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<p align="center" class="style71"><span class="style77"><font face="Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif"><span class="style69 style31"><span class="MsoNormal style78"><span class="style18 style117"><span class="style36 style26"><span style=""><span style='mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'><span class="style18 style117"><span style=""><span style=""><span style='mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'><span style="font-family: color: #336699"Times New Roman", Times, serif; font-style: italic;"><span style=""><span style=""><span style='mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'><span style=""><span style=""><span style='mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'><span style=""><span style=""><span style='mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'><span style="font-family: color: #336699"times new roman", times, serif; font-style: italic;"><span style=""><span style=""><span style='mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'><span style=""><span style=""><span style='mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'><span style=""><span style=""><span style='mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'><span style="font-family: color: #336699"Times New Roman", Times, serif; font-style: italic;"><span style=""><span style=""><span style='mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'><span style=""><span style=""><span style='mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'><span style=""><span style=""><span style='mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'><span style="font-family: color: #336699"times new roman", times, serif; font-style: italic;"><span style=""><span style=""><span style='mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'><span style=""><span style='mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'><img src="file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Roger%20Baylon/Application%20Data/Macromedia/Dreamweaver%20MX%202004/Configuration/ServerConnections/images/csdr_logo.jpg" name="image" width="284" height="86"></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></font></span></p>
<h1 align="center">Today’s Nuclear Concerns: Dirty Bombs, Improvised Low-Yield Nuclear Devices,
and Modern Weapons:
Why the World Needs to Come Together </h1>
<h2 ALIGN="center"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17" SIZE="4" FACE="Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">The Honorable Dale Klein</h2>
<h3 ALIGN="center">
<B>OPENING REMARKS</B><span class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"><B> </B>
</FONT></span></h3>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> As the U.S. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical,
and Biological Defense Programs, it is my responsibility to understand
a particularly frightening threat facing the United States and the world– a clandestine nuclear attack, which can be defined as any attack involving
a nuclear weapon, improvised nuclear device (IND), or radiological dispersal
device (RDD) delivered by unconventional means, not by military missile
or aircraft.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> My message regarding that threat is simple but sobering: the possibility
that a clandestine nuclear attack will occur somewhere in the world is
real, serious, and present. At issue is whether we, as a global community,
believe that the threat is real enough, serious enough, and present enough
to warrant our coming together to combat its danger. Also at issue is the
question of whether we believe there is anything we can do about the danger
of such an attack even if we work cooperatively and take collaborative
action.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> My response to each of those questions is an emphatic yes—the threat is
real enough, serious enough, and present enough to demand immediate action,
and, yes, if the global community can come together to fight those who
would perpetrate such violence against us, I believe that our efforts can
make a real difference.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Before I discuss this threat in more detail, I would like to point out
some positive action that has already been taken. It is my opinion that
the NATO nuclear umbrella agreement has prevented more countries from developing
nuclear weapons than all the treaties we have developed. Many, if not all,
of the original NATO countries had the technical and financial ability
to design and build a nuclear weapon. However, by participating in the
NATO agreement, the need to do so, both perceived and real, was reduced.
</FONT></p>
<p class="style71">
</p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> There are no similar agreements in the Middle East and other regions. Therefore,
we have seen the desire of several countries, including Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Pakistan, India, and North Korea, to develop nuclear weapons. In fact,
since the end of the Cold War the number of countries that possess the
knowledge, materials, and technical capability to produce nuclear weapons
has nearly doubled.</FONT></p>
<h3 ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"><B>THE THREAT IS REAL</B></FONT></h3>
<p ALIGN="LEFT"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> First, let’s consider the demand side of the nuclear proliferation problem.
I think we can safely say that demand is up—states are seeking to develop
and acquire nuclear weapons for many reasons, including military, political,
and economic. The director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency recently
commented that, “The desire for nuclear weapons is on the upsurge. Additional
countries may decide to seek nuclear weapons as it becomes clear their
neighbors and regional rivals are already doing so. The domino theory of
the twenty-first century may well be nuclear.” (George Tenet, Feb. 11,
2004) In addition, rogue states and substate groups seem to be motivated
by the destructive potential of these weapons or devices as well as the
desire to achieve the psychological impact an attack by such means would
engender.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> It seems likely that the demand for nuclear weapons is not going to decline
in the coming years. So let us now take a look at the supply side of the
problem.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> The knowledge, technology, and materials required to implement a successful
clandestine nuclear attack are spreading at an accelerated rate to both
state and nonstate actors. The most difficult obstacle now facing a terrorist
is acquiring fissile material to use in a weapon or an improvised nuclear
device. While states have traditionally sought to produce plutonium or
highly enriched uranium themselves, there is a dangerous potential for
procuring it on the black market as well as stealing it from poorly secured
areas. Because the Cold War ended, surplus nuclear assets exist, including
people, technology, facilities, and materials.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> The former Soviet Union’s transition from a secret military infrastructure
to a commercial enterprise raises issues today related to safety, security,
and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Several countries are currently providing financial and technical assistance
to Russia to help secure its nuclear weapons and usable weapon material.
