|
Server : Apache/2.4.62 System : FreeBSD fbsdweb2.web.rcn.net 14.1-RELEASE FreeBSD 14.1-RELEASE releng/14.1-n267679-10e31f0946d8 GENERIC amd64 User : www ( 80) PHP Version : 8.3.8 Disable Function : NONE Directory : /domains/enrgy/spiewak/ |
Upload File : |
<html>
<head>
<title>Uses of Options in Electric Power Marketing</title>
</head>
<body style="font-family: Arial" vlink="#808080">
<div align="center"><center>
<table border="0" cellpadding="8" cellspacing="0" width="98%" bgcolor="#000000">
<tr>
<td width="100%" valign="middle"><a name="top"></a><img src="../images/pmamagsm.gif" alt="PMA Online Magazine" border="0" align="right" WIDTH="229" HEIGHT="100"></td>
</tr>
</table>
</center></div><div align="center"><center>
<table border="0" cellpadding="8" width="98%">
<tr>
<td width="25%" valign="top" align="center"><!--webbot bot="ImageMap" rectangle="(14,297) (97,322) http://www.powermarketers.com/adrates.html" rectangle="(11,230) (95,257) http://www.powermarketers.com/pmajobs.htm" rectangle="(12,163) (96,189) http://www.powermarketers.com/main.htm##_parent" rectangle="(12,95) (96,121) http://www.powermarketers.com/power2.htm##_blank" rectangle="(11,29) (96,54) ../pmamag.htm" src="../images/magmenu.gif" alt="PMA OnLine Magazine Menu" border="0" align="center" startspan --><MAP NAME="FrontPageMap"><AREA SHAPE="RECT" COORDS="14, 297, 97, 322" HREF="http://www.powermarketers.com/adrates.html"><AREA SHAPE="RECT" COORDS="11, 230, 95, 257" HREF="http://www.powermarketers.com/pmajobs.htm"><AREA SHAPE="RECT" COORDS="12, 163, 96, 189" HREF="http://www.powermarketers.com/main.htm" TARGET="_parent"><AREA SHAPE="RECT" COORDS="12, 95, 96, 121" HREF="http://www.powermarketers.com/power2.htm" TARGET="_blank"><AREA SHAPE="RECT" COORDS="11, 29, 96, 54" HREF="../pmamag.htm"></MAP><a href="../_vti_bin/shtml.dll/spiewak/ss-opt.htm/map"><img src="../images/magmenu.gif" alt="PMA OnLine Magazine Menu" border="0" align="center" ismap width="110" height="350" usemap="#FrontPageMap"></a><!--webbot bot="ImageMap" endspan i-checksum="54178" --><p><a href="../searchpma.htm"><img src="../images/archives.gif" alt="Archives Search" border="0" align="center" WIDTH="70" HEIGHT="40"></a></p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p><a href="ss-opt.htm#top"><img src="../images/b-t-top.gif" alt="Back To Top" border="0" WIDTH="71" HEIGHT="35"></a></td>
<td width="75%" valign="top"><strong><big><big><big><font face="Arial">USES OF OPTIONS IN
ELECTRIC POWER MARKETING</font></big></big></big><strong><p ALIGN="JUSTIFY"><font face="Arial">by Scott Spiewak, Cogen Power Marketing<br>
</font><font face="Arial" size="2">(<em>originally published by PMA OnLine Magazine: 12/98</em>)</font></p>
</strong></strong><p ALIGN="JUSTIFY"><strong><strong><font face="Arial" size="2"> </font></strong></strong></p>
<p><font face="Arial">Options are products which give the purchaser the right, but not the
obligation, to buy or sell something at a set price. In the context of electric power,
they are typically contracts which give the purchaser the right to purchase generating
capacity at a fixed price. For this right, the purchaser pays a fee called a
"premium". To date, option transactions have been the exception. However, for
reasons which will be evident as this article progresses, this category is ready to boom
along with that new class of players, the independent power marketers. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">First, why haven’t there been more option transactions? To
understand, let’s look at one transaction which took place. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial"><strong>The Minnesota Power & Light / Wisconsin Power &
Light Option Agreement </strong></font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">Last year, MP&L sold WP&L an option to purchase 75 MW of
firm, coal-fired capacity for the period commencing January 1, 1998 and ending December
31, 2007. The option was to be exercised within one year of its signing. For this right to
purchase, WP&L paid $250,000 down, plus an additional $25,000 per month until the
option expired, or until it was exercised. (These payments are called
"premiums".) </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">WP&L entered into this agreement because it was really hoping
that generating capacity from another, planned plant would become available to it. But it
wasn’t sure, because the other plant still had to survive the regulatory review
process. Thus, to hedge its bets, WP&L purchased the option. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">As things turned out, WP&L was lucky. The original plant was not
approved, so it needed the MP&L power, and after paying out more than $500,000 in
premiums, it exercised its option, taking a contract for the coal-fired capacity. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">Afterwards, with time to reflect on the transaction, it became clear
to those involved that there was a problem. Not that WP&L didn’t get a good deal.
