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<title>June 2004: Storm Clouds Over Olympus</title>
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    <p align="left"><font face="Arial"><strong><small>About The Author:<br>
	<br>
	</small></strong><span lang="X-NONE" style="color: black"><font size="2">
	ROGER FELDMAN, Co-Chair of Andrews Kurth LLP Climate Change and Carbon 
	Markets Group has practiced law related to the finance of environmental and 
	energy projects and companies for 40 years.&nbsp; In particular, he has analyzed 
	and executed a wide variety and substantial value of project financings.&nbsp; He 
	chairs the American Bar Association&#8217;s Committee on Carbon Trading and 
	Finance, serves on the Board of the American Council for Renewable Energy, 
	and has been a senior official in the Federal Energy Administration.&nbsp; He is 
	a graduate of Brown University, Yale Law School and Harvard Business School.</font></span></font></p>
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    <img src="../images/feldman.gif" alt="Washington Viewpoint by Roger Feldman" border="0" width="375" height="75"><p><b><u><br>
      </u></b><u><b>June 2004</b></u></p>
    <p align="center"><font size="6"><b>Storm Clouds Over Olympus</b></font></p>
    <p><strong>by Roger Feldman&nbsp; -- &nbsp; Bingham, Dana L.L.P.<br>
    </strong><font face="Arial" size="2">(<em>originally published by PMA OnLine 
    Magazine: 2</em>004/06/27)<br>
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    &nbsp;</span></p>
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    <p>One of the risks of dwelling on Olympus, is what we call &#8220;opportunity 
    costs&#8221; (hubris in Greek) i.e., being so wrapped up in dealing with the world 
    as you choose to understand it, that you miss the threat posed by reality as 
    it is. So it has been on Pennsylvania Avenue. So it is in microcosm at the 
    FERC. The Commission has been perfect-ing its market power determination 
    screens, while the financial state of the market has become more and more 
    perilous for practical, long-term competition.<br>
    <br>
    Case in point: FERC has been doing major tinker-ing with its rules for 
    determination of whether market based rates (&#8220;MBR&#8221;) should be available to 
    the owners of particular generating facilities. The approval of market-based 
    rates has been at the core of FERC&#8217;s system of deregulation for a decade. 
    Applying what is now acknowl-edged to be an outmodeled &#8220;hub and spoke&#8221; test, 
    FERC approved virtually all MBR applications, up until the time a few years 
    ago when it began to challenge receipt by MBRs for &#8220;unregulated&#8221; facilities 
    owned or controlled by a utility within the utilities&#8217; area of effective 
    market power. Since 2001, FERC has first swung to a very rigorous &#8220;supply 
    margin&#8221; test; then retreated somewhat to its just announced &#8220;two-screen&#8221; 
    test, and now is designing a broad rulemaking proceeding (RM04-7) to 
    consider under what circumstances market-based rates should be granted to an 
    applicant. FERC is no longer exempting from MBR-examination the contract 
    arrangements arrived at by parties just because they are situated in RTOs. 
    While one expectation is that as a result more vertically integrated 
    utilities&#8217; facilities will qualify for market-based rates than under the 
    prior interim rule, the further more troubling expectation is that, for IPPs, 
    and should be for power asset acquiring entities, much ink and treasure will 
    now have to be spent on what was a ministerial act.<br>
    <br>
    Without going into the details on the various tests &#8212; which are bound to 
    change some post-Rulemaking, it would appear that in these efforts, FERC is 
    seeking to preserve some competitive balance between IPP suppliers and 
    utilities, and thereby to protect the core system of competitive power it 
    has labored to put in place. There is some merit in this objective. 
    Nevertheless it represents an unintended diversion from the most important 
    task which FERC (or someone in the Federal Energy chain of com-mand) should 
    be monitoring: the efficient redistribution and absorption of the overbuilt 
    asset fleet through the operation of orderly capital markets. The real story 
    of 2004 continues to be uncertain independent supplier financial health and 
    the reshuffling of the asset ownership deck.<br>
    <br>
    The financial reality which the FERC is facing to-day is that a significant 
    portion of the nearly 175,000 MW of gas fuel generation built between 
    1999-2003 falls into the &#8220;merchant&#8221; (i.e., not firmly contracted) category 
    (and there remains, in addition other generation capacity that is par-tially 
    built. As a result of the surge in gas prices, the spark spread on this 
    capacity has waned to a level where project debt service cannot be met in 
    many instances. There is a significant ledge of debt outstanding which is 
    coming due with respect to this market power capacity &#8212; payment of some of 
    which was merely pushed out through refinancing and will come due in the 
    next five years. There is a significant body of sophisticated capital market 
    opinion that this ledge of debt will not be rolled over again, partly 
    because capital markets are not as robust as they have been, partly because 
    faith in the fundamentals of reserve margin absorption has been eroded away, 
    and partly because banks have gotten a better fix on temporarily running and 
    then ridding themselves of power assets.<br>
    <br>
    There have been large pools of capital accumulated to purchase what was 
    perceived to be a golden opportunity to buy assets and later resell 
    generating at bargain prices. But the market has already taken down a large 
    proportion of the assets with supporting power contracts that are available. 