Previous methods of controlling proliferation, designed to limit trade
where necessary and prevent the diversion of civilian material, will not
work, either in Russia or in Iran, where this issue is also a concern,
because of the co-mingling of defense and civilian infrastructures and
materials. The global community must instead find better ways to prevent
diversion, ensure transparency, and assure the irreversibility of this
dual-use process.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Similar issues have also arisen concerning other nations that are part
of the burgeoning nuclear suppliers network. Over the last 20 years, several
developed and underdeveloped countries have slowly weaned themselves from
any need for foreign support, goods, and services and have emerged as a
nascent suppliers group that will be able to provide competitive cradle-to-grave
nuclear energy services throughout the world for the next 10 to 20 years.
These are the suppliers that will provide nuclear goods and services to
support third-world industrialization and the global energy demand. And
as this emergent suppliers club expands its membership, so too will the
number of targets for ambitious proliferators increase.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> By 1996, 15 countries had developed complete and indigenous nuclear-fuel-cycle
capabilities. Some of these countries, including Japan, China, South Korea,
Argentina, India, and Brazil, now stand poised to become very competitive
nuclear suppliers to the next growth area. Some have already established
an independent multilateral cooperative network.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Weapons-grade material, moreover, is not necessary to produce a radiological
dispersal device, which is designed to disperse radioactive material and
thereby cause destruction, contamination, and injury—a “dirty bomb.” However,
acquiring such material through theft or illegal commerce is less difficult
than obtaining material for a nuclear weapon or improvised nuclear device.
</FONT></p>
<p class="style71">
</p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, has already
demonstrated a large and potentially enormous appetite for nuclear materials,
technologies, and expertise. Because of his public role, he was well positioned
to succeed in his other, more covert role: as a prominent black marketer
of nuclear materials and knowledge to state regimes and, perhaps more indirectly,
to sub-state terrorist groups determined to acquire a nuclear capability
to further their horrific schemes.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> But in addition to Khan’s work selling instruments of terror and destruction,
he also helped to create menacing networks that persist though his occupation
as an arms dealer has ended. Khan became quite wealthy selling Pakistan’s
nuclear technology, but his significant and frightening success resulted
from a simple economic formula: demand creates supply. It is going to take
great effort to reduce the demand as well as eliminate, or at least reduce,
the supply.
</FONT></p>
<h3 ALIGN="CENTER" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17">
<span class="style69"><B>THE THREAT IS SERIOUS</B></span><B> </B>
</FONT></h3>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> The consequences of a clandestine nuclear attack would be enormous.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> While there are a number of unconventional weapons that fall under the
category of weapons of mass destruction, only nuclear weapons truly fit
that bill. Only nuclear weapons have the destructive potential to threaten
both the physical integrity and the physical existence of states.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> But what about “weapons of mass disruption?” RDDs—dirty bombs—would not
achieve mass destruction, certainly. But an RDD has the potential to cause
significant damage and injury if set off in a heavily populated area. The
same holds true for an IND. And make no mistake, a terrorist capable of
obtaining the materials for such a device would most certainly use it.
As demonstrated on September 11, 2001, and more recently in Spain, terrorists
do not differentiate between those in uniform and innocent civilians. They
have demonstrated a clear disregard for human life.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> But should the consequences of a clandestine nuclear attack be measured
only in terms of lives lost and economic cost? Or should we also consider
the consequences associated with the regional, national, and potentially
global trauma that would follow such an event? A clandestine nuclear attack
would have repercussions that could profoundly impact the world politically,
economically, and even culturally in a variety of ways.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Any clandestine nuclear attack—whether it results in tremendous physical
damage and heavy fatalities or a relatively small amount of physical destruction—will
be transforming in ways on which we can only speculate. But let us speculate
for a moment. An entire global generation of men, women, and children might
be permanently scarred by such a life-altering event. Time itself would
be measured in terms of before and after, similar to the way the phrase
“after 9-11” has permeated the American idiom. No one alive at the time
of such an attack—anywhere in the world—might ever feel safe and secure
in the same way that they had before; many might never feel truly safe
again. An enormous number of people could become intimately familiar with
fear and possibly motivated by fear. Thus the threat is serious.