It was happy with the terms of the capacity purchase agreement, although not so happy as
it would have been if its original plans had come to fruition. WP&L’s ratepayers
were protected, but what about its shareholders? </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial"><strong>For shareholders, no up-side, only down-side</strong> </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">As things worked out, the $500,000 premium became a down payment on
some well- priced coal fired capacity. But what if WP&L had not exercised the option?
The premium payment would likely be a shareholder expense, as it would not have resulted
in a useful contract for the ratepayers. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">This places WP&L in an uncomfortable position. By doing what was
right for its ratepayers, it took an uncompensated risk for its shareholders. That is,
when the option is exercised, as it was, the ratepayers come out ahead, and the
shareholders are kept whole. When the option is not exercised, the ratepayer is kept
whole, but the shareholder is penalized. For the shareholder, option purchases are thus a
no up-side, potential down- side transaction. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">This explains why in the five years I’ve tracked every
interutility transaction at the FERC, this is the only option contract I’ve found. It
also helps to explain why, shortly after this transaction, WP&L formed an independent
power marketing affiliate: Heartland Energy, and why the WP&L employee who signed the
option contract now works for Heartland. </font><strong></p>
<p><font face="Arial">Options: A Role for Independent Power Marketers</strong> </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">Electric utilities are generally not very good at managing risks.
Because of their regulated status, and their remaining monopoly powers, they have no
reason to hedge, and as pointed out in the above example, significant disincentives to
doing so. Thus, for example, unlike other major fuel purchasers, electric utilities rarely
do anything but pay current market prices. If they were to lock in long-term fuel prices,
they would take the risk that for some period those prices would be above market rates,
and the state utility commission would “disallow” a part of the payment. It is
much easier to ride the market prices up and down, and simply pass through the volatility
to the ratepayers through fuel adjustment clauses. Similarly, with generating capacity,
utilities have ceded the construction of greenfield plants to independent power producers,
continuing to be involved in new powerplant construction primarily through their own IPP
affiliates, because only in that fashion can the risks of construction be balanced by
appropriate, unregulated rewards. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">However, recently, electric utilities have entered a new phase in
risk-averse behavior. Prodded by the debt rating agencies to reduce their long-term
exposures, electric utilities have all but ceased offering the long-term power sales
agreements which were the foundation for project financing for IPPs in the 80’s.
Simultaneously, perhaps to justify the failure to either buy or build, utility forecasts
are showing little or no need for new generating capacity for the foreseeable future.
Right or wrong, such forecasts allow electric utilities to defer the painful choice
between adding to rate base or buying under long-term contract. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">However, at least one utility, Jersey Central Power & Light, has
pointed out that with the advent of open transmission access, there is a marketplace for
energy and capacity, and in a marketplace, shortages tend to be self-correcting. Based
upon this rationale, JCP&L has moved to cancel its long-term procurements and replace
them with short and mid-term contracts. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">JCP&L’s approach is clearly the wave of the future.
However, the question then becomes: How does one create this new marketplace? Utilities
tend not to be very quick players. They are not constituted to operate in a market
environment. Actual power users are not yet permitted to buy and sell power, and while
this will undoubtedly change, it does not permit much activity by the ultimate customers
today. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">This leaves the independent power marketers. In this new field, many
of the IPMs are experienced natural gas marketers--- Natural Gas Clearinghouse, Enron,
Howell, CVE, and others have established affiliates to exploit their experience in the
deregulation of natural gas to the new competitive power markets. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">Natural gas has been a treated as a commodity for several years now,
with an active futures market made by NYMEX, and over-the-counter trade in forward
contracts, swaps and options. Thus, for the gas marketers, taking these products into
electricity is a natural step. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">However, options have a particularly valuable role, because of the
oddities of electric power regulation and the need to exert leverage in order to be a
player in this most capital- intensive of all industries. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">Most importantly, IPM’s can pay option premiums, and for the
risk they take, receive commensurate rewards -- just like the independent power producers
before them, and unlike hapless pioneers such as WP&L. </font><strong></p>
<p><font face="Arial">Examples: Using the Option Mechanism Today</strong> </font><strong></p>
<p><font face="Arial">(1) Calls:</strong> </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">Many utilities perceive themselves to be "long" on
generating capacity. That is, they have more of the stuff than they need for the
foreseeable future. If the capacity is in a region which is glutted, there may be no
utility customers willing to pay a reasonable price for the surpluses, so it either lays
fallow, or the plant is operated with the energy being sold into the short-term power
markets with no premium for capacity value. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">A role power marketers can play to alleviate this problem is by
paying the long utilities a premium for the right to purchase generating capacity at a
specified price, called the "strike" price. For this, the IPM pays the utility a
fee, called a "premium". This premium revenue, because it has not been
considered previously by utility commissions, becomes additional shareholder profit, going
right to the bottom line. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">From the IPM’s perspective, purchasing this type of option,
known as a "call", has several advantages: </font><ul>
<li><font face="Arial">It differentiates them from the hoi polloi of consultants and power
marketers who wish to be paid to assist the utility in finding new customers for its