    It is seemingly disinclined to swallow pure merchant power capacity at 
    anything near cost on the basis of the hockey stick basis of the same story 
    which created the untimely generation surplus in the first place (abetted by 
    speculative issuance of developer debt.) The capital mar-kets have also 
    taken notice of the fact that in this environ-ment of likely rising gas 
    prices, it is more economic for generators to extend the life of existing 
    coal plants and profit from the enlarging spark spread which results from 
    the fact that at the margin the price paid i n many jurisdic-tions is based 
    on the price for power produced from natural gas.<br>
    <br>
    While the investment banking community currently is brokering some sale of 
    merchant fleets through auctions, the market clearance price has been at a 
    significant discount below initial cost and has also reflected seller or 
    buyer tax benefits from engaging in the trans-action.<br>
    <br>
    In addition, the asset sales that are occurring are, first of all, to &#8220;finan-cial&#8221; 
    rather than operating sponsors and are financed to a significant extent with 
    B loans, which are decidedly short term, or other high-yielding short-term 
    debt. There are also strategic financial buyers, for the longer term, that 
    focus on trading around assets, but most private equity funds and many large 
    private equity investors, are looking for relatively short term exits. The 
    successful sale of a restructured com-pany, NRG, highlights that there must 
    be a significant debt reduction of debt through conversion into equity and 
    facility operating enhancement through cost cutting if sale of a dis-tressed 
    restructured firm is to be well received.<br>
    <br>
    The current financial market scene also is characterized by move-ment of 
    bank debt into fewer bands, abetted by skillful financial intermediaries; 
    the extension of time for some asset foreclosures and th emergence of 
    several experts companies in asset management. But it should be recalled 
    that they are merely acting for the lend-ers to whom the assets have 
    devolved. Good stewardship does not make a stable market environment by 
    itself. Restructuring individual companies does not restructure power 
    markets.<br>
    <br>
    What should be the responsi-bility of a prudent regulator, survey-ing the 
    financial wreckage of the power industry? Market deregulation worked almost 
    too well: leading too many competitors into the market-place, backed by a 
    willful lender loos-ening of credit market standards by lenders who endorsed 
    the potential of merchant power approach in the face of both questionable 
    market realities and in reliance on a national tidal wave of deregulations. 
    Under the circum-stances, perhaps it is therefore unwise for regulators to 
    enhance the uncer-tainties of the market by market fur-ther by raising new 
    issues as to its pricing regimen and by reducing the governance significance 
    of such re-gional transmission regulatory bodies as it has painfully put in 
    place? Per-haps it is unwise to treat its role as perfecting a utopian 
    model, in which the rating agencies have stated little faith, and into which 
    traditional long term debt is reluctant to venture. Yet, that is the 
    direction FERC is going. It has the potential to drive the industry forward 
    into another perfect storm, based on recurring financial industry response 
    to the overbuild which has overtaken the industry. The longer run threat to 
    the industry is far greater than the market power issue proposed to be 
    addressed by the new Rulemaking.<br>
    <br>
    There are storm clouds over FERC Olympus. The local deities think the cloud 
    relates to issues of protecting local market competition (or now as they 
    would have it, the pursuit of the efficiency in the new century.) The 
    capital markets think the clouds have more to do with the financial worth of 
    some of the assets that competition has produced and the resultant viability 
    of the IPP companies&#8217; ability to compete. As they say at FERC: lord what 
    fools these mortals be.</p>
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text-align:left"><font face="Arial" size="2">
	<span lang="X-NONE" style="color: black">ROGER FELDMAN, Co-Chair of Andrews 
	Kurth LLP Climate Change and Carbon Markets Group has practiced law related 
	to the finance of environmental and energy projects and companies for 40 
	years.&nbsp; In particular, he has analyzed and executed a wide variety and 
	substantial value of project financings.&nbsp; He chairs the American Bar 
	Association&#8217;s Committee on Carbon Trading and Finance, serves on the Board 
	of the American Council for Renewable Energy, and has been a senior official 
	in the Federal Energy Administration.&nbsp; He is a graduate of Brown University, 
	Yale Law School and Harvard Business School.</span></font></p>

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