonia’s participation in peacekeeping missions in the Balkans since 1994, in Afghanistan since 2003, and in the ongoing Iraq operations, as well as from numerous observer missions over the last decade. In sum, my observations are based on Estonia’s experiences contributing to peace and stability worldwide.<FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> </FONT> </FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="center" class="style83 style8"><strong>THE LIKELY EXPEDITIONARY ENVIRONMENT</strong></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style79 style1 style86"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> The most probable operation will be conducted by a multinational task force operating under an unclear or a questionable mandate. This task force will likely be deployed into a failed state or a state on the brink of fragmentation. Opposing forces are likely to be technologically inferior, probably lacking a centralized command, but they will use asymmetric warfare. The mission of the intervening stabilization task force could be anything from securing disaster relief to forcible entry to stop a massacre, as we did in the Balkans.<FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> </FONT> </FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style79 style1 style86"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Regardless of which auspices the operation is conducted under—the UN, NATO, or a coalition of the willing—there are some key aspects to bear in mind.<FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> </FONT> </FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style79 style1 style86"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> First and foremost, the operation should be focused on restoring the local political process and economic life. We, the military, can stop violence, but we cannot prevent criminal activities from intertwining with people’s daily life. That is what happened in Kosovo, where organized crime is taking control of the country and the people—family by family.<FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> </FONT> </FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style79 style1 style86"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Without the local political process in place, the military will be forced to stay in the area for a considerably longer period, perhaps 20 years, during which time a generation will grow up without a positive vision of its future, because the people were deprived of the right and obligation to take care of their country. This generation will learn not to play, but to fear, to hate, and to fight —which is what happened in Afghanistan, a country that has been fighting since 1980. More than one generation has grown up in Afghanistan without any peacetime skills, without any positive idea about the future. What, then, will they pass on to their children?<FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> </FONT> </FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style79 style1 style86"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Without a prudent economy in place, a surrogate shadow economy will bloom. This economy will be based on cultivating and trading drugs within countries and families; and trading drugs across the very same borders that we, the military, are to guard. States can operate only with a viable economy, because otherwise there will be no means of sustaining statehood. Only drugs and terror emerge from a disappointed, warlike environment. </FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style79 style1 style86"><span class="style86"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> In order to rebuild a state, therefore, one must first take nearly airtight control of its borders, as we did in Estonia in 1989, and develop the essentials of a state apparatus as well as deal with the primary concerns of the people—public safety and social security. Legitimate power must be credible and useful, or the people will not accept their leaders’ right to govern them. We see the manifestation of this problem in today’s Iraq, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. </FONT><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"></FONT></span></p>
<p ALIGN="center" class="style79 style1"><span class="style69 style83"><B>ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED</B></span></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style79 style1 style86"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> I would now like to discuss several lessons learned from numerous failures and some successful peace operations during the last 50 years. </FONT></p>
<UL class="style79 style1">
<LI class="style86"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17">First, the legitimacy of intervention, both in legal and moral terms. The ability of the on-scene force commander is seriously hampered when he and his men have doubts about the legality and justification of their actions. We must continue working on developing a solid political and legal framework to address the issue of humanitarian intervention, because there is difficulty in reconciling respect for sovereignty, the cornerstone of the modern international system, and the moral obligation of democratic states to protect human rights. </FONT></LI>
<LI class="style86"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17">Second, the appropriateness of the military instrument. There is a saying in English: “If the hammer is your only tool, every problem looks like a nail.” For all too long the military has been considered the handiest instrument to do everything. While I don’t question the policies of military intervention, I do have to ask how far we can go tasking the military with nation building. Which capabilities can reasonably be developed within the military and which should be handled by another entity? </FONT></LI>
<LI class="style86"><span class="style86"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17">This leads to my third point, namely, the clearness of mission. The very nature of military planning implies that a clear objective or a clearly defined end state must be set, because it is from that end state that mission-capability requirements are derived and an appropriate force package is compiled. Ambiguity of mission will as a rule be reflected in all sorts of caveats, which nations taking part in the mission must put on their forces. As time for planning dwindles, now and even more in the future, we will see the need for close and coordinated cooperation between political decision-makers and military leaders to provide expertise. Toward that end, the NATO Military Committee is currently working to streamline decision-making processes and to make sure that political and military planning are conducted in parallel, not subsequently, as they have been so far. </FONT><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"></FONT></span></LI>
</UL>
<p align="center" class="style16">POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS</p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style79 style1 style86"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Now let me turn to a couple of suggestions. The idea of establishing a NATO stabilization and reconstruction force was raised by Dr. Binnendijk. I would like to elaborate a bit on this. Earlier I said that the most probable operation would deal with asymmetries and low-intensity, soft-end security risks, such as those we see now in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the response to these risks can not be more high-tech gizmos within the existing paradigm—we need to radically change our thinking and develop a unified conceptual basis for all security-providing agencies that are involved in the very complex process of nation-building. That concept should depart from the capabilities-based approach across the whole spectrum of actors, from, say, paramedics to law enforcement to the military, thus enabling us from the initial planning stage to pull together a task force best suited to address the problem at hand. This approach would also enable us to reconfigure the task force whenever necessary to respond quickly to changes on the ground, thereby avoiding the worst nightmare of any military commander—mission creep, which is what happened in Somalia and Srebrenica. </FONT></p>
<p class="style79 style1 style86"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17">Last but not least, there has been a lot of talk about capabilities during the last several years. I am afraid that not all politicians, diplomats, and military personnel always understand the word’s meaning in the same way. From a purely military perspective, I would say that capability can not be separated from the structure that is carrying it. </FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style79 style1 style86"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Judging from the past, divisions will not always be deployed, but rather battalion-size battle groups with organic support elements far bigger than those for in-line battalions, in order to compensate for a missing brigade or division. Therefore, considering the increasing need for force flexibility, we may need to rethink the traditional way of looking at the force structure: not seeing battalions as pre-structured line units, but rather as an administrative framework for producing and maintaining pockets of competence. If the same approach is applied across all actors involved, we may actually reach the level of flexibility and responsiveness needed to deal with rapidly changing situations on the ground.</FONT> </p>
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