surplus capacity. </font></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><font face="Arial">It provides an affordable mechanism for taking a position in
substantial amounts of generating capacity. </font></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><font face="Arial">It provides the leverage needed to make substantial profits without
having to take inordinate risks. </font></li>
</ul>
<p><font face="Arial">To understand the value of an option, lets again go back tothe
MP&L/WP&L example. In that case, the "premium" was roughly $500,000, for
the right to purchase 75 MW of firm, coal-fired capacity for ten years, from January 1,
1998 through December 31, 2007. The "strike price" was $7.52/kW/Mo, escalating
to $10.71/kW/Mo by the year 2007. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">However, say that during the option period, (which was over a year
long), the mood of the country changed. Say we left the recession, oil prices increased,
and suddenly coal-fired capacity was in great demand. Replacement cost for coal capacity
runs about $25/kW/Mo. However, say that during the year, other utility customers began to
change their minds, and while they weren’t ready to commit to construction, they were
interested in purchasing coal -fired capacity at a discount from replacement costs. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">With our option in hand, we are in a position to offer coal-fired
capacity at that discount. Imagine that we could exercise the option at $7.52 escalating,
and mark it up by $5/kW/Mo. It would still be a substantial discount from replacement
costs, and for our $500,000 investment, we could turn a tidy profit. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">At $5/kW/Mo. x 75 MW x 10 years, the profit on this transaction
would be $45 million. Less, of course, the half million dollar premium, and the overhead
of a power marketing operation. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">It is thus easy to see the attractiveness of the use of calls. For
utilities selling calls, it is immediate additional profit. To the extent it is perceived
as being an "out-of-the-money" call, the utility perceives itself to be selling
something of little value. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">For the IPM, even out-of-the-money calls which are not exercised can
be profitable. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">Today, IPMs are being formed rapidly. In many ways, the industry is
very much like the early cogeneration business, with mom and pop operations springing up,
and refugees from other industries rushing in. These new IPMs are hungry for product, and
calls are the perfect addition to a portfolio for the optimistic IPM. Profits can thus be
made by an IPM which originates a call, simply by reselling all or part of it to another
IPM at a profit. Only when the call expires must it be exercised in order to avoid losing
all value. And calls such as the WP&L/MP&L option contract, with provision for
extension by the payment of additional fees, need not even include a final termination
date. It could go on, producing more revenue for the selling utility, forever. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial"><strong>(2) Puts</strong> </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">With utilities dropping out of the game of purchasing power from
IPPs under long-term contract, project financing has gotten more difficult. Now, a project
may have sufficient guaranteed income to cover a part of its debt service, but still not
have sufficient revenue to support project financing. If the developer has enough faith in
the market, it might be willing to invest more equity in the project in order to allow it
to go forward, taking the risk that there will be a market there. Or, in the alternative,
the IPP can purchase a "put". </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">A put, in contrast to a call, gives the purchaser the right, but not
the obligation, to sell capacity at a specific price. Thus, the IPP can use a put to place
a "floor" under the price at which it will be able to sell capacity. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">Necessarily, the floor will generally be just high enough to allow
financing to go forward. The higher the floor, the more expensive the put. If all goes as
it should, the put will never be exercised. Instead, the IPP will use it to support
financing, and afterwards, seek a buyer which will be willing to pay a more attractive
price for the capacity. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">For the independent power marketer, the put provides immediate
income, as it is paid for taking on the potential liability of a capacity purchase.
However, the IPM does face potentially substantial liabilities. If the market goes against
it, and the put is exercised, almost by definition it is because the IPP has been unable
to find a buyer at a better price. The IPM will have to take a loss. Just as the call
creates tremendous upside leverage, the put creates vast downside leverage. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">Because of this enormous risk, puts can be inordinately expensive.
However, one way of "buying-down" the put is through the simultaneous sale of a
call. The call creates a price ceiling for the capacity, as the IPM can require delivery
at the call strike price. The call/put combination creates what is called a
"collar". The price of the capacity can vary, but only between the floor (put
price) and the ceiling (call price). </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">Done in this fashion, the result can be a "no-cost
collar". That is, no money changes hands when the agreement is signed, and the call
price is set by reference to the desired put price. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial">A no-cost collar would be particularly desirable to an electric
utility seeking to offload downside risk, because there is no premium payment. Also,
because of the potential upside from the call component of the collar, there is a greater
likelihood that the company desirous of a put will find a supplier. </font></p>
<p><font face="Arial"><strong>Conclusion</strong> </font></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Arial">The key question one might ask is: "Why now?"
Why are independent power marketers being formed today at a rate of one each week? The
answer is that the FERC is implementing open transmission access under the EPAct of 1992.
With transmission access, we for the first time have liquidity, so that capacity purchased
in one region can be sold in another. That liquidity is providing the means by which
independent power marketers can create new value by taking on risks which would be
uncompensated if taken by utilities. This is merely another aspect of the commoditization
of electric power. </font><em></em></td>
</tr>
</table>
</center></div>
<p align="center"><a href="ss-opt.htm#top"><img src="../images/b-t-top.gif" alt="Back To Top" border="0" WIDTH="71" HEIGHT="35"></a></p>
</body>
</html>