</FONT></p>
<h3 ALIGN="CENTER" class="style69 style79">
<B>THE THREAT IS PRESENT </B></h3>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Do we really believe the threat exists today? And is it high? Or can we
afford to delay acting? To answer these questions we must look at the issue
of secondary supply, which has emerged as a growing concern in recent years.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> As their domestic nuclear capabilities have improved, nations that traditionally
have been recipients of nuclear-related technology and materials are themselves
becoming suppliers of those same technologies and materials. Pakistan is
a prime example of this phenomenon, although Iran and North Korea are also
cause for concern. In fact, North Korea has resumed its production of plutonium,
and information provided by Abdul Quadeer Khan confirms the country’s efforts
to develop highly enriched uranium. Coupled with its withdrawal from the
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and its nuclear weapons capabilities, there
is justified concern that North Korea could sell plutonium or other nuclear
weapons–related material and technology to other sub-state groups.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> So how much longer can we, the global community, wait to take action against
the increasing proliferation of nuclear weapons? It would appear that the
time for action is upon us. The threat is present.
</FONT></p>
<h3 ALIGN="CENTER" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17">
<span class="style69"><B>ACTION THAT COULD BE TAKEN</B></span><B> </B>
</FONT></h3>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> If we accept that the problem is real, serious, and present, we must next
ask a difficult and controversial question: Is there a solution? The answer
to that question is yes. Can we eliminate the threat? That answer is no.
But can we mitigate the threat? A definite yes.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> There are three actions we can take to reduce the danger associated with
the threat of a clandestine nuclear attack:
</FONT></p>
<UL class="style71">
<LI>
<p><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Clearly our top priority must be the establishment of treaties and agreements
that provide for real consequences in cases of noncompliance; harsh words
by the IAEA when North Korea kicked them out or when Iran stalls on meeting
the additional protocol requirements have little real impact. Simply put,
without the support of real action in the face of national defiance, global
treaties carry little weight. Agencies such as the IAEA become subject
to the whims of dictators who clearly recognize their lack of authority.
If treaties and agreements are to be effective, then they must be supported
by UN resolutions that are enforced—not crippled by indecision and inaction
or more resolutions. The wrong message is consistently being sent and the
result continues to be the capability to proliferate weapons of mass destruction.
</FONT></p>
</LI>
<LI>
<p><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Develop a better accounting system for all nuclear material.
</FONT></p>
</LI>
<LI>
<p><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Develop a global monitoring system to track the movement of nuclear material.
</FONT></p>
</LI>
</UL>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Such detection and neutralization efforts will help to create uncertainty
in the minds of those who want to do us harm, and increased uncertainty
will result in a decreased likelihood of attack. We must exploit our adversaries’ fear of failure.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> The best way for us to prevent a clandestine nuclear attack is to come
together, work together, and succeed together. We must help each other
in order to help ourselves. To do this we must take a multilayered approach
to the problem, including efforts to:
</FONT></p>
<UL class="style71">
<LI>
<p><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Prevent proliferation
</FONT></p>
</LI>
<LI>
<p><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Deter the use of nuclear or radiological weapons and devices
</FONT></p>
</LI>
<LI>
<p><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Defend against such use
</FONT></p>
</LI>
<LI>
<p><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Defeat those who would employ such means
</FONT></p>
</LI>
</UL>
<h3 ALIGN="CENTER" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17">
<span class="style69"><B>CONCLUDING REMARKS</B></span></FONT></h3>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> The threat of a clandestine nuclear attack—using nuclear weapons, improvised
nuclear devices, or RDDs– is real. Therefore we must all work together
to build the relationships that will allow us to cooperate and collaborate
to meet this challenge, and realize that an attack on any one of us is
an attack on all of us. The September 11 terrorist attack in the U.S. was
felt by citizens of all nations. Similarly, few in the world could claim
to be immune from the fear generated by the deadly sarin gas attack in
Japan in 1995, or the discovery of the lethal agent ricin in London in
2003, or the anthrax attacks in the United States in 2001. While we tend
to become less concerned about such events as time passes, I believe a
clandestine nuclear attack would have a negative impact over a much longer
period of time.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><FONT COLOR="#1f1a17"> Presently we have a new–but perishable–opportunity to share management
of past, present, and future nuclear stresses through visionary leadership.
But we need international cooperation and collaboration on a scale never
before achieved—which is, I believe, possible. We all have a common enemy,
terrorism, and a common goal, peace and prosperity. So together, I believe
we can develop an imaginative new world blueprint for preventing the further
proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies, deter potential adversaries
from even attempting to attack using clandestine nuclear weapons and devices,
defend ourselves against such attacks, and defeat decisively those who
would effect such atrocities. With enough cooperation, we may even be able
to eradicate the underlying seeds of terrorism and provide the basis for
a millennium of world peace and prosperity.
</FONT></p>
<p ALIGN="LEFT" class="style71"><span class="style77"><span class="style73"><span class="style9"><a href="file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Roger%20Baylon/Application%20Data/Macromedia/Dreamweaver%20MX%202004/Configuration/ServerConnections/index.html">csdr home page</a>| <a href="#top">top of page </a>|</span> </span><span class="style43 style78">©2003, 2004 center for strategic decision research</span> </span></p>
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